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Preface 
Health development in countries of Asia and the Pacific is constantly facing new 
challenges. Just as we approach the eradication of poliomyelitis, new and emerging 
infectious diseases are being reported, requiring intensive efforts at prevention and 
control. At such times, it is realized that financial constraints prevent people from 
seeking timely health care and completing the treatment regimen. This, in fact, can 
defeat the best plans for preventing and controlling diseases. 
Many countries in Asia and the Pacific have introduced cost recovery and cost 
sharing mechanisms by charging for publicly provided health services, as part of 
their health sector reform measures.  As a result, the share of private financing in 
total health care spending has significantly increased in the past two decades. Such 
reforms in health care financing, however, were carried out without adequate 
measures to enhance financial and social protection systems for people who cannot 
afford the charges and fees for services. Evidence shows that private out-of-pocket 
financing is an inequitable and inefficient way of funding health services. However, 
there is potential to convert out-of-pocket payments into prepayment schemes. 
Health insurance is one form of such a scheme. Recently, there has been growing 
interest in health insurance not only as a financing mechanism, but also as an 
effective social safety net that provides greater protection for the low-income 
population against health care cost.  
The World Health Organization (WHO) is now intensifying efforts to work 
closely with its Member States in developing appropriate health care financing 
options to provide stable and adequate resources for health. The Regional Office for 
the Western Pacific has introduced a series of Round Table Discussions among 
Ministers of Health during the annual sessions of the Regional Committee since 1999. 
The topics covered were: social safety nets, health and poverty, essential public 
health functions and regional strategies on improving access to essential drugs. All 
these topics touched on health care financing options. 
The Regional Office for South-East Asia has also organized similar discussions 
and debates on health care financing policies and options. The latest was at the 56th 
session of the Regional Committee in September 2003 which adopted a resolution on 
health care financing. It urged Member States to study and explore social health 
insurance (SHI) as one of the alternatives for health care financing, especially for 
countries that have not yet adopted it on a national scale.  
Social health insurance was discussed at the 114th session of the WHO Executive 
Board in May 2004 and at its 115th session in January 2005. The discussions focused 
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on the goals and process of development of SHI, especially in low- and middle-
income countries. It was stressed that guidelines on the key design features are 
needed to develop social health insurance systems in countries. It was also 
underscored that the “purpose of health care financing is to make funding available, 
as well as to set the right financial incentives for providers, to ensure that all 
individuals have access to effective public health and personal health care”.  
Governments are mainly responsible to oversee SHI development in 
collaboration with all stakeholders. WHO needs to work with all the organizations 
and agencies concerned with developing health insurance, to facilitate protection for 
populations excluded from the formal sector schemes.  
Asia and the Pacific have a wide variety of experience on SHI development. Some 
high-income countries, such as Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea and New 
Zealand have developed broad health care financing arrangements based on 
prepayment, including social health insurance, and have achieved universal coverage. 
Others like China, India, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Mongolia, Philippines, Thailand and 
Viet Nam have introduced social health insurance in recent decades and their major 
task is to achieve universal coverage in the near future. The main challenge for WHO at 
the national, regional and global levels is in strengthening the capacity to respond 
efficiently to the increasing demand for technical advice and cooperation in all areas of 
health financing and policy, including social health insurance.  
This publication is a step in this direction. It is the outcome of joint efforts by 
the WHO Regional Offices for the Western Pacific and South-East Asia, the Asian 
Development Bank, and health care financing experts in the two regions. An attempt 
has been made to document regional experiences in health care financing 
arrangements through prepayment with critical analysis on factors linked to success, 
failures and lessons learnt in various socioeconomic settings.  
While experiences from 12 selected countries have been highlighted, the lessons 
are relevant for all countries in Asia and the Pacific. The publication will therefore be 
useful for policy makers and for international development partners undertaking 
technical assistance in the field of social security and/or social health insurance. It 
will be a valuable source for specialists engaged in such programmes/projects, since 
it provides recent perspectives and the factors associated with the expansion of social 
health insurance in Asia and the Pacific. 
Shigeru Omi, M.D., Ph.D. Samlee Plianbangchang, M.D., Dr.P.H. 
Regional Director Regional Director 
Western Pacific Region South-East Asia Region  
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1 
Introduction 
1.1 Finding the Optimal Methods to Finance Health Care 
Countries all over the world have always been concerned with developing their 
health care financing systems so as to ensure access to health care for all their 
citizens. They have sought to develop systems that would provide adequate financial 
resources and be affordable to all those sharing in the costs, through mechanisms that 
will not entail financial barriers to seeking care, particularly at the time of illness.  
In addition, the systems that are established need to have mature and 
transparent managerial and administrative structures which would enable cost and 
quality control as well as adaptability to changes in demography and disease 
patterns. Governments are also seeking an appropriate mix of systems that would 
allow all members of society to maintain dignity and receive care as a right rather 
than as charity.  
Health care financing systems that enable the entire population to be covered 
would, in general, include two main funding mechanisms: financing from general tax 
revenues and through social health insurance (SHI). Before universal coverage is 
reached in most countries, voluntary social health insurance schemes have played an 
important role in expanding coverage. Of the two main funding mechanisms, social 
health insurance as the main source of health care funding is gaining greater 
attention in developing countries.  
One simple reason is that many developing countries have a relatively small 
tax-base and there is some systemic deficiency in increasing government funding to a 
level that would meet both public and personal health care needs. Some countries are 
also to experimenting with reforms in health care financing by achieving an optimal 
balance between tax-fund and social health insurance, before developing the more 
rigid legislative measures required for compulsory SHI.  
  2 Social Health Insurance 
Many countries of Asia and the Pacific (AP) region are among those actively 
seeking ways to reform health care financing systems to meet the above conditions. 
This publication deals specifically with sharing the experience of social health 
insurance development through a study of the existing schemes in 12 selected 
countries, in the South-East Asia and the Western Pacific Regions of the World 
Health Organization. These two WHO Regions include both the largest and the small 
countries in the world. Some have been relatively free of conquest and conflict while 
others attained independence from colonial rule, and have seen major political and 
economic transitions in the last several decades. 
A small number of these countries have reached universal coverage mainly 
through social insurance or prepayment mechanisms, and are now battling with 
changes related to ageing of their populations, different burden of diseases and the 
need to contain rising health care costs. The common aspect in the development of 
SHI systems in these countries was that it started in periods of concerted efforts to 
accelerate economic growth. In process, it was recognized that social protection was 
necessary for the health and productivity of workers to further strengthen sound 
economic growth.  
Social health insurance is part of the development of social protection, 
especially for people who can contribute for health care as prepayment on a regular 
basis, either through their employment benefits or by state social assistance for the 
population groups who are not economically active. The process of development 
progressed through stages by covering both salaried and self-employed workers and 
their family dependants in both the public and private sectors.  
In these countries, such as Japan and the Republic of Korea (RoK), economic 
development may have played a greater role than health system development or 
reform in achieving sustainable health care financing systems that allowed for equity 
in access to health care.  The extension of coverage occurred in parallel with the 
formalization of the entire labour force, so that very few individuals were excluded 
by their employment status by the time universal social health insurance coverage 
was achieved.  
The social health insurance systems in these countries have undergone 
significant reforms, particularly during the last decade. The changes were made 
because of the shifts in demography and in economic development. It also took 
account of patient and provider preferences. The well-established administrative 
structures and adherence to the legislative requirements for change facilitated the 
implementation of change without creating new gaps in coverage and inequities in 
access to basic health care.  
Besides those countries that have reached universal coverage, many others in 
Asia and the Pacific are still in the early stages of developing and implementing 
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appropriate health care financing policies and reforms. A majority of countries had 
launched the compulsory social insurance systems as part of broad social security 
systems or as independent health insurance systems. However, the coverage of such 
system is still generally limited to the formally employed labour sector. With the 
majority of the population being associated with the non-salaried and informal 
labour sector, the current situation in many countries, especially in least-developed 
ones, has more individuals excluded from social health insurance than those covered.  
Some countries have started community-based health insurance (CBHI) 
schemes with mixed results. Despite the increase in government interest and 
sponsorship in such schemes for the excluded populations, total membership in such 
schemes has not yet significantly altered the proportion of the total insured 
populations in the same countries.  
Health care financing, as a major component of health sector reforms is now 
underway in many countries of Asia and the Pacific. There are some concerns in 
developing appropriate financing mechanisms which respond to factors beyond 
stability and the level of funding to provide services for basic health care needs. In 
addition to the concept of equity in access, there is concern with developing systems 
which would enable: 
¦ affordable, fair and progressive contributions by households and other 
partners; 
¦ optimal pooling levels to reduce risks and foster solidarity among 
different populations; 
¦ increased efficiency in the purchase of health care; 
¦ relationships between the scheme, providers and members that 
discourage moral hazard and abuse; 
¦ improvement in the quality of health care delivered; 
¦ improvement throughout the health care system through increased 
financial resources and more appropriate allocation of these resources, as 
well as rational use of an appropriate mix of services, and 
¦ the delivery of health care with greater consideration for patient 
preferences and increased satisfaction among health professionals. 
Health care financing methods also need to be responsive to changes in the 
roles of ministries of health. Many countries seek to relieve the governments from 
their responsibility for the direct delivery of personal health care services and to limit 
government provision to services within the context of public health.  
  4 Social Health Insurance 
The changes in ownership of health care facilities ultimately lead to more 
private provision. There is a need to provide access to a changing mix of public and 
private health care providers, in which the private component may include non-
profit as well as for-profit facilities.  
In some countries, this mix has changed in favour of private for-profit providers 
before appropriate regulations and accreditation mechanisms have been put in place. 
In others, this situation has also promoted the unregulated growth of private for-
profit commercial health insurance before social health insurance, with its 
advantages of broad pooling and potential for health system improvement could be 
implemented for a critical mass of the population. 
Where governments provide a significant proportion of personal health care, 
there has been some transfer of financial autonomy to the public health care 
providers as well as decentralization in management functions. To increase revenue 
for their facilities, particularly the self-financed autonomous hospitals and health 
clinics, many countries have formally introduced user charges, for example in China, 
the Philippines and Viet Nam.  
The public providers face new pressures to raise revenue to replace the 
government allocations, and soon realize that the simplest and fastest way to do so is 
by generating demand for services in a population with low levels of knowledge 
about health care.  
Low-income populations, who may have low utilization patterns and low 
expectations of health care, find it difficult to understand why health services are no 
longer free of charge. When faced with having to pay for health care in an 
environment in which government services are perceived as being of poor quality 
and entail long waiting periods, scarcity of staff and drugs and outdated physical 
conditions, there may be a tendency to seek care from private providers.  
Often, the reasons for seeking care from private providers are not related to the 
perceived quality or convenience in receiving care, but to the fact that some private 
providers are prepared to be flexible with regard to payment for their services. They 
may accept payment in kind or defer part of the payment in order to establish their 
own market. That is, changes in the health care financing system, which impose user 
charges without social safety nets, can promote the use of unregulated and poor 
quality care from private providers. 
One may argue that the imposition of user charges in public facilities usually 
has a in-built strategy for exempting the poor. Even when the exemptions are 
reasonably efficient in determining the poor or poorest families, there remains a large 
proportion of the population whose incomes may be seriously decreased by the 
combination of having to pay for health care at the time of illness when the patient’s 
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role in decision-making regarding the type and volume of services needed is low, 
and income may be reduced because of the illness. 
There is now some urgency in developing stable and equitable health care 
financing for all countries. This stems from the realization that paying for health care 
has become a leading cause of family impoverishment. The situation is aggravated in 
some countries by the introduction of user charges for health care in public health 
facilities without prior establishment of social safety nets. Poverty reduction 
measures have so far not been able to solve this problem significantly; the 
establishment of social health insurance mechanisms was included as a new strategy 
in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) of most developing countries. 
There is increasing understanding that charity or donations cannot replace 
equity in providing health care for the poorest families and individuals. Protection of 
the poor through complicated exemption mechanisms has proved to be expensive 
and inefficient. Evidence also indicates that exemption mechanisms often fail in 
reaching the targeted individuals and many countries are trying to formalize these 
failed mechanisms with government-funded social insurance, as in Viet Nam (1–5).  
Concerns with the links between poverty and health have demonstrated the 
necessity to provide access to health care for all households in all income levels, 
through health care financing systems that also protect wage earners in times of 
economic recession or restructuring. Populations excluded from compulsory social 
insurance systems are likely to be those excluded from other social security benefits, 
such as income replacement in old age, during maternity leave and due to illness(6).  
Health care financing systems therefore need to be both pro-poor and effective 
to combat poverty caused by illness. They also need to be conducive to economic 
development through reasonable and controlled levels of contributions and health 
care expenditure. 
In countries where the development of social health protection may be most 
urgently needed, the ultimate goal has to be universal coverage, that is, coverage of 
the entire population including those who would be excluded from conventional 
schemes. The issue of covering dependants of the contributors of social health 
insurance is particularly important where the compulsory social health insurance 
systems start with employed/salaried workers.  
Many women will reach old age without ever having being employed or 
receiving retirement benefits and the only opportunity for them to be covered may be 
as the spouse of an active or retired salaried worker. Children cannot be 
economically active and the practice of exempting children from user charges means 
that, de facto, they may be dependant on under-funded public health care systems, as 
in China and Viet Nam.  
  6 Social Health Insurance 
Just as the value of social health protection in economic development and in 
poverty alleviation is recognized, the need for sound design of such systems is 
increasingly understood. Any form of social protection dealing with contingencies 
requiring income protection or replacement in illness, old age, disability and during 
pregnancy, needs legislation and regulations. These cannot be easily changed to meet 
deficits created by weak financial control, pressures created by providers or by the 
irrational use of benefits by the insured populations.  
Because of the need for a sound legislative base, universal coverage cannot be 
reached through ad hoc extensions of pilot projects and even opportunities to learn 
from pilot schemes may be limited by political pressures to expand coverage, as in 
China, Laos PDR and Viet Nam. New social health insurance schemes may acquire 
experience and professional maturity over time, but their initial design has to be 
sound. Appropriate design will also enhance the opportunities that social health 
insurance implies for better financial planning and resource management.  
There is now a considerable body of global literature on the various forms of 
health insurance, covering both the evolutionary stages and later developments (7-11). 
However, it is difficult to find the analyses that might look at the response of social 
health insurance systems to defined problems. Such analyses are likely to be in the 
files of the social health insurance institutions that dealt with the issues rather than in 
international or even national publications.  
In Asia and the Pacific, there is a paucity of up-to-date national monographs 
and case studies that provide comprehensive information on the evolution of social 
health insurance which would define the current problems and lay out plans for 
expansion of both coverage and benefits. Despite the differences among countries in 
the AP region, there is some added value from learning from the experience of 
countries with similar economic development and from first-hand knowledge gained 
by visits and through dialogue among the countries.  
1.2 Case Studies 
The primary purpose of the collection, compilation and analysis of country case 
studies on social health insurance schemes and their potential development in 12 
selected countries in Asia and the Pacific is to expand the literature by including the 
recent records of comprehensive reviews. The second purpose is to facilitate the 
development of social health insurance through the review at national level of, 
technical cooperation between countries and of advice from the international 
development partners.  
Advice to governments on how to develop equitable and stable health care 
financing mechanisms has always been a complex issue. The necessary 
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considerations of demography, economic development and employment and cultural 
differences as well as prevailing morbidity patterns and the availability and 
dispersion of health system resources, make it different for standard models being 
followed.  
Sound principles of social health insurance have been available for many years 
through the Convention 102 of the International Labour Organization (ILO) issued in 
1957 (12). These basic principles are still valid. Subsequent amendments were made in 
response to changes in technology and scientific knowledge, rather than any change 
in the principles of social justice and equity. WHO and ILO later disseminated 
various guidelines and manuals on the development of social health insurance (13, 14).  
So far, the development of SHI in many countries has not followed even some 
basic tenets of the aforementioned ILO Convention, although the same countries may 
have ratified the Convention. The global and regional activities of the International 
Social Security Association (ISSA) also provide important opportunities for Member 
Countries to learn, based on publications and open dialogue on the real experiences 
of social health insurance systems (see http://www.issa.int). Again, the ISSA is an 
organization of members linked to ILO, and many new social health insurance 
systems are not yet aware of the benefits of membership.  
While there are no fixed standard policy packages for social health insurance, 
there certainly are advantages in following basic principles and guidelines. This is 
particularly important when the schemes are based on practical experience rather 
than on theory.  
It sometimes appears that there has been very little consideration of basic 
principles and that recent social health insurance development was dictated by 
inappropriate financial motives, without due concern for all members of the 
population and without adequate legislative and regulatory mechanisms.  
In countries where there has been little or no development of social health 
insurance as is the case in most Pacific Island states, the understanding of this health 
care financing mechanism is biased by the practices (and limitations) of for-profit 
commercial health insurance.  
The above should be kept in mind for future action by the international 
development partners that they been have less successful to some extent in the 
provision of policy and technical advice, and that it is time to improve the technical 
capability and advocacy for policy both at international and national levels in this 
important field.  
There is also a need to strengthen the knowledge and experience acquired so far 
to develop a good presentation in the optimal context, addressing appropriate 
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decision-makers, and to appreciate the technical nature of the development of social 
health insurance. This publication is an attempt to fill the gaps.  
The level of government financing of health care in many countries in the AP 
region may be low, with an added feature of very low salaries for health care 
professionals in the public sector (15). The optimal health care financing systems with 
affordable prepaid contributions by households should not replace government 
funds when the overall funding level is low.  
Technical advice for the development of social health insurance may, therefore, 
have to include references to a mix of health care financing sources. The advice may 
also deal with possible shifts in the allocation of government funds from acute 
curative services to public health functions, as well as to the financial support of the 
population that cannot pay its own health insurance contributions.  
Another area for technical support may relate to the link between the 
acceptance of social health insurance by health professionals, and the improvement 
in their regular incomes that may be expected from the new financing mechanisms. 
A review of the country case studies and the comparative presentation of the 
major factors could provide information to assess the applicability of the various 
forms of health insurance in their own context. The analysis attempts to put forward 
responses to specific development questions based on the selected experiences in the 
countries of Asia and the Pacific.  
The development of SHI in many other countries in the AP region and 
elsewhere is recognized, but has not been included in the comparative analysis. The 
understanding of the issues in these countries should result in the design of a social 
health insurance system or a mix of financing systems within the appropriate policy 
framework and legislative foundation, and in a feasible plan to reach universal 
coverage in each of the countries in the AP region. 
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2 
Study Methods 
2.1 Countries Where Study Was Conducted 
The case studies were collected from 12 selected countries from Asia and the Pacific 
namely; Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Lao People's 
Democratic Republic (PDR), Mongolia, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Viet 
Nam. Beyond the obvious differences in geography and population sizes, these 
countries range in two major aspects of their health insurance development.  
One group of countries consists of low population coverage to universal 
coverage through mandatory social health insurance and social assistance. Another 
group ranges from a single national system to pluralistic social health insurance, 
including compulsory social security framework and parallel development of 
voluntary community-based health insurance. Differences in other characteristics, 
such as contribution partners, range of health care benefits and provision of health 
care by public and private providers were not considered in the selection of 
countries.  
2.2 Sources of Information 
The two Regional Offices approached the selected countries and relevant 
experts/institutions to collect and compile the case studies based on the basic sets of 
questionnaires on the existing and proposed social health insurance schemes. The 
guidelines for preparation of the case studies covered the following areas: 
¦ Background -  basic information about the country and its socioeconomic 
factors for considering changes in health care financing and social health 
insurance.  
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¦ Development of prepayment/health insurance mechanisms -  initiatives to 
develop compulsory and voluntary prepayment mechanisms, 
development plans and strategies including legislative aspects, 
government participation and commitment towards universal coverage.  
¦ Compulsory prepayment social health insurance mechanism -  
organizational and institutional arrangements, insured population, 
contribution level and payment, benefit types and provider payment 
arrangements. 
¦ Voluntary prepayment health insurance schemes -  documentation on 
existing voluntary prepayment mechanisms, including community micro-
health insurance and other social solidarity practices.  
¦ Social security programmes, covering risks of maternity, disability and 
old age and social assistance for the non-economically active and 
indigent populations -  existence of social security welfare, social 
assistance programmes, their operational linkage and affiliation with 
compulsory and voluntary prepayment and risk-pooling mechanisms.  
¦ For-profit commercial health insurance -  the scope and development of 
for-profit commercial health insurance schemes, and the current 
legislation on their operations.  
¦ Critical analysis of health care financing though prepayment/ earmarked 
taxation and health insurance mechanisms -  current population coverage 
on compulsory and voluntary basis, changes in health-seeking behaviour, 
key factors associated with success and failure and major current 
challenges.  
¦ Conclusion -  overall conclusion including the role of health care financing 
through prepayment mechanisms in enhancing equity and achieving the 
country's socioeconomic development goals.  
In general, the initial country case studies received from the contributors 
adhered to the framework. After an initial review, the country case studies were 
returned to the contributors for clarifications etc. edited and put into a standard 
format. It is important to note that the country case studies were written by national 
experts who have first-hand knowledge of social health insurance development in 
their own countries. Technical assistance was provided in some countries and, in 
some cases, this was limited to translation and clarification of terminology.  
These country case studies provide authentic descriptions of the complex issues 
involved. They serve the first purpose of this study, which is to expand available 
literature through actual country sources. Most country case studies include recent 
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government policies and plans for the extension of social health insurance. The case 
studies on each country are provided in full text in Part II of this publication. Annex 1 
contains brief profiles on the contributors of each country case study. 
A critical objective of social health insurance is equity in access to health care, 
which may be reflected in the use of health care. Patterns of utilization are obviously 
very important with regard to the impact of provider payment mechanisms.  
This publication, however, does not make any attempt to request information 
on the rates of utilization of health care of the insured and non-insured populations. 
In the best case and with considerable effort at national level, it may have been 
possible to obtain partial information on the use of major categories of health 
services. With the exception of some countries that have reached universal coverage, 
age and sex specific rates are not available and there is almost no information on the 
use of health care in private facilities.  
In retrospect, it may have been worthwhile to request more data on additional 
specific factors such as the scope of information systems and the distribution of 
expenditure by type of health insurance benefit. The main objective of the study was 
to expand the knowledge on what exists within a fairly short time and with limited 
resources so that the benefits of the experiences could be made available as soon as 
possible. 
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3 
Main Issues in the Country 
Case Studies 
The section covers major development issues, characteristics and recent changes 
summarized from each country case study. These are generated for their relevance to 
other countries and may not necessarily be major concerns in the respective 
countries. The brief descriptions are by no means actual summaries of the case 
studies, but illustrate a range of differences in social health insurance systems at all 
stages of development.  
3.1 Australia 
In Australia, the private insurance schemes were the “Friendly Societies” set up in 
the 1850s by the middle and higher income employed workers to protect themselves 
from health care costs. These were non-profit funds patterned along the lines of the 
European Mutual Sickness Funds. Many of these funds employed doctors on 
capitation basis. The first action in Australia was through the Health Act of 1953 
which called for government subsidies for voluntary private health insurance, and 
created the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme.  
The "Friendly Societies" covered around 70% of the population by 1972, when 
the first compulsory social health insurance scheme, Medibank was created by law. 
Medibank started operating in 1975 with funding from general tax revenues to cover 
health care at public hospitals and under the supervision of the Health Insurance 
Commission (HIC). The target population was all citizens and other legal residents in 
Australia. One year after implementation, the programme became Medicare, with 
funding through a means-tested 1.5-2.5% levy on taxable income. The HIC was then 
allowed to establish a private health insurance fund to cover health services by 
private health facilities. 
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Australia has universal coverage since 1975 through parallel mechanisms to 
cover different populations and different benefits. Despite changes due to pressures 
from political sources, market forces and the medical profession, a combination of 
public and private health insurance schemes guarantees universal access to medical 
and hospital services while the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme covers drugs and 
medical supplies. Long-term care is covered by a separate compulsory Nursing 
Home Programme.   
The current combination of public and private health insurance schemes is 
working with a mix of public and private providers. The Australian government 
provides funding for all three public Programmes through a general and health levy, 
while it also subsidizes private health insurance. While public ownership is 
dominant for hospital care, Australia’s doctors usually practice as independent 
private practitioners.  
Publicly owned community health centres are not established throughout the 
country, and access to primary health care is hampered by the non-availability of 
practitioners in rural areas and low-income urban neighbourhoods, where 
population have difficulty in to pay for services. The growth of private for-profit 
hospitals and insurance companies has also led to an additional problem.  
As this trend shifts resources from the public to the private sector, problems 
grow in access to hospital-based care by the low-income population, who tend not to 
have the private insurance that could enable shorter waiting times. There is an on-
going political debate on the extent of public involvement in the organization, 
funding and provision of health care, linked to concerns regarding both equity and 
market forces in health care. 
3.2 China 
The development of social health insurance in China has followed two separate and 
parallel paths. One path is the development of rural cooperative medical systems 
(RCMS) for rural workers and another is the development of social insurance 
schemes for urban salaried employees. Both schemes target individuals rather than 
families.  
While the RCMS could cover all members within a household, the urban 
schemes have no provision for the dependants or other non-employed people. The 
Ministry of Health is traditionally responsible for health care of the rural population, 
while social protection for the urban population is the responsibility of the Ministry 
of Labour, later termed the Ministry of Labour and Social Security.  
It is extremely complex to describe the process of expansion of coverage of SHI 
in China. In the rural areas, the scope of protection is lower than that before the 
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economic transition. The RCMS was established in the mid-1970s and within a 
decade, it covered nearly 90% of the villages. The rural communes provided the 
financing for the RCMS, while the leadership of the commune and the party directly 
influenced the provider behaviour. Local governments at the provincial and county 
levels planned and supervised essentially low-cost services.  
Most of the RCMS throughout the country collapsed during the late-1980s and 
mid-1990s, when China transformed its system of collective agricultural production 
to that of private household production. Many rural communities, particularly in the 
remote areas where members of the households did not have regular income from 
employment in the new township and village enterprises, faced major problems in 
paying the typically unregulated user charges for health care, from the basic primary 
health care in their own village health centres to the services at the township and 
county hospitals.  
In 2000, 87.3 % of sick people in the rural areas had paid their own medical 
expenses in full, with 25% having to borrow money from others to cover the cost of 
health care. Out-of-pocket payment for health care became the major reason for 
poverty among rural families (16). More than 60% of patients from the rural areas left 
the hospitals before they completed their in-patient treatment, due to non-
affordability of user charges (17). 
Around the mid-1990s, the Ministry of Health estimated that less than 10% of 
the rural population had any form of protection from the increasingly high costs of 
paying for care. The Ministry of Health began implementing a series of pilot projects 
to re-establish the RCMS.  
A majority of these projects were funded and carried out in collaboration with 
international development partners, such as the Sichuan Province study by the 
RAND Corporation, the 14 county RCMS projects supported by WHO, the Poverty 
County Survey and Intervention Experiment in 10 counties with UNICEF, the 
International Health Policy Programme Project in three Poor Counties, a UNDP rural 
health project, the Poverty Alleviation Component of Health VIII Project of the World 
Bank and a DFID project in several counties.  
The variation in design and management of these projects was enormous while 
financial viability, attractiveness and sustainability were low. In 2001, UNDP 
conducted a review study of these RCMS projects to identify the best practices (17). 
The study involved many national experts from various government agencies and 
academic institutions, who had been battling with various efforts to re-establish the 
RCMS. The study highlighted its findings which were given serious consideration by 
the System Reform Office of the State Council, the State Development Planning 
Commission, and the Ministries of Finance, Agriculture and Health.  
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In 2003, the Chinese Government issued national guidelines on the 
implementation of Rural Medical Assistance, to address existing problems of illness 
and health care charges that led to poverty. The new design emphasized the need for 
government subsidies at all levels of the administration: township, county, principal 
and central. By the end of 2003, 60 million individuals had enrolled in the new form 
of RCMS and the log-term plan for RCMS development is to cover all rural farmers 
by 2010.  
Reforms for social health insurance in the urban areas were undertaken within 
the framework of the social security reforms for employed people, first by the State 
Commission on Economic System Reform and later by the new Ministry of Labour 
and Social Security in the 1990s. The earlier social security schemes entailed 
insurance packages for workers - active and retired – employed at enterprises. Health 
benefits were not extended to the dependants of workers. In some cases, employees’ 
family members who were unemployed were entitled to a 50% reduction from the 
current user charges.  
The first thrust of the reform launched by the State Council in 1998 was to shift 
the level of pooling from the single enterprise level to the municipal level and, in 
some cases, to the whole county. The second reform measure was the creation of both 
individual accounts and pooled funds, with individual accounts to be used for minor 
illness and pooled funds for major illnesses requiring hospital care.  
The reform process was slower than expected in expanding the coverage to new 
cities and regions, and had been hampered by complicated systems of accessing 
various funds and lack of clear legislation with necessary mechanisms to increase 
compliance. The participation of employees in the private sector is still very low, as 
China still has no standard law on social insurance. 
The reforms covering in the rural and urban populations since the mid-1990s 
had left several significant gaps in both coverage and benefits. In rural areas, 
inclusion of the rural residents working in the township and village enterprises or in 
private enterprises may be at the discretion of the local rural or workers’ scheme and 
the approach to coverage is still aimed at individuals rather than families. In urban 
areas, there is still no provision for self-employed, migrant workers and the non-
economically active population. The local governments' social assistance funds were 
inadequate to cover the health care needs of the urban poor.  
In both rural and urban workers' social security schemes, benefits are still 
limited. This has created high dependence on commercial finance companies for 
supplementary insurance. Private for-profit health insurance schemes have become 
extremely lucrative in China, spurred by both the inadequacies of public schemes 
and the increase in income of salaried employees in the private sector. Unfortunately, 
the purchase of private insurance by the high-income salaried employees does 
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influence compliance in participation in the public schemes. The public schemes face 
increasing financial problems, particularly as the proportion of retired workers 
among the insured population increases.   
The current reform efforts in social health insurance in China are focused on 
expanding the coverage in each of the two defined population groups – rural farmers 
and urban workers. The problems in this split are recognized and the agencies 
responsible for the reform now suggest to plan and implement pilot projects, with 
integrated health insurance systems, in both urban and rural areas, with universal 
coverage as the ultimate goal. 
3.3  India 
India with its huge population of over a billion and the inter-state variations makes 
generalization in any sector difficult. At the national level, the economic growth in 
recent years is impressive and there is significant advance in the reduction of 
unemployment and the rapid development of information and technology. Despite 
this, current government spending on health lags behind all other forms of 
development. Low-income population has also faced with increased out-of-pocket 
spending, in order to get access to health care, often of poor quality in an unregulated 
private sector.  
Population coverage by any form of health insurance is still very low in India. 
The principal social security law, passed in 1948, a year after Independence, was 
aimed to provide health care for the working population– particularly low-salaried 
state employees and their dependants. By 1954, the government has created a 
compulsory health insurance scheme for central government employees. 
During the last decade, there is increasing collaboration between states and 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to extend the social protection, including 
health protection, through state-sponsored, community-based or micro-insurance 
schemes. Through the various compulsory and voluntary health insurance schemes, 
they have covered around over 85 millions of beneficiaries. Since the benefit 
packages and various systems for access to different levels and types of providers 
had led to variation in the quality and access to health care. 
De facto, India has not yet developed or implemented a policy to meet the basic 
objectives of providing equity in access to health care and adequate stable funding to 
meet health care needs. Social health protection has not been a major political issue 
for some years.  
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The opportunities to extend social health insurance coverage through 
mandatory systems is still limited, since salaried employees do not constitute the 
majority of workers and the tax base is still relatively small.  
The best case in the short term is considered to be the merger of the Employees’ 
State Insurance Scheme (ESIS) and the Central Government Health Scheme (CGHS) 
with improvement in the provision of benefits under a merged scheme. The 
challenge remains the huge population of the informal sector.  
In contrast to China, India is responsive to greater involvement of NGOs. 
Various interested parties are now looking at the potential of NGOs to extend 
coverage through promotion of health care as part of social protection schemes for 
the respective population, and the accelerated establishment and expansion of 
community-based health insurance schemes.  
3.4 Indonesia 
Indonesia introduced a national compulsory social health insurance scheme for civil 
servants in 1968. The scheme is managed by the state-owned company, PT Askes. 
After reforms in 1992, it now manages compulsory social health insurance for all civil 
servants and their dependants. The contribution of 2% of the monthly salary was 
borne solely by the employee till 2003, when a central government contribution of 
0.5% of basic salary was added. This government contribution is expected to increase 
to 2 per cent after some years. The beneficiaries include about 14 million civil 
servants, their spouses and two children less than 21 years old.  
In 1992, Indonesia also introduced another SHI scheme for private sector 
salaried employees, managed by PT Jamsostek. The scheme had covered about 3 
million employees and their spouses, and children below 21 years (up to the third 
child) by 2003.  
The Jamsostek scheme is compulsory for all private sector employers with 10 or 
more employees or with a monthly payroll exceeding Rupiah (Rp.) one million. 
Employers contribute 100% premium on the basis of 3% of basic salaries for single 
and 6% for married employees, while the employees do not need to contribute.  
Employers who provide better health benefits than those offered by the scheme 
are exempted from joining the scheme. Due to this exemption clause, many 
employed workers were not covered by the scheme. Some employers provide health 
benefits or purchase commercial for-profit health insurance. As a result, it is 
estimated that the scheme only covered about 10% of the enterprises with 10 or more 
employees.  
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The Ministry of Health, through the Health Act of 1992, introduced a nation-
wide “Managed Health Care Scheme” called Jaminan Pemeliharaan Kesehatan 
Masyuarakat (JPKM), using the model of the voluntary Health Maintenance 
Organizations (HMO) in the United States. It was promoted as a socially oriented 
scheme to provide comprehensive health benefits through a network of health care 
providers managed by public and private health maintenance organizations.  
By the end of 2002, there were 24 licensed JPKM bapels (Indonesian HMOs), 
which are basically health insurance carriers, mandated to provide comprehensive 
health benefits through public and private health care providers and to make 
payment to providers on a capitation basis. The total estimated population covered 
under the JPKM scheme is around one million. 
Since the 1970s, Indonesia has introduced many community-based risk-sharing 
schemes, including the nation-wide programme called, Dana Sehat (community-
based micro-health financing schemes). After the economic crisis in the late 1990s, the 
government introduced different approaches for providing subsidies for health 
through the nation-wide Social Safety Net Programme in order to reduce the 
financial burden of the people, especially the poor. According to available 
information, around 12 million people have benefited from this programme and its 
introduction has significantly reduced the need to re-establish or expand Dana Sehat 
schemes by the communities. 
In 2002, the President of the Republic of Indonesia established a “Presidential 
Taskforce on Social Security” to look into the restructuring of existing SHI schemes 
with a few possible policy options (all inclusive): (a) to integrate public and private 
employee schemes into one scheme, creating specialized SHI management under a 
National Social Security System, with uniform benefits for all; (b) to possibly merge 
the PT Askes and PT Jamsostek into a single independent SHI agency at the national 
level, like “National Health Insurance”; (c) to make the new carrier independent, 
non-profit, controlled by a tripartite body (representation from employees, 
employers and the government).  
The National Social Security Bill passed in mid-2004 covers social health 
insurance as part of social security measures and is expected to lay the foundation for 
universal coverage in Indonesia. The Bill will also resolve an anomaly in the 
development of social health insurance in Indonesia.  
In the past, all insurance schemes or companies have been governed by the 
commercial insurance regulations which stipulate the payment of dividends on 
revenues. This has led to confusion regarding the status of PT Askes and PT Jamsostek 
schemes as for-profit enterprises. Though there are, in fact, no major profits 
generated and the revenues are derived from contributions, partly provided by 
government as employers, there is a conflict regarding whether these revenues 
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should be taxed. The legal status of social insurance will be shifted to that of non-
profit state enterprises under the National Social Security Reform Bill.  
3.5  Japan 
The development of social health insurance in Japan has a long and interesting 
history. The first solidarity mechanism to cover health care expenditures was the 
voluntary community health insurance or “Jyorei”, set up at the village level in 1835, 
based on rice contributions. A survey carried out by the Japanese Ministry of the 
Interior in a rural agricultural district in 1933 showed that most families had heavy 
debts and that medical expenditure was the major cause. In an attempt to improve 
the health situation in rural districts, the government decided to introduce 
community-based health insurance systems. The planning of the systems took 
lessons from the previous “Jyorei”.  
The Community-Based Health Insurance Law was approved by the Diet of 
Japan in 1935 and implemented in 1938. The initial system was designed to meet the 
needs of low income families in underserved rural villages, but the law stipulated 
that membership could be opened to all population groups. As a result, the 
membership increased dramatically.  
The first formal sector system of compulsory prepayment for health care was 
introduced based on a trial of the German model, implemented in 1905, for selected 
government employees such as railroad and steel workers. The system was extended 
to all salaried employees through the passage of the Workers’ Insurance Law of 1922. 
This law was drafted at the time that the labour movement in Japan was gathering 
momentum in the early 1920s. Although it faced a financial crisis shortly after its 
establishment in 1929 due to the global financial depression, the system gradually 
developed as the nation’s economy grew.  
When implemented in 1927 there were two separate systems under the Law. 
The first and centrally administered system was for companies with five and more 
employees. The second system was society-managed, and a society was established 
as an independent insurer by companies with more than 300 employees. This feature 
of the Law explained the vast number of health insurance societies that operated in 
Japan, until legislation allowed for mergers to enable broader pooling and a 
reduction in administrative costs. The recent reforms have permitted companies with 
over 300 salaried employees to consolidate their insurance “societies” with those of 
other companies.  
 By 1943, 74.6% of the total population of Japan was covered by various types of 
health insurance schemes. After an interruption during and for several years after 
World War II, all health insurance schemes grew in their membership as the 
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economy boomed at the same period. By the late 1950s, the two forms of health 
insurance (Workers’ Insurance and Community-based Insurance) covered almost 
90% of the total population. Universal coverage was achieved when new legislation 
in 1961 made participation in any insurance scheme mandatory for all citizens. 
The interesting feature in the universal coverage in Japan is the pluralistic 
approach, that is, the vast number of social health insurance societies. This approach 
required a long process of standardization of benefits and other conditions, and 
information systems that enabled monitoring of membership and financial data to 
feed into national records. Efforts are being made to accelerate the consolidation of 
schemes, as Japan still has over 50 000 schemes covering compulsory health 
insurance for a population of 127 million.  
Later developments included legislation of the Elderly Insurance system in 1983 
and long-term care insurance in 2000. Earlier, the Elderly Welfare Law of 1963 had 
provided health care free of charge to elderly citizens (over age 65). However, an 
increase in utilization to levels considered to include unnecessary services coupled 
with the increase in life expectancy created huge financial pressures on the 
continuation of the free care approach.  
The Elderly Insurance Law introduced a new and separate fund, with 
contributions from the specific previous insurers (Community-Based or Workers’ 
Scheme) and from general tax revenues. With the number of elderly in Japan still 
rising, many of the schemes face difficulties in covering their previously contributing 
members through old age. To alleviate at least the long-term care burden, a Long-
term Care Law was implemented in 2000 to cover home care for the elderly and long-
term institutional care for the population over 40 years of age, through a separate 
pooled fund.  
Both the Elderly Insurance System and the Long-term Care Insurance Laws 
have not significantly changed the financial problems of appropriate health care for 
the elderly, who are expected to constitute one quarter of Japan’s population by 2015. 
The creation of an independent health insurance system for the elderly is now under 
consideration.   
Another interesting aspect of health insurance development in Japan is the way 
in which the private for-profit sector has developed. Private insurance is attractive to 
cover the costs of care in private facilities and authorizes user charges and co-
payments. However, private insurance does not function as supplementary or top-up 
insurance, as patients choosing to use private facilities cannot be reimbursed by the 
social insurance. That is, patients have to choose whether they use the services (and 
facilities) covered by their social insurance or whether they use private facilities and 
pay the entire amount or use private health insurance for that episode.  
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3.6  Republic of Korea 
The Republic of Korea (RoK) started its SHI scheme with the enactment of health 
insurance legislation in 1963. Compulsory health insurance initially covered 
employees of formal sector establishments (with more than 500 workers). In the 
1980s, the scheme expanded to cover all government employees and teachers and 
firms with less than 300 employees.  
This was further extended to small firms of less than 16 employees and then to 
the self-employed in all urban and rural areas. Universal coverage was essentially 
attained by 1989, with almost 96% of the 47 million population of the country, 
covered under the mandatory social health insurance scheme. The remaining 4% of 
the population were covered by the medical aid programme for the poor, which is 
financed through general taxation revenue.  
The rapid expansion of compulsory social health insurance to all population 
sectors, including the agricultural sector and the self-employed in cities and villages 
was mainly contributed by the rapid and high growth in GNP, which was an average 
of 13.3% during the period 1977-1989 (18, 19). 
The SHI schemes in the RoK in a sense represent a trade-off between social 
protection for all and the expansion of health care benefits. Probably in order to keep 
labour costs low, the contribution rate for salaried workers was set at 3.5% of the 
salary (amended to 3.9% in 2003). This rather low contribution rate cannot fund all 
services at all times, particularly in a fee-for-service situation with high utilization 
rates.  
The financial balance is achieved by high co-payment rates for most services, 
and the people still have to bear around 50% of the costs at the time of illness. 
Furthermore, many types of high-cost diagnostic services such as magnetic resonance 
imaging (MRI) were not included as insurance benefits. The co-payments are waived 
only for people covered by the medical aid scheme. 
A profit-oriented private health care delivery system has always dominated the 
health care delivery and the social health insurance funds managed to extend 
coverage and deal with cost control through several unique mechanisms. The main 
feature is the umbrella organization, the "Korean Health Insurance Corporation", 
which centralized several administrative functions including those based on a well-
managed computerized membership database. Claims review is carried out as a 
central service for all the funds, and enables a regular quality assurance approach. 
The organization also negotiates fees and conditions with providers.  
The vast data banks have recently enabled introduction of some interesting 
innovations focused on health promotion as health insurance benefit (20). Information 
on health services utilization enabled the creation of a “Record to Prevention and 
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Promotion” programme. The data banks are used to alert regional authorities about 
vulnerable populations and thereby prioritize their disease control programmes. The 
database also provides the insured persons with guidelines on “economic” utilization 
(bearing in mind the high cost-sharing in the Korean health insurance system).  
Another step initiated by the SHI in RoK was improvement of emergency 
services. While this may not strictly be seen as health promotion, the improvement 
was significant in reducing complications and residual disabilities resulting from 
needs for acute care and trauma, and thereby reducing the costs of care borne by the 
health insurance funds. 
The costs of health care, both from insurance funds and out-of-pocket payment 
(co-payment) by the consumers have risen over the years. By 2000, over 350 health 
insurance societies that managed different funding arrangements and benefit 
schemes were merged into a “single fund”. In order to improve the quality of health 
care and also to contain the increasingly higher costs of health care, the Korean 
Parliament passed the ‘National Health Insurance Act’, which mandates the 
consolidation of all health insurance funds into a single fund, bringing the pooling 
level to the maximum. This should be considered a tremendous achievement, 
particularly in the light of the political dimensions involved.  
3.7 Laos People’s Democratic Republic 
The Laos People’s Democratic Republic (Laos PDR) is one of the least developed 
countries that lately introduce social health insurance through a parallel approach to 
cover different population segments. Basic health care package was included in the 
contributory Civil Servants Social Security Scheme that started in 1989. A single 
contribution is made by Civil Servants at all social security branches, and there is no 
separation of funds to allow for a clear commitment regarding an allocation for 
health care, while the priority is the payment of old age pensions. Actual 
reimbursement for health care is made according to capacity to pay back when the 
claim is made. The result is late and inadequate payment after considerable 
paperwork, which has led many civil servants to forego submitting their claims. 
The reform in the social security system in late 1990s took these deficiencies into 
account. The Social Security Decree of 1999, implemented in 2001, covered a broad 
compulsory social security system for employees in the private sector in enterprises 
with over 10 workers. The administration of the Social Security Office (SSO) 
maintains a separate fund for health care, managed by a separate Medical Division 
and also supervised by a separate Medical Board. Health insurance for workers and 
dependants was included in the Decree, and the first stage of operation covers the 
capital city, Vientiane (spouse and children upto 6 years in the first stage, now being 
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extended to all family members). The scheme is now being extended to other 
provinces as administrative capacity is developed, though with some delay. The SSO 
contracts with the three hospitals in Vientiane on a capitation basis, which has served 
to control expenditures and to vastly simplify the administration of the new system. 
The capitation provider payment was supported by the timely development of the 
information system, covering both the membership database and the utilization of 
care by both insured and non-insured patients in the contract hospitals.   
The Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare is responsible for the SSO in Laos 
PDR. From the beginning, coordination with the Ministry of Health was emphasized, 
since it was critical for the determination of benefits, particularly for the positive 
acceptance of the capitation payment method in the Ministry of Health’s hospitals. 
An indirect but very important result of this coordination was the interest developed 
in the Ministry of Health on the potential of social health insurance in improving 
access to health care for the population excluded from the SSO. 
A first step was the establishment of a Health Insurance Policy Unit in the 
Ministry and training of core personnel. This national team then served as national 
counterparts in a community-based health insurance project, which run under the 
technical assistance of WHO. The project has set up voluntary community-based 
health insurance (CBHI) schemes in three places, with minor adaptations of the same 
design in each site, and in accordance with regulations and guidelines developed by 
the Ministry of Health.  
As in the SSO, the CBHI includes ambulatory and hospital care benefits, and 
uses capitation as the provider payment method in contracts with public providers. 
The information system too is an adaptation of the SSO system. The commitment and 
ownership by the CBHI already made an improvement in the quality of care given by 
the providers. It has also led to an increase in the typically very low health care 
utilization rates. The Ministry of Health is now planning expansion of the number of 
project sites and coverage within each site, so that the CBHI will form a network of 
SHI across the country. Laos PDR, therefore, serves as an example of separate but 
parallel government-sponsored social health insurance development both for the 
formal and informal sectors. Through compulsory and voluntary schemes, Laos PDR 
should eventually reach a level of coverage that will serve as the foundation for 
compulsory universal coverage. 
3.8 Mongolia 
Mongolia even though having a relatively small population, decided to implement 
social health insurance for the entire population in the mid-1990s, which was a very 
ambitious move. There were two major interlinked factors which supported the 
political ideology, in a new government concerned with the transition of a centrally 
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planned to a market-oriented economy. The first was the need to maintain the levels 
in equity and access to health care that was achieved during the previous periods. 
The second factor was the need to create financial protection of the population 
during the transition period. The vulnerability of this population to the transition 
was well understood. A relatively well-resourced health system was in place and 
universal coverage was considered a feasible goal for a population of 2.5 million at 
the time. 
Intensive preparation for the introduction of the system was made by the 
Ministry of Health over the two years preceding implementation of the Citizens’ 
Health Insurance Law in January 1994. Implementation in the initial stage had 
several features: the system was set up as an independent social insurance system for 
health care, and the State owned commercial insurance company was contracted to 
operate the scheme.  
At that critical time in economic transition, there was an element of competition 
between the initiators of health insurance and other social security benefit branches 
and indeed, health insurance came first. Another initial feature was the very heavy 
subsidization by government to ensure universal coverage. Contributions for several 
groups were paid by government, regardless of the actual incomes of the individuals. 
For example, government paid for cattle-breeders, students and women with young 
children. The approach was individual rather than family coverage, and fee-for-
service was chosen as the provider payment model. The benefits covered only 
hospital care in the first stage.  
The first years of operation were very difficult, as it became increasingly clear 
that the high level of subsidization was untenable. The health care system in 
Mongolia could then be characterized as having a high supply of human resources, 
but with low salaries, and a high supply of hospital beds but with outdated medical 
technology.  
The public providers (hospitals and clinics) anticipated increased revenues 
through the new health insurance system with its fee-for-service provider payment 
method. Hospital admission rates and length-of stay increased within a short time. In 
the capital, Ulaanbaatar, the rates after two years of operation essentially meant that 
30% of the population was hospitalized in a given year while the average length of 
hospital stay doubled compared to the preceding period. 
As the privatization of state-owned enterprises began, and alternative 
employment was not easily found, unemployment and poverty increased. Many 
adults lost entitlement to health insurance when they lost jobs and universal 
coverage was seriously compromised. The relatively new social health insurance 
system had to establish new mechanisms to register and collect contributions from 
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self-employed workers. For those who were covered, co-payments for health care 
created new burdens for the lowest income households. 
The inputs from technical support from international development partners 
were, to some extent, lost in the sudden transfer of the health insurance system from 
the Ministry of Health to the State Social Insurance General Office in 1996. While 
there was some gain in efficiency through the joint collection for all social security 
branches, there was a vacuum in technical capacity, including capacity to develop 
information systems, which took several years to fill. 
Although the direct responsibility for the operation of social health insurance 
had been taken away, the Ministry of Health maintained its role in policy 
development. The Ministry was always cognizant of the problems and willing to 
correct the design faults. The first major improvement was the introduction of the 
Family General Practitioners Programme, through which ambulatory care benefits 
were added, with the payment of doctors on a capitation basis.  
The social health insurance system therefore responded to the need for primary 
health care in the community. The information system was then improved and 
budgetary problems related to inequities in utilization of health insurance benefits 
and the rationale for subsidization of specific populations could be assessed. 
The next stages of development focused on steps to control utilization through 
accreditation of providers and payment mechanisms, better linkage between the 
Ministry of Health and the broad social security framework, and revision of the 
policies on subsidization. The changes were made through amendments to the 
existing law, until a new Citizens Health Insurance (CHI) Law came into effect in 
January 2003.  
The new (CHI) law paves the way for several critical changes. The unit of 
coverage will be changed from individual to family. This will enable the government 
to stop paying contributions for most students, as they will be covered through their 
parents’ contributions. The accreditation of providers will have to be expanded to 
include standards for the delivery of care. The experience with capitation in the 
Family General Practitioners Programme has been positive and the new law enables 
capitation for hospital-based services. 
This development process in Mongolia is not unusual for a country in economic 
transition and illustrates the problems in achieving maturity in a new social security 
system. The main challenges for the system now are improvement in management 
and technical capacity. Emphasis will be placed on developing the capacity of the 
system to negotiate with providers and ensure quality. Throughout the country with 
its dispersed population including nomadic cattle herders, improvement in the 
capacity to register and collect contributions is a priority. A far better legislative basis 
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for universal coverage through social health insurance is now in place. The return to 
de facto coverage of the entire population needs to be achieved before the currently 
unregulated private commercial and for-profit sector is allowed to take over the 
higher-income population. 
3.9 Philippines 
The development of health insurance in the Philippines has moved through initial 
attempts to provide broad social protection to the population to more focused 
concern with access to basic health care, and is now a priority area of the Health 
Sector Reform agenda. The Philippines embarked on social health insurance as an 
integral part of social security from 1960s, before several countries in the Region that 
have already reached universal coverage.  
The original Medicare Programme launched in 1969 made health insurance 
mandatory for salaried workers in the private and public sectors, through existing 
separate social security systems for each sector, and regulated by the Philippines 
Medicare Commission. This Programme had several characteristics, which could 
have accelerated universal coverage. Dependants of the workers were covered, 
entitlement was continued on retirement and the law included provisions for 
voluntary enrolment of the self-employed and informal sector population in Phase 2. 
There was no significant extension over the next three decades, as a result of 
slow and unstable economic development, problems of both accreditation and 
fraudulent claims in the Medicare Programme and low compliance with the law. 
Contribution rates were low (2.5% of salary with low ceilings and shared equally 
between the employer and employee) but benefits were limited to inpatient hospital 
care and the total amount of reimbursement per admission was below 50% of the 
hospital charges. Phase 2 was limited to small pilot projects and attempts to extend 
benefits to ambulatory care were hampered by widespread fraud in the fee-for-
service reimbursement for hospital care.  
By the end of the 1980s, the Medicare Commission had been discredited by 
claims of fraud and inappropriate accreditation of providers, and the overall lack of 
compliance with the social security legislation left many salaried workers outside the 
system. In the meantime, private investors set up health maintenance organizations 
(HMOs), which offered prepayment plans linked to the use of specific health care 
providers.  
Although the premiums were far higher than the social health insurance 
contributions and HMOs were established only in the largest cities, this form of 
prepayment for health care was attractive for highly-paid employees and self-
employed professionals. Interest in the HMOs played some role in improving the 
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knowledge and awareness about prepayment for health care, and NGOs began 
community-based health insurance schemes on a non-profit basis.  
Health care financing through social health insurance for the formal sector and 
for the informal sector became parallel priority areas of international development 
aid. The work done through a large USAID project provided the basis for the drafting 
and passage of the National Health Insurance Act of 1995. This Act created a 
National Health Insurance Programme and the Philippines National Health 
Insurance Corporation, or PhilHealth, to administer the new Programme. The Act 
stipulates that universal coverage should be reached within 15 years of 
implementation, and recognizes the role of community-based schemes in reaching 
the entire population. The new scheme effectively ended Medicare, and links with 
the social security systems for the private and public sectors were broken when 
PhilHealth began its own registration and contribution collection.  
The new administration later took over the voluntary health insurance coverage 
of overseas Filipino workers and their dependants, numbering several million 
persons. A priority area for PhilHealth has been the coverage of the indigent 
population, through subsidization of the contributions for the poorest families. The 
introduction of user charges in public hospitals and the change in public hospital 
budgeting towards self-financing obviously created urgency to cover the indigent 
population.  
The high proportion of the population living below the poverty line in the 
country has led to considerable delays in this effort, as it involved developing 
appropriate mechanisms to identify the poorest families and to develop fair 
guidelines for the transfer of national funds to provinces with a low tax base and a 
high proportion of the indigent.  
A major problem is the inadequacy of funds to support the entire indigent 
population, particularly with the high administrative costs involved. However, 
implementation of the Act has had several positive effects.  
Recognition of the needs of the population for primary health care led to pilot 
schemes and the ultimate inclusion of ambulatory care benefits, and accreditation of 
health facilities led to the establishment of standards and regulations, which should 
ultimately lead to improvement in the quality of care for all population sectors. 
Efforts are now focused on finalizing accreditation criteria for community-based 
schemes and their incorporation into the universal coverage target.  
Despite all the efforts, the overall coverage is less than half of the population 
and the households still bear about half of the health care expenditures under the 
new National Health Insurance Programme. As with the previous Medicare 
Programme, this is in part due to the low compliance by employers in registering 
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their employees, and in part due to the limitation of reimbursement, or support value 
as it is termed. Both of these areas have yet to be addressed before significant 
extension of coverage can be expected. 
3.10 Singapore 
Compulsory prepayment and social health insurance mechanisms in Singapore 
consist of the 3-M schemes of Medisave, MediShield and Medifund. The three 
schemes were developed over a decade, following a policy of both personal 
responsibility and government commitment, taking into account changes in health 
care needs and demands related to the ageing of the population and developments in 
medical technology.  
The first component, the Medisave Programme launched in 1984, is a form of 
compulsory savings in individual accounts, at a rate linked to wages, and covers the 
health care expenditures of family members. Pooling in the Medisave system is 
therefore only at the level of the family. The individual savings accounts were 
designed to encourage individuals to stay healthy and minimize the use of 
unnecessary medical services. The ideology leading to the individual (or family) 
account system was based mainly on the cultural approach to saving for unforeseen 
contingencies as a manifestation of self-reliance and through strong family ties. 
Medisave was also designed to counter the potential for unnecessary health care in a 
well-resourced health care system. To discourage over-utilization from the demand 
side, co-payment by the patient at the time of use was applied.  
As it became clear that Medisave individual accounts were not sufficient to 
cover high-cost health expenditures, the government recognized the need and 
demand for broader pooling through a social insurance mechanism. Medishield was 
introduced as a catastrophic insurance plan in 1990, financed by premiums deducted 
from the Medisave, unless the account holders request otherwise. The threshold to 
reach the expenditure for entitlement to reimbursement through Medishield was 
high. Supplementary Medishield Plus Programmes were offered to enable different 
levels of coverage, based on deductible or excess amounts per policy year, claim 
limits per policy year, and claim limits per lifetime. 
The third scheme - Medifund was established through the government 
endowment funds in 1993 to support health care for the poor. This component does 
not cover individuals identified as poor or indigent, but considers requests for 
financial assistance on a case-by-case basis with preference given to low-wage 
Medisave/ Medishield contributors and elderly persons whose accounts are not 
adequate to cover expenses. Medifund therefore completes the scope of the 
arrangements to enable universal coverage. 
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The limitation of all three components to hospital-based services is sometimes 
overlooked. The 3M financing system covers expensive hospitalization and limited 
outpatient procedures. It includes non-acute care in community hospitals, which 
provide post-acute and rehabilitative care, and hospices. Yet, Singapore has a public 
primary health care system with a wide range of general practitioner and public 
health services delivered in community health centres.  
Singapore’s health care financing system represents an experiment in the 
development of individual medical savings later supplemented by social insurance. 
Several countries have tried to copy the medical savings component but have not 
reached the same results in terms of equity in access to health care, possibly as some 
of the conditions were omitted.  
The public health services cover a wide range of primary health care, with a 
strong emphasis on prevention and health promotion activities. The individual 
accounts in the Singapore Medisave system cover family members and not only the 
contributing individual. At the time of its launching, the differences in earnings 
among the population were not vast, so that there were not large differences in the 
amounts accrued in each account. Variation in the actual number of dependants who 
could access the same account was somewhat reduced by the government’s success 
in lowering family size and the account can now be used to cover the health care 
costs of extended family members.  
By the time Medisave was extended to the self-employed in 1992, this sector 
was completely formalized, that is, the self-employed as well as salaried employees 
were registered and there was a very high level of compliance with legislation and 
regulations.  
Despite the strong cultural value of savings, the government did not see 
individual medical savings as a single solution to all health policy problems and 
accepted responsibility in developing a supplementary system through social 
insurance as well as the tax-funded allocation to cover the population, which could 
neither save nor contribute towards their own health care.  
The same ideology, involving redistribution, savings and insurance has been 
applied in a new programme to cover the health needs of the growing elderly 
population in Singapore. There is no comprehensive system for financing long-term 
care, and financing currently draws on direct payments from older individuals and 
their families, community assistance to voluntary welfare organizations which secure 
up to 50% or more of their recurrent expenditure from fund raising, and government 
funding through grants-in-aid to voluntary welfare organizations.  
Currently, there is an on-going review of the 3-M system to be followed later by 
a review of the optional health insurance products. Despite the range of components 
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to cover different expenditure levels and contingencies, there are still gaps in the 
system, which could increase with changes in demography (ageing) and morbidity 
(more chronic diseases). Some of the gaps are created by an increase in people who 
opt out of Medishield (the only component which is not fully compulsory). Early 
policy announcements point to the need for compulsory enrolment and greater 
enhancement of benefits through strengthening of the insurance components of the 3-
M financing mechanisms. 
3.11 Thailand 
In October 2001, Thailand has achieved universal access to health care through a 
combination of social health insurance and government-funded schemes, through 
more than two and a half decade of targeting approach by successive governments. 
The first form of social protection was the Social Welfare Scheme for poor and low-
income households as part of the national social welfare scheme in 1975. This welfare 
scheme was developed for the indigent population and enabled free-of-charge care at 
public facilities for ambulatory and inpatient services. By 2000, around 20 million 
people were covered under this scheme. The budget was allocated through the 
central tax revenues. The major criticism of the scheme focused on the difficulties in 
means-testing for identifying the poor, due to which many of the poorest households 
were not effectivenly included. 
In 1978, Thailand introduced the Civil Servant’s Medical Benefit Scheme 
(CSMBS), to cover health care for all civil servants (including employees of state 
enterprises), pensioners and their dependants (parents, spouses and upto 3 children 
under 18 years old). The total number of retired and existing civil servants and their 
dependents was over six million in 2003. The scheme started with a fee-for-service 
reimbursement model for all services, which resulted in lengthy hospital stays, over-
use of prescribed drugs and diagnostic tests. The source of funds is the general 
revenue of the government and the scheme is managed by the Comptroller’s General 
Department (CGD) in the Ministry of Finance. Following various studies and the 
after effects of the economic crisis in the late 1990s, the government, initially accepted 
the recommendations of Health Systems Research Institute of Thailand, on the 
payment mechanism reform of the CSMBS toward capitation for ambulatory care 
and global budget and diagnosis-related groups (DRG) for inpatient care.  
Unfortunately this was not actually implemented.  The CGD instead adopted a co- 
payment policy by beneficiaries, after the economic crisis in 1997 in view of cost 
savings. Through this, beneficiaries had to pay drugs outside items listed in the 
National Essential Drug List.  In addition, the Scheme does not allow beneficiaries to 
use private admission, except emergency care.   
The first community based health insurance (CBHI) scheme developed in 
Thailand was the Voluntary Health Card (VHC) project started in 1983 initiated by 
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the Ministry of Public Health. The scheme initially covered mother and child-care in 
rural areas. Coverage was extended in 1994 through the involvement of local leaders, 
and benefits were expanded to primary health care and in-patient care in district 
hospitals. By the mid-1990s the VHC covered around 11 million persons. The MOPH 
proposed a reform from CBHI to a publicly  subsidized voluntary health insurance, 
whereby families had to pay 500 bahts per year for their Family Card membership 
and government, regardless of the income level of the rural households (who are not 
covered by the social welfare scheme), matched this.  
The first compulsory social health insurance system came through the 
integration of health care and the social security scheme for private sector-salaried 
workers. Based on the Social Security Act of 1990, the government introduced 
national mandatory social health insurance for all private enterprises with more than 
20 employees using a capitation, low-cost contract model. The Social Security 
Organization (SSO), under the Ministry of Labour, manages the scheme. In 1994, 
coverage of SSO was extended to the private or commercial establishments with 
more than 10 employees. By 2002, it included small enterprises with more than one 
employee. The scheme now covers over seven million employees, and also provides 
limited benefits for the spouses of insured workers. 
The financial contribution was progressive with a five-fold gap between the 
contribution of the highest and lowest wage earners, based on 4.5% of payroll equally 
shared by the employers, employees and the government for sickness, maternity, 
invalidity and funeral grants.  Health care benefits was comprehensive include both 
outpatient and inpatient care, and the providers are contracted through capitation. 
An interesting feature of the system is the participation of the private for-profit 
hospital sector. Currently, about half the number of contracted hospitals is in the 
private sector and these receive the same capitation payment as public hospitals. 
Failure to extend coverage to workers' dependants (non working spouse and 
dependant children) has been a major reason for the limited growth in coverage of 
the population through the SSO. 
Thailand’s Universal Coverage Scheme, notably known as the “30 bahts 
Scheme” began in October 2001, with the idea of replacing the Social Welfare Scheme 
and the Voluntary Health Card Scheme. The programme was operational nation-
wide by mid-2001 and now covers almost all citizens except civil servants and their 
dependants and those covered by the Social Health Insurance Scheme. The Universal 
Coverage Scheme provides comprehensive health care with virtually no co-payment 
by users, apart from a nominal fee of 30 bahts per each health visit or hospital 
admission. The scheme is mainly funded by general tax revenue, with an estimated 
budget of 1400 bahts per capita per year (currently about US$ 35) which is paid 
directly to designated providers as a capitation payment, based on the positive 
experience of the SSO capitation model.  
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Due to the low cost scheme, the Universal Coverage Scheme demonstrates a 
long term financial sustainability and affordability by the government, which in fact 
applies the same approach to all beneficiaries, regardless of income. The scheme 
requires a financial commitment that has to stand up to economic shocks, and the 
lack of progressivism attracts some criticism. Recent evidence from EQUITAP study 
indicates a concentration index of direct tax of 0.9057 and indirect tax of 0.5776. Thus, 
the concentration index of combined direct and indirect tax was 0.6996, indicated 
progressivity of general tax financed health insurance scheme. Though evidence from 
the study indicated that the UC scheme is progressive due to its finance from general 
tax system, it also covers all individuals who are engaged in the informal sector.  
The coverage of the “30 bahts scheme” by the end of 2002 was around 76% of 
the total population. The remaining population is still covered by the CSMBS (11%) 
and SSO (13%). Thailand has therefore reached universal coverage through a mix of 
public and private financing and public and private health care providers. It remains 
to be seen whether the SSO can significantly expand coverage to dependants of its 
insured members and thereby reduce the burden on government. 
3.12 Viet Nam 
Viet Nam introduced compulsory social health insurance for active and retired civil 
servants and for private sector employees in enterprises with over 10 workers 
through the Health Insurance Decree of 1992. The Viet Nam Health Insurance (VHI) 
was set up as a national administrative structure, initially under the Ministry of 
Health. The VHI was also charged with extending coverage to social health insurance 
on a voluntary basis to dependants of the insured workers, through the same 
provincial administration. These efforts were largely unsuccessful, with the exception 
of coverage of about four million school children(21, 22). There was significant success 
in mobilizing provincial welfare funds to purchase health insurance cards for the 
indigent population in several provinces. By 2000, about 12 million individuals were 
covered by VHI. However, the financial viability of the VHI was threatened by 
several factors: 
¦ The fee-for-service provider payment system, which led to charges for 
unnecessary services for the insured; 
¦ The insured public sector population had a high proportion of retired civil 
servants, with the associated health risks of the elderly, and  
¦ Compliance with registration and contribution payments was very low in 
the private salaried sector, which had higher wages than the public sector 
employees.  
The last point is particularly significant. As in Thailand, the VHI did not extend 
coverage to the workers' dependants, which essentially led to low interest in the 
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social health insurance scheme. For this sector, compliance increased from around 15 
% in 1995 to 50% in 2000, as more attention was paid to registration of small 
enterprises in the private sector, and intensive promotion campaigns were carried 
out by the VHI.  
Since mid-2001, several important developments have occurred. The VHI was 
merged with the Viet Nam Social Insurance (VSS) agency, directly under the Prime 
Minister’s Office. The Ministries of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs and Health are 
represented on the governing board of the VSS through their Vice-Ministers. The 
Central Government of Viet Nam has set up a special health care fund, 75% of which 
comes from the Central Government budget to provide a social safety net for about 
14 million people. With WHO technical assistance and an Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) project, voluntary insurance is now being extended to at least half of the 
country’s provinces, at community level and through the administration of VSS. The 
conditions will be the same as the health cards for the poor, that is, family 
membership, comprehensive health care benefits, no co-payment at the time of use, 
and capitation payment to providers. There is political pressure to extend coverage 
as rapidly as possible, prompted by the realization that current user charges and 
even co-payments in the public system create high financial burdens for the majority 
of the population. 
Viet Nam is now actively introducing changes to increase coverage in both the 
formal and informal labour sectors. The principle of having one system is 
maintained, and the mechanisms to increase coverage in the informal sector, in both 
rural and urban areas, take the form of decentralized implementation of community-
based health insurance, albeit under the administration of the VSS within the 
national system. 
The development of social health insurance in Viet Nam has taken an ambitious 
path since the Health Insurance Decree of 1992. From the start, there has been 
concern with the vulnerable populations, such as the retired state workers (all 
workers from the pre-transition period), the disabled and the poor as well as citizens 
to whom Viet Nam gave meritorious status. The government insisted on maintaining 
one national scheme with compulsory and voluntary components, and 
nongovernmental community-based schemes were discouraged. Decentralization of 
the major functions of the social health insurance scheme was carried out in a 
planned and rational way, with a fixed allocation for administration and training 
within the system.  
The major challenge now is to the make the necessary adjustments to cover a 
population in which the majority of workers are in the private and informal sectors, 
including the elderly who reach retirement age without prior employment in the 
formal public sector. Another challenge is how the social health insurance system can 
improve the quality of health care within its budgetary constraints. 
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4 
Comparative Analysis of 
Experiences 
As stated in the Section 1.2 on the purpose of the case studies, the comparative 
analysis attempts to provide some direction on how the different health care 
financing systems have to deal with major issues facing the political decision-makers 
and the administrators especially in planning and implementing various social health 
insurance schemes.  Some of the issues involve crosscutting that may come out in 
more than one part. Based on the comparisons, the potential impact of changes in 
some critical aspects of the schemes are discussed. 
4.1 Can Universal Coverage be Achieved only Through 
Compulsory Mechanisms? 
The answer to the question of the necessity of compulsory measures for health 
insurance schemes to achieve universal coverage is therefore “yes”.  All countries 
that have achieved the universal coverage have implemented necessary legislation to 
achieve compulsory participation. The following table (Table I.1) and the respective 
analysis provided information on the processes involved in reaching universal 
coverage. 
Table I.1 shows the countries that have achieved universal coverage (100% with 
minor reductions for some categories of residents) and the estimated total coverage 
in the rest of the countries, as indicated in the study questionnaires mentioned 
earlier. These figures are only estimations, since it is not possible to derive the total 
population covered by the various community-based schemes. The estimates do not 
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include coverage by private for-profit insurance. Comments on some factors that 
may affect the extension of coverage are included. 
Both Australia and Japan started with voluntary, mutual or community-based 
prepayment systems. Compulsory HI systems were launched on the basis of this 
experience and in response to labour developments and positive economic growth. 
The political action in the form of legislation to achieve universal coverage was taken 
when coverage through voluntary schemes (Australia) or a mix of compulsory and 
voluntary systems (Japan and the RoK) reached a relatively high proportion of the 
population.  
Singapore began its first social health insurance scheme on the foundation of a 
compulsory savings scheme applied to the entire population. In all these countries, it 
was clear to the policy-makers that universal coverage could only be reached by 
compulsory mechanisms, and the burden on the government to cover the non-
economically active and indigent populations was accepted as an integral part of the 
policy. 
Economic growth at the time created optimism that universal coverage could be 
sustained. Perhaps Mongolia was different in this regard as it attempted to cover the 
entire population in one stage, without the prior experience of partial coverage 
through contributory prepayment before steady economic growth, and at an 
extremely high and ultimately unsustainable government cost. The decisions in the 
case of Mongolia were taken at the very beginning of economic liberalization (and 
cessation of free public services) and were strongly driven by the political desire to 
avoid exposing the population to a long period without health protection.  
In a number of countries with compulsory social health insurance for the 
salaried sector and some community-based schemes, social health insurance 
coverage has still not reached a critical level. While it is difficult to define this level, 
one could consider coverage of over 30% as the level that may influence government 
action towards universal coverage. However, there are several reasons for the slow 
extension or even stagnation in coverage and these may differ by country.  
Table 1 also showed several significant differences in design factors that may 
determine the potential for extending coverage and may explain some stagnation in 
the growth of social health insurance. The individual country case studies lend 
support to the hypothesis that it may be easier to launch legislation for universal 
coverage when there is a critical mass of the population covered by compulsory 
and/or voluntary social insurance, and in public and non-government schemes. The 
country case studies also provide details on how governments cover the indigent and 
non-economically active populations so coverage is effectively “universal”. 
  36 Social Health Insurance 
Table 1: Scope of Social Health Insurance Coverage by Country (Scheme) 
Country/ 
Scheme 
First 
Law/ 
Decree 
Year 
started 
Current 
Estimated 
Coverage 
Comments 
Australia 
Medicare (C) * 
 
1972 
 
1975 
 
Universal 
 
All citizens and legal residents 
are eligible. 
Family as the unit of coverage 
China 
Urban workers 
Basic Insurance (C) 
RCMS (new) (V) * 
 
1998 
 
2003 
 
2000  
 
2003  
 
10% of total 
population 
 
Guidelines, not yet law. 
Implementation in stages by 
region. Limited to urban 
workers only, mainly in the 
public sector. Individual 
coverage in rural and urban 
schemes.  
India 
ESIS (C) 
CGHS (O) 
CBHI schemes (V) 
 
1948 
1954 
from 
1950s 
 
 
 
20% of total 
population (all 
schemes) 
 
Family members covered but 
scheme excludes higher- 
salaried workers, and small 
enterprises. Very different 
arrangements by location, 
occupation and benefits. 
Indonesia 
ASKES 
Jamsostek (C) 
CBHI (V) 
 
1968 
1991 
 
 
1968 
1992 
1980 
 
20% of total 
population 
 
Families covered. 
Small enterprises excluded. 
Dependants limited to two 
children. Very different 
schemes 
Japan 
Workers 
Community 
Elderly 
 
1922 
1938 
1999 
 
1927 
1957 
2000 
 
Universal 
(from 1961) 
 
Extension in stages by 
population group. Family 
coverage 
Republic of Korea 
National scheme 
merging the existing 
schemes (compulsory)  
 
1976 
 
1977 
 
Universal 
 
Gradual extensions to different 
occupational sectors, family 
coverage.  
Lao PDR 
CCS (C) 
SSO (C) 
CBHI (V)  
 
1989 
2000 
2002 
 
1989 
2001 
2002 
 
 
 
5% of total 
population  
 
All have family coverage. 
Reimbursement very limited by 
fund capacity.  
Still limited to capital city. 
Controlled extension of pilot 
projects. 
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Country/ 
Scheme 
First 
Law/ 
Decree 
Year 
started 
Current 
Estimated 
Coverage 
Comments 
Mongolia 
National scheme 
(C) (G) 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
78% 
 
Initial universal coverage 
dropped, new systems will 
register self-employed. 
The Philippines 
PhilHealth (C) (G) 
CBHI (V) 
 
1994 
 
1995 
 
55% of total 
population 
 
PhilHealth National Health 
Insurance Programme 
combines previous systems. 
Singapore 
Medisave (C) 
Medishield (O) 
Medifund (G)  
 
1983 
1989 
1992 
 
1984 
1990 
1993 
 
Universal 
 
Three layers enable universal 
coverage for hospital-based 
benefits, with low cost public 
primary health care. 
Thailand 
SSO (compulsory) 
CSMBS (civil 
servants) 
“Universal Coverage” 
 
1990 
1978 
 
2001 
 
1991 
1978 
 
2001 
 
(13%) 
(11%) 
(76%) 
Total 100% 
 
Dependants not covered. 
Dependants covered in non-
contributory scheme. 
Rest of the population, 
completing universal access. 
Viet Nam 
VSS (C) 
VSS (V) 
VSS-CBHI (V) 
HCFP (scheme for the 
poor (G) 
 
1992 
1993 
2002 
2002 
 
1992 
1994 
2003 
2003 
  
Dependants not covered. 
Students 
Informal sector. 
Acceleration of government 
programme to subsidize health 
insurance for the low-income 
populations, including family 
members except children 
under six years (still 
government-funded) 
* (C) Compulsory, (V) Voluntary, (G) Government-funded programme, (O) Individuals can opt out.  
 
While several countries have passed legislation on universal coverage for some 
period, actual coverage is behind target. Obviously, the legislative mechanisms need 
to have appropriate sanctions to assure high compliance for the salaried as well as 
non-salaried sectors. The next section would look at some of the limitations which 
might explain the lag in expansion. 
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4.2 Are There Limitations Which Inhibit the Extension  
of Coverage?  
There are indeed many limitations in various schemes that could hamper the 
expansion of coverage. Most limitations are of design issues that may influence the 
attractiveness of a particular form of health protection among the population at large.  
Limits in covering dependants -  As discussed above, several countries limit the 
benefits to workers only, or limit the number of dependent children covered by the 
schemes for the formal sector.  This limitation is usually a feature of the schemes in 
which both employer and employee share the contribution burden as in the case of 
China, Thailand and Viet Nam (will deal in details in the next section). Indonesia 
limits the number of children to be covered to two, and till to the age of 21 years.  
Limiting the number of children to be covered as dependants to insured 
persons may be questioned.  If the intent is to encourage smaller families, this may 
not be the most effective mechanism. In any case, limitations on the number of 
children covered in families which have more than two children are likely to lead to a 
greater moral hazard: the insured member is more likely to cover the child with 
existing health problems than healthy children. 
There are some objective difficulties in the extension of benefits to children. In 
schemes in which the employer is liable for the collection of contributions, 
registration tools to record all dependent children need to be developed. Decisions 
have to be made as to whether children are registered under the working father or 
mother in case both are working, as duplication in registration should be avoided. 
Other decisions will consider up to what age children should be considered 
dependent (usually 18 but often 21 as in Indonesia and the Philippines), and whether 
they should be insured as individuals if they are working and over 16 years of age (as 
required in Japan and Australia).  The issue of how to cover children residing outside 
the home was debated for several years in Mongolia, where school-age children of 
the nomadic population usually spend most of the year in boarding schools far from 
home. Finding solutions to all these problems depends to a large extent on the 
sophistication of population registries and the maturity of the schemes. 
Beyond estimates of the total number of persons who could be covered if the 
spouse and legal dependants (generally children up to the age of 18) were covered, 
the attractiveness of “worker only” health protection should be considered. Active 
workers are generally healthy adults, whose incomes generally support their non-
economically active family members. Schemes, which cover their own reduced health 
needs, but leave them vulnerable to high costs of the health needs of their families, 
may not be attractive. It is reasonable to assume that workers would exert more 
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pressure on non-complying employers to ensure their registration and continued 
participation if all their dependants were covered. 
Limits on earning level and enterprise size -  may have a negative outcome on 
the substantial extension of coverage. The ESIS in India earlier had the limits on 
compulsory membership to a fixed amount of salary. This condition was part of the 
design to protect low-income workers. Another limitation of ESIS is that very small 
enterprises with low reported annual incomes are not included, while the Law only 
applies to enterprises with more than 10 workers (20 for some categories of 
enterprises). Over the 50 years, some adjustments have been made in the salary limit 
for membership.  The changes still have not matched the increases in average wage, 
so that ultimately the proportion of workers covered has not increased. Earners of 
wages above the set amount find it difficult to meet health care costs in a period of 
rapidly rising costs; and there have been cases of workers with chronic health 
problems in the family refusing to accept promotion if the higher wages would bring 
them above the fixed level for entitlement. 
In parallel, the growth of small enterprises, including family businesses, has 
been significant in the past decades. The ESIS still has no provision for these salaried 
workers or for the self-employed sector, whether formal or informal. At the end of 
2003, only 8.5 million workers were enrolled and 33 million persons were entitled to 
benefits through the ESIS.  
Another SHI scheme for government workers – the CGHS covers about half of 
that number, bringing the total number of insured persons under compulsory 
schemes to around 45 million persons or less than 5% of the population. While it may 
be a sheer size, it is indeed a very small proportion of the total population of India. 
One can only speculate as to what extent, the coverage could have been extended, at 
least to individuals in the families of private sector workers, if the salary ceiling had 
been lifted and provisions had been made to cover enterprises with less than 10 
workers.  
Similar issues may have been faced in Indonesia. The Jamsostek scheme for 
private sector salaried employees is not compulsory for all enterprises. Small 
enterprises with low salaries are also not covered. At the other end of the scale, 
enterprises that provide health care benefits considered better than those of Jamsostek 
are exempted to be part of the scheme. These enterprises are generally better paying 
establishments, which tend to purchase commercial for-profit health insurance 
schemes, at higher costs.  
The exclusions and exemptions also limit the pooling as well as the financial 
viability of social health insurance funds. The lowest paid and less-secure workers 
employed in the small enterprises are excluded; those covered by Jamsostek will have 
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a weak fund for essentially low-and-middle income workers, without the benefit of 
the higher contribution amounts coming from higher paid workers. These conditions 
are generally not conducive to the steady growth of social health insurance through 
solidarity. On the contrary, such systems limit the ability to achieve equity in access 
to health care. 
In countries which have not reached universal coverage, stagnation in the 
extension of coverage may also mean stagnation in the development of technical 
capacity in the existing schemes to improve management. Particularly when the vast 
majority of the insured members are low-paid workers, the internal pressure on the 
scheme to improve may be low. The private sector and even better paying public 
sector workers like those in China, India, Indonesia, the Philippines and Viet Nam, 
for example, essentially remain outside the social health insurance schemes. 
The inclusion of enterprises with high-paid workers will improve pooling 
between low-and high-paid earners, and also increase pressure on the funds towards 
improvement in the quality of benefits and transparency in management. 
Inclusion of both public and private sector worker -  In countries where 
universal coverage is achieved, public and private sector workers and their families 
will usually be covered by the same scheme (as in Australia, Mongolia and 
Singapore) or by separate schemes (as in Japan and the Republic of Korea).  It is 
worth considering whether specific labour conditions for civil servants have kept 
them out of social health insurance schemes in the other countries. In the past and as 
currently practice of in many countries in the Region, civil servants were provided 
health services free of charge at public institutions. This arrangement was often a 
fringe benefit for the generally low-paid government workers, and no deductions 
were made from their salaries for this benefit. 
The shift to universal coverage necessitates a contributory mechanism for civil 
servants, in which the government has to undertake to pay its part as the employer of 
civil servants. Apart from the issue of imposing contributions on the typically low-
paid civil servants, schemes for civil servants can be problematic for some 
developing countries.  
In countries in which the Ministry of Finance previously paid all civil servants’ 
salaries, as in Viet Nam, this Ministry may take the responsibility for contributions 
for all public sector and state enterprise workers. As in the reform of urban 
employees in China, coverage of civil servants necessitated budgetary allocations to 
respective government agencies to cover their own workers’ contributions. 
The ministries of health now tend to favour shifting from free care for civil 
servants to social health insurance coverage. Free-of-charge services in government 
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facilities are essentially funded by the budget of the Ministry of Health. Government 
hospitals may not receive payment for the health care provided to civil servants but 
are expected to bear the costs within their allocated budgets. The introduction of user 
charges at the public health care facilities puts the emphasis on revenues and 
expenditures within each institution.  The care of non-paying patients, including civil 
servants, becomes a source of resentment and also a real financial burden, this time 
for the public providers. 
The reformists in Thailand have been trying for several years to introduce 
financing reform of the Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme (CSMBS), from fee for 
service reimbursement model to a more close-end provider payment, such as 
capitation for ambulatory care and global budge with Diagnostic Related Group 
(DRG) for inpatient services.   
The failure to create a contributory insurance system stems mainly from the 
reluctance of the beneficiaries to contribute since the public sector salary was still 
low, and a general perception that it is a fringe benefit, to compensate low salary. A 
similar situation exists in Laos PDR, where the Ministry of Finance has resisted 
initiatives to merge a contributory social insurance system of civil servants with that 
of salaried workers in the private sector.  
Similar to the inclusion of family dependants, the inclusion of civil servants 
under the social health insurance coverage is important for expanding universal 
coverage, particularly in countries undergoing the streamlining of their public 
services. One of the benefits of covering both the public and the private sectors is the 
flexibility of movement between public and private sector employment and between 
salaried and self-employed status. Universal coverage effectively provides the 
security in mobility between sectors without the fear of loss of entitlement to health 
protection. 
Limits in the legislative instrument -  Legislative instrument itself may have 
been a constraint or reason for stagnation in the growth of social health insurance 
coverage. In China and Viet Nam, the nature of the legislative tool could be the root 
cause of low compliance. In these countries, all social security schemes are governed 
by decrees rather than laws. Decrees may be faster and easier to enact, but do not 
have the punitive sanctions needed for compulsory memberships involving regular 
contributions by both employer and employee. Viet Nam is now in the process of 
formulating a social security law for passage in 2005 and is considering of including 
social health insurance in this law. The alternative would be a separate law, which 
could take several years. The advantages of a law as the legislative instrument and 
the joint collection of contributions for all social security benefit branches are likely to 
increase compliance in Viet Nam.  
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India and Indonesia have national laws, but again with exclusion of the better- 
off enterprises and employees. Thailand’s the Social Security Law of 1990 allows no 
exemptions and has extended coverage to smaller enterprises by stages since its 
implementation in 1991. With the additional advantage of joint contributions 
collected for all social security benefits, compliance in the Social Security Office’s 
health insurance is over 80%. An additional factor was the flexibility shown by the 
scheme during the period of economic crisis starting in 1997. The contribution rates 
for employers and employees were reduced (from 1.5% to 1.0% of salary each) for 
over two years. Entitlement to benefits was extended from three to 12 months after 
termination of employment for those workers who lost their jobs. This at least 
minimized the loss in membership due to the economic crisis. 
The Philippines’ Law covers all enterprises regardless of size and level of salary 
of the employees. Even enterprises with single workers and domestic workers are 
covered. However, overall governance is weak, and workers’ interest is low and non-
compliance is common. Employers also take advantage of the stipulation contained 
in the law that workers are covered after three months of employment. Evasion of 
registration is made possible by the firing and rehiring of workers every three 
months and thereby maintaining the same worker over years on temporary contracts 
without proper coverage of social security. This situation may also be affected by 
high unemployment rates in the Philippines, when low-paid workers are more 
concerned with having a job and income than social protection.  
The above factors do not by themselves lead to expanding universal coverage.   
But at least they create the legislative, financial and administrative structures on 
which universal coverage schemes can be built upon. One can argue that some of the 
factors, such as the capacity to enrol dependants, depend on the maturity of the 
system. Other factors such as the level of compliance are linked to the legislative 
instrument, which mandates registration and regular payment of contributions. On 
the other hand, even when the appropriate instrument is in place, good governance 
will probably be the main determinant in the extension of coverage. External 
technical support may facilitate the maturity of a social security system, but good 
governance needs to come from internal or national efforts. 
Limits in technical capacity: Particularly during the first years of operation, 
limited technical skills and experience can inhibit the extension of coverage and 
benefits, as was noted in the country papers of Laos PDR and Mongolia. Part of the 
problem is the tendency of government to employ the top posts in new social health 
insurance schemes with political rather than professional appointments while the 
training of health insurance managers has been very limited. 
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4.3 Does Exclusion of the Informal Sector Limit the 
Extension of Coverage? 
The issue of whether universal coverage can be achieved when the labour force has a 
large informal sector is an important fact; due to the majority of workers being in this 
sector in most countries. The answer is simply ‘yes’. The exclusion of this informal 
sector does limit the extension of social health insurance coverage.  
Most countries that have achieved universal coverage do not have a real 
informal sector, since  most economically active individuals are registered for income 
tax purposes. Certainly they have self-employed workers and small-scale family 
enterprises, with unpaid family members as workers, who would constitute as an 
informal sector, if they were not registered as operators of businesses, service 
providers or independent artisans.  
In countries with large number of labour forces in the informal sectors, the 
tendency of the governments is to adopt social safety nets, exclusively for this 
population, rather than improving the coverage through the existing social insurance 
schemes(23, 24). There are several plausible explanations . While there may be an 
overall intention to increase the national tax base, law enforcement on the 
registration of small businesses, including entrepreneurial activities of single vendors 
or service providers may not be a priority. There are reasons linked to the 
management capacity of the social health insurance schemes themselves.  
It is indeed difficult for fledgling SHI schemes to take on the tasks of registering 
individuals rather than employers, particularly when there are few forms of 
registration of the target members. It is also far easier to tackle non-compliance in 
registration and contribution payments when a law stipulates employer liability for 
these functions. If health care is integrated, a broad social security system that 
collects contributions for pensions, invalidity and maternity benefits and a funeral 
grant, there is some reluctance by the schemes to cover populations who opt for only 
one benefit branch, that is, for health care. This benefit is not only the most frequently 
used (compared to pensions, maternity and invalidity allowances), but also complex 
in terms of the expertise required in dealing with health care providers. 
An additional complication is determination of the base rate for contribution for 
the informal sector. In a population that is generally not registered for income tax 
purposes, a contribution rate set as a percentage of income can be difficult to apply. 
When compulsory social health insurance was extended to the self-employed in 
Japan and the Republic of Korea, contributions were set according to household 
income categories, based on family size and assets. The number of groups was 
eventually minimized in Japan to simplify calculations while the number of factors 
entered into the assessment of assets of farmers in the RoK was reduced.  
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In most systems that cover the informal sector, and as in CBHI, flat rates are set, 
sometimes according to family size as in Laos PDR, and in a small number of broad 
income groups as in some schemes in India and Indonesia. A key factor in the 
coverage of the low income self-employed and informal sector was the subsidization 
of the contributions by government like in Japan and Republic of Korea. The new 
guidelines for the RCMS in China acknowledge the necessity for subsidization of 
farmers’ contributions by all levels of government.  
The experiences from the selected country case studies already show that it is 
indeed possible to develop schemes for the formal and informal sector populations, 
through a national approach similar to Viet Nam, or through a parallel approach, 
promoting compulsory social security schemes for the salaried population and CBHI 
for the rest of the population like Laos PDR. In both cases, the major issues 
influencing enrolment and sustained membership by the informal sector is the 
affordability of contributions, with the family as the unit of coverage, flexibility in 
collection and a balanced range of health care benefits. 
4.4 Is Universal Coverage Dependent on the Contribution 
Burden and Sharing? 
The comparison of contribution rates across the selected countries shows that both 
the level and the sharing of contributions are not linked to the achievement of 
universal coverage. In most countries studied, the SHI schemes have contribution 
rates that could be considered at low level compared to European countries(25). As 
shown in Table 2, the flat rate amounts paid by employers and employees or 
households vary from less than 1% of income in the RCMS to 8% in the urban 
workers’ schemes in China and the workers’ scheme in Japan. 
The comparison of the contribution levels is difficult to make because of some 
added amounts by the governments, similar to the case of Australia. Government 
funding towards SHI may be in the form of full or partial subsidies for all insured, or 
for specific populations such as the self-employed in the Republic of Korea, rural 
residents in China and the indigent populations in several schemes, or for specific 
functions as in Japan, where government funds subsidize the management of the 
social health insurance schemes.  
It is also difficult to add the rates and amounts in order to determine the total 
amount of contribution revenue per person or family as opposed to expenditure. The 
total amount of savings in the individual accounts in Singapore’s Medisave is 
considerable, but contributions are only made until age 55 and this constitutes 
savings accounts for future expenditure on health care over the age of 55. That is, the 
scheme pools payments across the contributor’s lifespan rather than across 
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populations. The individual accounts in China come from 5% of the total 8% of salary 
(including employer and employees). This division has already been seen as 
inappropriate since the insured tend to attempt to avoid accessing their savings while 
the pooled fund is inadequate. Local authorities can now decide on the proportions 
to be placed in individual and pooled accounts.  
The data in Table 2 are extracted from the country case studies and from replies 
to questionnaires. While very specific rates were provided for some schemes, the 
response was a general statement in others, such as “rates set according to household 
income” as in the compulsory community scheme in Japan. In any case, the rates 
cannot stand up to any meaningful comparison, as the benefits and the co-payments 
are different among the schemes. For example, all three of Singapore’s schemes only 
cover hospital-based care (including outpatient care) as health insurance benefits, 
while primary health care is provided through the government-funded community 
clinics or by employers. Prescribed drugs are included as health insurance benefits in 
most of the schemes, but are covered under a separate Pharmaceutical Benefits 
Scheme in Australia. Australia’s Medicare also provides limited dental benefit in 
public hospitals, while Singapore does not cover dental care at all and Japan 
reimburses 70% of dental care expenditure. 
Table 2: Contribution levels in the Social Health Insurance Schemes  
(by Country/Scheme) 
Country/ 
Scheme 
Employer 
% of 
salary 
Employee/ 
(% of salary) 
HH% income 
or flat rate 
Government Total 
Comments 
(on co-payment and 
benefit limits) 
Australia 
Medicare  
 
0%  
 
1.5 -2.5% of 
income 
 
Rest of budget 
 
NA* 
 
Co-payments: 15% of 
primary care fee, some 
others. 
Separate drug scheme.  
China 
Urban workers 
 
6.0% 
 
2.0% 
 
0.5% in some 
cities 
 
8% 
 
Co-payments: 20% for 
most services. Partially 
in individual account. 
RCMS (new)  NA Flat rate, less 
than 1% of 
income 
May reach 
matching 
amount 
NA High co-payments and 
ceilings. 
India 
ESIS  
CGHS  
CBHI schemes 
 
4.75% 
 
 
1.75% 
Flat rate 
Wide range 
 
 
As employer 
 
6.5% 
 
No co-payments, care 
in scheme facilities. 
Most have ceilings for 
reimbursement. 
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Country/ 
Scheme 
Employer 
% of 
salary 
Employee/ 
(% of salary) 
HH% income 
or flat rate 
Government Total 
Comments 
(on co-payment and 
benefit limits) 
Indonesia 
ASKES 
Jamsostek 
CBHI  
 
0.5% 
3-6% 
 
2.0% 
0% 
Wide range 
 
As employer 
Some subsidy 
 
NA 
 
No co-payment. 
Ceilings on 
reimbursement. 
Japan 
Workers 
Community 
Elderly 
Welfare 
 
4.0% 
-  
Transfers 
-  
 
4.0% 
Varies by 
income 
Transfers 
-- 
 
Mgnt 50% 
paid by local 
govt. 33% of 
expenditure 
All costs 
 
NA 
 
30% co-payment. 
30% co-payment. 
66% transfer . 
10% co-payment. 
Republic of 
Korea 
NHIP salaried 
 
Self-employed 
 
Medical-Aid (3%) 
 
 
1.95% 
 
-  
 
-  
 
 
1.95% 
 
According to 
assets 
-  
 
 
20-45% of 
contribution 
for self-
employed 
Pays in full 
  
 
High co-payments, 
according to service, 
reaching average of 
over 50%.  
Same benefits as other 
sectors 
Lao PDR 
CCS  
SSO  
CBHI  
 
-- 
2.2% 
-- 
 
6% for all social 
security 
1.8% Flat rate, 
About 2% 
income 
 
As employer  
-- 
-- 
-- 
 
NA 
 
No co-payment but 
amount limited. 
No co-payments. 
No co-payments. 
Mongolia 
Salaried 
Self-employed 
Indigent/ 
vulnerable 
 
3.0% 
-  
 
3.0% 
Flat rate 
 
-  
Government 
pays flat rate 
 
 
NA 
 
5-15% co-payments for 
hospital care. 
50-90% co-payment for 
drugs.  
Philippines 
PhilHealth 
CBHI 
Indigent 
 
1.25% 
-  
-  
 
 
1.25% 
Flat rate 
Flat rate-2%  
 
Central and 
local level pay 
for indigent 
families 
 
NA 
Ceilings for most care 
create low “support 
value”. 
Some have ceilings 
Low support. 
Singapore 
Medisave/ 
Medishield  
Salaried 
Self-employed 
Medifund  
 
3.0-4.0% 
-  
-  
 
3.0-4.0% 
5% net 
income 
-  
 
 
 
Funds all 
 
NA 
 
Percentage linked to 
age group. 
20% Co-payment. 
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Country/ 
Scheme 
Employer 
% of 
salary 
Employee/ 
(% of salary) 
HH% income 
or flat rate 
Government Total 
Comments 
(on co-payment and 
benefit limits) 
Thailand 
SSO (Covers 
health care, 
maternity, 
disability, death 
and cash 
allowances  
 
1.5% 
 
1.5% 
 
1.5% 
 
4.5% 
 
No co-payments 
Government benefit 
scheme for civil 
servants 
Government-all others 
through UC system. 
Viet Nam 
VSS  
VSS -Students 
VSS-CBHI  
HCFP (Scheme 
for the Poor 
 
2.0% 
 
 
1.0% 
Flat rate 
about  
$4-5/ person 
 
As employer 
Fully supports 
“Meritorious 
Persons” 
Subsidies and 
Full support 
  
20% co-payment 
(pensioners/ meritorious 
exempted) 
No co-payment. 
         *NA – not available 
 
Table I.2 also shows differences in the partners sharing the contribution burden. 
In some countries, including those which have reached universal coverage, employer 
and employee share the burden (Japan, RoK, Mongolia and Singapore), while in 
Australia, the employer does not contribute to health care other than through general 
income tax, which forms a substantial part of the source of funding.  
In Australia and Singapore, co-payments at the time of use were introduced 
mainly to create awareness and partnership in cost-sharing in universal coverage 
arrangements. In Japan, the RoK and Mongolia, co-payments were applied to limit 
demand, although the capacity of providers rather than patients in generating 
demand was recognized. Co-payments were introduced in Viet Nam after several 
years of operation, mainly as a mechanism to increase hospital revenues. It was then 
easier to implement co-payment rather than increase the fees on a more cost-related 
basis. 
There are also differences in maternity care benefits (26). In some schemes, as in 
Laos PDR and Thailand’s scheme for the private sector salaried workers, maternity 
benefits are provided as part of the health insurance branch. Or, maternity care may 
be covered by a separate social maternity insurance programme, which also includes 
cash allowances as income replacement during maternity leave. In Japan and the 
Philippines, health care costs for normal deliveries are not covered at all while the 
cash allowance for salaried-working women is provided through maternity 
insurance.  
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In all the schemes that have achieved universal coverage, government covers a 
significant part of the financial burden. In some countries (as in Japan, the RoK and 
Singapore), government funding is targeted to the support of indigent or other 
vulnerable populations. In Australia, the government not only uses general tax 
revenues to support health insurance benefits in the public delivery system, but also 
subsidizes supplementary private health insurance to enable access to private 
facilities. Government funds are also the major source in the Pharmaceutical Benefits 
Scheme through the subsidization of a defined list of drugs. 
In countries with low coverage, governments are now increasing commitments 
to cover the indigent and other vulnerable populations through substantial or even 
full payment of contributions. This is an important shift from the previous ideology 
of free care for the poor or exempting poor from user charges in public hospitals.  
The purchase of “health insurance cards for the poor and vulnerable” as in 
Mongolia, Viet Nam and now in the Philippines essentially means that the 
contributing and non-contributing insured persons should have the same access to 
health insurance benefits. In Viet Nam, the purchase of health insurance cards for the 
poor is expected to apply to around 14 million individuals (about 18% of the 
population) in the next few years. For this population, there will be no payments at 
the time of receiving comprehensive benefits.  
An often missed issue is the extent to which these programmes are indeed 
“poor friendly”. In the Philippines, the local government funds (from local taxes) are 
inadequate to allow subsidization of all families living below the poverty level, 
which may be over 40% in some very low-income provinces. Even with additional 
national funds, some provinces may not be able to support more than around 25% of 
their indigent populations. An environment of competition between poor families to 
be identified as “poorest” has developed. Free health insurance cards do not mean 
that all benefits are fully covered, as the same low support value still applies 
whereby the patient has to find cash to cover a significant portion of a hospital care 
bill. A recent positive change was the inclusion of ambulatory health care benefits for 
the population covered by the Indigent Programme (other insured persons are still 
limited to hospital-based benefits). The expansion of benefits to ambulatory care 
answers the need for access to primary health care and reduces the likelihood that 
patients will be requested to pay additional charges.  
There appears to be some trade-off between maintaining low contribution 
levels, and the benefits covered as well as the level of co-payment. One example is 
the Republic of Korea, where the rate could be considered very low for a newly 
industrialized country. The decision to allow only very minor adjustments to the 
contribution rate is driven by economic policies, linked to the need to keep labour 
costs from negatively affecting the price of exported goods. In recent years, the 
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Republic of Korea has made very significant efforts to reduce expenditures rather 
than increase revenues from contributions. The measures taken have included the 
merging of funds and a campaign to encourage rational health care seeking 
behaviour. Efforts are now turning to a more stringent review of providers and to 
changing provider payment from the purely fee-for-service system.  In the recent 
efforts in Japan to merge social health insurance schemes, the motives are not only to 
increase the level of social pooling. An important by-product of the mergers is the 
potential to reduce administrative costs, leaving a high proportion of the contribution 
revenues for the provision of health care benefits.  
A very different situation regarding low contributions, limited benefits and 
high co-payment prevails in the rural health insurance schemes in China. The 
contributions in China even with subsidies from the local and central governments 
are too low to enable an attractive benefit package, and involve considerable 
uncertainty in the actual amount which may be charged at the time of use. Although 
the flat rate contributions were low, the schemes requested annual payment in 
advance, which many rural residents found difficult to make. The combination of a 
lack of experience in prepayment for goods and systems, lack of flexibility in 
contribution collection plus the uncertainty of the real value of the prepayment at the 
time of use make such schemes unattractive for the target beneficiaries. It is hardly 
surprising that the extension of coverage is very slow in these populations. 
The question posed is whether universal coverage is dependent on the 
contribution burden and sharing. With the wide range of contribution levels, even 
considering the differences in the benefits covered and co-payments at the time of 
use in some schemes, it would be incorrect to link universal coverage with the level 
and sharing of contributions. Universal coverage has been achieved with both low 
and higher contribution rates, and with different combinations of sharing between 
employers, employees or households and the government. 
Two factors related to contributions probably increase the potential to reach 
universal coverage. First reason is the formal commitment by the government to 
support the poor and other vulnerable populations. There is no standard definition for 
the latter category. Who is considered vulnerable and deserving may depend more 
on historical and cultural values than any other factor.  This is the case in Viet Nam, 
where the government has always paid the contributions of about one million 
individuals categorized as “meritorious citizens” for their past contributions to 
society (mainly in the liberation of the country). The government subsidies for the 
self-employed in Japan and the RoK were probably critical to cover this population. 
The Thai government has recently decided to reach universal coverage by taking on 
the financial responsibility for all the population excluded from the public and 
private salaried sector schemes. In this case, the responsibility is linked to a fixed 
amount per person paid to specific providers. The viability of this financial burden 
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has not yet been established, and the government is in favour of expanding the 
proportion of the population that can be covered by the social insurance system. 
The second essential factor is good governance. The revenues accruing from 
contributions are dependent upon the honest reporting of salaries by employers and 
income or assets, especially in the case of the self-employed. These are dependent on 
good governance. The financial viability of social health insurance funds generally 
determines to what extent both the SHI benefits and management can be improved. 
In the transition from limited coverage to universal coverage, the attractiveness of 
social health insurance and interest among the non-insured populations will be 
linked to the performance of the existing schemes, in terms of registration, the 
payment of contributions including co-payments, the provision of benefits and 
provider payment, all of which depend on good governance within the social 
insurance schemes. 
4.5 How Important is the Provider Payment Mechanism? 
A priori, it is not possible to specify which provider payment method is appropriate 
to achieve universal coverage through social health insurance. The different method 
or mix of methods of payment mechanisms is important in achieving cost control, 
with which it is very difficult to extend both coverage and benefits.  
As shown in Table 3, the different countries used all the conventional provider 
payment methods including fee-for-service, capitation, case payments, some 
applying DRG and flat amounts per in-patient day. In some schemes in India and 
Indonesia, where most health care benefits are provided directly by the scheme’s 
own health facilities, the provider payment is essentially a budgetary allocation to 
operate the services.  
The question which could then be asked is whether specific provider payment 
methods have any impact on improving coverage. The previous sections noted the 
importance of the attractiveness of the schemes. This factor is not only dependent on 
affordable contributions and flexibility in collection. Attractiveness and long-term 
interest are more likely to be linked to the perception of the quality of health care 
benefits and satisfaction among both the insured and providers. These factors may be 
directly and indirectly affected by the provider payment methods.  
Australia and Japan both developed their universal coverage schemes on the 
foundation of their original voluntary schemes which used ‘capitation’. Yet, fee-for-
service was adopted as the main method when universal coverage was legislated, 
possibly following the then current patterns in the West, where fee-for-service was 
perceived as enabling more professional freedom and greater choice by the insured 
person(27). In those countries with almost universal coverage through SHI and using 
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fee-for-service as the main provider payment method (like in Australia, Japan, RoK 
and Singapore), measures are applied to limit payment to providers and to prevent 
abuse. All of them use fixed-fee schedules, negotiated between the insurance 
agencies with providers and updated according to regulations. While in Australia 
and Singapore, there is virtually no over-billing by the doctors, additional gratuities 
are commonly given to the doctors in Japan and the RoK, especially when treatment 
involves a hospital admission. On the other hand, Thailand’s system of universal 
coverage through SHI and other government-funded scheme uses capitation as the 
main provider payment method. 
Australia, Japan, RoK and Singapore have sophisticated computerized claims 
review systems, with the capacity to target patterns of inappropriate provision of 
care by specific providers. As noted in the Singapore country report, provider 
payments methods based on the volume and type of service require very efficient 
management of the claims processing and billing systems with computer linkages 
between providers and the schemes.  
Many health insurance schemes are generally faced with provider pressure to 
be paid (or patient pressure to be reimbursed) and their own pressure for reliable 
review of all claims. Claims of inappropriate use, misuse or abuse are often difficult 
to prove when clinical decisions of health care professionals are involved. The tasks 
can be done at high administrative cost with sophisticated information systems, even 
incorporating financial caps on the earnings of providers whose incomes from 
insurance go above set levels. It has taken these well-established health insurance 
systems many years to reach such procedures.  
Despite the tight controls that are imposed on levels of income of providers 
through these systems, fee-for-service has remained the preferred method for 
providers in these countries. The social health insurance schemes, however, are keen 
to shift to other mechanisms, such as more case payment and capitation. 
The situation becomes more complex when fee-for-service is used, especially in 
the lower-income countries and in schemes that are still in the developmental stage 
and have only rudimentary health and financial management information systems. 
In the Philippines, problems with fraudulent claims from hospitals were a major 
reason for not extending benefits to ambulatory care and delaying the enrolment of 
the informal sector in the previous Medicare scheme.  
The practice of submitting fraudulent claims was facilitated by the lack of an 
appropriate claims review procedure. Under the new administration of PhilHealth 
there are now efforts to cover ambulatory care, but through capitation contracts with 
providers. The limitation to hospital-based care has been a strong factor in the lack of 
attractiveness of the scheme, and the country case studies of fraud obviously did not 
increase credibility with regard to the financial management of the scheme. 
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Mongolia faced similar problems, particularly in the first two years of 
implementation, and quickly shifted from a strictly fee-for-service method to 
prospective flat amounts per day for inpatient benefits. The change did not solve all 
the problems, as hospitals began to increase the length of stay, and retroactive case 
payment was then applied. When benefits were expanded to ambulatory care in the 
community, capitation payment was agreed with the general practitioners from the 
start. 
An important issue in the development of new schemes is the capacity to 
control costs and safeguard the financial viability of the schemes, while keeping 
administrative costs as low as possible. The capitation method, which facilitates cost 
control and requires a less complex and less costly billing system, has therefore been 
adopted by several new social health insurance schemes, as in Thailand and Laos 
PDR (in both the formal sector and the community- based schemes). Contrary to their 
initial expectations, capitation is now preferred by the providers. The method implies 
that the provider is paid in advance, regardless of actual use by the insured 
population. Particularly after decentralization of the Ministry of Health budgets and 
the transfer of some financial autonomy to public hospitals, the directors of hospitals 
are interested in having a regular input of funds from a third party source, which 
does not necessitate follow-up individual patients for payment.  
Any payment method can be problematic in countries with new social health 
insurance schemes. If public hospitals are under-funded to start with, the low and 
irregularly paid staff may not welcome patients who have prepaid for their care. 
Opportunities for under-the-table payments are reduced by such schemes. Until 
hospital revenue from health insurance became a significant factor in the budgets of 
hospitals in Viet Nam, there were complaints of a negative attitude by the staff 
towards the insured population. The same problem was faced in Thailand, at the 
start of the social health insurance system for private sector salaried workers, which 
uses the capitation method. 
The fee-for-service method may be more popular among providers in high-
income countries with established social insurance schemes - with well-developed 
information systems. Capitation, with the potential for regular income and exclusion 
of the patients from the financial transaction, may increase the popularity of the 
health insurance scheme among health workers and the insured population in low-
income countries. This interest and satisfaction among all parties, and the financial 
viability of new social health insurance schemes, are important determinants of the 
rate of extension of coverage, and ultimately the potential to reach universal 
coverage. 
Acceptance of the new schemes will obviously increase if health workers see 
direct benefits in the form of increased income, and the provider payment method is 
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an important consideration in assuring that increase. If provider income is dependent 
on the volume of care provided in a fee-for-service system, conflict develops between 
the scheme, provider and the insured, as occurred in Mongolia, Viet Nam and the 
Philippines. Providers want to generate use, patients are angered by the co-payments 
(the amount can be substantial and the percentage system is regressive) while the 
schemes run out of funds. The conflict is particularly difficult to resolve when the 
Ministry of Health is responsible for both the public providers and the health 
insurance scheme. 
Table 3: Provider payment methods in Social Health Insurance Schemes by country 
Country/ 
Scheme 
Main Payment method 
for Community 
Ambulatory Care 
Main Payment 
Method for Hospital 
Care 
Comments 
Australia 
Medicare  
 
Fee-for-service 
 
Per in-patient day in 
private hospitals 
 
Fixed fee schedules. 
Most hospital benefits 
provided in public 
hospitals where staff 
are salaried, DRGs 
widely used. 
China 
Urban workers 
RCMS (new)  
 
Fee-for-service 
Fee-for-service 
 
Various methods 
Fee-for-service 
 
Most pay fee-for-
service, but some areas 
now use case payment, 
per inpatient day and 
capitation.  
Few use capitation. 
India 
ESIS 
CGHS  
CBHI Schemes 
 
Salaried staff 
Salaried staff 
Fee-for-service 
Capitation 
 
Salaried staff 
Salaried staff 
Fee-for-service 
Capitation 
 
Most services in 
ESIS/CGHS facilities 
Fee-for-service for 
outside services  
Schemes facilities. 
Some have own health 
facilities. 
Indonesia 
ASKES 
Jamsostek 
CBHI  
 
Salaried staff 
Fee-for-service 
Fee-for-service 
 
Salaried staff  
Fee-for-service 
Fee-for-service 
 
Askes own health care 
facilities. 
Some schemes use 
capitation. 
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Country/ 
Scheme 
Main Payment method 
for Community 
Ambulatory Care 
Main Payment 
Method for Hospital 
Care 
Comments 
Japan 
Workers 
Community 
Elderly 
 
Fee-for-service 
Fee-for-service 
Fee-for-service 
 
Fee-for-service 
Fee-for-service 
Fee-for-service 
 
Case payment in 
university hospitals, 
Some now use adapted 
DRGs.  
Government budgets 
for specific services 
(e.g. for new and 
emerging infections).  
Republic of 
Korea 
All population 
 
Fee-for-service 
 
Fee-for-service 
 
Fee-for-service remains 
the only method 
Fixed-fee schedules 
Lao PDR 
CCS  
SSO  
CBHI  
 
Salaried staff 
Capitation 
Capitation 
 
Fee-for-service 
Capitation 
Capitation 
 
Based on hospital user 
charges 
Capitation paid to 
hospital as main 
provider. 
Capitation paid to 
hospital as main 
provider. 
Fee-for-service 
payment by SSO for 
services outside 
capitation agreement. 
Mongolia 
All populations 
 
Capitation  
 
Case payment per 
admission 
 
Capitation is paid to the 
family general 
practitioners. 
Philippines 
PhilHealth 
All populations 
 
 
CBHI 
 
Fee-for-service 
 
 
Fee-for-service 
Capitation 
 
Fee-for-service 
 
 
Fee-for-service 
Capitation 
 
Guidelines for fees in 
public hospitals, private 
hospitals can set own 
fees. 
Capitation now tried.  
Some schemes have 
own primary health care 
facilities.  
 Singapore 
All populations 
 
Fee-for-service 
 
Per inpatient day 
Case payment 
 
Fixed-fee schedules, 
but private practitioners 
and hospitals charge 
more. 
  55 Selected Case Studies from Asia and the Pacific 
Country/ 
Scheme 
Main Payment method 
for Community 
Ambulatory Care 
Main Payment 
Method for Hospital 
Care 
Comments 
Thailand 
SSO 
 
Capitation 
 
Capitation 
 
Capitation paid to 
hospital as main 
provider. 
Fee-for-service 
payment by SSO for 
services outside 
capitation agreement. 
Viet Nam 
VSSI – 
compulsory and 
voluntary  
VSSI – Poor 
 
Fee-for-service 
 
Capitation  
 
Fee-for-service 
 
Capitation 
 
Total amount to single 
provider is capped.  
Trials with capitation for 
community (voluntary) 
populations and health 
cards for poor started in 
2003. 
 
Social insurance systems cannot easily increase their contribution rates to deal 
with deficits, particularly when the cause is the provision of unnecessary benefits. As 
the capitation method implies a fixed amount at regular intervals regardless of use, the 
revenues can be used to increase the incomes of the provider’s health workers 
according to a plan or negotiated agreement with the staff. This may be more difficult 
to do under fee-for-service payment. The major disadvantage of the capitation method 
is the potential for under-service to the patient, and this needs to be controlled through 
an appropriate quality assurance and utilization review system. 
4.6  What Role Can Voluntary and Community-Based Health 
Insurance Play in Reaching Universal Coverage? 
As noted above, voluntary health insurance, through community-based health 
insurance (CBHI) or micro-insurance schemes, is now gaining support as an option 
for the informal sector. Evidence of this interest is the recent publications on the 
subject, which have moved from descriptions of the establishment of specific 
schemes(28-31), through lists of reported schemes and recently to more in-depth 
analyses of specific aspects of CBHI (32-36). In Thailand, efforts are being made by 
national formal SHI schemes to enable coverage on a voluntary basis for individuals 
who have shifted from salaried to self-employment status. Viet Nam is now 
intensifying efforts to cover the informal sector through its national scheme. 
The difficulties in extending coverage to this large population sector by the 
small formal sector schemes are now better understood by the international 
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development agencies dealing with social protection and ILO has launched new 
initiatives to find solutions for “excluded populations”.  The informal sector 
generally does not have the same leadership through association with fellow workers 
as in the formal sector (through unions). Their priorities for household expenditure 
may not include regular prepayment towards the contingency of ill-health. Other 
efforts to develop CBHI relate to concern with poverty and the linkage between 
poverty and paying for health care ( 37-39). National authorities are currently reviewing 
the potential for voluntary community-based schemes to provide access to health 
care, and some countries have included plans to develop social health insurance 
efforts at the community level in their Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP).  
As discussed below, voluntary schemes have an important role to play in 
extending social health insurance coverage, both through voluntary membership in 
compulsory schemes and CBHI schemes. However, the potential of such schemes to 
help reach universal coverage may depend on the perception of their attractiveness 
in terms of real financial protection at the time of illness and perception of the quality 
of care provided as benefits. As with compulsory schemes, limitations in their design 
may be the major reasons for problems in creating and sustaining positive 
perceptions. 
The governments of Australia and Japan proposed legislation for social health 
insurance to cover all population sectors when there was positive experience with 
voluntary health insurance. The Friendly Societies in Australia and the “Jyorei” in 
Japan were open to all interested individuals for membership, and all dependants 
were covered. Undoubtedly, this positive exposure to prepayment mechanisms to 
protect all family members against the risks of paying for health care, and to 
eliminate financial barriers at the time of use, paved the way for public acceptance of 
the universal coverage concept (40). The long delays in implementation of universal 
coverage in Australia were not caused by the lack of interest of the public at large, 
but mainly by opposition from the medical association and political concerns with 
increasing forms of compulsory taxes. 
If the recent development of CBHI is examined in more detail, there are crucial 
differences in the development environment compared to the early voluntary 
schemes in Australia and Japan. The first members of these schemes generally had 
the financial capacity to enrol and maintain their contributions. In Australia, if not in 
rural Japan, there was some familiarity with other non-life insurance systems, such as 
property and motor vehicle insurance. There is still negligence familiarity with these 
concepts for example in rural India or Indonesia. 
The capacity to pay contributions on a regular basis has been a major problem 
in several of the countries. In China, the State Council decision in 1993 was to 
develop health insurance for the rural population by re-establishing the RCMS that 
prevailed before the economic transition.  The reason for not wanting to create a new 
entity was the positive perception of the rural population to the RCMS. The initial 
lack of success was not due to the lack of willingness to pay, but capacity to pay. In 
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addition, registration and contribution collection were only possible once a year in an 
administrative environment that was not “user-friendly” and not geared to social 
marketing. The new RCMS had very low contributions but also provided limited 
benefits at low quality and a low level of reimbursement after long delays. The lack 
of capacity soon became a lack of willingness to pay. 
The country report of Viet Nam covers voluntary affiliation in the national 
social health insurance system, aimed at the dependants of insured workers, the 
informal sector population and students. The first two groups showed little interest, 
again because of the lack of familiarity with prepayment, the lack of flexibility in 
registration and contribution collection as well as benefit limitations. Affiliation was 
minimal until the recent efforts starting in 2002 to encourage enrolment among the 
informal sector population. Voluntary coverage was more successful in terms of 
numbers in the student population. In an effort to boost voluntary coverage through 
the VHI, students’ health insurance was introduced to cover several million 
schoolchildren as the Ministry of Education became an active partner in registration 
and collection of contributions through the schools(41). 
The coverage of the family including all dependent children is obviously 
preferable to covering workers through compulsory insurance and then attempting 
to cover non-economically active family members through voluntary mechanisms, 
including a special programme for schoolchildren. One of the disadvantages of the 
students’ programme has been the exclusion of children who are not in school, either 
because they are homebound due to disabilities or because they are drop-outs. The 
programme still had some advantages. The students insurance in Viet Nam made an 
important “contribution” by creating awareness of the value of the prepayment 
mechanism among the families of the millions of children. 
The country case studies of India, Indonesia, Laos PDR and the Philippines 
provide the development of CBHI in detail. The growth of voluntary CBHI in these 
countries has been more haphazard and problematic in terms of the level of pooling 
and capacity, to provide an appropriate spectrum of high quality health care to meet 
the populations’ needs. Despite the strong community ownership that was an 
integral part of their development, many schemes collapsed after several years of 
operation.  
Very few of the CBHI schemes developed in India, Indonesia and the 
Philippines offer membership to individuals or families outside their own immediate 
group. In addition to the low level of pooling as noted above, common reasons are 
problems with financial viability, which may be caused by high drop-out rates in 
populations with little understanding of the principle of insurance, and changes in 
their capacity to pay regular contributions. The lack of flexibility in registration and 
contribution collection exacerbates these problems, as noted in the descriptions of 
CBHI in all countries. In each of the countries, there are successful schemes, but there 
are few cases of significant expansion and replication or adaptation to other 
communities (42).  
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The experiences in India and Indonesia in particular show that voluntary CBHI 
cannot be imposed on populations but needs to be developed in partnership, through 
civil society organizations and following government policies if not in full 
partnership with local government. The process recognizes that successful schemes 
cannot become models for replication, but that core elements need to be identified, 
and adaptation is required for each new population. Basic tools, such as information 
tools with membership data base management and benefit definitions, can be 
transferred, but some adjustment to deal with local conditions.  
At the same time, the involvement of all stakeholders can mean that the growth 
of voluntary CBHI schemes is slower than initially envisaged, and slower than the 
usual pace of work of international development agencies. It takes time to appreciate 
that slower may be better in the long run, and to understand the local politics which 
hinder or help the growth of the scheme. Experience in the Philippines has shown that 
local government can be extremely helpful in providing support and extending 
coverage to new populations over which it has some leverage, such as associations 
requiring licences for vendors or service providers. On the other hand, local 
governments can create significant delays in growth by proposing alternatives that 
may not be better ideas but simply plans based on vested interests or jealousy 
regarding the success of the schemes developed by community organizations (42).  
The new interest in CBHI is promising. Governments are now becoming 
involved in efforts to establish CBHI for vulnerable populations, and have committed 
resources to the process. These resources may be limited to developing guidelines 
and technical assistance in setting up the administrative mechanisms, as in the 
Philippines and Indonesia. In India, state governments are also sponsoring the 
establishment and subsidization of CBHI for specific vulnerable groups. 
Perhaps the most interesting example of government involvement is in Laos 
PDR, where the Ministry of Health has regulated the establishment of pilot CBHI 
schemes and is an active partner in their planning, implementation and evaluation.  
These schemes are in very different parts of the country but follow the same design 
with minor adjustments for local conditions related to household income or the 
provision of health care. The Ministry of Health is now keen to expand these schemes 
to other parts of the country as fast as possible.  
Community-based health insurance can provide more than access to basic 
health care. A secondary benefit is the empowerment that comes from enabling 
access to an essential service, and the development of a sense of pride in the 
realization of dignity rather than charity in accessing health care. This is a central 
principle in strategies towards social justice and emphasizes the creativity of people 
living in poverty and of local communities as the source for social improvement. 
Even the smallest voluntary schemes remain important today for low-income 
populations in countries that have not yet reached universal coverage. There are two 
major reasons for this: first, they provide access for the low income populations 
(which obviously cannot afford the high premiums of commercial for-profit 
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insurance) and second, these schemes increase the knowledge and awareness of the 
benefits of health insurance, therefore stimulating interest in other population groups 
and political leaders.  
The interim goal should, therefore, be to expand membership in existing and 
new CBHI schemes until a critical mass of social health insurance is reached and 
legislation on universal coverage can be introduced. Optimally, the introduction of 
compulsory social health insurance will also facilitate broad social protection for the 
population excluded from such mechanisms for the formal salaried sectors, through 
appropriate sharing of the burden between households and government.  
The impetus for the development of community health insurance may have 
come from a vacuum in access to health care and exclusion from existing social health 
protection mechanisms. The efforts to reach the critical mass of coverage will need far 
more coordination and regulation than before. This is where government support in 
determining best practice in all aspects of CBHI, setting minimal standards and 
creating networks becomes crucial.  
If it is necessary to go through a phase of extending social safety nets for health 
through small voluntary insurance schemes, the challenge will be to develop 
networks of community-based schemes that follow the same basic principles and 
design. It would also be unfortunate if the development of social health insurance 
becomes an area of donor competition. The uncoordinated development of small 
voluntary schemes by a variety of donors and other development partners could also 
undermine appropriate assessment of the impact of voluntary health insurance over 
time.  
When universal coverage legislation is launched, it will mean that membership 
in a social health insurance scheme, including community-based schemes, will be 
compulsory for the entire population. It should also mean that these funds will be 
pooled with the social health insurance funds of other population sectors, so that 
CBHI does not continue to cover the low-income population with low contributions. 
Universal coverage should also mean the optimal spread of risks and pooling of 
funds, with solidarity enhanced by the sharing of interest and ownership between all 
population sectors.  
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5 
Conclusions 
5.1  Social Health Insurance as the Major  
Financing Mechanism  
Policy makers around the world are continually reviewing their own health systems 
– especially the way the health care financing mechanisms are adopted. After 
reviewing the experience in the selected 12 countries of Asia and the Pacific, the 
interest in social health insurance as a major health care financing mechanism 
appears to be stable and confirmed.  Most of them tried to achieve the goal of 
universal access to health care, until more citizens can be covered by compulsory and 
voluntary prepayment mechanisms.  It is still difficult for many developing countries 
to have universal coverage through compulsory and voluntary prepayment schemes, 
due to the existence of large informal sector and difficulty in premium collection and 
enforcement.  
Realizing the universal coverage of access to key promotive, preventive, 
curative and rehabilitative health interventions for all at an affordable cost is 
dependent on organizational mechanisms that would ensure financial-risk protection 
and equity in financing. A key common characteristic of successful health financing 
is that some part of the financial contributions of households is prepaid and pooled. 
However, no health systems would meet the full cost of health services out of the 
prepaid and pooled funds collected by tax or insurance contributions. Many of them 
required co-payment, sometimes of an informal nature. 
The countries that have reached universal coverage are now dealing with 
changes necessitated by shifts in the demography and disease patterns of their 
populations. With the percentage of insured population over 60 years constituting 
between 10% and 20% of total membership, all these countries have introduced 
additional insurance mechanisms, to cope up with the ageing of their members. The 
focus now is on activities to promote health and apply preventive measures to reduce 
the onset and progression of chronic diseases. The social insurance schemes of 
Australia, Japan, the RoK and Mongolia are now integrating personal preventive care 
and health promotion as health insurance benefits for individuals and for the insured 
population at large. Singapore is increasing its public health activities in 
collaboration with the social insurance systems to enforce the prevention of chronic 
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diseases. However, experience in reducing chronic illness and disability shows that 
all social health insurance schemes, regardless of whether they are old or new, 
compulsory or voluntary and large or small, should cover prevention and health 
promotion (20).  
The prepayment element in social health insurance, whether as a single national 
scheme or through the pluralistic approach as in Japan and RoK, creates commitment 
between the contributors, the scheme and the health care providers. The commitment 
in turn promotes sensitivity to changes in consumer culture. Members now tend to 
be more demanding as patients and have new knowledge and preferences regarding 
their own health care. Australia has been responsive to these changes by developing 
private health insurance as supplementary health insurance on a voluntary basis to 
enable the use of private facilities that are not generally covered. Private for-profit 
health insurance has also grown in Japan and RoK, mainly to cover the high co-
payments. In all cases, persons with for-profit private insurance cannot opt out of the 
public schemes (as in Indonesia), so that private insurance has not weakened the 
socially pooled funds. 
The previous Chapter reviewed the countries' experience based on six essential 
questions.  As noted, it might be necessary to reach a critical mass for coverage, 
before the government can enact legislation on universal coverage. It is, not yet, 
possible to predict on what would be the exact percentage of the population that 
should be suitable for any specific country to start with.  For some countries, positive 
experience with SHI coverage of around 30% of the population may suffice. Others 
may need to cover more than half the population, before debating a compulsory 
mechanism. Possible intervening factors are the dispersion of the population, the 
categorization of populations between urban and rural residents and the maturity or 
capacity of the existing systems to take on new populations.  
The analysis shows that there are no simple and replicable models for social 
health insurance. There are general principles, objectives and components that may 
be common to all schemes. Within a geographical area such as Asia and the Pacific, 
the social, cultural and economic differences would prevent the simple replication of 
successful SHI schemes from one country to another. Even within each country, 
simple replication for expansion to other geographical regions may not be effective. 
Differences in levels of income in urban and rural populations, as well as differences 
in the administrative structures on which to build the social health insurance 
schemes may dictate how the principles might be followed to achieve the goals of 
social protection. 
The transition to universal coverage may take several years, even several 
decades. The length of time is also not predictable. There could be some interruptions 
in the middle of best-laid plans, because of changes in government policies, 
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particularly when the changes include different political ideologies regarding 
solidarity and equity in access to social services and privatization (43). There may also 
be delays because of economic crises.  
On the other hand, epidemics of new and emerging communicable diseases 
such as Avian Influenza and HIV/AIDS, or the re-emergence of diseases such as 
tuberculosis and malaria could spark acceleration in the process, as it becomes clear 
that early access to health care is crucial to prevent the spread of such diseases.  
Essential elements that would determine the speed of transition are the relative 
acceptance of the value and concept of solidarity in society, the effectiveness of 
government stewardship/governance, and the people's trust in the government and 
its institutions. Another element is the availability of skilled managerial personnel to 
facilitate the effective management of a nation-wide SHI schemes. 
While the length of time for achieving UC cannot be predicted, the analysis of 
social health insurance experiences in selected countries of Asia and the Pacific yields 
a few sets of recommendations on how to increase the potential for achieving 
universal coverage.  
5.2 Recommendations to Increase the Potential to  
Reach Universal Coverage 
The need for compulsory mechanisms: 
¦ The laws and regulations for compulsory social insurance should be based 
on national legislative tools and frameworks, rather than on laws and 
regulations taken from other countries. 
¦ The core principles need to be defined in the basic legislation while 
components needing amendment or updating over time should be 
covered in implementing rules and regulations attached to the law. 
¦ The legislative instrument should include strong sanctions to ensure 
compliance, particularly in the registration of the target population and 
the collection of contributions. 
Design factors to overcome limitations: 
¦ All members of the family should be entitled to health insurance benefits 
through a family contribution, with the definition of family adapted to 
suit the cultural and religious values of the population. 
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¦ Family coverage should respect the principle that each member of the 
family is covered in his/her own right. 
¦ Contributory social health insurance schemes should apply to both public 
and private sector salaried workers, and their dependants. 
¦ Social health insurance should be compulsory for salaried employees in 
enterprises of all sizes and among employees at all salary levels, with the 
appropriate ceilings for the calculation of contributions. That is, very low 
and very high wage earners should not be exempt from the schemes. 
¦ Health care benefits should include ambulatory and inpatient care, and 
cover preventive, curative and rehabilitative services.  
¦ The comprehensive health care benefits should have a strong primary 
health care base, with continuity, and an efficient referral system for 
secondary and tertiary care. 
¦ The law governing social health insurance should include procedures for 
the regular updating of health insurance benefits. 
Coverage of the informal sector and community-based health insurance:  
¦ Compulsory social health insurance or broad social security schemes 
should be strengthened to extend coverage to the informal sector. 
¦ If the existing social insurance schemes cannot cover the informal sector, 
or cannot cover rural populations due to a lack of representation in some 
areas, community based or micro-insurance schemes should be developed 
for such excluded populations, at all income levels and through the 
support and collaboration of government and non-government initiatives. 
¦ All established schemes should follow national regulations and basic 
guidelines covering the core principles of social health insurance and in 
ensuring the administrative integrity of the schemes. 
¦ All community-based or micro-insurance schemes should be covered by a 
network, sponsored by governments, to assist their operation through the 
provision of training activities, monitoring and evaluation and the 
exchange of information on experiences. 
¦ Government and development partners should take an active role in 
increasing awareness among the population about voluntary coverage and 
community-based schemes. 
¦ Linkages should be established between the compulsory social insurance 
schemes, and community-based and micro-insurance schemes to ensure 
  64 Social Health Insurance 
basic compatibility in entitlement and benefits across the schemes, and 
enable the eventual creation of conditions for universal coverage. 
The contribution burden and partners: 
¦ The contribution rate and amount borne by all partners should be 
affordable by the majority, with family contributions based on an agreed 
formula rather than contributions for each individual in the family. 
¦ Where relevant, the contribution should be shared between employers 
and employees, with employers responsible for at least 50% of the burden. 
¦ Sources of funding, from different levels of government, need to be 
identified and committed through legislation to share the contribution 
burden for the low-income, self-employed and informal sector workers. 
¦ Contribution collection for the self-employed and informal population 
sectors should be regular but flexible and take account of the capacity to 
pay in this population.  
¦ For families and individuals that cannot contribute, sources of financing 
should be identified and committed through legislation to subsidize or 
fully cover the contributions as social assistance programmes. 
¦ In new schemes and until there are justifications for change the prepaid 
contribution should be the only form of payment into the social health 
insurance scheme made by the insured. That is, co-payments and limits by 
cash amount and volume of services should be avoided, particularly when 
the newly insured population has low utilization patterns. 
¦ The law governing social health insurance should include regulations on 
the procedures and frequency of changes in contribution rates.  
Provider payment: 
¦ The methods and conditions of provider payment should be defined in 
contracts with accredited providers of the benefits covered by the social 
health insurance scheme. 
¦ The provider payment method should not facilitate the generation of 
demand by providers but promote the rational use of health care benefits 
with maximal satisfaction among both the insured and the providers.  
¦ The provider payment method should be compatible with the capacity of 
the scheme to deal with the financial transactions involved, through 
information systems that adequately cover entitlement of the insured, 
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identification of providers, the type and mix of health care benefits, and 
permit linkage with quality assurance systems.  
¦ To the extent possible and particularly in new schemes, capitation 
payment to providers should be applied as the optimal method to enable 
cost control, with very limited fee-for-service payment for defined 
exclusions from the list of services covered by capitation. 
¦ Provider incentives should be incorporated through guidelines on 
effective ways to use health insurance revenues at the local provider level.  
¦ The use of health insurance revenues at local provider level should 
include regular and sustained improvement in health worker income, as a 
direct result of the introduction of social health insurance. This increment 
may be linked to the number of families or persons covered by the 
insurance but should not be linked to the volume and type of services 
provided. 
Inter-dependence:  
¦ The financial viability of the fund does not depend on any single 
management function. The financial sustainability of a scheme should also 
be assured by the design factors linked to revenues by reaching the 
maximal rate of compliance in contribution collection, and to expenditure 
factors, by using the appropriate provider payments method and the 
appropriate benefits. Preventive services and health promotion can be 
important in controlling costs related to both acute infectious diseases and 
chronic conditions, and in both new as well as mature schemes. 
¦ There is inter-dependence between many recommendations stated above. 
¦ The inter-dependence between these factors also points to the importance 
of partnerships among all stakeholders in developing social protection, 
including health care. In most countries in Asia and the Pacific, public 
sector health facilities are still providing essential health care. Effective 
collaboration and coordination between the Ministry of Health and the 
social insurance schemes at all levels (national, regional and local) will 
impact a range of factors. These include procedures for the accreditation of 
both public and private health care providers and agreement on pricing 
policies (including the capitation amount) between the providers and the 
scheme. Effective collaboration will also facilitate responsiveness to 
changes in the needs and preferences of the insured population. 
Procedures to update health care benefits over time, and the reinforcement 
of prevention and health promotion, depend on collaboration between the 
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social health insurance scheme and public health authorities, regardless of 
their role in the direct provision of health care. 
Countries' commitment and solidarity:  
¦ In all of the above, the underlying conditions are government commitment 
to solidarity and to equity in access to health care. The crucial factor is 
making social health insurance work through good governance. 
Compulsory social health insurance to reach universal coverage requires 
the enactment of appropriate legislation. The enforcement and periodic 
amendment of regulations to deal with changes in the needs of the insured 
population require good governance.  
¦ Well-managed social health insurance schemes can provide stable funds 
for continued improvement in the health system. It is reasonable to expect 
that credibility in the system will come from a better-funded scheme based 
on broad pooling of low and high-income earners, and low and high-risk 
populations. Providers should then have the ability to operate their 
services efficiently and health workers should derive satisfaction from 
being able to practise their professions in an efficient environment and 
with reasonable remuneration. The greatest gains are for the insured, 
whose regular and fair prepayment should guarantee timely access to 
health care of assured quality without facing financial barriers at the time 
of use and for any family member. 
WHO views universal coverage, which is secure access to basic health care for 
all at an affordable price, as the ultimate objective of social health insurance. Timely 
technical expertise from international development partners and technical 
cooperation among the countries in the Regions can assist the process of reaching 
universal coverage.  
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Australia 
Roy Harvey 
1. Background  
The Australian health system has been very successful by a number of criteria while 
it has had a few significant failures. The health of most Australians has improved 
significantly over the last 30 years: in 1970 the life expectancy of Australians was 
ranked 17th in the world, by 1987 it ranked 9th and by 2000 it ranked 3rd, almost equal 
to that of Sweden and just lower than Japan (AIHW 2002).  
The life expectancy at birth for males was 76.6 years and for females 82.0 years 
(based on the years 1998-2000). While many social and economic factors have 
contributed to this improvement, it is likely that the equity of access by both high-
and-low income people to well-organized and funded health services has contributed 
to this success. Some of the health programmes in Australia, such as the HIV/AIDS 
programme and the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme, have been used as models by 
many countries.  
On the other hand the health of Aboriginal and Torres Straits Islanders is 
among the worst of any indigenous peoples in the world. The estimated life 
expectancy at birth for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander males and females is 19-
20 years lower than for other Australians. This is comparable to the life expectancy of 
the whole Australian population in 1910-1920 (AIHW 2002 page199).  
There are still significant differences in mortality rates between income groups 
within Australia, although this is, in part, due to the health of higher-income 
Australians improving faster that of lower-income groups, rather than a deterioration 
of health for lower-income groups.  
In 2001-2002 Australia spent Australian (A) $66.6 billion on health services, A$ 3 
397 per person – 9.3% of GDP. Health expenditure, as a percentage of GDP, is about 
average for high-income countries. Australia is regarded as having been successful in 
controlling the rate of health care costs increases and, on average, achieving 
significant improvements in health.  
Australia is a large country (7.7 million square kilometres), with a relatively 
small population (20.03 million in January 2004). The World Bank classifies Australia 
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as a high-income country. The Gross domestic product per person in Australia 
during 2002-2003 was A$ 37 192 (US$ 21 805 using direct exchange rate conversion1).  
The World Bank World Development Indicators Database (July 2003) ranked 
Australia 27th on the basis of gross national income per person in 2002 with an 
income per person of US$19 7402, just lower than Singapore which was ranked 26th 
with an income of US$20 690. The Australian economy has been growing strongly for 
about 10 years with an average rate of growth of around 3-4% (GDP per person) and 
it is generally considered that there are good prospects that this strong rate of growth 
will continue.  
2.  Development of Compulsory and Voluntary 
Prepayment/Health Insurance Mechanisms  
Unlike many European countries, which have single ‘systems’, which integrate most 
aspects of health service financing and delivery, Australia has a number of separate 
financing and organizing streams. Some of these, such as the Pharmaceutical Benefits 
Scheme (PBS), have been relatively stable for 50 years. Despite the existence of large 
pressure groups like the international pharmaceutical drug industry, the PBS has 
evolved in a systematic and consistent manner over its lifespan.  
The history of funding medical and hospital services in Australia is one of 
continuing change - movements between ‘market’ models and universal models of 
financing of hospital and medical services. There are strong views within the 
Australian community that support each of these polar positions and the organized 
medical profession has been active to promote its own interests, which generally 
correspond to that of the market position – though with significant government 
subsidies. That the system regularly moves from the more market-oriented position 
to a universal coverage position suggests that the majority of the population 
probably supports the universal position, but that the political processes make this 
unstable. This section describes this Australian experience in seeking to develop 
stable health funding systems.  
Many of the debates about the best ways of organizing and funding health 
services can be traced back to the values and attitudes of early European settlement 
in Australia. In the early 1800s the colonial administrations were expected to provide 
                                                   
1 The Exchange Rate US$:$A has varied significantly over the 12 months. It was US$0.568: $1 in December 2002, 
but was US$0.77:$1 in January 2004). 
2  Using the World Bank Atlas method of determining GNI/person. This method basically uses exchange rates 
to compare GNI/person. If Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is used to rank GNI/person Australia ranks 18th 
while Singapore ranks 32nd. The comparisons using PPP method provide a better measure of the relative 
purchasing power of people to buy goods and services within their own country. 
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hospital services to convicts, soldiers and administrators. Some of the convicts had 
been sent to Australia because they had been advocating for greater freedom and 
equality in Britain, and when they were freed they continued with these beliefs.  
When free settlers arrived from Britain, they brought with them the belief that 
they and their families should make their own provision for health services. Some 
also brought middle class attitudes that charity hospitals should be established to 
provide limited free services to the ‘deserving’ poor 3. Over time a compromise was 
reached whereby the charity and community hospitals accepted subsidies from the 
colonial administration. The Australian ‘public’ hospitals started to have a different 
character to the US and English voluntary hospitals which were entirely privately 
funded. Religious hospitals were established in the mid-to- late 1800s, which 
provided another element, which is still found in the Australian health care system.  
From the mid-1800s onwards, the middle class and better-off workers sought to 
protect themselves from the costs of medical services and medicines by establishing 
Friendly Societies that provided basic insurance against these costs. Many of these 
Societies employed doctors on a capitation basis4 to which doctors objected - but the 
Societies did provided doctors with much needed income.  
From early colonial times there have been three sets of interests that have 
shaped the debate about funding and organizing health services in Australia: groups 
wanting equity of access to health services and supporting a significant government 
role in the provision of health insurance and health services; those who had ‘a 
residual concept of social welfare which holds that the family and the market are the 
main structures of social support and income distribution, and that the government 
should not intervene unless they break down’ (Sax, 1984, page 27); and the doctors 
who believed that they should determine how they should be paid and how much 
they should be paid. These forces have been engaged in major conflict in Australia 
during the 1940s, 1960s, 1970s and again since 1998. In general, medical profession 
was aligned with conservative/ market-oriented political parties, while the equity of 
access/government intervention views has been supported by the leftist Australian 
Labour Party.  
The other factors that shaped the form of health financing in Australia have 
been the Australian Constitution which defined the powers of the Australian 
(Commonwealth) government and of the State and Territory governments, and the 
historical fact that the large majority of hospitals in Australia have, since the late 
1800s, been owned or funded by state governments. The 1901 constitution gave the 
powers in relation to the provision of health services to the states and shared the 
taxation powers between the Commonwealth and the states.  
                                                   
3 This section draws mainly on Sax (1984) and Gray (1991). 
4 Doctors were paid a fixed amount per person insured per year and had to provide all requested services. 
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During the first 30 years of the 1900s, organized medicine in the form of the 
British Medical Association (BMA) was often in conflict with the Friendly Societies 
about the form of payments to doctors and the amounts of payments to doctors. 
These conflicts resulted in higher payments to doctors, but the proportion of the 
population covered by these societies declined significantly (Sax, pages 20-1). During 
the great depression of the 1930s, the declining membership of Friendly Societies, 
together with increasing numbers of unemployed who sought health services from 
‘free’ state hospitals, led the (conservative) United Australia Party government in 
1937 to develop a proposal for a National Health Insurance programme. Though the 
programme had been agreed with the Council of the British Medical Association in 
Australia, the membership of the BMA opposed the proposal, and the government 
withdrew its proposal from the parliament (Scotton, 1993, page 7).  
In 1942, during the Second World War, the states agreed that the 
Commonwealth would exercise the state income taxing powers5. During the war the 
Australian Labour Party government introduced legislation to allow the 
Commonwealth government to make certain types of social security payments and to 
provide pharmaceutical benefits. In 1945 the medical association challenged the 
constitutional validity in the High Court of the Pharmaceutical Benefits Act and the 
Court found it unconstitutional. In 1946 the ALP government sought to change the 
constitution by referendum to validate its wartime legislation and to allow it to pay 
medical and dental benefits also. The referendum was passed – one of the few 
constitutional changes ever agreed to by the voters of Australia. In 1949, with the 
cooperation of a conservative state government, the medical profession challenged in 
the High Court the legality of regulations made for the implementation of the 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme. The court again upheld the challenge to the scheme 
(Gray, 1991, pages 69-71).  
The ALP was defeated in the national elections in 1949 and the Coalition6 
(conservative) Government, with the support of the medical profession, made minor 
modifications to the PBS programme and implemented it in the early 1950s.  
The developments leading to universal health insurance and changes that 
occurred in private health insurance are discussed further in Section 3 and 4 
respectively.  
                                                   
5 Following the war, the Commonwealth maintained control of these taxing powers, and over the next decades 
used its control of the major source of taxation to influence state policies, especially in relation to health.  
6 During the war, the United Australia Party dissolved and became the Liberal Party. Since the end of the war it 
has formed an alliance with the Country Party, later renamed the National Party. Both parties are 
‘conservative’ – oriented towards business and farming interest. The term Coalition Government is used to 
describe their time in government.  
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3. Voluntary Health Insurance Schemes  
There has been a long history of voluntary prepayment/health insurance schemes 
operating in Australia. These schemes were established and operated without 
receiving any government subsidies or tax benefits. By far the largest ‘voluntary’ pre-
payment systems were the Friendly Societies into which people paid annual 
contributions, and received medical and some hospital services which were funded 
by the societies.  
These have existed in various forms since the late 1800s. Doctors were generally 
paid on a capitation basis – an annual fee to provide all necessary care to the 
members of Societies. The membership of Friendly Societies was at its peak in the 
1920s – about 30% of the population were members (Scotton pages 5-6; Sax pages 19-
20), but membership declined significantly during the depression in the 1930.  
Some were still in existence in 1953 when the Coalition government supported 
the establishment of, and subsidized, ‘voluntary’ hospital and medical insurance 
funds. Many of the largest health insurance funds were established by doctors and 
their organizations at that time. Insurance then covered mainly medical and hospital 
costs and paid for both services on a fee-for-service basis, the preferred method of the 
medical profession (Sax, pages 58-64).  
The National Health Act of 1953 laid the basis of development of private health 
insurance for the next 20 years. The Act established government subsidized 
‘voluntary’ hospital and medical insurance, and a limited Pensioner Medical Service, 
which provided limited free medical services to Age Pensioners.  
Health insurance membership increased to about 70% of the population by the 
mid- 1960s (Scotton p10-15). There were concerns throughout the period about the 
level of benefits paid by the insurers and administrative costs of 23%, and different 
concerns about the availability of services for uninsured people. There were also 
concerns about the regressive nature of tax deductibility of health insurance 
contributions, which resulted in high-income people paying proportionately much 
less than low-income people.  
When an Australian Labour Party (ALP) government was re-elected in 1972, it 
established the Health Insurance Commission to implement its Medibank 
Programme– a universal, tax funded health insurance scheme that provided public 
hospital services free of charge (by agreement with the State and Territory 
governments) and highly subsidized medical services (free services if doctors bulk-
billed – which 60-70% soon did).  
When Medibank was introduced in 1975 medical insurance was effectively 
eliminated and private funds offered Ancillary Insurance (providing payments for a 
part of the expenses for dentistry, optometry and some allied health services) in place 
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of medical insurance. Little publicity was given to the change and most people who 
had been insured continued to pay the premiums, but the low rate of expenditure 
from funds showed that most people were unaware of their entitlements under the 
new ancillary insurance. As stated in Section 3, private health insurance increased 
during the period 1975 to 1983 until Medicare was introduced by a new ALP 
government. Membership of private health insurance again fell after the introduction 
of Medicare. By 1998 (after the election of the coalition government in 1996) 30% of 
the population were insured.  
Since 1998, the Australian government has introduced a range of incentives for 
people to take out private health insurance and disincentives for high-income groups 
not to. In 1997 it introduced a 30% subsidy for health insurance premiums and a 
Medicare Levy Surcharge (tax) of an additional 1% of income for high-income 
earners – these resulted in an increase in coverage from 30% to 31% of the 
population. The government encouraged the funds, doctors and private hospitals to 
develop payment methods whereby privately insured patients had certainty about 
the cost of treatments in private hospitals – this had been identified as a major cause 
of dissatisfaction with private health insurance. There has been slow progress on this 
issue as it implies that doctors should submit to private sector cost control.  
In 2000 the government required health insurance funds to charge age-related 
premiums for people who joined after a specified date – Lifetime Cover. This allowed 
funds to charge people over 30 years of age an additional 2% for each year of age 
over 30 years, up to a maximum loading of 70% (at age 65 years). The Lifetime Cover 
resulted in an increase of coverage to 45.5% of the population in 2001, and then 
declined slightly to 43.4% of the population by 2003. In 2003, the average premium 
for hospital insurance for a family was approximately $1 800 (estimated from PHIAC 
Annual Report (Tables 4 and 6 and text).  
This policy of increasing the private health insurance coverage was justified on 
three grounds:  
¦ People who could pay for their own health care should take out private 
health insurance and leave access to public hospitals to those who could 
not (a return to arguments of the 1800s and 1950s);  
¦ People should be able to choose where they received hospital care, and  
¦ More private health insurance would increase access for lower-income 
people to public hospitals.  
When elected, the government said that it would ‘maintain Medicare’. It argued 
that this was consistent with its commitment.  
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The policy was opposed by many groups on several grounds:  
¦ It could destroy the universal coverage of Medicare and would lead to a 
two-class health care system with lower standards of care being provided 
to low- income groups; 
¦ It encouraged people to use private hospitals which were more costly than 
public hospitals; 
¦ It provided Australian government subsidies for high-income groups to 
pay for dentistry and a range of other services, which were not subsidized 
by the Australian government for low-income people. In fact, the 
government had recently withdrawn subsidizes for dental services for 
aged and poor people which had cost about half of the amount that the 
private health insurance subsidy provided for dentistry for high-income 
groups, and  
¦ Administrative costs of private health insurance are very high (over 10% 
of premiums go to administration and not to paying for health services).  
There is considerable debate as to whether access to public hospitals has 
improved for low income groups as only less than half of private health insurance 
spending goes to hospital services. It appears that the subsidy has substituted for 
out-of-pocket spending for higher-income groups and done little to increase access to 
public hospitals for low-income people (Deeble 2003). Robertson and Richardson 
(2000) have argued that if patients move from public to private hospitals, the 
resources to treat them will move with them. An increase in private services must 
almost inevitably result in fewer resources for public services.  
At the time of writing this report membership of private health insurance was 
falling slowly, and those leaving were people who contributed more than they drew 
from the funds (Ian McAuley, ABC News OnLine, August 21, 2003). Private health 
insurance premiums are set to rise by 7% in 2004. The instability that has been 
evident in private health insurance since 1975 is still present.  
4. Compulsory Prepayment Social Health  
Insurance Mechanisms  
As described in Section 3, Medibank was the first universal health insurance 
programme in Australia. It provided:  
¦ Universal coverage to all Australians and migrants who intended to reside 
in Australia;  
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¦ Free access to State Government owned public hospitals as ‘public’ patients 
(i.e. people accepted the care of doctors employed by hospitals) on the basis 
of medical need. People who wanted to be treated as ‘private patients’ or 
wanted to go to private hospitals could purchase private health insurance 
and would receive a (small) subsidy towards the costs of their hospital fees. 
The Australian government entered into contracts with each State and 
Territory government and agreed to pay the hospitals 50% of their 
operating costs in return for providing services to Medibank patients; 
¦ Insurance against fees charged by doctors (A subsidy of 85% of the 
standard fee was charged. Doctors could bulk-bill the Health Insurance 
Commission and receive the subsidy directly instead of having to wait for 
the patient to submit the claim and be reimbursed. A large proportion of 
services were bulk billed; and 
¦ There were other parallel initiatives such as the creation of community 
health programmes and community health centres.  
Though Medibank was established as the first universal compulsory health 
insurance mechanism, it did not stay in the original form. The ALP government was 
defeated in the elections in December 1975. The Coalition Party government, though 
elected on the promise of "maintaining Medibank", cited budgetary considerations as 
the reasons to make major changes to the scheme over the next eight years. Tax 
incentives were introduced to ‘encourage’ people to opt out of Medibank and join 
private health insurance funds, which about 50% of the population did.  
There were also significant reductions in Commonwealth funding of public 
hospitals. Compared to the earlier private insurance arrangements, the changes to 
Medibank (called Medibank Mark I, II and III) had the virtues of maintaining 
universal coverage and not providing higher tax benefits to high-income earners than 
low-income earners. When the ALP won the national election in 1983, the Health 
Insurance Commission had become Medibank Private – the largest private health 
insurer in Australia although it still processed Medibank public’s claims.  
When re-elected in 1983, the ALP government introduced Medicare, which had 
most of the same features of Medibank. Medicare remained largely unchanged until 
1996, when the Coalition parties won office again. Over the period 1983 to 1996 
private health insurance had declined to about 30% of the population.  
When the Coalition won the election in 1996, promising to ‘maintain Medicare’ 
(instead of Medibank in 1975), it reintroduced incentives for people to enrol in 
private health insurance. It introduced a 30% government subsidy to people taking 
out insurance in 1997, which resulted in an increase of membership to 31%, and, as 
described in Section 3, it introduced Lifetime Cover. This resulted in an increase of 
membership to 45.5% in 2003, but it has declined by about 2% since then.  
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A decline in bulk-billing by doctors in 2002-2003, has seen the government 
move, through the ‘Fairer Medicare’ then ‘Medicare Plus’, to change access to direct 
billing by offering doctors an additional $ 5 to bulk-bill Concession Card holders (see 
Section 5 for an explanation of the Concession Card).  
Health consumer and welfare groups are concerned that this will lead to 
doctors only bulk-billing Concession Card holders, and not bulk-billing other low-
income families who miss out on the cards. This government considers that this is the 
best way to ensure that Concession Card holders are bulk-billed. Health consumer 
and welfare groups are also concerned that it will undermine the principle of 
universality of Medicare and could slowly lead back to the two-class health care 
system that existed during the 1950-60s.  
Medicare7 is generally described as having three pillars:  
¦ Free treatment as a public patient in a public hospital;  
¦ Payment of a Medicare rebate at 85% of the schedule fees for a visit to a 
doctor outside hospital, and  
¦ Affordable pharmaceuticals through the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme. 
(Prime Minister’s Press Statement, 18 November 2003).  
This is a ‘universal’ programme in that all Australian citizens and non-citizens 
with certain residency qualifications are eligible for the benefits. Some foreign 
nationals living in Australia may also be eligible for these benefits if their country of 
citizenship has a reciprocal agreement with Australia for provision of health services. 
In general, Australia has reciprocal agreements with countries from which it derived 
large number of migrants (UK, Italy, Greece etc).  
Medicare (Hospital) -  The Australian government has agreements - Australian 
Health Care Agreements – with all State and Territory governments for their public 
hospitals to provide treatment free of charge (inpatient and outpatient) to all eligible 
persons. The agreements also cover psychiatric services. For inpatient services in 
public hospitals, treatment is free if people are ‘public’ patients – that is they agree to 
be treated by doctors nominated by the hospitals8. The agreements require public 
hospitals to provide access to services on the basis of medical need (not on the basis 
                                                   
7 The term Medicare is used to describe both the universal programme and the system of subsidies for medical 
service costs. In this report, Medicare will be used to describe the entire programme and Medicare (Medical) 
will be used to describe the medical services insurance programme. Medicare (Hospital) will be used to 
describe the funding of hospital services. 
8 Hospital doctors are usually salaried, but most public hospitals also employ private doctors on a ‘sessional’ 
basis, whereby they pay for half-day sessions to treat public patients. It is common for both salaried doctors 
and sessional doctors to have ‘private practice’ rights to treat private patients in public hospitals and charge 
fee-for-service. 
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of ability to pay). Hospitals provide all services (including medical, surgical, 
diagnostic, drugs, allied health professionals etc.) free of charge to public patients.  
Public hospitals also treat ‘private’ fee-paying patients but in 2001-2002 only 
13% of inpatients were private (AIHW 2003a, Table 6.1). Most State and Territory 
governments have contracts with private hospitals to provide services for "public" 
patients but fewer that 3% of public patients are treated in private hospitals. In 2001 
and 2002, 68% of all overnight patients were treated in public hospitals and 56%9 of 
all same-day patients were treated in public hospitals.  
Funding – Medicare (Hospital) -  In 2001-2002, the total expenditure on 
Medicare (Hospital) was A$17.1 billion. The Commonwealth provides 46.8% of 
public hospital expenditure, the State and Territory governments funded 47.4%, and 
the remaining 5.8% is from health insurance, injury insurance and out-of-pocket 
payments by private patients (1.5% - from private patients). The Commonwealth, 
State and Territory funding for Medicare (Hospital) is raised taxation in one form or 
another.  
Medicare (Medical) -  The Australian government funds the Medicare 
Programme10 that is operated by the Health Insurance Commission (HIC). The HIC 
pays part of the medical costs incurred by individuals. Medical services related to 
workplace injury and motor vehicle third-party insurance are not eligible for subsidy 
under this programme.  
There is a Medical Benefits Schedule (MBS) that defines approximately 4 700 
services: consultations with general practitioners and specialists, diagnostic and 
radiological tests, surgery and a small number of dental and optometric services. The 
Schedule lists a fee (set by the government) for each service and a "benefit" that is 
paid to the person who incurs the cost. The benefit is either 85 per cent of the 
Schedule fees for outpatient services or 75% of the Schedule fees for inpatient 
services, or the Schedule fees less an amount of up to $ 57.10, whichever is greater 
(HIC Website). Doctors are not required to charge the MBS fee so patients may pay a 
larger ‘gap’ (the difference between the fee and the benefit) than is described in the 
HIC website.  
Some specialists charge well above the scheduled fee, but sometimes there is 
price discrimination whereby higher fees are charged to richer people and low-
income people are bulk-billed or charged lower fees (see Performance of Medicare 
(Medical) in Section 8). ‘Bulk-billing’ is a process whereby the doctor agrees to accept 
the medical benefit defined in the MBS in full payment for the service and the HIC 
                                                   
9 In 2002, 44% of the population had private health insurance. See later discussion. 
10 The discussion on Medicare is correct at time of writing this report, but the Australian government is seeking 
to make changes to the Programme. The majority of Senators in the upper house of the Australian Parliament 
are currently delaying or opposing the changes. 
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pays the benefit directly to the doctor. Claims can be made electronically; about 67% 
of all services were bulk-billed in 2003.  
Medicare (Medical) Funding -  In 2001-2002, total expenditure on medical 
services was A$ 11.2 billion. $ 515 million (4.6%) were spent on services related to 
work place injury or motor vehicle injury which are not eligible for Medicare 
(Medical) rebate. Services covered by Medicare (Medical) totalled A$ 10.6 billion of 
which the Commonwealth11 paid 85%, the private health insurance funds 4% and 
individuals 11.2%. Most of the funds were provided from general taxation revenue. 
There is a Medicare Levy of currently 1.5% of taxable income with exemptions for 
individuals and families with low incomes12.  
In addition, there is a Medicare Levy Surcharge of 1% which was is applied to 
high income (taxable incomes in excess of about A$100 000) individuals and families 
who do not have private health insurance – this was intended to ‘encourage’ high-
income people to take private health insurance. In 2001-2002 these levies raised about 
$ 5 billion – less than half of the cost of Medicare (Medical). The levies were never 
intended to fund Medicare or Medicare (Medical) – the levy was imposed to cover 
the difference between the health insurance programme that operated before 
Medicare (Medical) was introduced and the additional costs of Medicare. The levies 
are paid to Consolidated Revenue, and not directly to health funding.  
The Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme -  The Australian government funds the 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) and it is operated by the Health Insurance 
Commission. The scheme seeks to ensure that all Australians have access to 
affordable, safe and cost-effective prescription medicines. There is a Therapeutic 
Goods Administration to ensure drug safety and quality of manufacture of all 
medicines sold in Australia; a Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee, which 
examines the cost-effectiveness of medicines to ensure that only medicines that 
provide value-for-money are listed on the PBS; and a Pharmaceutical Benefits Pricing 
Authority, which negotiates prices with drug manufacturers.  
Medicines subsidized on the PBS are only available on prescription by doctors. 
In many cases, doctors have to follow prescribing protocols that include both safety 
and cost. Doctors and pharmacists who participate must register with the Health 
Insurance Commission.  
All Australians, permanent residents and persons with defined categories of 
visas are eligible for medicines subsidized under the PBS. In 2004, there are three 
levels of patient co-payment for medicines provided under the PBS: A$ 23.70, A$ 3.70 
                                                   
11 The Commonwealth subsidy to private health insurance is included as a Commonwealth outlay. 
12 In 2002-03 The Medicare Levy of 1.5% applied fully when an individual’s taxable income exceeded $ 16,283, 
and a two person family, combined income exceeded $ 34,301. The limit was raised by $ 2,334 per child. 
Pensioners did not pay the levy until their incomes exceeded $ 20,000.  
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and A$0. Patients with ‘Concessional Cards’ paid $ 3.70 up to a maximum payment 
of A$ 197.60 (52 prescriptions) in any year – after that the medicines are free.  
A wide range of social security beneficiaries (such as recipients of age pensions, 
disability pensions, unemployed beneficiaries, and supporting parents) have 
concession cards. All other people, general beneficiaries, pay A$ 23.70 per medicine 
up to a maximum payment per person or per family13 of A$ 726.80 (about 31 
prescriptions) after which the charge is A$ 3.70. General beneficiaries receive a Safety 
Net Card when they reached the safety net limit. The Safety Net arrangements 
operate on a calendar year basis. The Health Insurance Commission is moving to 
operate the safety net arrangements entirely on an electronic basis – it currently 
operates as a part paper- based and part electronic system.  
PBS Funding: In 2001-2002 the total sales of medicines in Australia were A$ 
nine billion of which A$ 5.6 billion were eligible for benefits under the PBS. The large 
majority of medicines not eligible for benefits were not prescription medicines. The 
only prescription medicines not listed on the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory 
Committee are new medicines that have not been considered for listing, or those that 
have been considered but are not considered cost-effective. Medicines that have been 
found by the PBS to be not cost-effective generally do not survive in the market place 
because they do not receive a subsidy and are generally more expensive than 
comparable medicines. In 2001-2002 the Australian government paid 85%14 of the 
costs of medicines listed on the PBS.  
High Level Residential Aged Care -  This is a universal programme but is not 
regarded as part of the Medicare Programme. It provides ‘nursing home’ care to old 
people who can no longer be maintained in their own homes even with significant 
Commonwealth funded community-based nursing and home help. The programme 
is ‘universal’ in that all Australians are eligible for support under it.  
The Commonwealth allocates ‘beds’ to private (some for-profit, some not-for-
profit) organizations to build and manage the facilities. There were about 92 000 
high-level residential aged care places (beds) in Australia in 2002. There are often 
waiting lists for entry to most places. This programme is an important element of 
health care in Australia. Of the total expenditure of A$ 4.1 billion in 2001-2002, 
individuals paid about 20%. (A significant proportion of these payments would have 
been from Australian government provided aged pensions.)  
                                                   
13 A family can include children up to 16 years old and students up to 25 years old. 
14 It is a coincidence that this 85% subsidy level is the same as for Medicare (Medical). The level of PBS subsidy 
has traditionally been lower than 85%. For decades it was about 65%, but as medicines became more expensive 
and the proportion of persons eligible for Concession Cards increased, the Commonwealth share of costs has 
increased.  
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Private Health Insurance -  Though Medicare is a ‘universal’ programme – 
available to the entire population - 44% of the population have private health 
insurance. This has been discussed in more detail in Section 4 above.  
5. Social Security and Social Assistance Programmes  
Australia has an extensive set of social security programmes which provide income 
support, rent assistance, employment training activities, travel allowances, 
rehabilitation services, child care support and other support including access to free 
or low cost health services  
There are three main ways in which low-income people can access affordable 
health care:  
¦ Their general entitlements under the Medicare Programme;  
¦ The availability of Concession and Health Care Cards issued by 
Centrelink (the agency that administers a wide range of government 
programmes); and 
¦ The availability of income support from social security benefits (listed 
below).  
Entitlements under the Medicare Programme -  All eligible persons are entitled 
to free inpatient and outpatient services at public hospitals. About two-thirds of all 
primary care and other medical services are bulk-billed (i.e. the doctor accepts the 
payment from the national insurer – the Health Insurance Commission – as full 
payment for the service. The patient makes no payment to the doctor) and doctors 
tend to provide these free services to low-income people and charge higher-income 
people fees that are above those recommended by the Australian government.  
Concession and Health Care Cards -  Centrelink issues three types of health 
care cards which provide a range of benefits to cardholders.  
¦ For low-income earners, a Health Care Card helps with the cost of 
medicines and a limited number of concessions;  
¦ For low-income earners (receiving selected payments), a Pensioner 
Concession Card helps with the cost of medicines and a range of 
concessions, and  
¦ People who are of Age Pension age but do not qualify for the pension may 
be able to get a Commonwealth Seniors Health Card (these are middle-
income retired persons).  
Card holders must meet residence requirements to get a concession card. All 
three cards ensure that medicines available under the Pharmaceutical Benefits 
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Scheme (PBS) are provided at reduced costs. Persons with a Health Care Card or a 
Pensioner Concession card are entitled to a range of additional subsidies including 
health, transport and educational concessions. These concessions may vary from state 
to state.  
Of the 161 million prescriptions subsidized under the PBS in calender year 2003, 
102 million were provided to concession card holders at A$ 3.70 per item and 32 
million were provided free of charge (under the Safety Net arrangements).  
Financial Support Available to Low-Income People -  The Australian social 
security system is based on the ‘safety net’ principle, whereby financial support is set 
at a relatively low level, and unlike social security in the USA and many European 
countries, support is not based on the previous income or earnings of individual 
beneficiaries. In addition, most social security payments are ‘means-tested’ – the level 
of support provided takes account of other income received (earnings, interest) and is 
sometimes adjusted to take account of the assets of the beneficiary (generally the 
value of a persons home is not counted as an asset but other real estate, shares and 
savings are counted). Social security payments in Australia are not time-limited like 
many earnings-related schemes overseas are.  
Social security support provides direct income support as well as a wide range 
of other forms of support. The main income support programmes (but not the only 
income support programmes) are for:  
¦ Aged persons (1 785 554) 
¦ Persons with disabilities (623 926) 
¦ Unemployed persons (Newstart Programme 514 004 – there are other 
programmes for specific groups) 
¦ Single parents (424 614) 
¦ Youth Allowance (to support young people who are studying, 308 663, 
and young people entering the workforce, 84 542). There is also a special 
support, accommodation and travel programme for aboriginal students. 
¦ There also are special benefits for War Veterans, who usually receive more 
generous support than other people.  
[The numbers in brackets indicate the number of people receiving support as of 
30 June 2001. Data are from the Commonwealth Department of Family and 
Community Services (2003)]  
The programmes listed above provided support to more than 3.7 million 
persons in the year 2001, about 19% of the total population. Almost all the 
programmes were means tested. There were many other programmes that provided 
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support to smaller numbers of people with special needs: carers allowance for people 
who provide support to disabled or old people; Widows Allowance; Special Benefit 
for persons who do not fit in any specific category.  
Payment in most of the above programmes is made on a two-weekly basis and 
amounts to A$ 452.80 for single adults (or $ 756 per fortnight for a couple). Payments 
for young people are at lower amounts. In all cases there is a range of additional cash 
assistance available, such as rent and travel allowances.  
Payments are also made to support families with children through a Family Tax 
Benefit A and B. Payments vary with the number of children and with the income of 
the family. The major forms of child support for families with two incomes, or where 
the people are in receipt of social security benefits, is through the Family Tax Benefit 
A. There are a number of conditions attached to the payment of this benefit but most 
people in Australia with dependent children are eligible for some payment. Families 
with incomes of A$ 31 755 per year, currently receive A$ 3401.80 per year for each 
child under 13 years old, A$ 4314.30 for each child 13-15 years, A$ 1 095 for each 
child 16-17 and A$ 1 470.95 for each child 18-24. The payment declines by 30 cents 
per A$ 1 by which the income exceeds this amount until the payment reaches $ 42 
per two weeks for children under 18 years of age, and A$ 56.52 for 18-24-year olds. A 
family with one child continues to get some additional child support payment until 
the family in come exceeds A$ 72 000 per year.  
There is an additional benefit (Family Tax Benefit B) for families in which one of 
the parents does not work.  
In 2001, the total number of families receiving Family Tax Benefit A and/or B 
was 1.8 million and benefits were paid on behalf of 3.5 million families.  
Additional benefits available to families with children include the Large Family 
Supplement, Multiple Birth allowance and Rent Assistance. A large number of 
additional conditions apply to the payment of these benefits.  
Maternity Benefits: A lump sum payment of A$ 833.52 is made, usually paid 
with the first instalment of Family Tax Benefit for the child. In a case of multiple 
birth, Maternity Allowance is paid for each child, for example, for twins A$ 1 667.04 
is paid. The same means-test applies to this benefit as to Family Tax Benefit A.  
Unlike many European countries, Paid Maternity Leave is not a workplace or 
social security entitlement. Governments and a small proportion of employers do 
provide paid maternity leave but this varies from workplace to workplace. Maternity 
leave is more likely to be available for women in higher paid employment and it is 
generally not available for men. This has been an issue of political debate in Australia 
for several years.  
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6. For-Profit Commercial Health Insurance  
There are two major forms of commercial insurance that cover some health care costs: 
Workers Compensation Insurance and Motor Vehicle Third Party Insurance (which 
pays for the costs of injuries to persons other than the owner of the vehicle insured). 
In all States and Territories in Australia, these types of insurance are mandated by 
law, but are generally administered by regulated private insurers. It is illegal for an 
employer not to have Workers Compensation Insurance and it is illegal to drive a 
motor vehicle on a public road without Motor Vehicle Third Party Insurance. In 2001-
2002 these types of insurance made up the bulk of the ‘Other’ sources of health 
expenditure reported in Australia – about 3.7% of total health care costs.  
Workers Compensation Insurance and Third Party Insurance -  Workers 
compensation insurance covers the costs of health services related to workplace 
injury or disease, income support, and death benefits. Income support is generally 
income related for a period of time, but in most cases only lasts for a defined period 
of time. At the end of the period of support from workers compensation insurance, 
injured workers are eligible for social security payments.  
 ‘Third Party insurance’ covers the costs of health care, income support and 
compensation that results from injury caused by motor vehicles. The structure of 
benefits for Third Party insurance is similar to that for ‘workers compensation’ and, 
in many cases, people will eventually be eligible for social security payments.  
Persons with a claim against workers compensation insurers or third party 
insurers are not eligible for Medicare (Medical) or Medicare (Hospital) benefits for 
costs associated with insurance claims but are eligible for benefits for all other health- 
related costs.  
General/Commercial Insurance -  The National Health Act regulates health 
insurance in Australia. It requires that any organization that wants to offer health 
insurance must register under this Act. The Act imposes a number of financial and 
reporting requirements on potential insurers and requires that they offer age-based 
‘community rate’ health insurance (that is, an insurer must offer insurance to all at 
premiums defined for each age group and the premium for a family, regardless of 
size, is to be set at twice the rate for a single person. The age adjustment is set in the 
regulations and not based on the individual insurer’s assessment of age-related risk). 
If an insurer produced a product that was not covered by the National Health 
Act, persons would not be eligible for the Australian government health insurance 
rebate of 30%. Also, person with higher incomes would still be required to pay the 
Medicare Surcharge Levy of 1% of taxable income, as exemption from this levy 
requires individuals to have health insurance from a fund registered under the 
National Health Act.  
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Thus general insurance is unlikely to be commercially viable if it competes 
against health insurance that is subsidized and free from surcharge.  
Given that the Australian population appears to support the ‘universal’ nature 
of the current Medicare Programme, it seems unlikely that commercial insurance is 
likely to be viable as a policy option in future.  
7. Critical Analysis of Health Care Financing Though 
Prepayment/Earmarked Taxation and Health 
Insurance Mechanisms  
Australia has had universal health insurance in one form or another since 1975, and 
since then, life expectancy has increased by about seven years. In 1970 Australian life 
expectancy was ranked 17th and it now ranks 3rd after Japan and Sweden.  
This rapid change in health cannot be directly attributed to the effectiveness of 
the health care system since some of the causes of this improvement were evident 
from the mid 1960s, when a rapid decline in mortality from cardiovascular disease 
started. The analysis of factors that have contributed to this improvement in life 
expectancy has attributed significant proportions of this improvement to factors such 
as a reduction in cigarette smoking (probably accounts for more than half the 
increase), improved diet (less fat), social attitudes that accepted public health-
inspired social controls (seat belts, random breath testing) and a harm minimization 
approach to managing HIV/AIDS.  
Over the period there has been a large increase in expenditure on health 
services. It is likely though that the method of financing health services, and 
accessibility to services for the rich and the poor and the old and the young have 
made some contribution to the improvement. For Aboriginals and Torres Straits 
Islanders, there is little doubt that their poor health status is, in part, related to their 
inability to access high quality health care.  
It is difficult to attribute changes in health to specific health care interventions 
or to specific methods of financing health care. However, it is possible to look at the 
impact of health financing on access to health services and to look at the extent to 
which health financing arrangements may obstruct access.  
Use of Health Services and Socioeconomic Status  
In 1992, the National Health Strategy published a report Enough to make you sick: how 
income and environment affect health (Research Paper No 1 September 1992). The study 
was conducted when the Medicare programme had been operating for 10 years; 
there had been some form of universal health insurance since 1975. This report 
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examined the relationship between health, health service use and socioeconomic 
status in Australia.  
The report found that ‘There is a definite pattern of health service use according 
to socioeconomic status. Compared with people of high socioeconomic status, those 
of low socioeconomic status make greater use of hospitals, outpatient clinics and 
doctors.  
It also found that disadvantaged groups make low use of preventive and dental 
services. It established that, by most available measures of health status, people who 
are disadvantaged have much poorer health than do people with higher incomes. 
The study found that there were many factors such as educational attainment, 
smoking and diet that influenced the poorer health outcomes of disadvantaged 
people. The Whitehall studies in the UK have found that, even after adjusting for 
these factors, the health of low-income people is generally much worse than people 
on high incomes. It has been suggested that the degree of control that an individual 
has over his or her life has a significant influence on their health, and that poorer 
people have less control over their lives than do richer people. There are elements of 
the structure of society that influence health differentials.  
It appears from the National Health Strategy study that universal health 
insurance does provide poor people with high access to hospital and medical 
services, but not sufficient to overcome their health problems. The health sector can 
ameliorate some of these factors, but cannot overcome the social factors. The low use 
of dental services by the disadvantaged was almost certainly the result of there being 
no dental benefits under the universal health insurance system. The National Health 
Strategy went on recommend a dental health service for the poor and it operated for 
several years until funding was withdrawn by the Australian government around 
1998.  
Access to health services in rural and remote areas 
There are problems of providing enough health services to rural and remote 
communities and people in these areas have restricted access to services. Experience 
in many countries shows that paying doctors more to work in rural and remote 
communities does not increase access to doctors. British Columbia (Canada) tried 
such incentives for many years and was not successful in altering significantly the 
number of doctors living and working in these areas. It is well recognized that there 
are social and cultural factors in the selection and training of doctors that result in 
them not wanting to work in these communities. Australia, like many other 
countries, has a number of programmes specifically designed to support health 
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professionals, not just doctors, to work in rural and remote communities. This is an 
area in which the type of health financing system is unlikely to be a significant factor 
in improving access to health services.  
Quality of Care  
The Responsibility for maintaining quality of care is very diffuse. The Australian 
Council for Safety and Quality in Health Care was established in January 2000 by 
Australian Health Ministers to lead national efforts to improve the safety and quality 
of health care provision in Australia ( see http://www.safetyandquality.org for 
details, work programme etc). Over time, this organization will probably play an 
important role in ensuring safety and quality in Australian health care, but it is still in 
the development phase.  
The Australian Council on Health-care Standards is the most active vehicle for 
monitoring and improving the quality of care. It is an ‘independent, not-for-profit 
organization, dedicated to improving the quality of health care in Australia through 
continually reviewing the performance, assessment and accreditation’ (ACHS 
website, http://www.achs.org.au). While it is not mandatory to be accredited a large 
proportion of all health care providers, both public and private, are accredited with 
ACHS.  
All States and Territories require doctors, nurses and several other health 
professions to be registered with State and Territory Registration Boards. Only 
registered persons can practice legally. All of the Boards have procedures which 
could result in health professionals being de-registered if it is found that their 
standard of practice was not adequate. De-registration for poor quality of care is 
fairly unusual.  
All of the medical specialities (including General Practice) and some of the 
allied health professions have processes to maintain quality of care – requirements 
for continuing medical education, audit and inspection programmes of varying 
degrees of intensity etc.  
The Health Insurance Commission has a programme to review the ‘patterns’ 
doctors practises (doctors who are registered for benefits under Medicare), mainly to 
discourage overservicing and/or fraud. It also engages in programmes designed to 
encourage good practice and good prescribing.  
There are a large number of small programmes designed to encourage good 
prescribing and a range of other good health service practices.  
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Overview of the Medicare Programme  
This section reviews the performance of the Medicare Programme in terms of barriers 
to access by user fees and a number of service use indicators. It provides some 
evidence that this programme does not impose financial barriers to needed care. It 
also provides some evidence consistent with the National Health Strategy report on 
use of services by low-income people – in this case, by social security beneficiaries, 
who do appear to have good access to care.  
The three programmes that constitute Medicare: Medicare (Hospital), Medicare 
(Medical), and the PBS cost A$ 33.9 billion in 2001-2002 and accounted for 54% of 
total recurrent health care expenditure (see Table 4). These programmes guarantee 
access to hospital services, medical services and affordable drugs. Direct costs to 
individuals provided only 6.7% of the revenue. Sixty seven per cent of medical 
services (bulk-billed) and 62% of hospital admissions (public patients) were provided 
without charge to patients.  
Table 4. Health expenditure in Australia - 2001-2002 - major programmes and services 
Commonwealth 
Programmes 
Direct  
(%) 
Health 
Insurance 
Subsidy  
(%) 
State 
and 
Local  
(%) 
Health 
Insurance 
–Net 
(%) 
Individuals
Direct  
(%) 
Other 
(%) 
Total  
(%) 
Total 
Expendi-
ture $ 
Million  
(%) 
% Recurrent 
Health 
Expenditure  
(%) 
Public hospital 46.2 0.6 47.4 1.6 1.4 2.8 100.0 17,087 27.3 
Medical services 79.4 1.5 0.0 3.9 10.7 4.6 100.0 11,187 17.8 
Pharmaceutical  
benefits scheme  
85.0 - - - 15.1 - 100.0 5,586 8.9 
Total Medicare  63.5 0.8 23.9 2.1 6.7 2.9 100.0 33,860 54.0 
High-level  
residential 
aged care 
74.8 0.0 5.1 0.0 20.1 0.0 100.0 4,137 6.6 
Private hospitals 14.8 18.3 - 47.8 6.0 13.1 66.9 5,149 8.2 
Dental  2.0 7.1 9.9 18.5 62.2 0.3 100.0 3,689 5.9 
Aids and appliances  4.1 3.7  9.6 80.4 2.2 100.0 2,403 3.8 
Other  23.3 3.1 29.7 8.1 39.1 4.9 113.7 12,456 19.9 
Total recurrent health 
expenditure % 
45.4 3.1 19.7 8.1 20.0 3.7 100.0 62,693 100.0 
Total recurrent  
health expenditure  
$ million  
28,445 1,950 12,370 5,087 12,512 2,329 62,693   
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Performance - Medicare (Hospital) -  There are some concerns that waiting 
times for some procedures in public hospitals for public patients are too long. Public 
hospitals are the major (in many locations the only) provider of emergency services 
and though there is often criticism of the performance of individual hospitals there is 
generally strong support for public hospitals.  
Performance - Medicare (Medical) -  In 2003 about 67% of all services were bulk 
billed by the providers, so that patients did not need to pay their doctors directly for 
these services. About 66% of primary care services (general practitioner services) 
were bulk-billed while the proportion for specialists’ services that were bulk-billed 
varied considerably: 27% of specialist attendances; 20% of obstetric services; 84% of 
pathology services; and 58% of diagnostic imaging services. It should be noted 
though that many specialist services are available free of charge through public 
hospitals.  
Performance – pharmaceutical benefits scheme -  There are concerns in 
government about the increasing costs of the PBS. However, almost all countries, rich 
or poor, have similar concerns. While not every drug is listed on the PBS and while 
there are some disease specific health consumer groups, which want additional drugs 
listed, there is widespread recognition that the PBS serves Australian’s well as both 
consumers and taxpayers. The PBS is regarded as a leader in the field of national 
medicines programmes and its processes have been studied and emulated by many 
countries. Comparisons of the cost of medicines in Australia generally find that, on 
average, prices in Australia are 60-70% of those in comparable countries. The 
National Medicines Policy in Australia, of which the PBS is a part, also calls for the 
development of an Australian-based research and manufacturing medicines 
industry. As part of the NMP, the Australian Department of Industry pays subsidies 
to companies, Australian and foreign-owned, that undertakes research and 
development in Australia. This programme has also been successful in increasing 
manufacture and export of pharmaceuticals from Australia.  
Dental Services -  This is the largest area of health expenditure for which there 
is no universal programme. Of the total expenditure of A$ 3.7 billion in 2001-2002, 
62% was paid directly by individuals, 18.5% was paid by individuals through their 
private health insurance contributions, State governments paid 10%, the 
Commonwealth paid 7% for privately insured people and 2% for others (mainly war 
veterans), and other sources paid 1.5%. The State government payments would be 
mainly for services provided by public dental clinics, often attached to large public 
hospitals. These State services are very strictly means-tested and have long waiting 
lists. The Commonwealth did fund a dental programme mainly for low-income and 
older people until 1997. The abolition of the Commonwealth programme 
corresponded to the introduction of the private health insurance subsidy. 
Commonwealth funds then went to dental services for higher-income groups.  
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The absence of a significant dental programme has long been identified as a 
limitation of the Medicare Programme.  
Aids and Appliances -  Another major limitation of the Medicare Programme is 
the limited range of aids and appliances available under it. Government sources 
cover about 5% of these costs, although most of this goes to privately-insured people. 
Some of these items are included under public hospital expenditure but it is not a 
large amount compared to that used by the community. The Commonwealth does 
fund incontinence aids, in part to reduce the pressure to admit incontinent old people 
to residential aged care facilities. The incontinence programme is paid for by the 
Commonwealth but administered by the States. The States provide a range of 
equipment through public hospitals but only to people with very limited financial 
means. As can be seen from Table 1, individuals pay 80% of the costs of these items 
out-of-pocket, their health insurance contributions pay about 10%.  
Services not covered by Medicare -  There are a number of major health services 
that are not considered part of the Medicare Programme. Some of the programmes 
are universal, others are selective, and, for services such as dentistry virtually non-
existent. 
Performance of the Medicare Programme -  The Annual Report of the 
Commonwealth Department of Health and Ageing reported that:  
‘Each year the HIC, which administers subsidies under the MBS and the PBS, 
produces a customer satisfaction survey that shows the level of support and public 
attitudes towards Medicare. The 2002–2003 survey showed that support for Medicare 
remains high, with consumer satisfaction at 93%. The survey also showed high levels 
of satisfaction among doctors (75%) and pharmacists (91%) with payment 
arrangements administered by the HIC.’  
8 Conclusion  
The problems that most countries face in health care are remarkably similar: how to 
get more money into health care; how to provide low-income groups with access to 
health care services; how to provide health services to remote and rural areas; how to 
ensure that preventive services are not starved of funds so that hi-tech equipment can 
be bought for large city hospitals where the Minister for Health and other important 
people are treated; how to ensure that services that are provided are of sufficiently 
high quality that they do more good than harm; how to decide which drugs should 
be subsidized etc. Though most of the problems in different countries are the same, 
the solutions will be country-specific. As this Australian case study shows, solutions 
are largely determined by history, values and local political processes.  
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For over a century Australia has been one of the richest (on a per capita basis) 
countries in the world - the level of health funds has almost always be sufficient to 
ensure high quality (to the extent that this can be determined) health services for all. 
Australians have been innovative in producing solutions to problems as international 
recognition given to programmes such as the Harm Minimization Policy for 
HIV/AIDS and the PBS show.  
This report shows that the values of a society are important in determining 
whether health services are made available to all. It also shows how special interest 
groups such as the medical profession can, by allying itself with political groups, 
produce changes to the health care system that look after its interests but which are 
not necessarily in the best interests of all health consumers.  
The Australian experience shows that when there is universal insurance for 
hospital and medical services, low-income people used high amounts of treatment 
services. However, low income people do not access some of the preventive health 
services. This suggests that, at the time the study was undertaken, there was not 
enough emphasis placed on promoting these services to low-income people and in 
ensuring that there were no previously unrecognized barriers (such as the 
availability of child minding services or the like) that impeded access. Dentistry was 
not included in the universal health insurance programme, and low-income people 
did not access preventive or restorative dental services. When considering the design 
of a universal health care system, especially where there are limited resources, 
consideration needs to be given to which services should be funded to have the 
greatest impact on national priorities - health, social and economic.  
The Whitehall Studies on the impact of social differentials on health status 
highlighted the fact that even if there is reasonable access to health services, 
significant health differentials still persist because of other social factors. In Australia, 
before the introduction of the first universal health insurance in 1975, low- income 
people were subjected to means tests at hospitals that were regarded as invasive and, 
in the view of many people, humiliating. It is quite possible that the existence of a 
good quality universal system with access according to need, could narrow the 
health differentials by giving low-income people a greater sense of dignity and 
entitlement within the society – issues that were discussed in Australia at the time.  
In general, health systems do what they are paid to do. If sufficient emphasis is 
not placed on prevention, the funding systems should be designed (or redesigned) to 
ensure that incentives are provided to individual health care providers and 
organizations.  
There is still much to be learned about the financing of health care. Despite 
large differences in the ways health services are funded, recent reports in Australia, 
the USA the UK and Canada have all highlighted the problems of coordinating 
 94 Social Health Insurance 
chronic care. There is a danger for low income countries in the lure of hi-tech and 
integrated computer networks etc. These may be readily financed in countries that 
spend US$ 2000 – 4000 per person per year, but what is often not recognized is that, 
as well as requiring large investments in hardware and software, it often takes a 
decade or more for clinicians and managers to develop the culture and skills to use 
these systems.  
It is possible to adapt complex universal health financing systems to operate in 
simpler systems at much lower cost. However, there are many effective systems for 
organizing and funding major health care sectors that could serve as models to 
others. Universal health insurance is one of those systems. By careful research 
countries can find systems that they can adapt to their own social and economic 
conditions.  
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China 
Lu Heping, He Jinguo, Yu Gongbin, Di Donghui 
1. Background 
China is the largest developing country in the world, located in the east of Asia, on 
the west coast of the Pacific Ocean with a land area of 9.6 million square kilometres. 
By 2003 the population in China amounted to 1, 292,270,000 with 768, 510, 000 in 
rural areas and 523, 760, 000 in urban areas, not including those in Taiwan, Hong 
Kong SAR and Macao SAR. According to the Fifth National Population Census in 
2000, the average life expectancy in China was 71.4 years old (male 69.6 years and 
female 73.3 years). In recent years, the natural growth rate of population in China has 
witnessed a downward trend, from 1.661% in 1987 to 0.601% in 2003, or a decrease of 
1% over 15 years, in which a transition to a population type with a low birth rate, low 
death rate and low growth rate was completed. The rapid decrease in the natural 
growth rate of the population and the increasing average life expectancy resulted in 
the ageing of population. In 2003 the population over 65 was 969, 200,000, accounting 
for 7.5% of the overall population. 
In 2003, the GDP in China reached 11.67 trillion Yuan, which was more than US 
$1.4 trillion based on the current exchange rate, ranking the sixth in the world, while 
the GDP per capita reached US $ 1,090, a medium or even low level in the world. 
With rapid economic development, constant increase of income level per capita, the 
mounting health care service charges and pharmaceutical prices and the aging 
population, total health expenditure also witnessed a swift increase from 225.78 
billion Yuan in 1995 to 568.463 billion Yuan in 2002, up from 3.86% to 5.425% of GDP. 
In 2002, government health expenditure, the social health insurance and individual 
payment contributed 15.21%, 26.45% and 58.34% of the total health expenditure 
respectively. Per capita health expenditure was 932.93 Yuan in urban areas, while 
268.61 Yuan in rural areas.  
There are five levels of government in China: central level, provincial level, 
municipal or prefecture level, county or city level, and township level with 
independent financial systems at each level. There are 31 provinces, autonomous 
regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government, 332 
administrative units at prefecture level under the 31 provinces, 2860 administrative 
units at the county level under the prefectures and 44822 administrative units at the 
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township level in China. Great disparities of economic and social development exist 
in urban and rural areas. In 2002, per capita GDP ranked highest with over 40,000 
Yuan in Shanghai, nearly 13 times of the lowest at 3,140 Yuan in Guizhou. In 2003, 
the per capita income of urban residents was 8,500 Yuan, 3.2 times that of rural 
residents of only 2,622 Yuan per capita. 
To better understand the development of the health care system and also the 
background of health insurance policy in China, we have to be fully aware of the 
basic national conditions. China, with a huge population base and vast land 
resources, is a developing country in full gear of economic development but still has 
a huge inter-regional gap in urban and rural areas. 
2.  The Development of Health Insurance in China  
Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 and till the late 70s, 
China undertook a planning system with the characteristics of high centralization 
and separation of urban from rural regions. At that time, health insurance mainly 
covered the urban population, which was adapted to the new planning system. This 
entailed free health care in government organizations and institutions, while 
Workers Insurance schemes at enterprise level were established in urban areas. 
Free Medical Care (FMC) meant that the government covered the medical care 
expenditures for employees in government organizations and institutions as well as 
students in universities and institutes, through “government insurance”. Concrete 
standards of FMC were set to satisfy the employees’ real demands for medical 
services within the national fiscal capacity and health sector’s capacity. The 
Employees’ Insurance Scheme (EIS) for all the employees as well as for the retirees in 
State-owned enterprises was supported by the net income of the enterprises. Some 
collective enterprises also followed the practice. During the first phase, employees 
contributed 3% of their total income, which was adjusted from 4.5% to 5.5% in 1957. 
In 1969, welfare funds for employees in government-run enterprises were 
established, and provided for salary bonus, allowance and medical subsidies. The 
welfare funds were derived from 11% of the total salary. Under the EIS, those 
employees’ family members who were unemployed were entitled to a 50% reduction 
from the current user charges. 
Since the 1980s the traditional FMC and EIS both showed drawbacks and 
disadvantages that were incompatible with the current needs. These were linked to 
several factors. First, along with the intensified market oriented reform, government 
loosened the control of medical service charges and drug prices and changed the 
policy of reimbursement in public health facilities. These facilities were becoming 
market players that made maximizing profits their goal. Since the medical costs were 
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mainly borne by the governments and enterprises, the FMC and EIS lacked effective 
cost control mechanisms. Medical expenditures soared, which added heavier 
financial burdens on Government and enterprises. 
Secondly, with the strengthening of the reform of the state-owned enterprises, 
restructuring of the economy and increasingly intensified market competition, the 
status of some enterprises was changed. Some enterprises faced difficult financial 
conditions and went bankrupt because of low efficiency. With no stable financial 
resources, the security of the employees’ basic medical care could not be sustained. 
Thirdly, the FMC and EIS were systems implemented by individual enterprises with 
low levels of socialized management. Under such systems, each person or employee 
belonged to the individual enterprises or government agency, which prevented 
mobility in the labour force and prevented the country from establishing a 
standardized labour market. Moreover, many heavily burdened enterprises failed to 
compete with others on an equal basis when it came to providing free medical care 
for those who retired early due to some historical and institutional reasons. 
For these reasons, reform in health insurance for urban salaried employees was 
undertaken since 1980 and different mechanisms were tested in many regions. 
Examples are the linking of medical expenditures with the interests of hospitals, 
employers and employees; hospitals controlling the FMC funds; and establishing 
social pooling funds for catastrophic diseases. Such measures helped to control the 
medical costs and also avoid over consumption. 
To strengthen the Employees’ Health Insurance System Reform, the 
Commission of Economic System Reform of the State Council, Ministries of Finance, 
Health and the newer Ministry of Labour and Social Security issued the Guidelines 
on the Pilot of Workers’ Health Insurance System Reform in April 1994. This led to 
the pilot project of establishing new Employees’ Health Insurance Systems in 
Zhenjiang, Jiangsu Province and Jiujiang, Jiangxi Provinces. After a one year trial 
period, the New Employees’ Health Insurance System started to bear fruit. On April 
1996, the State Council decided to further expand the pilot reform to 57 cities in 29 
provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central 
Government. Based on the experience of pilot reform, the State Council issued 
Decision on the Establishment of Urban Employees’ Basic Health Insurance System 
on December 1998, marking the start of Urban Employees’ Basic Medical Insurance 
System Reform. On July 2000, the State Council held a Symposium on the National 
Urban Workers’ Basic Health Insurance System Reform and Health System Reform in 
Shanghai. It was then decided to accelerate the Urban Employees’ Basic Health 
Insurance System Reform and meanwhile promote the health system reform by 
introducing market competition mechanisms; standardizing national drug 
production and distribution and improving the quality of medical services with 
controlled costs.  
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3.  Design of the Urban Employees’ Basic  
Health Insurance System 
State Council’s framework of health insurance systems 
At present, China has no standard Law on Social Insurance. The State Council’s 
Decision on the establishment of Urban Employees’ Basic Health Insurance System in 
1998 and other documents promulgated together with the Ministries of Finance and 
Labour and Social Security defined the health insurance system and also laid a 
framework for the basic health insurance for urban employees. 
Coverage 
Basic medical insurance is compulsory in many countries, while in China the health 
insurance system is now compulsory for urban salaried employees but not for all 
urban residents. All the urban employers, including enterprises, organizations, 
institutions, social groups and private enterprises, and their employees have to join 
the Urban Employees’ Basic Health Insurance System. The Provincial Government 
can make the decision regarding whether village and township enterprises and their 
employees and urban owners of private enterprises and their employees will join the 
system. 
Financing 
The premium of the basic medical insurance is paid mainly by employers and 
employees. In principle, the employers should pay an equalling at 6% of their 
employees’ salary and the employee should pay at 2% of salary. According to the 
regulations, retirees covered by the system will not pay anything as their individual 
contribution to the premium. Local governments can entrust the taxation authority or 
social insurance agency to collect the health insurance contributions. 
Pooling tier  
In principle, the fund pool of the basic health insurance should be established in 
administrative areas at prefecture level and above, including prefecture and 
municipality. In principle, the three municipalities directly under Central 
Government Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai, should establish the fund pool at the 
municipal level.  
Combination of individual account and social pooling 
The basic health insurance system has established a mechanism to combine the social 
pooling and individual accounts for the fund management. A proportion of the 
  101 Selected Case Studies from Asia and the Pacific 
contribution paid by the individual is put into the individual account, while part of 
the contribution by employers is used for social pooling funds and around 30% is put 
into the employee’s individual account. The exact proportion can be decided by the 
local authorities with the consideration of the scope of medical expenditures covered 
by the individual account, employees’ age and other factors. The social pooling funds 
should cover the expenditures for catastrophic diseases and inpatient medical 
services. Deductibles are set at 10% of the average amount of local employees’ 
salaries. The ceiling has been set at 4 times the average amount of local employee’s 
salaries. Medical expenditures to the amount between the deductible and the ceiling 
amount should be paid by the pooled funds and a proportion of the expenditure 
should be borne by individual. The funds in the individual account should be used 
for the expenditures of common diseases, outpatient services or for expenditures at 
the amount below the deductible. 
Fund management 
Since China has not developed a mechanism to determine a social security budget, 
the basic health insurance funds are not incorporated into a budgetary management 
system. At present, the social security funds are controlled under the mechanism of 
Special Accounts with the characteristic of “special funds used for special purposes.” 
The administrative expenses for the social insurance agencies’ operation come from 
the fiscal budget at each level; and basic health insurance fund cannot be used for 
operational expenditures. The basic health insurance system has to adhere to the 
principle of keeping expenditures below income and balancing the revenues and 
expenditures. 
Designated facilities 
The employees’ basic health insurance system uses a mechanism of designated 
hospitals and designated drug stores, which are selected by the operational agencies 
of the social health insurance system. The selection of the hospitals is based on the 
consideration of Western medicine and traditional Chinese medicine services in 
hospitals, appropriate conditions in all categories of hospitals: community, specialty 
and general hospitals. The principle of the selection is to provide the insured 
population with maximum convenience. 
Reimbursement 
The method of reimbursement or provider payment of medical expenditures covered 
by the basic health insurance is selected according to the capacity of the operational 
agencies and the different types of designated hospitals. The specific methods 
include global capitation, fee-for-service, diagnostic-related-group (DRG) and 
combinations of some of these. When the DRG method is used, the diagnosis of a 
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disease, outpatient services and the inpatient services can be taken as category or 
group for reimbursement. Medical expenditures are reimbursed to hospitals directly 
by the health insurance operational agencies. In the places where direct 
reimbursement cannot be made, the medical expenditures can be paid by the patient 
or employer first and then be reimbursed by the operational agencies. 
Special groups of people 
For some of the employees in poorly managed enterprises, the amount of the 
contribution paid by the employers can be lowered. The reduced amount can be used 
for the establishment of pooled funds while the establishment of individual accounts 
can then be postponed. In this way, the employees in enterprises with financial 
difficulties can be incorporated into the basic health insurance system and they can 
enjoy the benefit of the system. Employees who do not have a clear labour 
relationship with their employers (such as temporary workers) can join the health 
insurance system as individuals if they pay the entire contribution themselves, i.e. 
both the employer and employee parts. As a starting point, their contribution will be 
used for the pooled funds. If the arrangements are in place, such employees can 
simultaneously establish pooled funds, individual accounts and subsidy mechanisms 
for very high medical expenditures. The amount of contribution can be fixed 
according to the average amount of employees’ salaries.  
The design of the health insurance system in different regions 
Under the State Council’s principles of health insurance reform, local governments 
work out their own implementation plan for the employees’ basic health insurance 
system. Since the levels of economic development, household income, medical 
expenditures and drug prices vary considerably across regions, the amount of 
contribution paid by employers, the percentage allocated to the individual account, 
deductible, the share of co-payment and some other regulation of the health 
insurance system are different. Regarding the amount of contribution paid by 
employers, most regions follow the State Council’s regulation and set the amount at 
6% of the total amount of the employees’ salary. In some areas the percentage is 
lower than 6%, as in Liuhe County, Jilin Province and Dongming County, Shandong 
Province; the percentage is about 2% while in Du’an County, Guangxi Province, it is 
2.5%. However, in Shanghai the percentage is 12%, in Kunming it is 10% and in 
Beijing it is 9%. Regarding the amount allocated to the individual account, the 
insured employees are generally divided into several groups according to age, and 
percentages are set for each group. This follows the principles that retirees should 
have access to a higher percentage than active employees and older employees 
should have access to a higher percentage than younger employees. The base amount 
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for the calculation of the percentage is the individual employee’s average salary per 
month in the last year (active employees). For retirees, the base amount for the 
calculation is average amount of salary of local employees. The average amount of 
pension can also be used as the base amount for the calculation (in Shenyang). 
Regarding the issue of whether retirees should themselves contribute, in 
general, the State Council’s regulations are followed, according to which retirees are 
not requested to pay a contribution. However, in some specific places, such as 
Guangzhou City, the employers are requested to pay the contributions not only for 
their active employees, but also for their retirees. The employers have to a 
contribution for retirees based on an amount equalling 75% of average salary of local 
employees. If the employers are in financial difficulty, the contribution can be made 
in several payments.  
With regard to reimbursement or provider payment, different places use 
different methods. In most places, the fee-for-service (FFS) method is used. However, 
other methods are being tested as for example, in Shanghai where a combined 
method of FFS plus Global Capitation is used. The DRG method is being tested in 
Mu Dan Jiang and Qi Qi Ha Er cities in Heilongjiang Province; global capitation and 
DRG are used in Zhenjiang, Jiangsu Province; In Changshu, Jiangsu Province, a fixed 
amount of reimbursement method is used with consideration of the level of the 
designated hospital and the diseases treated. In Hainan Province, a global capitation 
payment method is used, savings are encouraged and expenditures over the 
disbursed amount are shared. In Tianjin City, the pre-payment mechanism is used 
combined with FFS and DRG.  
Multi-level health insurance system 
The basic health insurance system is the core of the urban health security system. 
Together with mechanisms for mutual assistance to cover very high medical 
expenditures, the medical subsidy for civil servants, enterprise supplementary health 
insurance and social medical assistance, a multi-level health security system in China 
is being formed. These are described below: 
Mutual assistance for very high medical expenditures  
To help some seriously ill patients pay for their medical expenses exceeding the 
ceiling of the basic medical insurance system, some regions have worked out a policy 
of mutual assistance for very high medical expenditures, namely health insurance 
only for catastrophic expenditures. This scheme is compulsory in most regions, and 
voluntary in the rest of the country. The fund for this scheme comes from employers’ 
payments, employees’ payments or a combination. A set amount or a certain 
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percentage of salary can be used for the calculation of the contributions to this 
scheme. In most regions the actual amount paid as contribution for this scheme does 
not exceed 100 Yuan. In Xi’an, Nanchang and Dalian, the annual contribution 
payment is 60 Yuan, 50 Yuan and 30 Yuan respectively. The set amount may vary 
between employees and retirees, for instance in Xintai, the employers’ pay 2% of 
their employee’s monthly salary, while the payment for retirees is 8% of their 
pension. The mutual assistance fund for very high expenditures is separate from the 
basic health insurance system. In Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing and Xian, this mutual 
assistance fund for very high medical expenditures is managed by health insurance 
agencies. It is entrusted to commercial insurance agencies such as the Xinhua Life 
Insurance Company in Tianjin, China Life Insurance Company in Zhengzhou and 
Pacific Life Insurance Company in Xiamen.  
Enterprise supplementary medical insurance  
Apart from the basic health insurance, enterprises can also establish supplementary 
health insurance to further relieve the burden on employees who already have basic 
health insurance and mutual assistance for very high medical expenditures. Under 
the regulations, enterprises that have paid the social insurance contributions in full 
can determine autonomously whether or not they want to purchase supplementary 
insurance. For the contributions to this supplementary health insurance, the 
employees’ welfare fund can be used to pay an amount that is within 4% of the 
employees’ total salary. The portion of the contribution that exceeds 4% can be 
considered as part of the enterprise production cost. This supplementary health 
insurance can be established by purchasing commercial health insurance or by 
entrusting social health insurance agencies. Some large companies operate the 
supplementary health insurance system by themselves. 
Health care subsidy for civil servants 
Under the State Council’s Regulations in Document No. 44 issued in 1998, civil 
servants enjoy a health subsidy in addition to the basic health insurance. In 2000, the 
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Labour and Social Security jointly issued 
Guidelines on a Health Care Subsidy for Civil Servants. The subsidy covers excessive 
medical expenses above the ceiling amount covered by the pooled funds of the basic 
health insurance. The subsidy also covers the medical expenditures for the services 
covered by the insurance but paid by individual civil servant in excess of a fixed 
amount. Medical expenditures for services used by persons entitled to specific 
services under central and provincial government regulations are also covered. In 
most regions, the health care subsidy for civil servants and the mutual assistance 
scheme for very high medical expenditures are independent of each other. That is, 
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when the medical expenditure exceeds the amount covered by the basic health 
insurance, the portion above the ceiling amount can be covered by a health care 
subsidy for civil servants. However, in some other regions, the mutual assistance for 
very high expenditures and the subsidy are inter-related so that the mutual 
assistance funds for very high medical expenditures take up the amount above the 
maximum, leaving the portion of individual payment below the ceiling amount to be 
covered by the health care subsidy for civil servants.  
Social medical assistance  
Social medical assistance is aimed at helping those who fail to join health insurance 
or at relieving the financial burdens that are beyond health insurance coverage for 
urban residents in extreme poverty. The Ministry of Labour and Social Security deals 
with health insurance, while the Civil Affairs Department manages social medical 
assistance. The social assistance fund has limited coverage and low assistance 
capacity as it is still in an initial stage. According to statistics, by the end of 2003 more 
than 30 cities across the country had established social medical assistance funds. The 
benefits of social medical assistance include considerable reductions or exemption 
from some user fees, such as registration and examination fees, general treatment 
charges and hospitalization fees. Social medical assistance also provides very poor 
persons with some support for participation in basic health insurance. The social 
medical assistance funds mainly come from local government budgets, the public 
welfare fund created by the lottery and donations. At present, the relevant 
departments under the State Council are working on a document to regulate the 
urban social medical assistance and thereby enable expansion. 
Work injuries and maternity insurance 
The pilot scheme for insurance to cover work injuries and diseases and maternity 
insurance was started in 1993. In 2003 the State Council issued Regulations on 
Insurance for Work Injuries, stipulating that any enterprises and private firms with 
salaried staff should join the system and pay the contributions for work injuries for 
all employees. Individuals were not liable for payment of this insurance. The 
contribution rates vary among different industries and even within each industry 
there are wide differences in the contribution brackets, according to the risk of injury 
and related treatment costs. This insurance covers any work related injury and 
occupational disease, as well as a cash allowance, and compensation for work injury 
induced disability. In the case of the death of a worker due to a work related injury or 
occupational disease, the insurance pays funeral expenses, a pension for the family 
and compensation for the loss of life of the worker. 
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By the end of 2002 the number of participants in the work injury insurance 
scheme had reached 44.06 million, the contribution revenue reached 3.2 billion Yuan 
and claims amounted to 1.99 billion Yuan with a cumulative surplus of 8.11 billion 
Yuan. By the end of 2003 the number of participants had increased to 45.73 million. 
At present there are no clear State Council regulations on maternity insurance 
but pilot maternity insurance schemes have been started in some regions. In other 
regions, women can be reimbursed for pregnancy related expenditures from the 
health insurance fund. In the pilot regions, the scope of coverage is urban enterprises 
and their female employees. The contribution rate can be decided by the local 
government according to the number of persons who may have a child, the amount 
of subsidy of delivery and the cost of delivery related care. The contribution rate can 
be adjusted and the highest rate should not exceed 1% of the total amount of salary. 
The benefits include reimbursement for pregnancy examinations, delivery, surgery, 
hospitalization, drugs and family planning, surgical fees, post-natal examination and 
treatment and a cash maternity leave allowance calculated on the basis of the average 
monthly salary of the previous year. By the end of 2002, the number of insured 
women had reached 34.88 million, revenue from contributions reached 2.18 billion 
Yuan while claims amounted to 1.28 billion Yuan with a cumulative surplus of 2.97 
billion Yuan. By the end of 2003 the number of insured increased to 36.48 million 
women.  
4.  Rural Health Insurance  
Due to differences in the levels of economic development and dual economic social 
structures, different health insurance systems were adopted in urban and rural areas. 
After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, urban residents were 
essentially provided with health care free of charge or were covered by the health 
insurance system for workers, leaving the rural residents without coverage. The rural 
cooperative medical system (RCMS) was introduced for rural areas and became 
popular in 1960s and 1970s. This system ensured some medical assistance to rural 
residents but was still far from a sound health insurance system. The RCMS has 
experienced ups and downs till almost complete collapse with the disappearance of 
the planned economy.  
There were several initiatives to tackle the problem of health care coverage for 
rural residents. In 1993, the State Council decided to re-establish the RCMS in 1993 
and various pilot schemes were implemented with the support of the international 
development partners. Most of these pilots were set up at township level, without 
uniform guidelines and without agreed and sustainable financial support of 
government at township, county and provincial levels. There were many problems 
with the pilots, including contribution levels which were too low to provide 
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adequate benefits, rigid registration procedures such as enrolment and contribution 
payment only once a year and complicated reimbursement methods with long 
waiting periods for insured persons to be repaid after they had themselves paid for 
health services. Most of the pilot projects collapsed after several years, and new 
attempts were made by the Ministry of Health to establish new forms of social health 
insurance for the rural population. 
In 2002 to tackle the existing problems of illness induced poverty and health 
care costs leading to poverty, the Chinese government again decided to establish a 
new rural cooperative medical system. Compared with the old system, the new 
RCMS design gave more emphasis to the government’s responsibilities in financial 
support. Both central and local governments allocated an equal share of 10 Yuan for 
each farmer participating in new RCMS in western and central rural areas. With the 
exception of the large cities, governments at all level in eastern and central areas 
were encouraged to provide a subsidy of 20 Yuan for each participating farmer. 
Under the principle of wide implementation after successful trial, this new 
RCMS is to be expanded to cover all farmers by 2010. In the 220 pilot counties that 
have adopted the trial RCMS since 2003, more than 60 million farmers have enrolled 
in the systems. Moreover, to alleviate poverty among farmers and ease their financial 
burdens, the Ministries of Civil Affairs, Health and Finance issued Guidelines on the 
Implementation of Rural Medical Assistance in 2003. The guidelines are aimed at 
ensuring multi-channel financing mechanisms, such government allocations and 
voluntary donations to provide funds to enable low income farmers to participate in 
the new RCMS and to cover their catastrophic medical expenses as well as treatment 
costs for special infectious diseases under State regulations. With the aim of 
establishing a standard and sound rural medical assistant system by 2005, the Central 
Government will also provide special fund to regions with financial difficulties. 
5.  For-profit Commercial Health Insurance 
With the development of compulsory social health insurance system, voluntary 
commercial health insurance was considered a good way to accelerate the 
development of health insurance in China. The operation of commercial health 
insurance companies in China goes back to 1982 when the China Life Insurance 
began to offer a cooperative employees’ medical insurance scheme. After more than 
20 years’ development, commercial health insurance has grown in China, 
particularly as the implementation of the Urban Employees’ Basic Health Insurance 
Reform left much room for the development of commercial health insurance. The 
commercial insurance sector is regulated mainly by the Chinese Insurance Law 
issued in 1995, amended in 2002 and other related documents issued by the China 
Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) and Ministry of Finance. The Insurance 
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Law states that health insurance, life insurance and accident insurance are all in the 
category of straight life insurance; while insurance for property loss, responsibility 
insurance and fidelity insurance are all in the category of property insurance. No 
insurance agency is allowed to cover both of the insurance categories without the 
approval of CIRC, while property insurance companies can operate short-term life 
insurance and accident insurance.  
According to the data available, by 2002 there were 29 life insurance companies 
and 8 property insurance companies providing more than 300 health insurance 
products. Besides the traditional products such as cash benefits and reimbursement 
for hospitalization charges, insurance companies have taken on new benefits such as 
income replacement and long-term care. The premium revenue has increased rapidly 
from 2.769 billion Yuan in 2000, 6.155 billion Yuan in 2001, 12.245 billion Yuan in 
2002 and 24.192 billion Yuan in 2003, which is a more than an eight-fold increase 
within these three years. The premium revenue accounted for 2.77% of overall life 
insurance revenue in 2000 and the ratio increased to 4.24% in 2001, 5.38% in 2002 and 
8.03% in 2003. The number of insured persons (for health care benefits) reached a 
record high of over 100 million in 2001, and increased to 136 million in 2002. 
6.  Health Insurance Reform: Progress and Achievement 
The framework for health insurance reform 
The major reforms in the urban areas have been underway for more than five years, 
since 1998. In urban areas, China has now established a multi-level health security 
framework, including employees’ basic health insurance, mutual assistance for very 
high medical expenditures, a health care subsidy for civil servants, enterprise 
supplementary health insurance and social medical assistance. This multi-level 
health security system with standard regulation and socialized management is 
compatible with the socialist market economy, independent from individual 
enterprises and institutions, and plays an important role in enhancing public health, 
promoting enterprise reform and maintaining social stability.  
Progress in the functioning of the health insurance system 
According to available information, by the end of 2002, pooled funds were 
established in 339 prefectures and 1435 counties and cities through the Urban 
Employees’ Basic Health Insurance systems. With regard to the number of insured 
persons, by the end of 2003, the number of persons insured in the Urban Employee 
Basic Health Insurance system reached 108.95 million, with an increase of 14.95 
million over the previous year. Among those insured, 79.77 million are active 
employees, comprising 56% of the total active employees in pilot regions, and with 
an annual increase of 10.51 million over the previous year. Another 29.18 million 
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insured are retired workers, with an increase of 4.44 million over the last year. Some 
provinces and municipality achieved a high percentage of coverage, such as in 
Shanghai where 95% of the salaried employees now have health insurance coverage.  
With regard to the revenues and expenditures of the Urban Employees Health 
Insurance, in 2002 the premium revenues and expenditure of the basic health 
insurance was 63.23 billion Yuan and 44.18 billion Yuan respectively with a yearly 
surplus of 19.05 billion Yuan and a cumulative surplus of 42.51 billion Yuan. The 
Basic Health Insurance Fund mainly comes from social pooling and also individual 
contributions. The surplus in pooled funds greatly affects the performance of basic 
health insurance. In 2002, the yearly surplus was 10.96 billion Yuan, while the 
cumulative surplus reached 23.51 billion Yuan. In general, the revenues and 
expenditures of the health insurance funds were well balanced that year. However, 
there were obvious inter-regional differences. In Shanghai for example, the pooled 
fund had a deficit of 650 million Yuan in 2002, or 8.6% of that year’s pooled fund 
income. In Beijing, Shandong and Hunan provinces, the yearly surplus of the pooled 
fund was lower than 20 % of the contribution revenue, while in Shanxi, Guangdong, 
Hubei and Tibet the yearly surplus in the pooled fund was more than 50% of the 
revenue. Generally speaking, as the health insurance reform progressed, the surplus 
in the health insurance funds has been on a downward trend. 
Improvement in access to basic health services 
Compared with the traditional Free Medical Care and former Workers Insurance 
Care in the urban areas, (which were both enterprises-based insurance systems 
compatible with a planned economy), the Basic Health Insurance System is better 
able to ensure equity in access to health care for the insured populations. The reason 
is that the Employees’ Basic Health Insurance System established a social pooling 
mechanism to improve the protection from the financial risks caused by illness and 
health care expenditures, especially in cases of catastrophic illness. It effectively 
reduces the financial burden for the enterprises in difficulty, including small 
enterprises and their employees. Moreover, the contribution rate was linked to the 
employees’ salary level in a way that the average per capita contribution in 
enterprises with good economic returns contributed more than those poorly 
managed enterprises while all the insured persons have the same access to health 
care and support from the pooled funds. 
Promotion of health services system reform and control of 
health care expenditure  
By introducing the risk-sharing mechanism, all the insured persons have to pay for 
part of their medical expenses, which has helped to control excessive demand for 
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health services. The insured persons take the initiative to choose from more than one 
designated hospitals so as to encourage competition and improve the quality of 
health services as well as the attitude of the health care staff. Moreover, compared 
with enterprises and individual patient funds, the health insurance fund has 
advantages in avoiding over provision of services in hospitals, in controlling the 
mounting costs of services and in regulating health services. According to statistics 
collected from general hospitals, from 1990 to 1998 the annual average growth rates 
of outpatient visits, expenditure on hospitalization and drugs during hospitalization 
were 25%, 23.7% and 22% respectively. In 2001, these rates decreased to 9%, 5% and 
4% respectively. This led to the conclusion that the implementation of the health 
insurance system has played a positive role in promoting health system reform and 
in controlling the costs of health care. 
7.  Health Insurance Reform: Problems and Challenges  
At present, China’s health insurance system still needs to study how to solve the 
following main problems:  
Slow progress in health insurance system reform  
According to the regulation in the State Council’s document No. 44, the Urban 
Employee Basic Health Insurance System should have been established in 1999 to 
take the place of the original Free Medical Care and Workers Health Systems. 
However, some government departments and institutions, as well as some more 
profitable enterprises, were concerned that the scope of benefits would be lowered by 
joining this social insurance system. This has led to some reluctance to participate on 
the part of stable enterprises, while at the same time the poorly managed enterprises 
cannot afford to join the system. Some local governments are also concerned that 
health insurance reforms might create more intensified financial burdens, based on 
their experience with pension insurance and minimum allowances for laid-off 
employees living expenses.  
An additional problem is the complicated design of the health insurance system 
which, together with other subjective and objective reasons, could lead to slow 
progress in the implementation of health insurance reform. By the end of 2001, nearly 
20% of the counties and cities in China had not yet started the health insurance 
reform to replace the Free Medical care and Labour Health Insurance System, while 
in other pilot regions, low coverage rates of 15% to 40% were reported at the end of 
2002. Moreover, the expansion of health insurance coverage has met with greater 
difficulties recently. Annual expansion from 2001 to 2003 was seen a downward 
trend, as the number of new participants in the schemes in 2001 were 34.99 million, 
21.15 million in 2002 and14.94 million in 2003 respectively.  
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Limited health insurance coverage  
By the end of 2003, only 109 million persons, or about one fifth of the urban 
population, had joined the Employees’ Basic Health Insurance System. That is, the 
new health security system still covers only a small proportion of the urban 
population. Some people are still covered by the old form of Free Health Care and 
the Workers Health Insurance. Many enterprises in difficult financial and managerial 
situations do not have enough capacity to pay the contributions for their employees. 
In addition, private enterprises have so far failed to enrol their employees in the new 
Urban Basic Health Insurance System. There are also several neglected groups 
among urban residents, such as including children and family members of the 
workers, students, elderly residents who are not covered as retired salaried workers 
and the unemployed. Such individuals are currently not covered by the new system 
and face financial burdens in seeking health care. 
Need for improvement in health insurance management  
and reimbursement  
At present, some regions do not have computerized information systems to simplify 
the health insurance procedures. Patients have to submit bills and there are 
considerable delays in reimbursement while there is no monitoring of the providers. 
Patients from small counties with lower level providers try to seek medical services 
at high level providers in big cities at higher cost than in their local health facilities. 
The health insurance agencies cannot prevent this trend and do not have effective 
control on health care costs. Moreover, the provider payment method has long been a 
disturbing problem to the health insurance operational agencies. Research findings 
and experience show that there is no perfect mechanism, but some careful design in 
provider payment should play a role in controlling negative provider behaviour. The 
studies of the current system so far have found that where fee-for-service is used as 
the payment method, there are high utilization rates of prescribed drugs and 
diagnostic tests using hi-tech equipment, reflecting unnecessary use. In the areas 
where global capitation is used to pay providers, common problems are the dumping 
of seriously ill patients, breaking down the inpatient services and using drugs that 
are not covered by the insurance to extract additional payments from the insured 
patients. 
Inadequacy of the pooled funds and risk protection  
Many countries launched health insurance system on the basis of a national pooled 
fund, while in China counties and prefectures are the major levels for pooling. The 
exceptions are the municipalities of Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin in which pooling is 
at the municipal level. According to statistics, by the end of 2002 and excluding 
Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin, around 1800 pooling regions had a total of almost 80 
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million insured persons and a pooled fund of more than 26 billion Yuan. This means 
an average of 40 thousand insured persons per pooling region and an annual average 
of 15 million Yuan as revenue from contributions per pooled region. Some under-
developed pooling areas with small populations only have several thousand insured 
persons and their annual revenue is limited to several million Yuan. At present the 
health insurance system in China can hardly follow the example of other countries to 
establish a national pooling fund. In a country with a huge population base and 
inter-regional differences in economic development, such blind imitation regardless 
of national conditions may not encourage local agencies to control irrational medical 
expenditures from the pooled fund. At the same time, the risk resistance capacity at 
the county level is too low to enhance equality of the health insurance system across 
the country. 
An additional problem is that some regions established more than one pooled 
fund. For example, Xi’an in Shaanxi Province, the health insurance systems at 
provincial, city and county levels established their own pooled funds. In Yancheng 
city there are three separate pooled funds: in Shizhi, Chengqu and Yandu, without a 
clear management base. Such practices impair the risk protection capacity and create 
unnecessary management costs in the health insurance system. 
Impact of delays in the health system reform on the  
health insurance reform 
The sky-rocketing price of prescribed drugs and the common hospital practice of 
compensating medical services by revenue from the sale of drugs have been the focus 
of the concern of the whole society over recent years. Those problems not only impair 
the public interests but also increase the burden on the health insurance funds. Some 
effective measures have been introduced to solve these problems. These include 
separating the accounts for health service revenue and for drug revenue, regulating 
the supply of drugs and introducing competitive bidding systems in drug 
procurement. Pilot reforms have been launched in Liuzhou, Xining and Qingdao, 
whereby independent retail pharmacies have been established to dispense drugs 
prescribed at outpatient facilities. However, the hospitals are all strongly against the 
above measures, as these are seen to have a negative effect on their financial interests. 
Since the local health department plays dual and contradictory roles of both health 
administrator and health provider, the problems mentioned above cannot be solved 
through dealing with such root causes.  
A mechanism to separate the management of drug revenue and expenditures 
was also introduced. However, this did not work properly because almost all the 
balance between the two was returned to the hospitals. The competitive-bidding 
process was used in drug procurement, but it lacked transparency. The pilot reform 
on the separation of accounts for health service revenue and drug revenue has been 
carried out over the last two years, but so far no substantial progress was made.  
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Pressures due to the ageing of the population  
In the first section, it was noted that China is now in a process of population ageing 
with a trend of significant further expansion in the future. The ageing population 
could lead to an imbalance in the health insurance funds by reducing the revenues 
and increasing the expenditures. On the one hand, an ageing population requires 
higher health care expenditures than a healthy young population, and a higher 
proportion of elderly insured persons will increase the expenditure burden on the 
health insurance funds. Estimations for Beijing reveal that the per capita health care 
expenditure on retirees is 3.5 times that of active employees. On the other hand, the 
current regulations state that retirees do not pay contributions towards their health 
insurance. The ageing population therefore induces a decrease of health insurance 
funds in real terms with less individual contribution. Indeed, the impact of the 
ageing population on the health insurance system is being shown in some regions.  
Difficulties in development of the rural cooperative  
medical system  
At present, the security level of the Rural Cooperative Medical System is low. 
Though it is related to the low income of farmers, the core reason is that the rural 
system does not have a financing mechanism that is at the same level as the urban 
employee’s basic medical insurance system. In pilot regions, farmers contribute 10 to 
15 Yuan per year which is less than 1% of their average annual per capita income of 
2622 Yuan. This means that even if the average annual per capita income is over-
estimated, there is still much room for possible increases in individual contribution 
rates or flat rate amounts. 
In 2002, the per capita expenditure on health for farmers was 103.9 Yuan. If 40 – 
50% of that amount, (approximately 40 to 50 Yuan) can be used for the contribution 
to an RCMS fund, an acceptable cooperative health fund could be set up. At present, 
each farmer contributes the same flat rate amount without considering income 
variation. There are significant differences in the farmers’ incomes, and many poor 
rural households with incomes below the average would not be able to pay increased 
individual contribution rates. It is not considered possible to establish a progressive 
contribution rate based on actual income due to the lack of transparency in farmers’ 
earnings. Government’s financial support to the RCMS through taxation helps to 
motivate farmers to join and also enhance equity among the insured farmers. 
However, the actual national situation is that government’s financial support to the 
RCMS has been limited and far from adequate due to the current level of economic 
development, central financing capacity and the large size of the rural population.  
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8.  Basic Ideas to Expand the Health Insurance in China 
As a developing country, China is no exception in facing problems and challenges in 
the establishment of social health insurance. To solve the problems and meet the 
challenges, China has to intensify and accelerate the health insurance reform. To 
further improve the health insurance system, China has to focus on the following 
main aspects. 
Completion of the financing mechanisms and solutions to  
the problems in the rural and elderly populations 
First and foremost, government should enlarge its investment in the social health 
insurance system. This is needed to provide the necessary medical assistance to the 
retirees from poorly-run enterprises, the needy and other poor people. At present, a 
large proportion of the health budget goes to service providers such as hospitals and 
clinics. No government funds go the to the demand side except for the government 
expenditure on civil servants and employees of state owned institutions. These 
practices prevent the government from meeting the requirements of public finance 
and hinder improvement in the efficiency of health investment. According to 
international experiences, health investment in many countries mainly goes into 
public health and the subsidization of the demand side. Therefore, the scale of health 
investment should be enlarged and the structure of health expenditure should be 
adjusted. The government should increase the investment for solving the health 
security problem of the poor, while enterprises and working individuals should 
really take responsibility for the financing of their health care through the 
prepayment mechanisms. 
Secondly, new resources of the health insurance fund should be explored at the 
appropriate time. The retirees should be encouraged to make their contributions with 
their pension as the base for calculation. In this way, a sound health insurance fund 
can be established in order to meet the challenges of the ageing population. Thirdly, 
tax authorities are encouraged to collect social security contributions, including 
health insurance contributions across the country.  
Strengthen the cost control mechanisms of the health insurance systems 
The sustainable development of the health insurance systems in China can only be 
achieved by controlling the costs and increasing contribution revenue. Technically, 
the process of developing adequate information systems should be accelerated and a 
membership data bank with complete diagnostic data should be established. A 
mechanism for dynamic and comprehensive supervision should be developed to 
effectively monitor the utilization of health insurance benefits. Through appropriate 
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regulations, sound mechanisms for rewards, penalties and even dismissals should be 
established in order to manage the designated health facilities and pharmacies based 
on their performance. The provider payment mechanism should be improved and 
completed.  
Adjustment of health insurance pooling mechanism at all levels 
The existing health insurance pooling system at county level should be shifted to 
prefecture level so as to improve the capacity for risk protection. Meanwhile, besides 
Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin, other provinces are encouraged to establish pooling 
funds at the provincial level if conditions permit. The regions without the required 
conditions can store some pooled funds at provincial level for further redistribution 
among prefectures. Moreover, the principle of localized management should be 
implemented and each region should have only one pooled fund.  
Acceleration of health system reform 
Firstly, the responsibilities of the health authorities should be clarified. The health 
administration cannot play the roles of an administrator and a provider 
simultaneously. The function of the owner of health facilities should be separated 
from health administration. The function of supervisor of the health service market 
should be further strengthened. Health administrations should actively promote 
health system reform. Secondly, based on the pilot reform of separation of hospital 
and pharmacy, the separate management of the drug revenues and expenditures 
should be intensified. 
Large hospitals should be encouraged to link with community health facilities 
by encouraging their technical staff to go to community facilities in order to operate a 
multi-level health system. Thirdly, to optimize the use of health care resources, an 
inter-hospital referral system should be established to satisfy the patients’ various 
needs. Fourthly, the provider payment method should be improved. DRG should be 
actively promoted and practice of large prescription with a large number of items 
should be stopped. Fifthly, there should be some restructuring of the medical facility 
arrangements and promotion of hospital ownership reform. The development of 
private facility could be encouraged to improve competitive mechanisms and to form 
a public-private health system with public ownership as the main body.  
Accelerate the establishment of rural cooperative medical system 
Firstly, the management of RCMS should be transparent and should be based on law. 
The utilization of RCMS funds should be supervised by the rural participants. The 
financial management of the RCMS funds should be strengthened. Secondly, the 
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financing capacity of the RCMS needs to be improved. With the rapid economic 
development and increasing income level in rural areas, the farmers’ ability to pay 
for their contributions is increasing. At the same time, government at all levels 
should increase the amount of subsidies to the RCMS. Thirdly, organization 
variations to suit local conditions should be encouraged. Different ways of managing 
RCMS under different environment should be explored considering the local 
economic development and farmers’ income levels. Fourthly, the relationship 
between RCMS and Medical Assistance for poor farmers needs to be clarified. In 
general, the medical assistance should be provided under the framework of the 
RCMS. In the regions where the RCMS has not been established, the medical 
assistance system can be implemented first for the purpose of reducing the burden of 
high medical expenditures on farmers. 
Expand health insurance coverage from urban employees  
to all urban residents 
Pilot projects with integrated health insurance systems in both urban and rural areas 
should be promoted. The development of a better-off society (Xiaokang) demands 
economic and social integration in both urban and rural areas across the country by 
rooting out the inequalities so that basic health insurance can be extended to all 
Chinese citizens. Theoretical research and international experiences also show that 
high level economic and social development may be preconditions for the realization 
of such goals, and China now still has a long way to go in this area. However, 
universal coverage should be the goal of reform. 
After the establishment of the Urban Employees Basic Health Insurance system, 
those with the ability to pay joined the system. Employees in private enterprises, 
students, family members and the unemployed should be covered, with assistance as 
required in order to have health insurance coverage extended from all urban 
employees to all urban residents. Measures then have to be taken to ensure basic 
health services for rural employees in urban cities. The gap between urban and rural 
health security levels should be narrowed in the future with the improvement in 
rural conditions. The pilot project of integrated health insurance systems should be 
implemented in selected areas in order to accumulate experiences for expansion 
across the whole country.  
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India 
Indrani Gupta and Mayur Trivedi 
1. Background 
India has experienced a mixed pattern of development in the recent past. Its 
performance has been impressive in many of the macroeconomic fronts like growth 
rate of GDP, reduction in unemployment and poverty, impressive foreign reserves, 
economic reforms, development of information and technology. Indicators of human 
development have also improved substantially over the years.   
However, there is still a lot of cause for concern. The benefits of economic 
development have been unevenly spread across regions as well as groups, and 
education, health, gender issues as well as economic and non-economic deprivation 
continue to plague the country, and are proving to be constraints in its development. 
Inter-state variations in almost all the development indicators, but especially human 
development indicators, continue to challenge national policymaking and make 
generalizations difficult even today. Some of the basic indicators of development are 
given in Box 1 
Selected Demographic Indicators Selected Economic Indicators 
Population  1.05 billion in 2003 GDP real growth rate 4.30
% 
0-14 years: 32.2%  GDP composition by sector: 
15-64 years: 63%  Agriculture  25% 
Population 
distribution  
65 years and over 4.8% Industry 25% 
Population 
growth  
1.47% Services  50% 
Birth rate  23.28 births/1,000 Labour force by occupation:  
Death rate 8.49 deaths/1,000 Agriculture 60%,  
Sex ratio  1.07 males/females Services  23%,  
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Selected Demographic Indicators Selected Economic Indicators 
Total: 59.59 deaths/1,000 live births Industry 17% 
Female: 58.93 deaths/1,000 live 
births  
Population below poverty 
line:  
25% 
Infant mortality 
rate  
Male: 60.23 deaths/1,000 live births Inequality (Gini coefficient)  37.8 
Total: 63.62 years  Unemployment rate  8.80% 
Male: 62.92 years  Inflation rate 5.40% 
Life 
expectancy  
Female: 64.37 years (2003 est.) Industrial production 
growth rate  
6% 
Total fertility 
rate  
2.91 children born/woman Share of organized sector  7% 
Total population: 59.5%    
Male: 70.2%    
Literacy rate  
Female: 48.3% (2003 est.)   
Source: Indian Health Profile 
Turning now to the health sector, while the indicators like IMR and maternal 
mortality rates do indicate that India has made large gains in health status over the 
past several decades, there is much in the current scenario to cause concern, 
especially when these indicators are compared to those in other countries, including 
countries of the region. Also, India is undergoing a health transition, one feature of 
which is a dual burden of diseases. While communicable diseases continue to 
contribute to the majority of health burden, non-communicable diseases have started 
becoming more prevalent. The morbidity and mortality of the poor still occur largely 
due to preventable infections, and childhood and maternal causes continue to 
contribute to the major burden of disease for the poor. 
In addition, the inequity in health status (as measured by infant mortality rate, 
under-5 mortality rate and maternal mortality) between the poor and the non-poor 
on the one hand, and the vulnerable categories and the general population on the 
other, continue to be a major issue. Many analyses indicate that the present system 
has serious problems with respect to access, efficiency, effectiveness and quality. The 
polarization of the disease burden and the continuing plight of the poor point to a 
level and mix of spending that seems at this point quite beyond the reach of the 
government. Public spending on health has been more or less stagnant at about 1 
percent of GDP, which places India among the bottom 20 percent of the countries 
(World Bank 2001). 
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Health spending in India is such that curative care continues to be the major 
part of primary care spending, with bulk of the spending coming from private 
sources. Overall, private health spending accounts for more than 80 percent of all 
health spending. Further, nearly all the private spending in India is out-of-pocket, 
with very little insurance coverage, leaving a majority of Indians vulnerable to 
substantial economic impact from health related problems (Ellis, Alam and Gupta 
2000). The middle- income households have either some form of coverage from 
employers or can buy insurance, and the rich have the ability to pay. The least 
covered or most vulnerable are the lower income and poorer households, who are 
left to cope with health shocks on their own (Gupta 2002). 
Curative public services mostly favour the rich; about Rs. 3 (about 7 cents in US 
Dollars at current rates) is spent on the richest quintile for every Rs. 1 (about 2 cents) 
spent on the poorest 20 percent (World Bank 2001). A study (Mahal 2000) applied the 
tools of benefit incidence analysis to the NSS 52nd round data on health, to assess the 
extent to which different groups gained from publicly financed and provided 
services. The findings indicate that the poorest 20 percent of the population only 
captured about 10 percent of the total net public subsidy. The richest quintile 
benefited three times more than the poorest.  
Other findings from the various available studies indicate that hospitalized 
Indians spend more than half of their total annual expenditures on health and more 
than 40 percent of those hospitalized borrow money or sell assets to sustain their 
expenditures. Those below the poverty line are much more likely to be hospitalized 
than others. While the poor still depend on the public sector for the majority of their 
health services like antenatal care, immunization, institutional deliveries and 
hospitalization, they access the private sector much more for outpatient care (about 
80 percent). While there are numerous quality concerns of public sector services, the 
private services that the poor access are generally of the lowest quality. Mostly the 
rich access the upper end of the costly private curative care -which is provided in 
facilities with higher standards. 
A case study based on Delhi confirms the above findings (Gupta and Dasgupta 
2000), and indicate that a greater percentage of high and middle-income households 
use government facilities, and a greater percentage of lower-income households use 
private facilities. Also, the lower income households are those with least insurance 
coverage and they are also seeking largely allopathic as well as institutional care 
(rather than indigenous practitioners). There is a more than 3 times difference 
between expenditure in private and public facilities, and even the public facilities are 
not as inexpensive as one would think.  
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All the above findings indicate that the poor in India (a) have a higher burden 
of disease, (b) the poor are less likely to get hospitalized than the rich, (c) have lower 
access to health services, (d) access the more expensive private sector for curative 
care, (e) have least insurance, and (f) are more likely to fall into further poverty due 
to health related expenditures. Also, the public spending on health is least likely to 
favour the poor. 
The conclusion seems to be that the national health policy of India has not been 
able to meet one of its main objectives: equity in health care financing and access to 
health care. With increasing privatization of both health services and insurance, these 
trends are likely to worsen in future. The seriousness of the situation has to be 
understood by policymakers, because if a large majority of the population is left out 
of the gains of development, including better and more sophisticated health care, this 
can only give rise to more discontent and discord. 
Since health care is an essential expenditure, and is also an investment both at 
the individual and national level, the failure to provide access to adequate care will 
also lead to a less productive working population, and future higher costs of 
treatment and illness. While weak government financing at the central and state 
levels is certainly a big constraint, there is an urgent need to look at the usefulness 
and efficiency of the current levels of spending on health. A system which spends the 
majority of funds on salaries and remuneration – leaving little scope for fresh 
investment - needs an urgent review. There is also the need to use sharper targeting 
tools, so that subsidized care reaches only those who deserve it. A greater 
involvement of non-government organizations (NGOs) and more public-private 
partnerships at the local levels might overcome some of the targeting problems.  
Given this background, social health insurance takes on an even greater 
urgency, because this is one option that will ensure a more equitable health system in 
the country. As will be discussed later, social health insurance in India is constrained 
by the fact that most of the work force is in the unorganised or informal sector – the 
share of organized or formal sector is only about 8 percent of the labour force in 
India.  This feature has also been a constraint in extending other social security 
benefits to the population at large. 
In the next section, we discuss the development of social security and insurance 
mechanisms in India. Section 3 discusses compulsory health insurance schemes that 
exist today, and in Section 4 we discuss voluntary but state sponsored/supported 
health insurance mechanisms. Section 5 briefly presents the state of commercial 
health insurance schemes, and Section 6 presents an overview of community 
insurance schemes in India. Section 7, 8, 9 and 10 discuss other non-health social 
security and welfare schemes that exist in India, to better understand the context in 
which to discuss the role of health insurance. Finally, Section 11 presents a critical 
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analysis of the health insurance set up and proposes some recommendations that can 
be considered to extend social health insurance in India.  
2. Development of Social Security/Insurance Mechanisms 
The social security programmes in India were visualized based on the Directive 
Principles of State Policy, which inter-alia, enjoins upon the State to strive to promote 
the welfare of the people by securing and protecting, a just economic and social 
order. With the ratification of many of the ILO Conventions, the provision of social 
security has taken on a more urgent dimension. Social security is based on the 
recognition of the fundamental social right guaranteed by law to all human beings 
who live from their own labour and who find themselves unable to work temporarily 
or permanently for reasons beyond their control. The state, as an agent of change, has 
to develop a system of providing protection to its labour through a legislative, as well 
as an administrative mechanism, so as to provide responsive, efficient, and long term 
assistance to its work force. A series of Acts were passed over the years to ensure 
greater social security to various vulnerable groups, including one major Act 
covering health services for the poor – the Employees State Insurance Scheme. The 
principal social security laws enacted centrally are the following: 
¦ The Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 (ESI Act) 
¦ The Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (WC Act)  
¦ The Employees’ Provident Funds & Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 
(EPF & MP Act) 
¦ The Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (P.G, Act) 
¦ The Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 (M.B. Act) 
¦ The Minimum Wages Act 1948 
In addition to these Acts, the government has been extending 
assistance/subsidy for both health and other requirements of indigent and 
vulnerable populations from time to time, and some major initiatives at both the 
central and state levels now exist in India. This form of assistance has taken many 
forms such as direct subsidy, subsidy by payment of premiums of standard 
insurance products and collaboration with non-government organisations to extend 
assistance. (Ministry of labour, 2002) 
While the bulk of the governments’ efforts are on social security/welfare for 
those who need it most, the government has also extended health benefits to its 
employees in the form of social insurance through one major scheme – the Central 
Government Health Scheme. 
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There is also the significant presence of the private commercial insurance sector, 
both for health and non-health insurance products. This sector has shown a rapid 
increase in the recent past. Finally, India has seen a fairly impressive growth of 
community-based schemes, both health and non-health, which has happened mainly 
in response to the continuing needs of the population for security of all forms – 
economic and health.   
Figure 1 gives a typology and lists all the schemes that have been studied in this 
analysis under the various categories. The categories considered here are health and 
non-health. Under health, two types of schemes have been considered – compulsory 
and voluntary. Similarly, the same classification has been followed under non-health 
schemes. Under voluntary schemes for both heath and non-health products, further 
three-way classification has been done – state sponsored, commercial and 
community based. In Figure 2, the major characteristics of each of these types of 
schemes are listed to better understand the design and differences of each.   
Figure 1. Typology of health and non-health insurance/welfare schemes in India 
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Figure 2. Characteristics of health and non-health insurance/ 
welfare schemes in India 
 
3. Compulsory Health Insurance Schemes 
There are essentially two compulsory health insurance schemes in India. These are 
the Employees State Insurance Scheme and the Central Government Health Scheme. 
Employees State Insurance Scheme  
The promulgation of the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 envisaged an 
integrated need based social insurance scheme that would protect the interest of 
workers in contingencies such as sickness, maternity, temporary or permanent 
physical disablement, and death due to employment injury resulting in loss of wages 
or earning capacity. The Act is also designed to also guarantee reasonably good 
medical care to workers and their immediate dependants. 
Following the promulgation of the ESI Act, the central government set up the 
ESI Corporation to administer the Scheme. The Scheme, thereafter ESIS, was first 
implemented at Kanpur and Delhi in February, 1952. The Act absolves the employers 
of their obligations under the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 and Workmen’s 
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Compensation Act 1923. The benefits provided to the employees under the Act are 
also in conformity with ILO conventions. 
The ESI Act 1948 applies in the first instance to non-seasonal factories using 
power and employing ten or more persons and non-power using non-seasonal 
factories and establishments employing twenty or more persons. The Act contains an 
enabling provision under which the “Appropriate Government” is empowered to 
extend the provisions of the Act to other classes of establishments – industrial, 
commercial, agricultural or otherwise. Under these provisions, most of the state 
governments have extended the ESI Act to certain specific classes of establishments 
such as shops, hotels, restaurants, cinemas etc employing 20 or more persons. 
 The Act extends to the whole of India and the administration of the ESI scheme 
is the responsibility of an autonomous body – the ESI Corporation (ESIC). The 
Ministry of Labour is the concerned Ministry that oversees the operation of the 
corporation. The corporation is chaired by the Union Minister for Labour, and the 
Labour Secretary is the Vice Chairperson. The other members are from central and 
state governments, employers and employees organizations, medical profession and 
the Parliament.  
The ESIS currently covers about 8,500,000 insured members, with a total of 
about 32.9 beneficiaries. The employers and employees contribute 4.75 percent and 
1.75 percent respectively of their wages.  
The regular pre-payment arrangements, with compulsory employer-employee 
contributions and ear marked deductions on the one hand, and the fact that this 
scheme has been set up as part of the social security net, makes this a typical social 
health insurance scheme, and the only one that fully qualifies as such in India. 
However, many analyses have revealed that the ESIS system suffers from numerous 
quality issues (Gumber 2002, Lawyers Collective Newsletter, 2003) including non-
availability of drugs, waiting time and poor services. 
The Central Government Health Scheme (CGHS) 
The CGHS was started in 1954 in Delhi with the objective of providing 
comprehensive medical care facilities to the central government employees (active 
and retired) and their family dependents. Besides central government employees, the 
scheme also provides services to (i) members and ex-members of Parliament, (ii) 
judges of the Supreme Court and High Court (both sitting and retired), (iii) freedom 
fighters, (iv) central government pensioners, employees of semi-autonomous 
bodies/semi-government organizations, (v) accredited journalists and (vi) Ex-
Governors and Ex-Vice Presidents of India. In addition, employees of the Accountant 
General of India are being provided these benefits in a few cities. 
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Contributions range from Rs.15 to Rs.150 per month to become a cardholder. 
The number of cardholders currently is 983,243 and the total number of beneficiaries 
is 4,327,014. It is important to remember that there is no fixed contribution from the 
government and the scheme is run as a benefit given to the employees. In other 
words, the government bears the cost of provision almost entirely, with only nominal 
contribution from the beneficiaries. 
The health services are provided to the beneficiaries through health centres, 
polyclinics and government/recognized hospitals and cover out-patients facilities 
under all systems of medicine, emergency services in the allopathic system, free 
supply of necessary drugs, laboratory and radiological investigations, domiciliary 
visits to seriously ill patients, specialist consultations both at the health centre and 
hospital level. 
The scheme was initially started in Delhi, and subsequently extended to 23 
cities. This scheme has all the important features of SHI, except that individuals can 
opt out of the scheme. In reality, however, such attrition is low. 
For those not covered under the CGHS, the All India Services (Medical 
Attendance) Rules, 1954 applies. Since this is an important rule, below it is explained 
in some detail, based on the information provided by the Ministry of Personnel 
Public Grievances and Pensions. 
Under this Rule, the government defines "Contributory Health Service Scheme" 
as any approved scheme of free medical attendance and treatment of servants of the 
Government and the members of their families in return for such monthly 
contribution by every Servant of the Government as may, from time to time, be 
determined by the Government. 
"Government" means in the case of a member of the Service serving in 
connection with the affairs of the Union, the Central Government, and in the case of a 
member of the Service serving in connection with the affairs of a State, the 
Government of that State: Provided that a member of the Service serving in 
connection with the affairs of a State falls ill in some other State the Government of 
that other State shall be deemed to be the Government for the purpose of clause 
"Member of the Service" means a member of an All-India Services as defined in 
section 2 of the All India Services Act, 1951, (61 of 1951). It is not clear what the total 
number of beneficiaries covered under this scheme is, but information on the scheme 
needs to be considered within the health insurance scenario in India. 
As in the case of ESIS, the CGHS has also been plagued by numerous quality 
issues and is not very popular among its beneficiaries, except for hospitalisation. 
 126 Social Health Insurance 
In addition to the contributory schemes mentioned above – which meet the 
classic definition of social health insurance - there are several health benefit schemes 
running for different groups of employees in the government sector. For example, 
railways, defense, mining and plantation workers are covered fully by health benefits 
offered by these organisations. Each of these benefit schemes is backed by their own 
health care infrastructures meant exclusively for the workers in that sector. The 
public sector undertakings like Oil and Natural Gas Commission and the Steel 
Authority of India also have their own facilities meant exclusively for their 
employees and their dependents. 
4. Voluntary State Sponsored/Supported  
Health Insurance Mechanisms 
The government – both at the centre, state and local – has been an active participant 
in many ways to support different schemes of health coverage in India. These 
schemes are voluntary in nature and the government subsidizes the premiums.  It is 
again difficult to collect accurate information from every state on each such scheme. 
Some details on selected schemes on which information could be gathered are given 
below, with the caveat that it is entirely possible that more such schemes may be 
running at present in India. 
(1) The Government of Jammu and Kashmir has offered to cover every 
government employee and three dependents by an Employees Group 
Mediclaim Policy offered by the National Insurance Company. A 
premium of Rs. 1400 has been fixed, and the governments of Jammu and 
Kashmir pay a subsidy for the first year of Rs. 700 and Rs. 350 depending 
on the type of employee for a sum insured of Rs. 300,000 per family unit 
on a floater basis.  
(2) Goa is providing financial assistance for availing tertiary care. Treatment 
to individuals whose income is less than Rs. 150,000.  Government has also 
enhanced the amount to the extent of Rs. 300,000 in the super specialized 
categories such as cancer, kidney transplant, neurosurgery and open-heart 
surgery including post-operative care. It is proposed to introduce a system 
of compulsory registration of beneficiaries with a payment of a nominal 
fee of Rs. 100/- per member of the family. More than one thousand 
beneficiaries have already received care through the scheme with benefits 
of up to Rs. 60,000,000 during 2002-03 and during 2003-04, Government 
has spent Rs. 60,000,000 up the end of December 2003 and 740 
beneficiaries have availed this facility. 
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(3) National Maternity Benefit Scheme (NMBS) under the National Social 
Assistance Programme of the government. Under this, cash assistance of 
Rs.500 is provided to women in households with incomes below the 
poverty line and 19 years of age and above, up to the first two live births. 
(4) Universal Health Scheme for BPL (below poverty line) population: under 
this scheme, explained in more detail below, the government provides a 
Rs. 100 per year subsidy for BPL population.  
(5) Centrally sponsored Thrift Fund Scheme for handloom weavers: the 
member contributes 8 % of wages or income and the Central and the State 
governments contribute 4 % of wage to the Fund.  
(6) Welfare Funds for Limestone & Dolomite Mine workers, Iron ore, Chrome 
ore & Manganese ore Mine workers, Mica Mine workers & Cine workers, 
Beedi workers: purchase of spectacles to mine and beedi (indigenous 
cigarette),workers, reservation of beds in tuberculosis hospitals, treatment 
and subsistence allowance in case of tuberculosis, reimbursement of 
expenditure upto Rs.100,000 for heart disease and kidney transplant, 
maternity benefits at Rs.500 per delivery to a female beedi worker for first 
two deliveries and assistance for family welfare. The collection is through 
a tax on mica export, export of iron ore, internal consumption of iron ore, 
manganese ore and chrome ore as well as limestone and dolomite. The 
welfare fund for beedi workers is being financed by at Rs.2 per thousand 
manufactured beedis. 
(7) Mathadi Workers Boards scheme: Diagnostic services such as radiology, 
pathology and ultrasound and health care from 12 health centres and two 
hospitals. Boards contribute 2 percent of their levy and each worker 
contributes Rs.20 per month. 
A very special case of government support is when a community insurance 
scheme is subsequently subsidized by government, either by subsidizing the 
premiums or by subsidizing other operational elements of the scheme. Below, we list 
two such schemes, but there may be other community insurance schemes that are 
also supported by government.  
(1)  Rag Pickers’ Insurance: this scheme started in Pune covers rag pickers 
with the Municipal Corporation of Pune contributing fully the premium 
on behalf of the rag pickers. The scheme is the Jan Arogya policy offered 
by New India Assurance Company. 
(2) Karuna Trust community insurance scheme in Karnataka: here also the 
government of Karnataka has assured support in the form of payment of 
premiums to vulnerable groups. The product is again a tailor made 
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product based on the Mediclaim policy offered by National Insurance 
Company. 
These examples indicate the states’ willingness to bear part of the burden of 
health and related expenses in the form of either premium or contribution to a pool 
or waiver of fees, or burdening other operational costs.  
5. For-profit Commercial Health Insurance  
While the private health insurance market in India is still relatively untapped, there 
has been a significant expansion in private insurance since the Privatization Bill on 
the insurance sector was passed.  
To give a brief background, the Insurance Regulatory and Development Bill, 
which was passed in the Parliament in January 2000, allowed the insurance sector to 
open up to private players. The Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority, 
IRDA, is the government agency that has been created to ensure that the insurance 
sector operates in a fashion that is consistent with the interest of the consumers. The 
General Insurance Company (GIC) was converted into India's national re-insurer 
from December 2000, and all the four subsidiaries working under the GIC umbrella 
were restructured as independent insurance companies. The Indian Parliament 
cleared a Bill in July, 2002 de-linking the four subsidiaries from GIC. A separate Bill 
has been approved by Parliament to allow brokers, cooperatives and intermediaries 
in the sector.  
In addition to the four public sector general insurance companies and Life 
Insurance Corporation, India now has 13 life and 9 non-life insurers in the private 
commercial sector. In addition, Third Party Administrators (TPAs) have been 
allowed to operate in the health insurance market to facilitate cashless transactions 
and smooth administrative functioning of the insurance market. Health insurance 
premiums in India have risen from Rs.5,310 million (or USD 117 million at current 
rates) in 2000-01 to Rs.1,045 (about USD 231 million) during 2002-03, which includes 
Overseas Medical Policies (IRDA Journal 2003). This is impressive and indicates that 
there is probably going to be continuous growth in the health insurance market in the 
near future.   
The major share of the health insurance market is of Mediclaim, the 
standardized product offered by the four public sector companies, National 
Insurance, New India Assurance, Oriental Insurance and United India Insurance.  
The Mediclaim scheme was till recently a reimbursement policy covering 
hospitalization and domiciliary hospitalization for a pre-specified period. There are 
additional features, such as reimbursement of the costs of medical examination, a 
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claim free bonus and family discount. An insured person can choose a sum insured 
between Rs. 15,000-Rs 500,000. Mediclaim excludes care for pre-existing diseases, 
HIV/AIDS, dental care and pregnancy related conditions. 
The private commercial insurance companies are at present only 10-15 percent 
of the total health insurance market. The products that they offer are similar to 
Mediclaim, and a few companies offer comprehensive products combining life and 
health insurance. 
In addition to Mediclaim and the private health insurance products, another 
policy offered by National Insurance Company and Life Insurance Corporation (LIC) 
of India is the Critical Illness Policy. For example, the Critical Illness Policy offered by 
the National Insurance Company is an exclusive benefit policy for individuals in the 
age group 20-65 years. The scheme covers critical ailments, including Coronary 
Artery Surgery, Cancer, Renal Failure, Stroke, Multiple Sclerosis, major organ 
transplants like kidney, lung, pancreas and bone marrow. A similar policy, Asha 
Deep, is offered by LIC. Among the private sector companies also, several companies 
offer either stand alone or composite critical illness policies. 
Finally, as mentioned above, the public sector insurance companies have 
introduced a Community-based Universal Health Scheme, with elements of subsidy 
for below-poverty-line (BPL) population. Under this scheme, premiums of Rs 1 per 
day per individual and Rs. 1.50 for a family of five, and Rs. 2 for a family of 7 have 
been fixed. This allows (a) reimbursement of medical expenses up to Rs. 30,000 
towards hospitalization (b) cover for death due to accident for Rs. 25,000 and (c) 
compensation due to loss of earnings at the rate of Rs. 50 per day up to a maximum 
of 15 days. 
6. Voluntary Community Based Health Insurance Schemes 
Despite the myriad schemes described above, there continues to be a significant gap 
between the needs of the population for health cover and what actually exists by way 
of such cover. To fill this gap, different NGOs and community-based organizations 
have come forward with their own schemes, catering to a wide range of populations 
and their needs. In a country the size of India, it is not possible to list in a 
comprehensive manner all the schemes currently run by different organizations in 
different states. This exercise, however, is urgently needed for getting the complete 
picture of health coverage in India.  
In this report, we have analysed 16 schemes in different parts of the country. 
Table 5 below indicates the salient features of these schemes. 
  
Table 5. Salient features of selected community health insurance schemes in India 
Scheme/ 
Characteri-
stics 
State of 
operation 
Services  
covered Beneficiary 
Premium  
structure 
Insu-rance 
coverage 
health/ 
Composite 
Insu-rance 
company 
Service 
provision  
by the  
NGO 
Co - 
payment 
Donor  
for the  
scheme 
AKHS, 
Ahmedabad 
Gujarat Registration and Consultation 
for any diseases any time, 
Yearly check up - Diabetes, 
Hypertension,  
Members of Dairy 
cooperative 
No direct premium. 6 paise 
per liter of the milk is being 
calculated. 
Health   Yes, OPD 
only 
Yes   
Vimo SEWA, 
Ahmedabad 
 Gujarat Hospitalization expenses with 
an upper limit ( Additional 
benefits of Maternity cover, 
Denture and Hearing Aid at 
subsidized rate for Fixed 
Deposit members) 
SEWA union 
members - Urban 
and Rural, their 
husband and children 
Vimo SEWA has 3 schemes 
under the integrated package  
1st 2nd 3rd Member : Rs.85   
Rs.200 Rs. 400 Spouse : 
Rs.55   Rs.150 Rs. 325 
Children : Rs. 100 Rs.100 Rs. 
100 
Composite ICICI 
Lombard 
and 
National 
Insurance 
No No   
Tribhuvandas 
Foundation, 
Anand 
Gujarat Members of TF are covered for 
primary care and secondary 
care at their sub centers, 
hospitalization at any of the 
eight empanelled trust hospitals. 
All families that are 
pouring milk at dairy 
cooperatives, 
irrespective of the 
amount of the milk. 
Rs. 25/year/ family for the 
membership of TF and 
pouring of minimum 300 liter 
milk/year for SPAM 
membership. The services of 
TF sub centres can availed by 
nonmembers at Rs. 10/year/ 
family.  
Health   Yes, OPD 
only 
No   
BAIF, Pune Maha-
rashtra 
Hospitalisation (Inclusive of 
maternity extension) UP TO Rs. 
5, 000 
Natural death Rs. 20,000 
Death due to accident Rs. 
50,000 
Partial permanent disability Rs. 
25,000 
Total permanent disability  Rs. 
50,000 Annual health 
examination 
Members of Self 
Help groups of BAIF, 
Individuals coming 
from a family having 
annual income 
considered as BPL or 
marginally above it. 
Rs. 225 for SHG member and 
Rs. 260 for others. (The 
additional benefits like, 
concession at the health 
facilities and loan for 
hospitalization, can not be 
extended to non-SHG 
members) 
Composite UIIC No No   
 
 
Rag Picker's 
insurance 
scheme, Pune 
Maha-
rashtra 
Hospitalisation, Standard jan 
Arogya policy coverage with an 
upper cap and life cover 
Rag Pickers, 
kabadiwalahs, 
Dabba-batliwalahs, 
Membership fees - Rs. 25 and 
LIC premium Rs. 25. Age 
below 45 - Rs. 70 46-55 - Rs. 
100 56-65 - Rs.120 66-70 Rs. 
140, Paid by Municipal 
Corporation Family floater: 
Same premium for spouse 
and 50% for a child. 
Composite New India 
assurance 
Co. Ltd 
No No   
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Scheme/ 
Characteri-
stics 
State of 
operation 
Services  
covered Beneficiary 
Premium  
structure 
Insu-rance 
coverage 
health/ 
Composite 
Insu-rance 
company 
Service 
provision  
by the  
NGO 
Co - 
payment 
Donor  
for the  
scheme 
CASP, Pune Maha-
rashtra 
Hospitalization (Up to Rs. 
16000), Domiciliary treatment 
(Up to Rs. 4000) 
needy and school 
going children and 
their families 
Rs. 330 per family of a child, 
parents and two siblings 
Health New India 
Assurance 
Co. Ltd. 
No No   
Community 
Assisted & 
Financed Eye 
Care – Pilot 
Project, L.V. 
Prasad Eye 
Institute, 
Hyderabad 
 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
Complete eye examination & 
Cataract surgical service and 
other secondary level eye care 
and minor surgical services. 
All individuals 
pertaining to rural 
areas of selected 
villages in the 
adopted areas. 
Rs1/person/month on yearly 
basis. 
Health  -  Yes No   
Seba 
Cooperative 
Health 
Society Ltd, 
Kolkata  
West Bengal Seba hospital is general 
hospital with 36 beds (6 ICU 
beds), OPD, specialty clinics, 
pathology, X-ray, USG, ECG, 
Echocardiography, Dental, GP 
clinic, Emergency, Ambulance 
and domiciliary services at night 
Middle - High-income 
group of people both 
rural and urban - 
Mediclaim scheme. 
Also open to patient 
not under Mediclaim 
Mediclaim and group 
Mediclaim - prescribed 
premium, - One time payment 
depending on the age of 
enrollment 
Health GIC group 
(National) 
yes, OPD 
and 
Hospitali-
sation 
No   
Student 
health home, 
Kolkata 
West Bengal Free consultation across all the 
specialties @ Rs. 2 per day All 
diagnostic tests @subsidized 
rate Hospital facilities: 
Admission charges for medical 
investigation Rs. 25 Adm. 
Charges for surgical Rs. 75 
Maintenance charges per day          
Rs. 10 
Students  Universal subscription @ Rs. 
4 p/year/ student Individual 
membership @ Rs. 60 p.a. 
Health   yes, OPD 
and 
Hospitali-
sation 
Yes WB 
government 
Sri Mayapur 
Vikas 
Sangha, 
Mayapur 
West Bengal Standard cover - Jan Arogya 
policy 
Poor marginalized 
women self help 
group members and 
their family members 
Age below 45 - Rs. 70 46-55 - 
Rs. 100 56-65 - Rs. 120 66-
70 Rs. 140, Family floater: 
Same premium for spouse 
and Rs. 50 for a child 
Health Oriental 
Insurance 
Co. Ltd. 
No No UNDP 
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 Scheme/ 
Characteri-
stics 
State of 
operation 
Services  
covered Beneficiary 
Premium  
structure 
Insu-rance 
coverage 
health/ 
Composite 
Insu-rance 
company 
Service 
provision  
by the  
NGO 
Co - 
payment 
Donor  
for the  
scheme 
Surul Health 
cooperative 
         
Karuna Trust, 
Mysore 
Karnataka Insured amount for 
Hospitalisation Rs.2500/- per 
year 
Rs.50/- per day as wage loss 
Rs.50/- per day for hospital for 
all services – no prescriptions to 
be given (The public health 
facilities should be used. Private 
health services are not covered) 
Ambulance services and 
referrals (to district hospitals / 
state level tertiary center) 
included 
Population of the 
T.Narasipura taluk in 
Mysore district and 
Bailhongal taluk in 
Belgaum district, 
focusing mainly on 
BPL and SC/ST 
population 
Rs. 30 per person per annum 
for general population 
In the case of SC/ST and BPL 
population, the premium 
would be fully subsidized from 
the project funds and the 
person insured would not 
have to pay any amount.  
In the case of BPL and non-
SC/ST population, the 
premium would be subsidized 
to the extent of Rs. 10 from 
the project funds and the 
person insured would have to 
pay the balance amount 
 Health National 
Insurance 
Co. Ltd 
 No No  UNDP 
BUCCS 
(Buldhana 
Urban Co-
Operative 
Credit Society 
) Health 
Insurance 
Scheme, 
Buldana 
Maharashtra Accidental death of member Rs. 
25,000 
If member is hospitalized for 
more than 3 days at a time Rs. 
50/- per day up to Rs. 750/- (i.e. 
15 days) 
Hospitalization for member and 
family(for one illness maximum 
limit Rs 15,000 with internal sub 
limits on various expenses) Rs. 
30,000 
Rural population of 
Buldana district, 
mostly farmers 
Individual: INRs 365/- 
Family of 5 (husband, wife, 
three children): INRs 548/- 
Family of 7 (husband, wife, 3 
children and insured’s 
parents): Rs 730 
Composite United India 
Insurance 
Co. Ltd 
No No Basic 
Health 
Programme, 
GTZ 
132 
Social H
ealth Insurance 
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Based on the analysis of these schemes, we can broadly classify them along the 
following lines: 
(1) What is the genesis of the scheme? 
(2) What is the entry point of beneficiaries into the insurance scheme?  
(3) Is it a prepayment scheme? 
(4) Is the payment always monetary or also in kind? 
(5) Integration of other non-health services with health services? Does the 
membership also bring with it other benefits? 
(6) Are the health services provided within the organization that administers 
the scheme or are de-linked and provided by providers not connected in 
any way to the prepayment organization? 
(7) Are there co-payments at the point of service delivery? 
(8) Is the insurance done by the organization itself or by a professional 
insurance company? In other words, are the risks borne by the 
organization or an insurance company? 
(9) Is the scheme dependent on external sources of funding for its routine 
operation? 
The analysis revealed a rich range of variation of schemes along these lines. 
Health has often been not the primary objective of the NGO activity or even the 
community group formation, but came because of a felt need of a group that was 
formed for some other reason. A good example is Tribhuvandas Foundation, which 
could mobilize groups on the basis of dairy activities, but subsequently incorporated 
health financing as another activity. In other examples, like Seba Hospital in Kolkata, 
the hospital management saw the need for insurance in their patients seeking care at 
their hospital, and decided on health insurance as a response to this need.  In other 
places, self-help groups (SHG), especially of women, were formed in response to 
needs of women, and often an important activity of such groups was micro credit. 
From this evolved a need for financing health care and examples of successful SHGs 
getting into health insurance are Vimo SEWA in Gujarat, Mayapur Vikas Sangha in 
West Bengal and BAIF in Pune. 
While all the schemes surveyed are based on pre-payment ones, the mode of 
collection as well as the administration and other details differ. One major difference 
has been presence or absence of a formal insurance company in the basic design of 
the scheme. There were several cases of successful collaboration with mostly one of 
the public sector companies, and the examples include SEWA, Karuna Trust, 
Mayapur, West Bengal and BAIF.  
Almost all the schemes were created in response to the needs of the most 
economically vulnerable population of the area. To that extent the enrollment had an 
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inherent bias towards those with lower ability to pay. This also implied the need for 
more flexibility in the premium and payment structure, which seems to have been 
one of most important positive points that emerged from the analysis. The four 
public sector insurance companies have been able to change their earlier inflexible 
image since the privatization of the insurance sector, and are now seen as important 
partners helping NGOs and CBOs in formulating tailor-made schemes on health 
insurance in response to the needs of the vulnerable population. 
However, one inherent problem of the various schemes continues to be the 
financial sustainability over the years. The dependence on outside funding or 
subsidies seems to be a real felt need, especially in areas where the size of the 
coverage is not too large for effective risk and income pooling. It is safe to say that 
the larger the pooling, the higher is the probability of self sustainability, and lower 
the need for dependence on outside funding. On the administrative side, the ability 
of some communities to mobilize enough members may be linked to success, as 
reflected by schemes which benefited from the formation of SHGs. If however, size is 
a problem, then the scheme is limited by the ability of the organizers to get the 
general population into the scheme, which is always a challenge. However, as 
mentioned before, for schemes like Student Health Home of Kolkata, size is not a 
problem but the paying ability of the student population is very low, implying that 
subsidized care will continue to strain the resources unless a fresh infusion of funds 
comes in from time to time. 
While it is not easy to hazard a guess as to what percentage of population is 
covered by these various community schemes, it is clear that these are fulfilling a felt 
need in many of the communities in the country, and are therefore playing an 
important role in making health care more affordable and accessible. 
More discussion on the role of CHIs will be done later under the critical 
analysis of the entire system of insurance in India. 
7. Compulsory Non-health Social Security/Welfare Schemes 
As mentioned above, there are a few major social security laws enacted in India. 
These details of social security provided under these Acts are given below, excluding 
ESI, which has already been discussed above. 
The Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (WC Act) 
The Act provides for payment of compensation to the workers and their dependents 
in case of accidents (including certain occupational disease) arising out of and in the 
course of employment and resulting in disablement or death. This applies to railway 
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servants and persons employed in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II of 
the Act.  Schedule II includes persons employed in factories, mines, plantations, 
mechanically propelled vehicles, construction works and certain other hazardous 
occupations. Minimum rates of compensation for permanent total disablement and 
death have been fixed at Rs. 90,000 and Rs.80.000 respectively. Maximum amount for 
death and permanent total disablement can go up to Rs.456,000 and Rs.548,000 
respectively depending on age and wages of workmen. 
The Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 (ESI Act) 
The Employees’ Provident Funds & Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (EPF & MP 
Act) (Separate provident fund legislations exist for workers employed in Coal mines and 
tea plantations in the state of Assam and for seamen). 
This Act is applicable to 180 specified industries/classes of establishments and is 
applicable to every establishment that is engaged in any one or more of the industries 
specified in the Act or any activity notified by central government in the Official 
Gazette, and employing 20 or more persons. Employees getting wages up to Rs. 6500 
per month is required to become a member. The current membership is 26,300,000. 
The employers and employees contribute 12 percent each of the basic wages, 
dearness allowance, and retaining allowance. 
The Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 (M.B. Act) 
The Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 regulates employment of women in certain 
establishments for a certain period before and after childbirth and provides for 
maternity and other benefits. The Act is applicable to mines, factories, circus 
industry, plantation, shops and establishments employing ten or more persons, 
except employees covered under the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948. It can be 
extended to other establishments by the State Governments. There is no wage limit 
for coverage under the Act. 
The Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (P.G, Act) 
The Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 applies to factories and other establishments 
employing 10 or more persons. On completion of five years service the employees are 
entitled to payment of gratuity of 15 days wages for every completed year of service 
or part thereof in excess of six months subject to the maximum of Rs.3.50 lakh. The 
current maximum limit is applicable from 24.9.1997. The wage ceiling for coverage 
under the Act was removed in 1994. 
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Minimum Wages Act 1948  
The wage policy for the unorganised sector, secured mainly through the Minimum 
Wages Act, 1948, is oriented towards providing a ‘Need-based Minimum Wages’. In 
the unorganised sector, the wages are fixed under this Act. Both the state and the 
central governments are appropriate governments for fixation/revision of minimum 
rates of wages in the scheduled employments falling in their respective jurisdiction. 
8. Voluntary State Sponsored/Assisted Non-Health  
Social Security/Welfare Schemes 
In addition to these Acts mentioned above, the central and state governments have 
launched several schemes designed for different segments of the population. These 
schemes are voluntary in nature and the government subsidizes the premiums. 
Below we list the schemes that are in the nature of welfare and are linked to 
insurance companies: 
Programmes with links to voluntary prepayment schemes 
¦ Janashree Bima Yojana covers death other than by accident (Rs. 25000 is 
payable), death/total permanent disability due to accident (Rs 50,000 is 
payable), and permanent partial disability due to accident (Rs. 20,000 is 
payable). So far 1,1580,000 persons have been covered under the scheme. 
The premium under the scheme is Rs.200/-per annum per member. Fifty 
percent of the premium i.e. Rs.100/- will be contributed by the member 
and/or Nodal Agency/State Government. Balance 50 percent will be 
borne by the Social Security Fund. This scheme covers workers in 
specified industry like textiles, printing etc. 
¦ Krishi Shramik Suraksha Yojana 2001: this covers death, disability and 
survival benefits for specific agricultural workers. The member will pay 
Rs. 365/- per annum, payable quarterly/half yearly/yearly. Double the 
amount will be contributed from the Social Security Fund. 
· Death: On death before age 60: i) Payment of sum assured of Rs. 
20,000/- along with return of accumulated amount with interest to 
the nominee. ii) Payment of an additional sum assured of Rs. 30,000/- 
in case of death due to accident, along with return of accumulated 
amount with interest to the nominee. 
· Disability: On disability due to accident before age 60 (i) In case of 
total permanent disability i.e. loss of two eyes or two limbs of use or 
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one eye and one limb of use, Rs. 50,000/-. ( ii) In case of partial 
permanent disability i.e. loss of one eye or one limb of use Rs. 25,000. 
· Survival Benefits: Lump Sum Survival benefits will be provided at the 
end of every 10th year after entry into the scheme till the member 
attains 60 years of age. The lump sum amount will depend upon the 
accumulation in his/her account. Further, lump sum benefit will be 
paid only if the  membership is in force. 
· Pension: Pension will be paid to the member on reaching age 60. The 
amount of pension will depend upon the accumulated balance in his 
account and the annuity rates at that time. Further, if member has 
paid for a minimum period of 10 years, then at least Rs. 100/- per 
month pension will be payable.  
¦ Varishtha Pension Bima Yojana: this provides pension during the lifetime 
of the pensioner in the form of a savings scheme with 9 percent interest. In 
the event of unfortunate demise of the pensioner, purchase price will be 
returned to the nominee / legal heir of the pensioner. There is also an exit 
option available after 15 years. Loan facility available to the extent of 75 % 
of purchase price after 3 years. 
9. Voluntary (Private) Commercial Non-Health  
Insurance Schemes  
¦ Mother Teresa Women & Children Policy covers Death/Disablement 
arising out of accident and also during childbirth at hospital, and surgical 
operation such as sterilization, caesarean, hysterectomy and removal of 
breast due to cancer. The premiums are Rs.15 per woman per annum for 
the basic cover and Rs. 23 per woman per annum for both basic and 
additional cover provided that it occurs within 7 days from the date of 
operation. All sections of women in the age group of 10 - 75 years 
irrespective of their income, vocation or occupation can be covered in this 
policy.  
· For Disablement of Insured women, the sums are: permanent total 
disablement Rs.25,000, loss of two limb/both eyes/one limb and one 
eye Rs.25,000, loss of one limb/one eye Rs.12,500. 
· For death: For married women the policy provides compensation of 
Rs.25,000 in the event of death of husband due to accident.  For 
unmarried women, the policy provides compensation of Rs. 25,000 in 
the event of death of the insured to the nominee/legal heir. 
 138 Social Health Insurance 
· Additional cover: Temporary Total Disablement - Rs.500- per month 
subject to a maximum of Rs. 1,500. 
¦ Raja Rajeshwari Mahila Kalyan Yojna Policy: this is very similar to the 
Mother Teresa policy described above. 
¦ Both the private as well as public sector undertakings offer a range of 
disability covers with varied characteristics. 
10. Voluntary Community Based Non-health  
Insurance Schemes 
As in the case of community health insurance, many NGOs offer a range of non-
health services including livelihood activities, pension, disability, income loss etc. 
Many of these are offered by the NGOs offering health products or financing and are 
tailor made to suit the needs of the community. These are most often than not, 
offered in the rural area to vulnerable populations. As in the case of CHI, it is 
extremely difficult to estimate the size of the population covered by such schemes, 
but the proliferation of NGOs offering a range of services around the country is an 
indication of the importance of these activities in the areas they are being offered. 
11. Critical Analysis of Health Care Financing Through 
Prepayment/Ear-Marked and Health Insurance 
Mechanisms 
There are several questions that can be raised around the issue of health insurance in 
India. 
¦ Is the current division among SHI, private insurance, CHI and other forms 
of coverage optimal? 
¦ Are the issues around access, availability and quality of health services 
similar across these different kinds of insurance schemes?  
¦ Does India have any scope to extend social health insurance given the 
existing status of employment and the labour force? 
· What is the percentage of current SHI coverage? 
· What can be the target coverage? 
· What are the constraints in scaling up? 
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The above analysis indicates that in India, unlike other countries in this region, 
there are numerous schemes running in different parts of the country, documentation 
of which is a daunting task. The variation across states is not trivial and it is very 
difficult to generalize on the basis of a few examples. 
Table 6. Health insurance coverage in India for selected schemes 
Schemes Beneficiaries  
(in million) 
The Employees State Insurance Scheme (ESIS)1  25.3 
Central Government Health Scheme (CGHS)2 4.3 
Railways Health Scheme 8 
Defense employees3 6.6 
Ex-servicemen 7.5 
Mining and plantations (public sector)4 4 
Health insurance (Public sector non-life companies)5 10 
Health insurance (Private sector non-life companies)6 0.8 
Health segment of Life insurance companies7  
(Public and private sector)  
0.23 
State sponsored schemes <0.5 
Employer run facilities/reimbursement schemes of private sector8 6 
Employer run facilities/reimbursement schemes of public sector9 <8 
Community health schemes 3 
                                                   
1 ESIS coverage as on March 20003 
2 CGHS coverage figures for 2003-04 
3 Figures for the Railways and Defense as per the officials in the respected ministry 
4 These figures are based on data from Director General Employment and Training, Ministry of Labour. Approximately 10 
million employees work in these two sectors of the government, as of March 2002. 
5 The number of policies for Mediclaim is about 2 million, which would yield roughly 10 million lives covered. No firm 
estimates of this are as yet available in India. 
6 The total number of lives covered has been calculated based on market share of private companies in the health business 
(premiums), since there is no other reliable estimate.  
7 All riders related to critical illness benefit, hospitalization benefit and medical treatment. 
8 Estimates are not available for this; private organized sector covered about 8.4 million employees in 2002. Using a factor of 4, 
roughly 35 million individuals and their families can potentially be covered. ESI covers about 25 million, and a gap of 10 million 
remains, of which many are covered under group medical insurance. Insurance companies cover about 11 million, and of these 
rough data indicate that about 40% is group policies (i.e. corporate sector); this implies about 4.4 million may be covered 
through insurance out of these 10 million individuals. Plantation and mining workers and their families in the private sector are 
covered by government regulations and amount to about 4 million individuals. This gives us a gap of 1.6 million. In the column, 
therefore, we have put a figure of 6 million, which is under the assumption that all of these 1.6 million people may be covered 
and adding the 4 million plantations and mining in private sector, and rounding off.  
9 Public sector companies employ 2 million workers; if a family size of 4 is assumed, at most 8 million workers and their 
dependents can be covered. However, not all PSUs offer health benefits/coverage. 
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As Table 6 above on coverage (in addition to free or subsidized care at 
government facilities) indicates, health insurance of all forms still covers only a small 
percentage of the population and their families. 
Broadly, there is only one nation-wide scheme that has the three most 
important features of social health insurance – compulsory contributions, ear-marked 
taxes based on earnings and contribution from the employers. This is, of course, in 
addition to the pre-payment arrangement. Thus, ESIS is the only scheme that 
qualifies fully as a typical SHI. However, if we relax the definition to exclude fixed 
employer contribution, CGHS (including those who are covered under the Medical 
Attendance Rule) can still qualify as a SHI, since it has the other important 
characteristics of SHI. These are then the two most important schemes that cover 
most of the states of the country under a uniform administrative structure, and 
together cover about twenty percent of the organized sector population, including 
dependents. Overall, these schemes probably cover less than 3 percent of the 
population, though in the absence of firm numbers, these are the best guesses. None 
of the other schemes that exist in the country can qualify as social health insurance, 
so it is safe to say that social health insurance at present covers a very small 
percentage of the population.  
As the table indicates, other schemes for government employees cover slightly 
less than 32 million individuals.  
Additionally, private sector and public sector undertakings (PSUs) cover their 
employees, with health benefits in the form of either reimbursement, or employer 
managed health facilities. However, it is very difficult to get any reliable estimate of 
these numbers. It is estimated that PSUs are probably offering coverage to about 8 
million individuals. Our calculations for the private corporate sector employer-
owned facilities indicate that about 6 million individuals and their families may be 
currently covered (including 4 million in mining and plantation). 
Another way of coverage is community health insurance offered by many 
NGOs with or without insurance companies. It is extremely difficult to estimate the 
coverage by community health insurance in India. Some estimates indicate that about 
5 percent of the population may be covered by health insurance, which seems too 
high. Our best guess is that it cannot be more than about 1 percent, of which a 
substantial part is already covered in the table under insurance companies.  Thus, 
approximately about 0.3 percent of the population may be covered by CHIs run 
solely by NGOs. 
The rest of the population has recourse to the for-profit insurance products both 
in the private and public sectors depending on the ability to pay.  Schemes offered by 
for-profit insurance companies in the government and the private sector cover an 
additional 4 million individuals approximately. This implies that a very small 
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percentage of the population – less than 1 percent - is covered by commercial health 
insurance offered by public sector and private sector insurance companies. 
If we add all these numbers and allow for some margin of error, the coverage 
still adds up to about 85 million. This is less than 10 percent of the population, and 
we are left with an uncovered gap of 90 percent. 
Turning to the issue of accessibility, availability and quality of health care that 
each of these insurance provides, as mentioned above, ESIS has long been plagued by 
quality problems. The quality of the health facilities are often considered so low by 
the insured population that patients prefer visiting private facilities rather than go to 
the ESI facilities. The CGHS, which entitles beneficiaries to avail some pre-specified 
facilities in the government sector, also has been criticized for poor quality of care. 
Together, it is often argued that the ESIS and to a lesser extent the CGHS have not 
been able to meet the standards of quality health care provision, and have together 
resulted in beneficiaries switching to private providers. 
This is in contrast to some of the targeted schemes, like those of the railways 
and defense, that have developed their own health care facilities, and which seem to 
be far superior to the ESIS and CGHS facilities in terms of quality. This is also true of 
the facilities in the public sector undertakings and private sector.  
Finally, those who have private insurance can choose from a wide range of 
facilities in the private sector. 
The unevenness of quality across the different insurance schemes indicates one 
major flaw in the current set up of insurance in India. A good health care system is 
one that offers homogeneous and quality health care to all the population, at 
reasonable price. A good health insurance system is one that is consistent with such a 
health care system.  
Broadly, the insurance system (outside private insurance) can be classified as 
“single group – single choice”, “multiple group- single choice” and “multiple group – 
multiple choice”. Here we are defining multiple group as a group that is pooled 
across both income and risk categories. If the group is not pooled across either 
income or risk, we are calling it single group. 
The analysis indicates that ESIS – which is not pooled across income and does 
not offer a choice of facility, is a “single group – single choice” product. CGHS pools 
across both income and risks and also has some choice of facility and is therefore a 
“multiple group – partially multiple choice” product. Finally, facilities like railways 
and defense which offer health care to their employees are “multiple group – single 
choice” models, because the pooling is across income categories, within the 
organization. 
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From the point of view of insurance, the model that pools the most is good, and 
from the point of view of the consumer, a system that gives choice is superior. To that 
extent, it seems a fully “multiple group-multiple choice” system of insurance may be 
perceived as the best option to follow. The CGHS has choice only at the tertiary level, 
but not at the level of health centres and polyclinics. Also, even among the hospitals 
that are pre-approved, the quality is better in the private hospitals compared to the 
public hospitals. That is because the latter continue to cater to the less well-off which 
in turn results in a deteriorating quality. 
What then is an optimal system of SHI to implement? A system that is truly 
“multiple group- multiple choice” should be able to pool across risk and income 
categories and give choice to consumers. The first part will ensure a feasible scheme 
and the last part will ensure a minimum standard of health care. 
The recommendations therefore, based on the above analysis are the following: 
¦ Ideally, extend SHI to all the workers in the organized sector: 
operationally, this may mean designing a product that is based on (a) 
prepayment (b) ear marked tax and (c) compulsory participation, and (d) 
employee contribution.  Operationally, this may not happen and the 
consolidation may result only across some categories. 
¦ From the supply of health care angle, this would also mean consolidation 
of the list of facilities where beneficiaries could go to avail of the services. 
¦ Given that the health care systems managed under public organizations 
like the railways and defence are working well, it is unlikely that they 
would agree to merge with the rest of the system. Thus, a more practical 
suggestion at this point is to merge the central and state governments 
under one umbrella and extend ESIS to all employees and not merely 
those earning below a certain amount. 
¦ One possible way of implementing a SHI is to tap the tax payment system, 
where an ear-marked SHI tax is paid with every tax return, based on 
earnings. Those who opt to pay the SHI tax will be entitled to a SHI card, 
which entitles them to services under the new unified scheme. This will 
ensure quality improvements, greater coverage, possible expansion of the 
tax paying base, and a higher incentive to join the SHI system. Those who 
opt out of the system can of course have recourse to private insurance and 
the private sector will continue to play a role as it does now.  However, 
the role may be a more pruned one, and would cater to only those with 
higher than average ability to pay. 
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Indonesia 
Hasbullah Thabrany 
1.  Brief History of Health Insurance Development  
in Indonesia 
Health care financing in Indonesia comes from the Ministry of Health budget, the 
Provincial and District health care budgets, the military health services budget, 
social health insurance corporations, private commercial health insurance, out-of-
pocket payments, and foreign aid and loans. The private sector financing comes 
mainly from out-of-pocket payment by individuals or households in public and 
private health care facilities, employer coverage, and private insurance. The amount 
of money contributed by the private sector is not known since Indonesia does not 
have a reliable a national health accounts system. However, recent studies indicate 
that the private sector contributes almost 80% of the health expenditures. According 
to the best estimates during the last ten years, public financing accounted only 23.7% 
of total health expenditure in 2000, down from about 30% five years earlier. With 
such a heavy dependence on private sources, and mainly as out-of pocket health 
expenditures, health insurance mechanisms become viable alternatives. 
The health insurance scheme for civil servants in Indonesia was first 
implemented in 1968. Before the establishment of the health insurance scheme, civil 
servants received reimbursement for their health care expenditures. Several pilot 
projects were undertaken by the Ministry of Health before the formal establishment 
of the health insurance fund (by Presidential or Government Decree). The scheme 
has evolved slowly but has continued to expand and to improve significantly, 
despite some problems and complaints by members. Currently the scheme covers 
comprehensive health benefits for civil servants and their families, and civil servants 
and military pensioners and their families. 
This is the oldest and the largest formal health insurance scheme in Indonesia. 
The scheme applies a social health insurance mechanism and is currently 
administered by a state owned company, as a for profit company known as PT 
Asuransi Kesehatan Indonesia (ASKES, or Health Insurance Company of Indonesia). 
The “for profit” objective of the company is not consistent with the concept and the 
philosophy of social health insurance. 
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Through the promotion of Village Community Health Development 
(Pembangunan Kesehatan Masyarakat Desa), various community and voluntary 
initiatives of health care financing in small scale community health funds (dana sehat) 
have been formally introduced by the Ministry of Health since the early 1970s. Since 
Indonesia had never provided free health care for the population, voluntary 
initiatives by the community to share resources to pay for health care have evolved 
since the 1950s. These initiatives used various names, including such as sickness 
funds, health funds, cooperative health funds, (MOH, 1994a). One model was 
introduced with the assistance of a private foundation in Banjarnegara, Central Java. 
Other similar schemes followed in East Nusa Tenggara and in Bali and then in many 
other regions of the country. By 1994, such schemes were developed in 11,506 
villages or 18.5% of the all villages in the country. The cash or in kind contributions 
collected by most of the funds were very small. 
In addition, the community managed health care (Jaminan Pemeliharaan 
Kesehatan Masyarakat, JPKM), based on the health maintenance organization (HMO) 
model in the United States of America was also intensively encouraged by the 
Ministry of Health. The JPKM has been actively debated since the inception of the 
concept in the Health Act of 1992. The latter scheme is formal, in a way that the 
MOH set regulations on the benefits, premiums, and formal licensing mechanisms. 
The Ministry of Health (MOH) in 1999 set a vision of Healthy Indonesia 2010 by 
prioritizing JPKM as one of the four main elements for health sector development: 
healthy paradigm, professionalism, decentralization, and development of managed health 
care through JPKM (MOH, 1999).  
Both community schemes and the JPKM have not had significant effects on 
fairness in health care financing and on the health status of the members. This is 
attributed to the provision of insignificant benefits and contributions resulting from 
the lack or deficiencies in the actuarial calculations.  
In 1992, comprehensive Social Security programs were first introduced 
through the passage of the Social Security Act. The Social Security Act mandates 
private employers and employees to contribute a percentage of their wages to 
finance four basic benefits: old age, occupational injury, death, and health benefits. 
The health benefits differ from other benefits in which the mandatory membership is 
conditional upon the provision of health benefits by employers through other 
channels. Employers who already offer better benefits from those offered by the 
Social Security schemes are exempted from mandatory joining the social security 
scheme. The scheme is administered by PT Jamsostek, which is also defined as a for-
profit state enterprise. The profit objective of the enterprise is also peculiar in the 
implementation of social health insurance or a social security system which is 
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associated with dissatisfactions and many complaints. This scheme has not attracted 
many participants from the private sector.  
2.  Evidence of Current Health Insurance Coverage 
Of the 212 million of Indonesian population, roughly 20.6% of the population is now 
covered by some form of health insurance. Data from the socio-economic survey 
(Susenas) of 2001 indicates that about 7% percent of the population is covered by 
ASKES, the most comprehensive scheme. The second largest health insurance 
coverage is the health card scheme, the social safety net (SSN) program introduced 
by the government in response to the economic crisis in 1999. The health card 
program was spread through pre JPKM agencies. A relatively low proportion of the 
population, 5.4%, is covered under social security health insurance schemes or 
under the employees’ benefit programs offered by employers. 
The benefits of those insurance schemes are not comparable therefore one 
cannot assume that those 20.6% of the population is completely free from financial 
risks once they are suffer from a severe or catastrophic illness. Detailed discussions 
of each types of health insurance are provided later.  
Table 7. Health Insurance Coverage in Indonesia, Susenas 2001 
Type of health insurance % population 
Askes 7.12% 
Jamsostek 1.50% 
Health Card, including JPKM 6.50% 
Others 5.40% 
Uninsured 79.40% 
 
Data on health insurance coverage in Indonesia are not easily available because 
there is no regulation mandating insurance agencies to report membership or 
policies to a single entity. Each institution has its annual report but annual reports 
published by private insurers or HMOs are difficult to compare since the format and 
the contents of the reports are not standard. At this time, the only source of 
information to assess the prevalence of insurance coverage is from the Susenas 
survey. The Susenas survey collect health insurance information every three years, 
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starting 1998. There are seven types of health insurance available: ASKES for 
government employees, social security (SS) or Jamsostek for some private 
employees, employer covered benefits (EC), health funds (HF), health card (HC) of 
the SSN program, JPKM, and other insurance (OI) including private for-profit 
commercial insurance companies. However, because the design of the survey 
depends heavily on the respondents answer, the results are subject to recall and 
information bias. As can be seen on Table 7, the prevalence of social security and 
JPKM coverage was higher than estimated due to an information bias. Many 
respondents were not aware, for example, that they actually had no health coverage 
from Jamsostek but they did have coverage for other social security program in that 
social security system. As a result, when they were asked whether they have health 
insurance from Jamsostek, they mistakenly reported that they do. 
The same bias occurred when respondents were asked about JPKM. Because 
the distribution of health cards in the social safety net program was channelled 
through a newly established JPKM organization, the respondents reported that they 
have JPKM coverage, where it was actually health card coverage. The confusion 
between JPKM and health card was rampant during the pilot project of JPKM using 
the SSN fund. Because of this reason, health card and JPKM were grouped into one 
in Table 1. 
How do we know that some respondents mistakenly reported their health 
coverage? The Susenas survey provides additional information about type of 
employment or source of main income for the households. By examining the pattern 
of health insurance coverage and the sector from which the household received its 
main income, one could safely make some assumptions on the coverage. For 
example, the majority of farmers would not purchase health insurance from 
insurance companies or be covered by Jamsostek, unless they were employees of a 
large company doing business in agriculture and such companies are very rare in 
Indonesia. As indicated in Table 8 below, respondents who work in agriculture and 
reported having health insurance actually had health cards through the SSN 
program distributed through a JPKM institution. More than 15% of those working in 
agriculture reported having JPKM. From the assessment of licensed institutions to 
sell JPKM, none of them sold their managed care products to people working in 
agriculture. From this assessment it can be concluded that those who reported 
having JPKM actually were covered by the health card scheme. 
The number of people covered by the social security scheme could be obtained 
directly from PT Jamsostek. By 2001, PT Jamsostek reported that their health 
insurance covered had 1.3 million active employees, or 2.9 million members with 
dependents (Jamsostek, 2003).  
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Table 8. Distribution of Health Insurance Coverage by  
Employment Sector, Susenas 2001 
Distribution of insurance types  
as reported by respondents (%) Sector 
Askes SS EC OI HF HC JPKM Total 
Agriculture 7.8 4.6 5.6 0.5 2.8 63.4 15.4 100 
Mining 4.9 25.6 40.4 1.4 1.6 23.7 2.3 100 
Industrial 4.6 47.0 26.5 1.5 1.6 16.6 2.3 100 
Utilities 29.5 22.3 37.8 1.6 -  8.8 -  100 
Construction 8.4 13.0 17.1 1.5 3.1 49.3 7.6 100 
Automotive 14.3 17.1 36.7 3.4 6.6 20.7 1.2 100 
Retail 25.9 12.2 15.6 2.4 3.8 35 5.2 100 
Wholesale 11.8 25.3 50.3 6.4 0.4 2.2 3.5 100 
Import-Export 10.3 39.2 33.2 5.4 - 11.9 - 100 
Transportation 12.7 18.3 25.1 7.7 2.2 28.6 5.5 100 
Financial services 24.7 27.2 39.0 6.6 0.8 1.2 0.5 100 
Health and education 84.3 3.2 7.1 2.2 0.6 2.1 0.5 100 
Total 28.1 16.6 15.0 2.1 2.0 29.0 6.3 100 
Civil Servant Social Health Insurance Scheme (ASKES) 
The legal bases for this scheme are Government Regulation No 69/1991, No 6/1992, 
No 28/2003. The scheme covers about 13.8 million members (almost 7% of the 
population). All civil servants and pensioners of civil servants and military 
personnel are mandated to contribute 2% of their basic monthly salary, regardless of 
their marital status. Starting 2004, the government is mandated to match the 
contribution 0.25%, to be increased annually to reach the matching of 2% by 2007. 
All members are entitled to comprehensive benefits considered medically necessary 
regardless of their wage levels. The benefits however differentiated into three non-
medical levels of services. The highest rank of civil servants are entitled to first class 
room and board, the middle one are entitled to second class rooms, and the lowest 
rank are entitled to be hospitalized in the third class room. All other medical benefits 
deemed medically necessary are not discriminated by rank. 
The benefits are delivered in a defined provider network; consisting of mainly 
public health centres and public hospitals. ASKES pay the providers using 
prospective payment systems: capitation, per case and per diem. The Ministry of 
Health and the Ministry of Internal Affairs determine the level of payment to 
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providers to ensure that ASKES can maintain solvency. In addition to administering 
the compulsory scheme, PT ASKES is permitted to sell commercial products to the 
private sector. Currently PT ASKES has contracts with over 2,500 companies 
covering about 1.5 million members; increased from 131,635 members in 1994. The 
commercial members are entitled to various levels of health benefits, arranged on 
managed care principles, provided by public and private health care facilities. There 
are five different products which vary by comprehensiveness of the benefits and 
non-medical benefit levels such as VIP room if a member is hospitalized or even 
hospital benefits in Singapore and Australia. Payments to the health care providers 
are negotiated on prospective bases. For each level of benefits, the premium is set 
and negotiated based on an underwriting assessment of the prospective groups. 
Premium rates are adjusted to ensure that the benefits will be adequately financed.  
The increase in premiums for compulsory members has, on average, been 
lower than the increase in health care expenditure. This results from the fact that the 
government does not determine changes in wages on a regular basis. On the other 
hand, health care costs, especially drug prices, increase annually to compensate for 
inflation and exchange rates in Indonesia. To ensure that PT ASKES remains solvent, 
the government determines payment rates to public hospitals. These are normally 
below the published rates (of hospital services) determined by local governments. 
The differences between the published rates, applied to all citizens not covered by 
ASKES, may vary from 0-50% depending on the size and location of the hospitals. 
The price differentials often become the subject of hot debates between the hospital 
directors and PT Askes. The hospitals often charge the difference between the 
published rate and the amount paid by ASKES to the members. This leads to 
dissatisfaction among both hospital staff and the members. 
The status of PT Askes as a state enterprise seeking profits creates more tension 
between the stakeholders. The implementation of social health insurance in other 
parts of the world is normally on a non-profit basis. Even if public hospitals are 
reimbursed according to cost, complaints are limited as the social insurance carriers 
do not take any profit to be paid as dividends. This legal status of the social 
insurance carrier in Indonesia carrier is now being reconsidered, with the intention 
of shifting the status to a non-profit state enterprise under the National Social 
Security Reform Bill currently debated in the Parliament.  
Although in theory all members have the right to receive comprehensive 
health services, many ASKES beneficiaries, especially those with higher incomes, 
have not used their entitlements due to the perceived low quality and hassle in 
obtaining the benefits. Susenas data showed roughly that one third of the members 
who needed health services claimed their benefits. Others simply pay out of their 
pocket for services outside the system. However, for catastrophic medical care, such 
as renal dialysis and open-heart surgery, almost all members used their entitlement. 
About 75% of patients in the centres for renal dialysis are ASKES members in 
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contrast to the 7% of ASKES members in the population (Thabrany, 1999). Despite 
some complaints and hesitancy to use benefits provided by ASKES, recent surveys 
indicated that 80% of the members were satisfied with the services provided in the 
network (Soetadji, 2002). It is conceivable that those 20% members who were not 
satisfied were mainly in the upper income levels. 
ASKES faces several problems linked to the trend in the country to transform 
public hospitals into autonomous or state enterprise hospitals. The transformation is 
followed by price increases as the perception spreads that autonomous hospitals will 
no longer receive the government subsidies. The second significant problem is the 
perceived poor quality of health services provided in public hospitals. The third 
problem is that the third child and beyond and related pregnancy treatments are not 
covered. The fourth problem is the relative adverse selection of the scheme that 
covers military pensioners (when health risks are higher) who were not covered 
during their active duties. The last problem is the demand for decentralized 
management in line with the Law of Local Autonomy now being implemented in 
the country.  
Private Employee Social Security Scheme (Jamsostek) 
The legal basis for Jamsostek, or the scheme covering salaried employees in the 
private sector, is the Social Security Law. All employers having 10 or more 
employees are obliged to join Jamsostek. The Law prescribes that (i) the 
participation in the health insurance program is conditional; (ii) only employers are 
mandated to pay the premium of 3% (for singles) and 6% (for married) of wages 
(non-contributory scheme); (iii) the wage ceiling has remained at one million Rupiah 
(equivalent of US$ 120) per month since 1993, freezing revenues for SHI 
contributions while costs of medical care continue to rise; and (iv) The benefits are 
provided to the employees and family members but only up to the third child 
(Jamsostek, 1999).  
Membership has grown very slowly from 199,000 members in 1991 to 2.9 
million people (1.3 million employees) in the year 2002. Only small employers tend 
to enroll their employees to Jamsostek while larger employers have opted out of 
Jamsostek. By 2002, Jamsostek covered less than 5% of the eligible employees. On 
the other hand, in 2002, there were 18.8 million employees enrolled in the other three 
Jamsostek social security programs (Jamsostek, 2003). A national labour survey 
estimated that there were 56.2 million workers fully employed in the year 2000 (ILO, 
2000). Data from commercial insurance companies show that in 1999, the total 
membership in private health insurance companies was close to 4 million people 
(Djaelani, 2000). In addition, there are currently 1.5 million members of PT ASKES 
enrolled in the private sector. The membership profile clearly indicates that many 
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employers are reluctant to enroll their employees in Jamsostek and reflects some 
inherent operational problems within Jamsostek.  
The first problem is that Jamsostek lacks management capacity to organize its 
health care program, especially in dealing with health care providers. The second 
problem is related to the ceiling of salary for premium determination. The flat 
amount ceiling that has not been updated for ten years ago, despite devaluation and 
changes in salary structure. As a result, the average contribution received by 
Jamsostek per member has been very low (in 2000 it was only Rp 5,224) (Jamsostek, 
2002). ASKES currently sells a more limited health insurance package for Rp 20,500 
per person per month (ASKES, 2002). With such a low average contribution, 
Jamsostek cannot negotiate with high quality health care providers and therefore 
has lost the trust of employers. Another structural problem of Jamsostek is the 
limited benefit package. For example, inpatient care is limited to 60 days, including a 
maximum of 20 days in an intensive care unit. Renal dialysis, cancer treatment, 
cardiac surgery, congenital diseases, and organ transplants are not covered at all 
(Supriyono, 1998). These limitations further discourage employers from enrolling 
their workers in Jamsostek.  
Commercial Health Insurance 
The community managed health care (Jaminan Pemeliharaan Kesehatan Masyarakat- JPKM)  
The JPKM Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) product is classified as 
commercial health insurance providing in kind benefits managed by various 
managed care organizations. The Ministry of Health (MOH) promoted JPKM to 
expand memberships through the growth of JPKM bapels. Using the SSN funds, the 
MOH provided incentives to set up a pre bapel, as a private corporation or 
foundation, to be developed as licensed JPKM organizations. A simple explanation 
of bapels is that these are non-insurance companies selling health insurance in the 
form of managed care product. The managed care product becomes an insurance 
product because it is involves risk-transfer among the members. The promotion of 
JPKM was based on the Health Act of 1992 which prescribes the government to 
encourage the development of JPKM. Ministerial decrees provide regulations 
regarding the licensing requirements to sell these types of health insurance. As 
HMOs in the United States of America (USA), the capital and other requirements for 
a bapel (HMOs) are different from the requirements for an insurance company. 
However, in the USA, the supervision of the HMOs is mainly the responsibility of 
state insurance authorities while in Indonesia it is fully under the MOH. 
Although in theory a bapel must offer comprehensive benefits, in practice so 
far none of the 24 licensed bapels provide truly comprehensive benefits due to their 
small size, both in terms of capital and operations. The majority of licensed bapels 
sold combinations of managed care and traditional commercial insurance products 
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because the market demands such products. According to the definition of the 
scheme, the largest JPKM bapel is in fact PT ASKES which administers health 
insurance for civil servants. It is rarely acknowledged since PT ASKES is not 
licensed by the MOH; instead it is licensed by a government decree which has 
higher legal status. Of the 24 licensed bapels, only two were non-profit because the 
MOH decrees require for profit status. When HMO’s were first introduced in the 
USA, 96% of the HMOs were in fact non-profit (HIAA, 1997). 
The largest JPKM pilot project in Klaten district, funded by USAID, failed due 
to incompatibility between the market and the concept of JPKM. The premiums 
were set without actuarial base and were too low and the benefits were inferior. 
Efforts to encourage businesses and insurance companies to sell JPKM have not been 
fruitful due to the conflicting concept of JPKM as a commercial insurance with the 
requirement to accommodate social functions. In addition, the Ministry of Health 
has no adequate capacity to regulate, supervise, and understand the business of 
health insurance. Currently, the expansion of JPKM is on hold. 
For-profit commercial health insurance 
Before 1992, many large private sector companies provided health benefits to their 
employees on voluntary basis. An Insurance Act was passed in February 1992 
permitting insurance companies to sell health insurance products. In parallel, the 
social security laws prescribe conditional mandatory health coverage through 
Jamsostek. It seems that the ‘opt out’ clause in the Jamsostek law was aimed to 
provide opportunity to the commercial insurance companies to continue to sell 
health insurance to employers. The Insurance Act does not regulate any conditions 
of the health insurance contract. Regulation is limited to the practices of the 
insurance business and these companies can sell any health insurance product 
considered commercially viable. The main form of the health insurance products are 
the traditional indemnity insurance or managed care (similar to JPKM). 
Both life and general insurance companies started to offer health insurance as 
riders or as a separate line of businesses. They had a market advantage because they 
had past relationships with employers in selling life or general insurance products. 
By 2000, insurance companies collected health insurance premiums totalling over 
360 billion Rupiah (Djaelani, 2002), which was more than double the amount 
collected by Jamsostek. Their market performance in terms of the number of people 
covered and the amount of premium earned higher revenues than the JPKM bapels 
that did not have experience and were limited in capital. However, it is still only 
large employers that purchase health insurance from the private commercial 
insurance companies. Medium and small employers do not buy insurance and did 
not enroll their employees in Jamsostek. This undermines the effort to provide 
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health insurance for all employees. Many experts have therefore recommended that 
the opt out option in the SS law should be removed in order to ensure that all 
employers provide health insurance for their employees (Mochtar, 2002) 
Micro and community health care financing schemes 
Dana Sehat and other community health care financing schemes were thought to be a 
viable alternative after the recommendations to increase user charges of public 
health facilities (Gani et al (1997) and YPKMI (1994). It was feared that higher user 
charges might threaten access to health services by low-income groups and the 
mobilization of private funds through a prepayment mechanism was perceived to 
be able to offset the recommendation to raise the user charges. Such initiatives have 
been introduced in many developing countries such as reported by Musau (1999), 
Atim et al (1998), and Edmond (1999). However, experience has shown that Dana 
Sehat failed to address the access problems due to very low benefits and vary small 
population coverage. The Dana Sehat schemes were introduced mainly to the poor 
and low-income households by setting the contributions based on consensus among 
the households. There was no incentive for households to contribute to Dana Sehat 
when the household could pay health centre services for the same amount that they 
contributed as a premium for the health insurance fund.  
A study by Thabrany and Pujianto using the National Socio-economic survey 
in 1998 found that only 1.87% of the populations had health cards or were members 
of health funds. The Susenas survey of 2001 showed that only 0.43% of the 
population joined a Dana Sehat. Studies by Silitupen, Iriani, and Asnah indicated 
that very few households paid contributions for more than two consecutive years. 
The studies found that drop out rates from the first year to the second year of Dana 
Sehat were between 60-90% annually. In addition, there was no significant 
improvement in access to inpatient care for the members, because most Dana Sehat 
did not cover these services or only provided insignificant amounts of lump sum 
cash when a member was hospitalized. These low levels of benefits discouraged 
long-term membership. It is not surprising that since the introduction of the 
schemes, there has been very little progress. After the SSN program for about 18 
million poor families was introduced during the economic crisis, the Dana Sehat 
schemes across the country were halted (Azwar, 2001).  
The Social Safety Net Scheme 
The Social Safety Net (SSN) program was introduced to provide financial assistance 
to assure that the poor have access to health services. There were three different 
programs in the health sector: 
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(1) The first program targeted high risk pregnant women by providing block 
grants of Rp 10,000 (about US$ 1.2 in 2004 exchange rate) per poor 
household per year directly to a village midwife. The midwife then could 
use the funds to refer high-risk pregnant mothers to a health centre or 
hospital for further treatment. This program increased access to hospital 
services for severe cases such as bleeding and complicated delivery 
(Hasan, 2000). 
(2) The second program was the promotion of JPKM by providing Rp 10,000 
per poor family per year to pre bapels. The pre bapel retained 8% of the 
funds for administration and marketing JPKM products to non-poor 
households. It was expected that after two years the pre bapels would be 
able to sell JPKM products and then become self-sustained. Through out 
the country, 354 pre bapels were created, the majority of which were 
established by civil servants or pensioners of civil servants within district 
health offices of each district. They had no experience on doing business 
of health insurance. After one year and under heavy criticism, this 
program was terminated. Evaluation of pre bapels revealed that the pre 
bapels had no potential to develop (Ekowati, 2000; Azwar, 2001). 
(3) The third program was the block grant of Rp 10,000 per poor family for 
health centres. The health centre could use the money to buy drugs to 
purchase essential drugs which were in short supply. In addition; public 
hospitals received some block grants for operational costs to compensate 
for care provided to the poor. This program did improve access for the 
poor. However, those who were “near poor” (not qualified for the 
assistance but unable to pay for expensive medical care) still face financial 
barriers to meet their medical needs. 
The SSN program was funded from a program loan from the Asian 
Development Bank. The loan was terminated in 2001 and then the government 
continued the program by directly distributed funds which were transferred from 
some subsidies for gasoline or petrol, to hospitals and district health offices.  
3. Strategic Purchasing 
Strategic purchasing is an essential element of health insurance schemes because 
once a person is insured; the demand for health services may increase. A liberal 
benefit approach could stimulate moral hazard and higher unnecessary utilization. 
The trade off between insurance and moral hazard must be managed by prudent 
purchasing of health services, including the inclusion of preventive measures as 
health insurance benefits. The Indonesian health insurance schemes, from the Dana 
Sehat to ASKES and Jamsostek that are managed in large scale, are designed to 
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implement some managed care techniques to control costs and to reduce moral 
hazard. For example, the Jamsostek and JPKM laws specifically prescribe capitation 
payment. The ASKES scheme also uses the term ‘efficient purchasing’ to allow more 
flexible prospective payment systems. With the exception of the commercial 
indemnity insurance sold by insurance companies, all other schemes use managed 
care techniques such as: limiting benefits in pre contracted providers (closed system) 
and use prospective payment such as capitation, per diem, per case, or a negotiated 
fee schedule in fee-for-service reimbursement. 
Although prospective payments and drug formularies have been used as part 
of the strategic purchasing approach, drugs remain the largest item of expenditures 
among the insurance schemes. Sulastomo (2002), for example, reported that until 
2001 the ASKES scheme spent 53 % of its total expenditure on drugs. ASKES has 
been using a drug formulary system (comprised of generic and brand names) in 
whereby pharmaceutical industries bid competitively for lower prices. Still, the 
proportion of drug expenditures of total expenditure remains high. This was due to 
low reimbursement levels for medical and hospital services.  
4.  Current Reforms 
The Road to Reforms 
The severe financial crisis sparked by the exchange rates problems of Indonesian 
currency, ignited several social riots and caused wide unemployment. Many policy-
makers suddenly became aware that Indonesia did not have any strong social 
security scheme that could prevent the economic risks of people when due to 
unemployment. In 1997, the contribution of the social security fund to the gross 
domestic product was less than 2% which provided no economic leverage to 
overcome financial crisis. In year 2000 and 2002, two comprehensive reviews on 
health insurance and health care financing were undertaken by the Center for 
Health Economic Studies, University of Indonesia, funded by the National Planning 
Board (Bappenas) and the World Health Organization. In addition, in 2001, a 
comprehensive social security review was conducted by the University of Indonesia, 
which was funded by the Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs. At the same 
time, the International Labour Organization (ILO) Jakarta also sponsored a social 
security review aimed at reforming Jamsostek schemes. The studies recommended 
social security reforms, including social health insurance. 
The House of Representatives (MPR) of the Republic of Indonesia also found 
that social security reform must was an important part of national reform. In the 
year 2000, the House of Representatives amended the Indonesian constitution by 
adding new articles and items, including an item stating that every citizen had the 
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right to social security (Article 28H). The Coordinating Ministry of Social Welfare 
(Menko Kesra) aware of the need to reform the Indonesian social security schemes 
and took action by establishing a Task Force on social security reform in 2000. The 
Task Force later became part of the Vice-Presidents secretariat in 2001. At the same 
time, the House of Representatives urged the President to establish National Social 
Security.  
In 2002, the President of the Republic of Indonesia issued a Presidential Decree 
establishing a Task Force on National Social Security System to write an academic 
paper and to draft a bill on the National Social Security System. In August 2002, the 
efforts to reform the Indonesian social security schemes were strengthened by the 
amendment to the Constitution’s Article 34 (item 2) stating that “the State shall 
establish social security for all people and empower the disadvantaged”. All of the 
above legal reforms brought a strong impetus to the enactment a National Social 
Security System.  
The Task Force managed to draft the Bill on National Social Security System by 
the end of 2003. The Bill was then submitted to the Parliament in January 2004, 
which intensively discussed and refined it. The Parliament also conducted hearings 
with stakeholders, and consulted every item of the Bill with the government. Finally 
on 28 September 2004, the Parliament unanimously agreed to pass the Bill, and on 19 
October 2004, President Megawati signed the law on "National Social Security 
System" on the last day of her tenure.  
The Law covers five social security programmes: health benefits, workers’ 
compensation, provident fund, pension scheme, and death benefit. The health 
benefit programme is managed and pooled nationally and financed by social health 
insurance and social assistance mechanisms. The goal of the health programme is to 
ensure universal access of health services in Indonesia and to ensure equity and 
fairness in health care financing. In addition—to be consistent with the goal of 
maximizing benefits to all citizens, the for-profit orientation of the current 
operations of four Social Security Agencies is changed to be not for-profit 
orientation. The health benefit programme will pave the way to establish National 
Health Insurance using the existing two agencies (called Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan 
Sosial—BPJS) that have been implementing social health insurance schemes (PT 
Askes and PT Jamsostek). The law mandates the government to pay contribution on 
behalf of the poor, part of a social assistance programme, to the BPJS.  
Challenges and Strategies of National Health Insurance 
The new design of National Health Insurance (NHI) within the National Social 
Security System has taken into consideration of the fact that Indonesia is a very large 
country with 210 million people, scattered in about 7000 islands. The labour force 
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was estimated at about 101 million people in 2004, with the distribution of 36.2% 
being salaried workers, 51.9% self-employed, 3.4% employers, and 8.5% family 
workers. The self-employed are mainly farmers, individual retailers, with very few 
being self-employed professionals. With only one third of labour force being in the 
formal sector, it is not easy to mobilize financial resources to finance health care for 
the entire population within a short period of time. In addition, the per capita 
income of Indonesians is relatively low (i.e. in 2004 it was about US$ 1 000 at the 
official exchange rate or about $ 2 800 in international dollars). The low per capita 
income significantly affects household expenditures and the ability of workers to 
contribute. The National Socio-economic Surveys showed that between 50%-70% of 
household expenditures from 1995-2000 was incurred on food.  
The NHI relies heavily on contributions from employees, employers and the 
government. It must start by improving the coverage in the formal sectors by 
mandating all employers, without “opting-out” provision as practised under the 
previous social security law, to allow the higher-income workers to share the risk 
with low-income workers. There are problems in determining and collecting 
contributions from those who work temporarily or as self-employed or seasonal 
workers. Many of the temporary and seasonal workers are working without any 
contract binding and they are paid daily or weekly by the small and medium-scale 
employers. Employers often do not count them as employees. Therefore, for efficient 
and effective administration, these groups should first be covered through the 
traditional publicly- provided service, and/or by levying user charges. However, it 
will be a great relief if local governments set fixed user charges for an episode of care 
rather than setting fees for several types of service as currently being practised 
nationwide. Universal access through the NHI scheme must be implemented 
gradually in accordance with the administrative capacity of the BPJS, and the 
employment, social and economic conditions of the country.  
Employees in low-income salaried jobs must be made to join the system. 
However, it should be considered cautiously whether workers earning low income 
should contribute half of their contribution, say 6% of salary, and whether it will 
affect their basic consumption significantly. If workers contribute 3% of their 
monthly wages, it may not affect this daily lives. However, if workers earning low 
wages must contribute over 15% of their wages for various social security 
programmes, they may suffer from difficulties in meeting their daily needs.  
Although the law that would regulate the implementation of the scheme in 
more detail is currently being developed, it is likely that the NHI would apply the 
following strategies:  
(1) All salaried employees and pensioners in the public and private sectors 
are mandated to contribute to the NHI. The contribution level shall be the 
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same for single and married employees to simplify administration and to 
strengthen the social solidarity principle. However, a salary cap should 
be applied. Within the first five years, the compulsory scheme must be 
imposed on employers with ten or more employees. The expansion of 
membership shall be enforced gradually to include employers with one 
or more employees by the tenth year of implementation.  
(2) In the mean time, workers in the informal sector may join the scheme on 
voluntary basis during the first ten years of implementation. The level of 
contributions for the informal sector should be calculated and be 
determined on a nominal amount that varies according to the estimated 
average income of various types of businesses.  
(3) Self-employed professionals such as physicians, lawyers, insurance 
brokers and insurance agents, etc. are mandated to join the NHI from the 
beginning. Although, they are not employers, they are licensed or at least 
are registered to do their business. Compliance to the NHI shall be 
required for renewing the licence to conduct professional services. The 
contribution will be calculated by the BPJS and paid directly by the 
professionals on a monthly basis. It is expected that the members of the 
compulsory scheme would expand automatically as informal 
employment will be reduced.  
(4) The poor and marginally poor (low-income) among the non-salaried 
workers shall be provided with subsidized contributions by the 
government. The eligibility of those who will receive subsidized 
contribution is subject to a means test. This group can be divided into two 
sub-groups:  
· In 2005, the government is already paying a contribution of Rp 5 
000/- per poor individual (US$ 1 = Rp 9 200 in March 2005).for about 
34.6 million poor, currently being enrolled to PT Askes, nation-wide. 
The average contribution in 2005 for existing health insurance for 
civil servants is about Rp 8 000/-. At the beginning, the health care 
benefits for the poor are less than the benefits provided for civil 
servants, mainly in hotel-type of services. In the end, there will be no 
difference on in health care benefit for those who receive subsidized 
contribution from those who contribute fully.  
· The low-income employees in the informal economy and also those 
who do not pass the means test (marginally poor) will still not be 
able to afford to pay for expensive medical care. This group must be 
provided with financial assistance for health care such as for 
inpatient care and elective surgical procedures. However, this group 
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may be able to afford expenses for outpatient care. The government 
should ensure access to expensive health care by providing 
subsidized finance in public hospitals or in third-class private 
hospitals. However, employees should be free to join the NHI on 
voluntary basis at any point of time. 
(5) Coordination on benefit packages with private insurance companies that 
offer supplemental benefits shall be developed. Workers who earn higher 
wages are normally not satisfied with the benefits provided by the NHI. 
Therefore, the law permits them to purchase supplemental insurance 
from the private sector. For example, the private insurance company may 
reimburse non-covered hotel type services in a hospital. Alternatively, 
those with higher incomes may pay the price difference on account of the 
charges paid by the NHI and charges accrued to the patient due to higher 
level of care, directly to the providers. However, they would not be 
allowed to completely opt out from the NHI.  
National Social Security Law and its elucidation 
The following paragraphs describe the health insurance part of the National Social 
Security Law 2004, and elucidate some of the relevant articles. 
Part Two Health Insurance 
Article 19 
Health Insurance is organized nationally, based on the principles of social insurance and 
equity. Health Insurance is organized to ensure that the members receive comprehensive 
health benefits and protection to meet basic health needs. 
The equity principle stands for equal access to health services for a given 
medical need without regard to the amount of contribution paid.1 The principles of 
social insurance cover: social solidarity (sharing) between the rich and the poor, the 
healthy and the unhealthy, the old and the young, and between the high-risk and 
low-risk individuals. It maintains the principle of compulsory/mandatory 
membership and no adverse selection. The contribution is set as a percentage of 
salary/income and is not a for-profit payment.  
                                                   
1 This provision indicates that the Indonesian government is committed to establish a National Health 
Insurance Programme that ensures equity, efficiency, sustainability and portability of health insurance 
coverage. 
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Article 20 
Members of Health Insurance Schemes are those who pay contribution or whose contribution 
is paid by the government. Dependents of a member are eligible for health benefits. Every 
member can enrol other family members to the scheme by paying additional contribution. 
Dependents mean a legal wife/husband, natural children, stepchildren of a 
legally married, legally-adopted children, and maximum of five persons including 
the member. Other family members (extended family) including the fourth child 
and beyond, father, mother, and parents are also supposed to be covered by the 
Law. To enrol other family members, a employee salaried worker needs to provide a 
legal letter authorizing the employers to deduct additional contribution from 
his/her salary and pay the contribution to the Social Security Corporation as 
stipulated in this Law. 
Article 21 
Health benefits remain valid for 6 (six) months after a member is laid off. If the member as 
stipulated in Section (1) is still unable to find a new job and she/he is in low income status 
after the six month-period, his/her contribution will be paid by the government. The 
government pays contribution for a member who suffers from a permanent total disability 
and is in low-income status. Further provisions of Section 1, Section 2 and Section 3 will be 
stipulated by a Presidential Regulation.  
Section 1: This rule allows a member who suffers from a lay-off and his/her dependents 
to have protection up to six months after she/he is laid off without any obligation to pay 
contribution.  
Article 22 
The health benefits cover individual services including personal health promotion and 
prevention, curative and rehabilitative services, and drugs and medical supplies, as medically 
necessary. 
Members shall contribute on cost-sharing basis for certain services that potentially may 
incur abuses and moral hazards. 
Further provisions of Section 1 and Section 2 regarding health services and cost-
sharing will be stipulated by a Presidential Regulation. 
Section 1: Health services in this Article include personal health promotion, 
immunization, family planning services, outpatient care, inpatient/hospital confinement, 
emergency care and other medical procedures, including haemo-dialysis and heart surgery. The 
services provided are of standardized quality to ensure the sustainability of the programme and 
the high satisfaction level of members.  
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The range of services will be subject to the medical needs of members that may change 
overtime and the financial capacity of the Social Security Corporation. These standardized 
services are necessary to maintain prudent spending.2 
Section 2: The types of services requiring cost-sharing arrangement are services that 
have a tendency for moral hazard (heavily influenced by the preferences of members), for 
example drugs as supplement, certain diagnostic procedures, and medical procedures that are 
medically inappropriate.  
In cost-sharing, there must be an effort to contain costs, especially in 
controlling the utilization of health services. Cost-sharing can involve a nominal 
charge for a service or a percentage of total costs of services, and be payable directly 
to health facilities at the point the charge for health services is incurred.  
Article 23 
The health benefits as stipulated in Article 22 will be provided in public or private health 
facilities that bind a contractual arrangement with the Social Security Corporation. In a 
medical emergency situation, health services as stipulated in Section 1 could be obtained in 
any health facility that does bind any contractual arrangement with the Social Security 
Corporation. If in a particular region there is no health facility that meets the criteria to fulfil 
the medical needs of a number of members, the Social Security Corporation shall provide 
other form of compensation. When a member needs hospitalization, the hospital confinement 
will be provided in a standardized room, along with boarding facilities. Further provisions of 
Section 3, and Section 4 will be stipulated by a Presidential Regulation. 
Section 1: Health facilities include hospitals, private medical practices, clinics, 
laboratories, dispensaries and other such health facilities. A health facility is eligible to be 
contracted if it has a valid licence issued by a government institution responsible for the 
health sector. 
Section 3: Any other form of compensation may be provided as cash reimbursement, as 
applicable to a member’s rights. 
Section 4: A member who demands higher class than a standard hospital room and 
board may upgrade his/her class of hospital confinement by taking supplemental health 
insurance coverage or simply pay additional charges which is the difference between the cost 
of services reimbursed by the Social Security Corporation and the sum of charges resulting 
from upgradation of services. 
                                                   
2 This provision indicates that benefits to be provided to members must be equal to the benefits provided for 
current Askes’ members (for government employees). However, the payment system and the amount of out-of 
pocket payment of the insured will be different from current Askes payment. This provision is intended to 
increase certainty and protection that the insured will later not have to pay catastrophic out of the pocket 
expenses to meet their health care needs.  
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Article 24 
The level of payments to health facilities for a region will be determined by negotiation(s) 
between the Social Security Corporation and association of health facilities in the region. The 
Social Security Corporation shall pay health facilities for services rendered to the members no 
later than 15 (fifteen) days after net claims are received. The Social Security Corporation 
develops health delivery, quality assurance and payment systems to increase efficiency and 
effectiveness of the health insurance scheme.  
This provision requires that the Social Security Corporation pays health 
facilities efficiently and effectively. The Social Security Corporation may provide a 
global budget to a hospital in a region to serve a number of members or to pay a 
fixed monthly per capita amount (capitation). The budget or capitation covers 
medical fees, nursing or hospital confinement, ancillary services, and medications 
consumed for which the hospital director has the authority to manage the use of 
money. By paying on all-inclusive amount, the hospital gets the flexibility to use the 
fund (money) as efficiently and effectively as possible.3  
In developing the health care delivery system4, the Social Security Corporation 
applies quality assurance and cost-containment systems, including the application of 
cost-sharing to prevent unnecessary services. 
Article 25 
The drugs listed in the formulary and their maximum prices, including other medical 
supplies which are covered, are determined by the Social Security Corporation in accordance 
with existing regulations. The determination of list of the drug formulary and related prices 
in this Article is intended to consider the dynamic of medical needs, availability, efficiency 
and effectiveness of drugs and consumable medical supplies.5 
                                                   
3 The fifteen-day limit for the SSC to pay net claims (claims that are completed with necessary documents to be 
processed) is to ensure a good corporate management and to ensure that health facilities will be satisfied with 
the payment and therefore there is no reason to provide poor services to the members. In addition, the SSC 
may develop various payment systems, such as per case, diagnostic-related groups, global budget, even 
capitation payment to hospitals and other health facilities. The various payment systems may be in different 
stages across regions because of differences in the feasibility and acceptability of payment systems. 
4 This provision does not intend to take over the roles of the Ministry of Health in developing a health system; 
rather this provision allows SSC to develop health care delivery system ONLY for its members. Such delivery 
system can require a gate- keeper system through a family physician or a 24-hour clinic.  
5 Drug expenditures have been the largest component of the Indonesian health care system. To ensure efficient 
and effective delivery system, the SSC must establish a list of drug formulary in which drug expenditures are 
covered. Drugs shall not be only generic drugs; rather all necessary or essential drugs needed to heal a patient 
must be in the list. However, certain brand names drugs may not be covered unless the prices of brand names 
drugs are competitive to be included in the list. Consumable medical supplies are all the necessary supplies 
such as an infusion set, prostheses and implants etc that are necessary to enable the patient to return to her/his 
productive state.  
 164 Social Health Insurance 
Article 26 
Services that are not covered by the Social Security Corporation will be further stipulated in 
a Presidential Regulation. 
Article 27 
The contribution of the Health Insurance Scheme for salaried workers is based on a 
percentage of salary up to a certain ceiling, gradually to be shared by the employer and the 
employees. The amount of contribution for non-salaried workers is a nominal amount to be 
determined periodically. The amount of contribution for contribution-aided beneficiaries is a 
nominal amount to be determined periodically. The salary ceiling as provided in Section 1’s 
to be determined periodically. Further provisions regarding the amount of contribution as 
stipulated in Section 1, Section 2 and Section 3 and the ceiling of salary as stipulated in 
Section 4 will be determined by a Presidential Regulation. 
The meaning of “periodically” in this section is a define timeframe to review or 
to set new contribution level related to the development of needs.6 
Article 28 
Workers who have more than 5 (five) family members, and who would like to include other 
family members or relatives shall pay additional contributions. 
Additional contributions as stated in Section 1 will be further stipulated in a 
Presidential Regulation. 
5.  Conclusions 
Indonesia has been implementing pre-payment (health insurance) schemes since the 
1950s, starting with community health funds. The formal health insurance scheme 
for civil servants was implemented in 1968. The year 1992 changed the way 
Indonesia provided health insurance with the passage of three laws: the Health Act 
(JPKM), the Social Security Law (Jamsostek) and the Insurance Law. These three laws 
promote the growth of commercial for-profit health insurance in Indonesia.  
The Ministry of Health has been very keen to promote JPKM as the dominant 
form of health insurance, offered as managed care. Massive efforts to stimulate the 
growth of JPKM were not successful because of the incompatibility between the 
market and the form of health insurance being promoted. The micro financing 
                                                   
6 This provision ensures that an adequate contribution is available to finance the health care benefits. 
Therefore, the level of contributions, both in nominal amount for non-salaried workers or as a percentage of 
salary, must be reviewed and changed over time.  
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schemes have not shown any successful evidence to improve the access and quality 
of health services. Learning from previous experiences, the National Social Security 
Bill passed by the Parliament in late 2004, covering social health insurance, will pave 
the foundation for a national health insurance system in Indonesia. In terms of 
strategic purchasing, Indonesia has long been committed to adopting cost control 
mechanisms to prevent moral hazards, and to improve efficiency by adopting 
managed care techniques. 
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Japan 
Toshihiko Hasegawa 
1. Background 
Geography and climate 
Japan consists of four main islands: Hokkaido in the North, Kyushu in the South, 
Honshu, the central and main, largest island, and Shikoku, located between Honshu 
and Kyushu. Japan extends 3,000 kilometres from North to South and the total land 
area is about 378,000 square kilometres. The land is 84% mountainous and forested, 
with only 16% of the land area habitable and fertile. The country is located on the 
circum-Pacific earthquake belt and experiences about 1,500 seismic occurrences per 
year (mostly tremors).  
Japan’s geographical diversity and North-South extent contribute to the 
country’s wide range of climates. In general, Japan has four well-demarcated seasons. 
In the North, the average temperature is below freezing in January and 22 degrees 
Centigrade in summer. In the South, on the other hand, the average temperature is 17 
degrees Centigrade in winter and 27degrees Centigrade in summer. The rainy season 
begins between mid-June to mid-July. Since the temperature is still warm during the 
rainy season, humidity is very high then. After the rainy season, September brings 
the typhoon season. Typhoons strike Japan and cause significant damages every 
year. From the beginning of the rainy season through the typhoon season, the 
precipitation is relatively high, about 160-200 mm per month.  
Population and health 
The population of Japan is about 127 million, with a relatively high density of 336 
persons per square kilometres (much higher in the inhabited areas). Population 
growth rate was 0.11% in 2003*. About 19.2% of the population is over 65 years old, 
indicating that Japan is already an aging society.1. Life expectancy at birth is 81.9 
(78.4 for males, 85.2 for females). In addition, Healthy Life Expectancy (HALE) is 75.0 
(72.3 for males, 77.7 for females)2. The total expenditure on health as a percentage of 
GDP is 6.8%3. 
                                                   
* Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Population Estimates, (2003) 
1 National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Population Statistics of Japan. (2003).  
2 World Health Organization, The World Health Report(2003) 
3 World Health Organization, The World Health Report 2003: Shaping the Future, (2003).  
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Politics 
Japan is a constitutional monarchy. The Japanese parliament, called the Diet, consists 
of the House of Representatives (500 members) and the House of Councillors (252 
members). The members of the Diet are elected by public election. The cabinet is 
headed by the Prime Minister. The current Prime Minister is Junichiro Koizumi. The 
cabinet also includes the ministers, who are appointed by the Prime Minister and are 
usually members of the Diet. The Prime Minister is elected by the Diet. There is a 
local administration system which consists of 47 prefectural governments and about 
3000 municipal governments whose governors are elected by public election. 
Prefectural and municipal governors, in addition to the central government, have the 
power to impose taxes. In recent administrative reforms, decentralization of the 
central government has taken place in terms of both political power and financing. 
Economy 
After World War II and the wartime destruction of the economy, Japan achieved 
extraordinary economic growth in the latter half of the twentieth century. On the 
heels of experiencing two oil crises in 1973 and 1979, the Japanese yen rose to 100 yen 
per U.S. dollar after the Plaza Accord in 1985, a significant change from the fixed rate 
of 360 yen per dollar that had been in force since the 1960s. After recovering from oil 
shocks, Japan experienced a bubble economy from 1987 until it burst in 1991. Since 
then, Japan has been experiencing deflation and struggling with low economic 
growth. Since 1996, Japan has been in its longest recession and deflationary spiral 
since World War II. In 2002, the number of unemployed persons reached 3,590,000 
(an increase of 190 thousand compared to the previous year) and the unemployment 
rate rose averaged 5.4%, the highest rate since World War II4. 
Education and religion 
Education is compulsory from age six through age fifteen years (elementary school 
and junior high school). The literacy rate among Japanese adults is above 99%. About 
95% of junior high school graduates go on to senior high school, and 30% of senior 
high school graduates go on to two-year colleges, four-year colleges or universities5. 
There are two main religions, Shintoism and Buddhism, and Japanese people 
generally participate in or observe the festivities of both religions. Three are about 1 
million Christians, which is less than 1% of the population. 
                                                   
4 Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. “The Trend of Employment and Unemployment” Tokyo(2003) 
5 Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, “The Basic School Survey”(2002) 
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2.  Development of Compulsory Health Insurance 
Mechanisms 
Discussion of introducing social insurance began in 1897 when Gotoh Shinpei, one of 
the leaders of health system development, came back from his study in Germany. In 
spite of the discussions, social insurance was not established until 1927, although 
Workers’ insurance initially started in 1903 as a trial for some government employees 
(mine workers, railroad workers, workers in the steel industry, and selected other 
workers). 
Compulsory Prepayment Health Insurance in Japan was developed in the 
following order:  
¦ Workers’ Insurance for some government employees started in 1905 
(Beginning with mine workers, then certain other government workers) 
¦ Mandatory Workers’ Insurance started in 1927 
¦ Community-based insurance system started in 1938 
¦ Total population coverage by health insurance was reached in 1961 
¦ The Elderly Insurance system started in 1983 
¦ Long-term care insurance started in 2000 
The chronological development of health insurance is shown in Figures 3 and 4 
below. 
Figure 3. The growth of health insurance coverage in Japan (1897-1985) 
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Figure 4. Population covered by various insurance schemes in Japan (1926-1985) 
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Figure 5. The relationship between economic growth and labour unrest in Japan 
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The development of worker’s insurance 
The discussion for introducing social insurance system began in 1897 when Gotoh 
Shinpei returned to Japan after studying the situation in Germany. He introduced the 
German type of Workers’ Insurance, which had started in Germany in 1884, to the 
Japanese Diet, but implementation of a mandatory insurance system for general 
workers in Japan came later, in 1927. However, before introducing the mandatory 
insurance for all workers, a trial version was implemented from 1905 for select 
government employees such as railroad and steel workers, and a broader workers’ 
insurance scheme for government employees was established in 1907.  
Japanese health insurance was first introduced on a broad scale with the 
promulgation of the Workers’ Insurance Law of 1922. It was implemented in 1927 
and constituted the very beginning of all social insurance in Japan. The system 
covered company employees, and included two separate insurance structures. On 
system was managed by central government and covered any company with more 
than 5 employees. The other system was society-managed, and a society was 
established by any company that has more than 300 employees as an insurer. Before 
the introduction of these systems, voluntary mutual aid associations had been 
established in a small number of companies, and employers’ assistance to workers 
for their work-related injuries and illnesses had been stipulated by the Factory Law. 
The Workers’ Insurance Law was enacted to protect workers at the time that the 
labour movement in Japan gathered momentum in the 1910s and early 1920s. 
Although it faced a financial crisis shortly after its establishment in 1929 (the world 
depression), this Health Insurance System gradually developed as the nation’s 
economy grew.  
3.  The Development of Community-Based  
Health Insurance 
Initial phase 
When the Ministry of the Interior carried out a survey in a rural agricultural district 
in 1933, it showed that most families had heavy debts and that medical expenditure 
was the most important cause of their debts. The background of this severe situation 
in rural areas was the world financial panic which began with the New York Stock 
Market crash in 1929, and dealt a strong shock to the Japanese economy, with special 
impact on rural agricultural districts due to a drastic fall in the price of silk. 
Compared with people in urban areas, the health conditions of the rural people 
were very bad and their needs for heath care were very high. However, most people 
living in rural districts could not afford to pay for medical care when they needed it. 
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Even if they could afford to pay, finding a doctor in a rural district was very difficult 
and they would usually have to pay for travel to see a doctor. This situation created a 
vicious cycle for rural people’s health. The imbalances in health care resources and 
health indicators are shown in Figures 6 and 7. In an attempt to improve the health 
situation in rural agricultural districts, the government decided to introduce a 
Community-based Insurance system.  
Prior to this initiative, Japan had a voluntary community health insurance 
called “Jyorei”, which dated back to 1835 and was initially based on rice 
contributions in villages. Before the Community-based Insurance Law was enacted, 
government carried out a pilot study of the experiences of Jyorei. Using the findings 
of that study, the Ministry of the Interior developed the basic structure of Japan’s 
Community-based Health Insurance. 
Figure 6. The number of medical doctors in Japan by residence  
(cities, villages, towns), 1900-1995 
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Figure 7.Urban – rural differences in infant-neonatal mortality rates  
in Japan (1900-1995) 
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Community-based Insurance was approved by the Diet of Japan in 1935, under 
the condition that it be open to all population groups. The system runs on the basis of 
cross-subsidies among population and income groups. In 1938, the Community-
based Insurance law was proclaimed and implemented, in the same year in which 
the Ministry of Health and Welfare was established. Community-based Insurance 
was designed to meet the needs of the poor in under-served rural villages. As was 
the case in the medical societies that had preceded it and in Jyorei, membership fees 
varied according to the households’ income categories. The system was initially 
voluntary, but became compulsory later, with the move towards universal coverage. 
Development phases towards achievement of universal coverage 
After the introduction of the Community-based Insurance scheme in 1938, the 
population covered by this system increased dramatically over a short period of time. 
By 1943, 74.6% of the total population of Japan was participating in one kind of 
health insurance scheme or another. Following the introduction of Community-based 
Insurance in 1938, the number of income groups was minimized to simplify 
calculations. The budget was subsidized by the central government, as well as by 
local government tax revenues which had increased substantially in the late 1940s. 
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During the last stage of World War II, and for several years after the war, the 
health insurance systems stopped functioning due to the lack of resources. However, 
from the 1950s, employment-related health insurance again grew rapidly as the 
economy boomed. The Japanese industrial structure changed with the dominant 
primary industries giving way to newly dominant secondary and tertiary industries. 
With that change, the population which should be covered by Workers’ Insurance 
increased, and at the same time, the population which should be covered by 
Community-based Insurance had decreased. It can be assumed that this changing 
industrial structure was one of the major forces driving Japan to achieve universal 
coverage, as reflected in Figure 8 below. 
The combination of the two forms of health insurance (Workers’ Insurance and 
Community-based Insurance) led coverage to reach 90% of the total population by 
the late 1950s. Subsequently, new legislation was enacted and implemented and in 
1961, when participation in an insurance scheme became mandatory for all citizens 
and universal coverage was achieved. 
Figure 8. Percentage of the primary industries population* engaged in Japan, 
France, Germany, the U.S. and the U.K. (1950-1990) 
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4.  Development of Health Insurance for the Elderly 
Health insurance for the elderly 
Specific measures regarding health and medical care for the elderly population began 
in 1963, when the Elderly Welfare Law was enacted. The benefit packages for health 
and medical care for the elderly were gradually expanded until the beginning of the 
1980’s. In particular, the system for providing for medical expenditures for the 
elderly, which began in 1978, had a very large impact on the health of the elderly and 
on health systems in Japan. Under the new system, the elderly (defined then as those 
at least 65 years old) could receive all medical care free of charge, and their access to 
health care providers improved dramatically. However, some problems also 
appeared, such as increases in the provision of unnecessary medical care and 
increasing financial constraints which limited the ability to provide the increased 
amounts of care. Such financial constraints were particularly serious for the 
community-based insurance programs, because of the elderly insured population 
were covered by community-based schemes.  
To solve those problems, the Elderly Insurance System was introduced in 1983 
through implementation of the Health and Medical Service Law for the Elderly 
issued in 1982. The targets of Elderly Insurance are persons at least 75 years old or 
persons or at least 65 years old with bedridden status. In the Elderly Insurance 
system, the insured initially could receive medical services with no co-payment, but 
are now subject to a 10% co-payment (whereas the co-payment is 30 % for other 
public health insurance beneficiaries other than very young children). The benefit 
package of the Elderly Insurance is also relatively broad when compared with other 
insurance schemes (see the table of financial arrangements).  
Persons eligible for the Elderly Insurance scheme still belong to the Workers’ 
insurance scheme as retirees or dependents or to the Community-based Insurance. 
However, the funding to provide medical care to the elderly is separated from those 
insurance funds, which contribute to the Elderly Insurance. Contributions from the 
funds are based on the total number of elderly in their schemes and total 
expenditures for the elderly shown in past records. The Elderly Insurance is financed 
mainly from tax revenues (38%) and contributions from each insurance scheme 
(62%). Recently, this contribution from each insurance scheme has become a big 
burden on each insurer, and tax subsidy rates have been increasing every year. This 
situation has caused passionate nation-wide arguments within the health sector 
reform movement in Japan. (See Figure 9 and Table 10). 
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Figure 9. Basic developments in the structure of the  
health insurance system in Japan 
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Development of long-term care insurance 
Long-term Care Insurance is not strictly a health care insurance scheme, but rather 
one of the welfare schemes. However, there is a close relationship between health 
insurance schemes and Long-term Care Insurance, particularly with regard to the 
Elderly Health Insurance explained above. In 1997, the Long-term Care Insurance 
Law was enacted, and implementation of the scheme began after 3 years of 
preparation. The purpose of this insurance is to provide integrated health care 
services to the elderly and to reduce the costs of medical care expenditures for long-
term hospital admissions of the elderly (called ‘socially necessary admissions’*). The 
main function of the system is to ensure provision of nursing care services at 
patients’ homes by providing financial support from the pooled funds for Long-term 
Care Insurance. The scheme covers nursing services for those at least 65 years old 
and also those between 40 and 65 years of age who are in need of care or support and 
are members of health insurance schemes. That is, the Long-term Care Insurance 
enables separation of the long term nursing care costs from other medical care 
expenditures, which continue to be paid by the health insurance schemes. 
As noted in the explanation of Elderly Insurance, the burden of health care 
services on each health insurance scheme has been increasing year after year because 
of rapid ageing of the population (Figure 10). Therefore, separating long-term care 
costs from medical expenditures was necessary to sustain the health insurance 
                                                   
* The household unit has dramatically changed from expanded family to nuclear family in Japan. In this 
situation, the elderly who need some support for living tends to prefer to stay in hospitals as patients for the 
long term. This is one of the reasons for Japan’s long average lengths of stay and for the escalation of elderly 
health expenditures in Japan.  
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schemes. However, Long-term Care Insurance faced financial constraints after only a 
few years of implementation. How to care for the elderly by using both Elderly 
Insurance and Long-term Care Insurance needs more detailed discussion.  
Figure 10. Population growth rate and % of population age 65 or above 
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Source: The census of Japan and government estimates 
The increasing elderly population has influenced the labour market in Japan, as 
the increasingly elderly population causes decreases in the working population. 
Given the need to collect contributions to support the health insurance system, a 
decreasing working population has created serious problems for Japan. Also, 
unemployment rates in Japan have increased dramatically (from 2% in 1990 to 5-6% 
in 2003*) because of the recession that has already lasted for more than 10 years. 
These are major issues to maintain contribution collection levels that will be able to 
provide appropriate health care services to Japan’s population. 
5.  Compulsory Prepayment/Social Health Insurance 
Mechanisms 
The total system 
According to the World Health Report 2000 the flow of health care financing can be 
divided into several steps such as the collection of revenues, pooling of funds, 
purchasing of services, and provision of services. For revenue collection, there are 
four main sources, including premiums paid by the companies for workers’ social 
insurance, premiums paid by employees for social insurance and by households for 
Community-based insurance, government tax subsidies, and user charges paid by 
patients. All premium rates, tax subsidy rates and co-payment rates are specified in 
each specific insurance law, which is enacted by the National Diet. 
                                                   
* Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, the Work Force Survey, (2004) 
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For the pooling of funds, there are two mechanisms in Japan: mandatory social 
insurance and the tax-based welfare system. The social insurance system can be 
divided into three components, workers’ insurance, community-based insurance, 
and elderly insurance. 
Japan has more than fifty thousand insurers, more than 9,000 hospitals and 
90,000 clinics and a large numbers of doctors, dentists and pharmacists, with 13 
million admissions (an average of approximately one admission for every ten 
persons) and 4,000 million outpatient visits (an average of 31.5 visits per person) per 
year at present. There are tremendously complex transactions involving extremely 
large numbers of claims and payments. Accurate, quick, reasonable and effective 
purchasing of health care requires efficient mechanisms. Two management 
organizations were created to deal with the tremendous numbers of transactions. 
One is the Social Insurance Medical Fee Payment Fund, mainly for workers’ insurance, 
and the other is the National Health Insurance Confederation, mainly for community-
based insurance. Each has an office in every one of Japan’s 47 prefectures. The 
insurers make contracts with those two organizations. Through this mechanism, the 
insurers do not have to deal directly with the many providers, and the providers only 
have to deal with two offices in each prefecture. (See Figure 11 on Health Financing 
Flows). 
Figure 11. Health Financing Flows in Japan, 2001 
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The payment system is mainly on a fee-for-service basis, with fixed nation-wide 
fee schedules and drug tariffs, except for long term care and teaching hospitals, 
where payment is based on fixed per diem rates. Case payment for teaching hospitals 
is new, begun in 2003. This case payment method is called Diagnosis Procedure 
Combination (DPC) a Japanese version of DRGs (Diagnosis Related Groups) and its 
fees are adjusted according to the severity and expected cost of treatment of diseases. 
The insured persons are obliged to pay co-payment fees directly to providers 
when they use services. One reason that health expenditure accounts for a relatively 
small fraction of Japan’s GDP, in spite of a mainly fee-for-service health care system, 
is that a nationwide universal fee schedule is set by the Central Social Insurance 
Medical Council managed by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. The Central 
Social Insurance Medical Council consists of three groups, the provider-dominated 
Japan Medical Association, purchasers such as insurers, and representatives of 
communities, labour unions and academia. Fee schedules and drug tariffs are set by 
this Council every two years or when deemed necessary.  
Pooling 
Organization and mechanisms 
There are two fund pooling systems, the social insurance system and the welfare 
assistance system. Within the social insurance system, there are three major 
components related to pooling of funds, including workers’ insurance, community-
based insurance and elderly insurance. For workers’ insurance, the pooling of funds 
is carried out within three distinct groups. The first and largest is composed of 1,722 
societies which have been created by some of the relatively larger companies which 
manage the insurance (A “society” in this sense is an insurer which has been 
established by a company that has more than 300 employees). Membership is 
currently 31 million, or about one quarter of the population of Japan. The second is 
the government-managed insurance system for the employees of firms with less than 
20 employees, with 28.5 million members (about 30 % of the total population). The 
third group consists of 79 mutual funds which provide insurance for specific groups 
of workers such as seamen and government employees, with about 11.1 million 
members (about 9% of the total population). 
The pooling of funds for community-based insurance programs is also carried 
out within three groups. One is the municipality-managed insurance, including 3,235 
villages, towns and cities, with 44.8 million members (35% of the total population). 
Separately, 166 associations (an “association” is an insurer which has been 
established by a professional group or trade association) manage community-based 
insurance schemes covering another 4.2 million members (3.3% of the population). 
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The fund for the Elderly and Retired is pooled at the municipalities, and payments 
for providing health care services for the elderly are made to health care providers 
through the Social Insurance Medical Fee Payment Fund or the National Health Insurance 
Confederation. Persons over 70 years of age or persons who are over 65 and have a 
chronic illness are eligible for this insurance. The elderly person legally belongs to his 
or her original insurance entity, Workers’ Insurance or Community-based Insurance. 
However, the fund for providing medical care services to the elderly is separated 
from those insurance funds. It is based on the contributions from Workers’ Insurance 
Fund and the Community-based Insurance Fund and government subsidies (from 
tax revenues). The total numbers of persons insured by this elderly insurance are 3.4 
million in Workers’ Insurance and 12.3 million in Community-based Insurance 
(12.3% of total population). The coverage of the population in the various systems in 
2003 is shown in Table 9. 
Table 9. Organization and membership of health insurance entities in Japan, 2003 
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Financial arrangements 
Financial arrangements differ among Workers’, Community-based and Elderly 
insurance programs. The Workers’ Insurance is financed from premiums and tax 
subsidies. The premium rate depends on the specific insurance program, with an 
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average premium of about 8% of salary, shared equally by employee and employer 
(50% each). Tax subsidies for society-managed and other mutual insurance programs 
are quite small, and they receive subsidies only for fixed management costs. 
However, the government-managed insurance is subsidized at a rate of 13% from tax 
revenue. Community-based Insurance revenues are based on household 
contributions, with premiums based on levels of income and differing among 
communities. Community-based Insurance is subsidized by taxes, which account for 
about 50% of total revenue. The revenue system of the Elderly Insurance program is 
complex. Funds contributed by Workers’ Insurance and by Community-based 
Insurance programs account for 67% of total expenditures. Another 33% of their 
expenditures are subsidized by tax (22% from central government, 12% from 
prefectures and municipalities). Patients have to pay co-payments directly to 
providers. The co-payment rate of the Elderly Insurance is different from that of 
other insurance schemes. While the co-payment rate of Workers’ Insurance and 
Community-based Insurance is 30% of all costs of services, the co-payment rate of the 
Elderly Insurance is 10%. However, even though there is a difference in the rate of 
co-payment across schemes, there is no difference in the benefits which insured 
persons can receive. The different financial arrangements are shown in Table 10. 
Table 10. Financial arrangements of health insurance entities in Japan, 2003 
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Benefits 
Almost all inpatient care, outpatient care, dental care and drugs are covered by health 
insurance schemes in Japan. Therefore, the insured persons can receive these services 
with a 30% co-payment (above 75 years old 10%, below 3 years old 20%). However, there 
are some exceptions. Services for health promotion, prevention of disease, and MCH are 
generally not covered by health insurance (Figure 12 shows the benefits in the different 
schemes). Section 5, Social Security Programs (2) Maternity services cover the 
arrangements for maternal and child services.  
Figure 12. Types of insurance benefits (in the case of health insurance) 
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In addition, certain other services are not covered, although the services can be 
provided at the patient’s own expense; they are called Specified Medical Expenses 
(Tokutei Ryouyouhi in Japanese). This latter group of services includes the cost for a 
private bed, the cost for certain specified dental materials, the special fee for 
reservation*, the consultation fees at hospitals with over 200 beds for a first visit**, the 
                                                   
*  The special fee for reservation: Generally, reservation of consultation is not necessary when the patient visits 
a hospital. Recently, however, some hospitals which provide advanced medicine have introduced reservation 
systems in their out-patients consultations, because their out-patient sections are too crowded, and the long 
waiting times of patients were big issues. Therefore, to reduce such waiting time, reservation systems were 
established and hospitals now permitted to charge special fees for reservation. 
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fees for overtime services (outside of regular consultation hours), the costs of services 
provided as parts of clinical trials, the costs for medications not approved for 
insurance reimbursement, and certain highly advanced types of treatment (with 77 
types specified). 
Purchasing 
For the management of transactions, two managerial funds were created, the Social 
Insurance Medical Fee Payment Fund established in 1948 and the National Health 
Insurance Confederation established in 1975. Insurers have contracts with those funds, 
with a cost of around 1 dollar per transaction. The funds receive claims and pay the 
providers. These funds do basic assessments of errors in the claims or possibly 
unreasonably high prices of the claims. Physician reviewers are employed by these 
funds to check those pre-selected claims. Therefore, each insurer does not have to 
assess each claim, a fact which contributes to keeping the transaction costs of the 
Japanese health insurance system low. 
Voluntary health insurance  
In Japan, there was a voluntary community health insurance called “Jyorei”, dating 
back to 1835, which initially was based on rice contributions for mutual assistance 
among villagers to fund contract medical services. We consider that this Jyorei 
system provided the foundation for developing what is now Community Health 
Insurance@. Today, however, Japan has achieved universal coverage under its public 
health insurance system, and this kind of voluntary prepayment health insurance 
scheme does not exist anymore.  
6.  Social Security and Social Assistance Programmes 
In Japan, social security and social health insurance schemes and welfare schemes 
share the roles of protecting the population and providing services in the areas of 
maternity and childhood, disability and old age, and for non-economically active 
persons. The systems are very complicated and there are close relationships among 
them. 
                                                                                                                                           
** The consultation fees at hospitals with over 200 beds for a first visit: there is a tendency to prefer big hospitals 
over small hospitals and clinics in Japan. To prevent such bypassing, hospitals with over 200 beds and 
permitted to charge additional fee for new patients. This fee is only charged for a patient’s first visit. 
@ Ogawa, Sumiko, Toshihiko Hasagawa, Guy Carrin, and Kei Kawabata, Scaling up community health 
insurance; Japan’s experience with the 19th century Jyorei scheme, Health Policy and Planning 18(3): 270-278, 
(2003). 
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Elderly 
Japan has a universal pension system to provide financial support for the elderly 
who cane thereby maintain at least a basic standard of living, even without any other 
income. If they become ill, the costs of health care are covered by social health 
insurance (Elderly Insurance for those at least 75 years old). If they have a physical 
handicap because of a chronic illness or advanced age, they can receive nursing care 
which is covered by Long Term Care Insurance with a co-payment of 10% of the 
overall cost. In addition, the municipalities provide many welfare services for the 
elderly, such as day care services, meal delivery and home visiting services, either 
free or for a small payment.  
Maternity 
Maternity services provided in hospitals are not covered by health insurance, in 
general. Therefore, mothers have to pay the costs of delivery by themselves. 
However, because of a cash allowance system included in the insurance schemes, 
after delivery mothers can receive a cash maternity allowance which more or less 
coincides with the usual costs of a delivery. In cases of pregnancy related illness or 
complications in delivery, such as toxaemia of pregnancy or Caesarean section 
delivery, the costs of medical services are covered by health insurance. In such cases, 
there is no financial burden on mothers except the 30% co-payment for the services, 
and the cash maternity allowance is still given. In addition, many maternal and child 
services are provided by municipalities as a part of their welfare systems, at no 
charge to the users. Japanese women generally receive both maternity services at 
hospitals (for which they pay in most cases) and free ante-natal services from 
municipalities during pregnancy.  
Tax-based welfare system 
Livelihood protection system 
There is a livelihood protection system for non-economically active people in Japan, 
providing cash allowances to maintain a minimum standard of living. The 
percentage of persons who receive this benefit is currently about 1~2% of the whole 
population. For their health care expenses, the costs are paid from tax revenues. 
Therefore, the beneficiaries themselves do not have to pay anything for the services. 
Fully tax-funded medical services 
There are some fully tax-funded medical services, such as services for the atomic 
bomb survivors (with certified ailments, that is, ailments officially recognized as 
having stemmed from the effects of the atomic bombs), war-related injuries and 
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ailments among Veterans of World War II, and for hospital treatment of new 
infectious diseases.  
Partially tax-funded medical services 
Some specific diseases or physical conditions have features which have enormous 
effects on the patients’ lives, both financially and in terms of their quality of life. 
Therefore, for persons who have one of those specific diseases or physical difficulties, 
parts of their medical care costs are partially covered or supported by tax revenues. 
The services covered include medical services for tuberculosis, mental health 
services, and services for persons covered by the livelihood protection system, 
rehabilitation services for the physically handicapped, medical aid for children with 
physical disabilities or potential physical disabilities. Usually, all health care services 
for persons with the specific diseases or conditions who meet the criteria are covered 
by health insurance, and the co-payments for them are covered by the tax revenues.  
Workmen’s compensation insurance 
Following passage of the Workmen’s Accident Compensation Insurance Law, the 
Workmen’s Accident Compensation Insurance System commenced in 1947. About 
49% of Japanese workers are now covered by the system, and the total expenditures 
for compensating their work-related accidents and other work-related health 
conditions are about 250 billion Yen per year (0.8% of total National Health 
Expenditures in Japan). All of the expenditures are covered by the system’s 
premiums. 
The purpose of the system is to improve the welfare of workers by providing 
necessary benefits for quick and fair protection when workers suffer from injury, 
diseases, disabilities, or death, arising from their work. At the same time, it aims to 
facilitate the social rehabilitation of the victims, the provide assistance to the victims 
and their families, as well as to ensure reasonable working conditions. 
This insurance system is managed by Government, and is compulsory for all 
the enterprises that employ workers, except for a few enterprises in agriculture, 
forestry and fishery. It also does not cover seamen and a large majority of public 
employees. Employers in small enterprises, self-employed persons and other workers 
with high occupational risks may obtain coverage under the Special Member system. 
Employees who are sent abroad by Japanese companies may also participate in the 
system under the same arrangement. 
Disability 
Persons with disabilities are supported by various welfare schemes, including health 
insurance, long-term care insurance and other tax funded welfare systems.  
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Tax based welfare system 
As mentioned above, there are tax funded welfare systems covering persons with 
disabilities and providing various services, including health care and cash benefits.  
Long-term Care Insurance 
See section 4.2 above on Long-term Care Insurance. 
7.  For-profit Commercial Health Insurance 
Under Japan’s Social Insurance System, no one can opt-out from the insurance 
system as an individual. Therefore, there is no private insurance that provides basic 
coverage for individual Japanese persons. However, supplemental private heath 
insurance to cover additional related expenditures has become popular because of 
the financial burden imposed by secondary costs. These include the costs of family 
visits to the hospital, income loss during a hospital stay, the costs of private 
accommodation in hospital, and payment of legally authorized user charges. 
For each episode of diseases, if the patient can afford to pay, the patient can 
receive private health care services which are not allowed to be used or paid for 
under Social Insurance programs. In such cases, none of the costs of services to treat 
the episode of illness will be covered by the Social Insurance System to which the 
patient belongs. The patients have to pay the entire amount by themselves (as an out-
of-pocket payment), even though some services are covered by the Social Insurance 
System. (Patients in Japan are not allowed to use private health care services and 
public health care services in one episode. Patients have to choose whether they pay 
for entire costs of health services or use Social Insurance System. If the patients 
choose to use the Social Insurance System, they can not use any health care services 
which are not covered by this system.) However, very recently one private insurance 
company started to cover this type of cost for one (single) disease episode under their 
private health insurance. Entire disease episode coverage is targeted to those who 
think that they would or might like to use special treatments which are not allowed 
to be used or paid for under the social health insurance programs. 
Finally, Social Insurance does not pay for health services due to injuries caused 
by traffic accidents. Therefore, all drivers are required to have, at their own expense, 
an obligatory automobile accident insurance which provides coverage for the health 
care of victims for injuries caused by traffic accidents. Due to limitations of the 
required minimum insurance, most drivers opt to also purchase complementary 
insurance policies which provide greater coverage for traffic accident related injuries. 
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Private for-profit insurance for non-medical services 
There are many private insurance schemes for non-medical services in Japan. These 
include schemes provided by both Japanese life insurance companies and foreign-
owned companies. The benefit packages differ from scheme to scheme, but most 
include travel costs to the hospital, income guarantee during hospitalization, the 
costs of private beds, and the costs of medical devices which are not covered by 
social health insurance. The percentage of the population subscribing to such 
insurance is not known exactly, but has been increasing recently. 
Private commercial insurance for medical services 
In 1998, SECOM, a private security service company, established SECOM Insurance 
Service Co., Ltd. In April, 2003, when the Japanese health insurance system was 
revised, SECOM offered a new plan under which the insured can receive and be 
reimbursed for advanced care and treatment which is not yet covered by the 
Japanese social health insurance system. Their plan also offers a product which 
covers the 30% co-payment which has to be paid when social health insurance 
beneficiaries use health services. This is the first case in which private insurance 
covers the costs of medical care in Japan. Although private for-profit insurance for 
medical services has not been popular in Japan; it is likely to become more popular in 
the near future. 
Car accident injury insurance 
There are two types of motor vehicle insurance for traffic accident injuries in Japan, 
compulsory and voluntary. Every car owner in Japan has to have the compulsory 
insurance, which covers the cost of health care services for persons injured in traffic 
accidents who are not in an insured vehicle when the driver of that vehicle is found 
to be at fault for the accident. However, this compulsory insurance is not enough to 
compensate other losses caused by the accident, such as the costs of car repairs, and 
the cost of medical care for the car owner and for other injured persons. Therefore, it 
is common for vehicle owners to have compulsory and voluntary insurance policies.  
8.  Critical Analysis of Health Care Financing Through 
Health Insurance Mechanisms 
Changing situation 
Japan is now experiencing very rapid ageing because of success in the increase in life 
expectancy and the very low birth rate. Persons 65 years of age or older will 
constitute one fourth of the total population of Japan in 2015 and one third in 2050, 
meaning that Japan will be the first ultimate-aged society in the world. Not only 
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Japan but also other countries, both developed and developing, will sooner or later 
reach this ultimate-aged society. Ageing will not only cause large burdens on the 
volume of health care but will also need new kinds of health services as the elderly 
will have many types of co-morbidity requiring integration and continuity of care. 
Expectations are now changing and health has become one of the greatest concerns 
for Japanese people since the basic requirements for living have been fulfilled. 
Consumer culture has also been changing to be more demanding. Particularly 
the Post-war baby boomers are now becoming big customers of the health care 
system, and they tend to insist, for example, on open discussion of their health 
problems and treatment. Japanese patients have only recently started to become 
concerned about safety and quality issues in medicine, following an incident of 
wrongful surgery at a highly reputable teaching hospital in 1999. (A lung removal 
was done to a patient who needed a Coronary Artery Bypass Graft and a CABG was 
done to a patient who needed lung removal. The incident created a major sensation 
in Japanese society.) Management of hospitals and clinics has become more 
competitive recently because the supplies of beds and of physicians have increased. 
Many new technologies which tend not to improve efficiency but do increase costs 
have been developed in health care. 
Finally, Japan has now been suffering from its longest economic recession since 
World War II. Even though we will be able to recover from the recession, the rapid 
economic growth known in the past is not expected to return, in part because of the 
ultimate elderly society which will prevail in Japan as a demographically matured 
society. 
Current issues 
Coping with increasing demand 
Increasing demand, due to demographic change and to the people’s rising 
expectations, requires the generation of new resources as well as improvement in the 
efficiency of the health care system. New financial sources for the elderly are 
essential and may cause conflict with younger generations. Some rationing of health 
care for the elderly may have to be considered in the near future. In Japan, equity in 
health care has been maintained very well up till recently. Now, however, we have to 
discuss the tradeoffs between efficiency and equity. Health services focused on 
prevention will be important to decrease the burden of disease.  
Restructuring for changing the health care delivery system 
Acute care of young patients is usually episodic and distinct. On the other hand, care 
for the elderly requires continuity, because of co-morbidity and chronic nature of 
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their diseases. Also, the care required varies according to the stages of the 
progression of the chronic diseases. Therefore delivery systems have to be centred on 
patients, and continuity of information is needed to provide efficient, safe and high-
quality care. Clinics, hospitals and tertiary centres have to be integrated to serve the 
changing needs and demands of the patients. The health care system needs to be 
restructured following the above principles.  
Improving system performance 
Improving system performance is essential in terms of quality, safety and efficiency. 
New payment systems need to be designed which will drive improvements in those 
areas of health system performance. Revisions of current laws will be required. 
Health sector reform and health insurance reform in Japan 
Health sector reform in Japan can be classified into three stages, and health insurance 
related reforms are the main target areas of reform in each stage. Since almost all 
major health care services are covered by either Workers’ Insurance or Community-
based Insurance, health insurance related reforms will have a strong impact on the 
entire health system in Japan.  
Japan’s first health sector reform was implemented in the 1980’s. Enactment of 
the Health and Medical Service Law for the Elderly in 1983 abolished free medical 
care for the elderly, which had been available since 1972, and triggered the reform. 
During the 1960s and into the 1970s, health care costs increased rapidly but were 
absorbed by the post-war high economic growth. After the two oil shocks that came 
later, the increase in health care costs became a very large burden on the government. 
The ensuing initial reforms attempted only to control health care costs and were not 
sufficient to establish a sustainable system of health care and health care financing for 
the ultimate aged society. 
With a view to conducting a more systematic health sector reform process, the 
second stage of reform started in the late 1990’s with two leading reform policy 
proposals, “Health Insurance System of the 21st Century – Directions for Radical 
Changes in Health Insurance and the Provision of Health Care”, proposed by the 
Ministry of Health and Welfare in 1997, and “National Healthcare – Guidelines for 
Securing Quality Health Care and Health Insurance for All”, proposed by the Medical 
Insurance System Reform Council of the Ruling Party, issued in 1997. Since then, those 
policy proposals have played a central role in discussions in preparation for the 
subsequent health sector reforms in Japan. The main areas of focuses in these policy 
proposals were changing the fee schedule, revising drug tariffs, and establishing an 
independent health care insurance system for the elderly, with reform of the system for 
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providing health care. The changes in this recent period could be considered the first 
comprehensive reform of Japan’s health care system and health care financing. 
In recent years, a series of reform steps have been implemented, including the 
clarification and prioritization of the use of hospital beds, the promotion of evidence-
based medicine, the introduction of a new training system for physicians*, the 
promotion of more intensive and more effective use of information technology in the 
medical care and medical information systems, measures to ensure patient safety and 
improvements in emergency medical care services. 
Figure 13. The Elderly Insurance Reform in 2003 
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Establishment of an independent health care insurance system for the elderly 
also has been proposed as a radical reform measure in addition to other changes in 
the Elderly Insurance system (as shown in Figure 13). The introduction of the Long-
                                                   
* The new training system for doctors just has been started in April, 2004. In this new training system, every newly 
qualified medical doctor has to take two years of obligatory clinical training. The new obligatory training 
program includes not only proposed for further training in advanced medicine at teaching hospitals but also 
training for work in primary care and community health care in small community level hospitals.  
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term Care Insurance system in April 2000 was not enough to sufficiently reduce the 
financial burden that the provision of health care to the elderly places on the social 
health insurance system in Japan. Therefore, establishment of an independent health 
care insurance system for the elderly seems to be necessary, although it is still under 
debate because of major differences among the many stakeholders’ views and 
interests. 
In 2001, as follow-up to the 1997 policy proposals, new policies to accelerate 
implementation of more integrated health sector reform were issued by the Ministry 
of Health, Labour and Welfare. The progress of the reform is closely related to the 
administrative reform of the Japanese government and particularly to the policy of 
deregulation of the social sector. Deregulation and a market-oriented approach are 
key issues in efforts to accelerate health sector reform. In terms of health insurance 
reform, the government of Japan intends to phase in the consolidation of all social 
insurance schemes. As a first step in that consolidation, the same co-payment rates 
have been applied in each scheme since April 2003.  
A comparison of the various reform proposals is shown in Figure 14 
Figure 14. Comparisons among several health insurance reform proposals 
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9.  Conclusion 
Japan can be considered to offer a rare success story in Asia in terms of good health 
outcomes, efficiency and equity, based on its having the world’s highest longevity, 
relatively low health services expenditures, and essentially 100% coverage of the 
population by health insurance. The reasons for these high attainments have to be 
examined carefully, considering not only health care factors but also social and 
historical factors. 
The history of Japan’s development of such high population coverage by health 
care insurance can have useful suggestions for developing countries. Japan’s health 
insurance system is unique and consists of two major components, the Workers’ 
Health Insurance and Community-based Health Insurance. In many developing 
countries, the salaried sector is small and the self-employed and informal sector 
(including for example farmers and small shop owners) is relatively large. Insurance 
coverage for the self-employed and informal sector populations has always has been 
problematic. The process of development of Japan’s community-based insurance is of 
special interest to those developing countries. 
Management costs for Japan’s health insurance programs are also relatively 
low, in spite of the large numbers of providers and insurers. Further analysis of 
Japan’s systems could provide lessons of interest to the rest of the world.  
On the other hand, in part due to its success in many areas, Japan now faces 
additional challenging issues such as the increasing and changing demands for 
health services due to demographic and epidemiological transitions. Restructuring 
health care delivery systems and creating new financial resources have become 
essential tasks. Although health sector reform in Japan began in the 1990s, progress 
has been very slow because of the involvement and conflicting interests of many high 
powered stakeholders. Japan could be a pilot case demonstrating the development of 
a sustainable, efficient and reasonable health care system suitable for an ultimate 
aged society. However, there is no easy answer, and many experiments and trials are 
needed. Collaborative and comparative studies such as this study could be very 
important and illuminating first steps in developing new models. 
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Republic of Korea 
Bong-min Yang, Ph.D. 
1.  Background 
Korea has witnessed a remarkable social change during the last four decades. The 
unprecedented high economic growth rates have been accompanied by 
industrialization, urbanization, and most conspicuously, democratization during the 
period of 1960s through 1990s. The country’s systems were highly centralized 
politically, economically, and socially until mid 1990s, and they became 
decentralized in 1995. The 14 regional governments now have independent 
constitutional status. Along with these social changes came the development of 
health care system, which was largely influenced by Western Medicine.  
The most noticeable change in the health care system is the establishment of a 
national health insurance system (NHI). The Korean government quickly proceeded 
from its initial step to the final goal of NHI. Each stage was achieved without much 
political, economic, or social resistance. The expansion of health insurance coverage 
was a popular issue, and voters indicated a strong preference for insurance during 
the process of democratization.  
A significant change in Korean’s health status has been brought about during 
the same period. Remarkable improvements in IMR (infant mortality rate) and LE 
(life expectancy) have been made over the last three decades. There is no question 
that the development of the health care system and the evolution of NHI system 
played a role. However, as health outcomes are affected by multiple factors such as 
life style, diet, income distribution, and environmental elements, it is hard to tell 
how much of a change in health outcome is attributable to the utilization of medical 
services or reliance on the health insurance system alone.  
Nevertheless, the level of health status of Koreans is still behind of those of the 
other Asian NICs (newly industrialized countries) and the OECD average (Ramesh, 
2003). Another interesting aspect of Korean health status is its distribution among 
social classes. Measured by the deprivation index1, an unequal distribution of health 
                                                   
1 Deprivation index, measured by locality, incorporates five deprivation factors, including family density 
(number of family members sleeping together in one room), male unemployment rate, rate of household (HH) 
heads holding manual jobs, and rate of households without kitchen or bathroom or shower (Son, 2002). 
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status among social classes is clear and the result is consistent among different 
measures of social classes (Son, 2002). Better access to health care through refining 
the current health insurance system may well be contributing to lessening of the gap 
between Korea and others countries in comparison, and the clear and significant 
difference in health status among social classes within Korea. 
Current Korean health care system  
Figure 15 depicts the resource flows among government, consumers, corporations, 
and service providers. In most cases, patients are given a choice of hospitals and 
clinics. In 1989, some regulatory provisions were introduced governing the choice of 
providers under the NHI. However, most patients did not abide by the rules, and 
hospitals, for fear of losing revenue, did not enforce these rules. As a result, the 
provisions have become ineffective.  
Figure 15. Current Korean health care system 
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Providers, who are mostly private, are paid by fee-for-service in return for 
providing services that are covered by insurance. Total expenditure is reimbursed in 
part by the NHIC (National Health Insurance Corporation) and the rest by patients' 
out-of pocket payments. The sources of insurance financing are contributions made 
by consumers, employers, and the government. The government runs the public 
health programs and the Medical-Aid Program through tax financing, but 
government’s role is relatively very weak, due to the strong presence of the private 
sector, in terms of total health financing 
2. Development of National Health Insurance 
Evolution of the NHI 
Table 11 shows the chronological development of social health insurance programs 
in Korea. A blueprint for the Korean health insurance system was initiated by the 
Health Insurance Act of December 1963, when Korea’s annual per capita GNP was 
still under US$100. This scheme was primarily aimed at voluntary coverage. 
However, little was accomplished due to limited financial resources and lack of 
participation. The government then implemented the first stage of its compulsory 
social security program for health care in July 1977, by enforcing observance of the 
scheme for corporations hiring 500 or more workers. In 1983, the corporate health 
insurance program was extended to firms hiring 16 or more employees. 
Table 11. Expansion of coverage of the NHI 
Population covered (%) 
NHI 
Number of funds 
Year 
(Insured and 
dependants) 
Medical-aid 
program 
Coverage  
(Population and benefits) 
Private 
sector 
workers 
Self-
employed 
workers 
Govt. 
workers 
1977 8.6 5.7 Includes firms with over 
500 workers 
513 -  -  
1980 24.2 5.6 Includes firms with over 
300 workers, 
government employees 
and teachers (since 
1979) 
602 -  1 
1985 44.1 8.0 Includes firms with over 
16 workers (since 1982) 
154 -  1 
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Population covered (%) 
NHI 
Number of funds 
Year 
(Insured and 
dependants) 
Medical-aid 
program 
Coverage  
(Population and benefits) 
Private 
sector 
workers 
Self-
employed 
workers 
Govt. 
workers 
1990 93.9 9.2 Universal coverage in 
1989, includes firms 
with over 5 workers, 
urban and rural self-
employed. 
154 227 1 
1995 97.6 3.1 Benefits expanded to 
180 days. Health 
examinations and high-
cost technology (e.g., 
C.T) included. 
145 227 1 
2000   Benefit days expanded 
to 365 days (since 
1999). Consolidation of 
all funds 
1 
Source: Modified version of the OECD Reviews of Health Care System: Korea, OECD 2003, p. 19 
A special program for civil servants and private school teachers began in 
January 1979. In January 1980, the scheme was extended to cover families of military 
personnel and pensioners. An occupational health insurance program was 
introduced as a voluntary scheme in December 1981 to cover groups of self-
employed workers with similar occupations. In January 1988, the rural regional 
health insurance program was initiated for people in rural farming and fishery 
areas. Finally, a program to cover self-employed and unemployed populations in 
urban areas, termed the urban regional health insurance program, began in July 
1989. Until then, this population was the group excluded from insurance benefits. 
The introduction of compulsory universal health insurance transmitted 
different signals to different economic agents. Many Koreans now regard health (or 
basic health care services) as one of their basic rights. Unlike other goods or services, 
everyone in the population is entitled to minimum health services for survival, 
regardless of his wealth or social standing. 
Providers can no longer enjoy unchecked autonomy as they are subject to the 
many constraints inherent in the system. Physician and hospital charges are 
contingent upon government fixed-fee schedules, and the acquisition of certain 
equipment and expansion or establishment of hospitals in certain areas needs the 
approval of the Ministry of Health and Welfare. 
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For the government, the transition implies enhanced financial and social 
obligations. Even with an economy in recession, it would be very difficult for the 
government to cut budgets or reduce benefits in the future, because people are 
accustomed to the welfare state, and would not accept such a change. On the 
contrary, it is more likely that the government will face an even greater burden as 
certain groups, such as the elderly and the handicapped, demand their fair share of 
the pie. 
Stimuli for the establishment of NHI 
It is interesting to note how successfully the Korean government proceeded from its 
initial step to the final goal of NHI. Politicians, especially those in the ruling 
Democratic Justice Party then (1977-1989) took the initiative and gradually 
expanded health insurance coverage. Multiple contributing factors were involved in 
the process of achieving NHI.  
First, the fact that North Korea provided health care free of charge for all 
citizens, while South did not, became one of the focal issues in politics. The 
government of South Korea had to introduce a comparable structure that would 
guarantee an equitable opportunity of health care use for all social classes. 
Competition between the two Koreas became one of the contributing factors 
towards mandatory health insurance legislation in the mid-1970s.  
Second, with speedy industrialization in the 1960s, people began to realize that 
some of their physical sufferings were not solely their own responsibility. Exercising 
their voting rights, people in the work place demanded health insurance schemes 
which mandated employer's premium contributions.  
Third, unilateral government policies promoting economic growth during the 
period of 1960-76, which resulted in an unequal distribution of wealth among 
classes, raised social equity issues. To avoid conflicts among classes, the government 
had to introduce the concept of social welfare into its policy agenda. The first 
outcome from such changes was the introduction of a health insurance scheme. The 
government and the leading political party pushed the idea with the hope that it 
could somehow solve the inequities, the injustice, and the unnecessary burden of 
being sick, brought about by rapid industrialization.  
Fourth, expansion of health insurance coverage was a popular political subject. 
As the gap in health care utilization between the insured and the uninsured 
widened in the early 1980s, the majority of the uninsured pressed politicians to 
advance the expansion of health insurance schemes. Politicians, especially the 
leading Democratic Justice Party then, took an initiative to start and gradually 
expanded health insurance coverage.  
Fifth, the growing strength of the Korean economy since 1960 was another 
factor that made the expansion of health insurance programs feasible. With 
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increased GNP and per capita disposable income, not only was the government able 
to finance part of the expenditures of the schemes, but also people could afford 
paying premiums and other related expenses. For example, two sudden jumps in 
the rate of beneficiaries in 1988 and in 1989 were feasible because (i) people were 
willing to pay premiums, and (ii) the government promised it would be responsible 
for part of the expenses incurred. 
Sixth, consumers, faced with swelling expenditures from increased health 
service utilization and rising medical fees, preferred to be insured than to take the 
risk of being uninsured. In general, there was not much disagreement amongst the 
public about going to a universal health care security system, though there were 
some debates on whether the tax-financed National Health Service system or the 
premium and user-fees-financed NHI was appropriate. It had been hoped that every 
Korean would have health insurance and the financial burden of the system would 
be shared fairly among social classes. 
There are other elements as well that contributed to achieving universal health 
insurance. One is the existence of a strong public executive and the other is a 
"regulation-oriented" intellectual tradition. Lastly, since there was no dominating 
private insurance that could have blocked any reform trial, the government could 
easily move forward towards its goal.  
Recent reform in the NHI: Consolidation of insurance funds 
In February 1999, twenty two years after the introduction of first public health 
insurance scheme, and twelve years after the inauguration of the NHI, the Korean 
Parliament passed the ‘National Health Insurance Act’, which mandates the 
consolidation of all health insurance funds into a single fund. Through this Law, 
Korea embarked on a transition from a multiple sickness fund system to a single 
fund system. This transition is part of the health care reform package that the 
country has been pursuing during the last ten years. It is a rather big change, and 
one that has been supported by various social groups, including civil non-
governmental organizations. 
The basic philosophy underlying the consolidation of insurance funds is the 
solidarity principle. The proponents of the consolidation of funds argued that social 
cohesion among different social groups could be strengthened through having the 
solidarity principle in the delivery of health services. They further argued that 
applying the solidarity principle to health insurance scheme is an important and 
necessary first step towards strengthening ‘social safety nets’ in Korea.2 
                                                   
2 The need for ‘social safety net’ is particularly emphasized with the rising unemployment rate these days. As 
one of the conditions of World Bank Loan (after the economic crisis), the Korean government agreed with the 
Bank to have a reasonable social safety net for the destitute, including the unemployed. 
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As shown in Figure 16, the transition from 373 insurance funds to a single fund 
involves two stages. In the first stage (Stage I), 227 Regional Insurance funds are 
being merged with the Civil Servant Insurance fund, thus creating a single fund 
which is named the ‘National Medical Insurance Corporation (NMIC)’. This process 
was completed by September 1998, and the NMIC was launched on October 1, 1998. 
In the second stage (Stage II), all Corporate Health Insurance Funds were merged 
into the NMIC, thus creating a nationwide single fund which covers the whole 
population under one umbrella. The single fund, National Health Insurance 
Corporation (NHIC), was launched in July 2000. The NHIC now functions as the 
central cortex of health insurance administration and delivery of insurance services. 
Before the integration of funds in 2000, the NHI faced problems of large 
financial discrepancies between funds, inequitable and insufficient risk pooling 
among beneficiaries, and low-level economies of scale. For example, the proportion 
of administrative costs to total insurance expenditure was 8.5% on average in 1997.  
The transition of NHI structure from a multiple fund system to a single payer 
system entails a substantial improvement in administrative efficiency. The total 
number of funds has been reduced from 389 to one (with 242 branch offices), and the 
number of employees working in the funds has been reduced by one-third (from 
15,036 employees before consolidation to 10,716 after full integration (NHIC inside 
report, 2003). With this increase in fund size and the decrease in number of 
employees, a reduction in annual administrative costs is realized. The percentage of 
administrative costs out of total insurance expenditure was significantly reduced 
from 7.3% in 2000 to 4.4% in 2001. The new structure witnesses a good size 
economies of scale. The saved administration costs could be used, for example, to 
lower user changes for low income class or to expand insurance coverage for the 
currently uncovered services. 
Figure 16. Two Stages in the Process of Consolidation 
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Needless to say, risk pooling has been improved a lot through the 
consolidation of funds. Since the whole population (farmers, business employees, 
and self-employed) is under one insurance scheme, risks of different population 
groups are now pooled and spread over the entire population.  
3. The Current NHI Structure and Organization 
Administration 
By July 2000 when stage II of the consolidation was complete, the structure of the 
national health insurance system was as shown in in Figure 17. The business of 
public health insurance is separated into two parts; administration and delivery of 
health insurance services by the NHIC, and review of claims and technology 
assessment by HIRA (Health Insurance Review Agency). Both are under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Health and Welfare in terms of operational budgets, 
but they are autonomous in their functions. 
Major operations, such as determining the level of contributions, level of 
service fees, reimbursement to providers, fund management, are the responsibility 
of NHIC. Meanwhile HIRA takes the role of (i) reviewing the appropriateness of 
claims made by providers and (ii) assessing new medical technologies, including 
new drugs. 
The role of NHIC is assisted by 161 branches that are geographically spread 
over the nation. The NHIC also runs a medical center, a general hospital with 650 
beds, to have on-site experience in both clinical and health promotion services. 
Figure 17. Administration structure of national health insurance 
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Financing 
The premium collection formula for salaried employees is different from the one for 
the self-employed. However, an uniform formula is used for all employees, and the 
same is true for all self-employed. There is one uniform premium rate, 3.96% of 
wage in 2003, for all the salaried employees, which is shared equally between 
employer (government for public sector workers) and employees. The premium 
basis for self-employed workers is taxable income, assets, automobiles, sex, and age. 
Government paid 45% of insurance expenditure of the self-employed in 2002. About 
four percent of salary as contribution rate is one of the lowest among OECD 
economies, and is the reason why the service coverage is constrained so much.  
Benefit package 
The benefit package is the same for all population groups. Benefit days, that is, the 
number of days of medical and drug treatment covered by insurance – expanded to 
180 days in 1995, and to 365 days in 1999. Population coverage expanded step by 
step, starting from the people with sufficient ability to pay, corporate employees, 
then towards the self-employed and to those in the informal labour sector.  
The extent and the level of benefit coverage are determined by the 
government. Most of the outpatient services and high probability inpatient services 
are covered by health insurance. However, many of the low probability but high 
cost services are excluded. Exclusion of high cost services is due mostly to the 
limited size of the insurance fund. Most of these excluded services are new or 
expensive high technology related medical services (such as MRI and ultrasound 
diagnostic tests). 
Payment and reimbursement 
As shown in Figure 15 above, patients pay according to fee-for-service (FFS) for all 
services at all referral levels. FFS has been the dominant method of payment for 
physicians (both Western and traditional medical practice), clinical services, and 
pharmacists. A demonstration with case payment structure3 using Diagnostic 
Related Groups (DRGs) began in early 1997. That was the first time that a payment 
structure other than FFS has been tried in the Korean health system. However, the 
case payment structure is not welcomed by provider groups, unless a substantial 
financial incentive is attached to it. Unfortunately, it is doomed to fail. Physicians at 
                                                   
3 It is a form of fixed compensation per episode which was originally developed by the US. In the US, the 
method is called DRG (Diagnostic Related Groupings).  
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hospitals are paid salaries, and occasionally they are paid bonuses based on their 
performance. 
The fee schedule is determined through negotiation between representatives of 
provider groups and the Chairman of the NHIC at the end of each year. When 
negotiation does not produce an agreement on the level of fees in time, MOH 
determines the fee levels through a committee meeting. Up to 2003, negotiation 
between the two parties has never been successful, implying that the government 
determined the fee levels.  
4. Social Security and Social Assistance Programmes 
In addition to the health insurance schemes, there are government financed public 
assistance programs for medical care: Medical-Aid (i) for the destitute and (ii) for the 
medically indigent (see Figure 15). The first category of beneficiaries consists of 
individuals who are extremely poor, or those living on public facilities, such as the 
homeless and elderly people without supportive family members. The second 
category includes individuals whose income and other means falls bellow a 
specified standard. As of 2003, 97.0 percent of the population are covered by health 
insurance and the remaining 3.0 percent are under the public assistance Medical-Aid 
Program (Yearbook of Health and Social Statistics, Ministry of Health and Welfare, 
2003). The benefit package of Medical-Aid is the same as the health insurance benefit 
package. In other words, those services that are not covered by health insurance 
(such as ultrasound, MRI and some special treatments) are also excluded from 
Medical-Aid coverage. The number of benefit days by Medical-Aid is 365 days.  
As shown in Figure 15, tax-financed public health centers provide preventive 
services mostly, including MCH, vaccination, child health, preventive dental, health 
education, and health screening. Some outpatient curative services are also provided 
at health centers. In some rural regions, health centers provide inpatient services as 
well, but on a limited scale. In the 1950s, government established national hospitals 
for tuberculosis and for mental illness. They still exist, and the need for separate 
services of this kind still remains. 
5.  For-profit Commercial Health Insurance 
There are commercial health insurance schemes in Korea. The first such a program 
was introduced in early 1980s, and the private health insurance market gradually 
expanded during the last decade (Choi, 2003). Currently, many life insurance and 
damage insurance companies carry private health insurance programs. In most 
cases, they cover only cancer-related expenses. It is because cancer treatment is 
usually catastrophic and is not well-covered by NHI. In this sense, one could say 
that private health insurance in Korea is a form of complementary health insurance, 
complementary to social health insurance program (SHI). There is yet a single case 
of private health insurance program which is a substitute for SHI. 
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The rate of Out-of-Pocket payment varies among cancer patients, depending 
upon what kind of hospital used and the class of services (single bed room, double 
beds room, or multiple beds room) patients receive. However, it is, on average, 
about half of the total treatment costs, which could be substantial for many cancer 
patients. Private health insurance covers this portion of total expense, i.e., the out-of-
pocket payments that are not reimbursed by NHI. However, it is interesting to note 
that reimbursement of private cancer insurance is (i) not linked to the actual amount 
of out-of-pocket payment, but is a fixed amount of benefit; and (ii) is always a cash 
payment. In other words, in most cases, when a patient is diagnosed as a cancer 
patient, he/she will be reimbursed a fixed amount in cash by private insurance 
companies.  
Over time, as shown in Table 12, in terms of total amount of reimbursement, 
the market for private health insurance has been growing continuously and rapidly. 
The rate of growth was a bit slowed down during the period of economic crisis (late 
1997 to early 1998), but it soon returned to the previous high growth trend. 
Unfortunately, official statistics on the number of population who purchase private 
health insurance programs is not available. A recent report by a local newspaper 
estimates the number could be over 10 million (about 20% of whole population), and 
that the market growth rate in terms of total premiums could be over 10% in the 
coming years.  
As the Korean society is aging rapidly, the likelihood of introducing private 
long term care insurance programs by commercial companies is becoming greater. 
When such a program is brought in, private health insurance market will be even 
larger, and will play an important role in protecting people’s health in Korean 
society.  
Table 12. Amount of reimbursement of private health insurance schemes 
Year Current amount (1) Real amount 
(1) 
1996=100 
1996 505,846 505,846 (100) 
1997 744,478 713,102 (141.0) 
1998 1,001,201 891,541 (176.2) 
1999 1,453,356 1,283,883 (253.8) 
2000 2,042,419 1,765,271 (349.0) 
(1) Unit: million Korean Won 
Source: Research Centre. Private Insurance Development Institute, September 2001 
6. Critical Appraisal of NHI Financing Mechanism 
The gradual expansion of health insurance plans, in conjunction with the growth of 
the private sector, has resulted in increased demand for services and higher-quality 
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care. The nationwide coverage of health insurance has contributed to increases in 
health service utilization and to upgrading the level of health of the people. The 
growing private sector imported new medical technologies aggressively and 
competitively, resulting in an apparent increase in the quality of health care. 
Annual health insurance statistics reveal that with the expansion of health 
insurance, the utilization of both inpatient and outpatient services has been 
increasing continuously over the last two decades, and that consumers, who believe 
private general hospitals provide better services, prefer care at general hospitals 
rather than at government hospitals or clinics. 
However, these changes involved costs in the form of inefficiency and 
inequity, which stemmed from mishandling of the evolving health system during 
the last three decades. As the market share of the profit-oriented private sector rose, 
many undesirable aspects developed in the system, over which the government has 
had very little control. Some issues arising after the NHI establishment include high 
user charges and weak public financing, commercialized health care, payment-
reimbursement method, lack of a referral channel, and the financial insolvency of 
NHI. 
High user charges 
Insurance coverage under NHI is limited in several respects: some of the expensive 
services are excluded as health insurance benefits; the “special treatment charges” 
which are not covered by health insurance come along with services in general 
hospitals, and the co-payment rate is high even for services which are covered by the 
insurance. The result is that only about 54% of total medical expenditures are 
covered by NHI in Korea, and the rest are out-of-pocket payments. A share of out-
of-pocket payment that is higher than 30% is seldom found in other social insurance 
schemes. Based on available information, the Korean out-of-pocket cost rates appear 
to be one of the highest in the world. This aspect raises, by nature, the issue of equity 
in access to health care. 
Weak public financing 
The public share of total health expenditure in 1998 was 46.2%, the lowest among 
OECD countries with social insurance systems. Out of the 46.2%, 12% is from 
government sources and the remaining 34% is from NHI. In Table 13, the Korean 
figures are compared to those of OECD averages. Due to the expansion of health 
insurance coverage, the public share in Korea has risen over the past years, but it 
remains far lower than the level of OECD countries. As well known, the aspect of 
weak public financing is just another side of the “out-of-pocket” coin. Therefore, 
weak public financing leads to the same equity issue as generated by high user 
charges.  
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Table 13. Public funding of total health expenditure, 1970-1998: RoK and OECD 
Public share (%) 
 
1970 1980 1990 1998 
Republic of Korea - - 36.6 46.2 
21-country average* 71.8 75.4 75.8 75.2 
* OECD average is for those 21 countries that have relatively a complete data set. 
Source: OECD Health Data 2002. 
Dominant private sector 
Another health insurance financing issue in Korea is the dominance of the private 
sector in health care delivery. The private sector, which was dominant in Korea before 
the introduction of social health insurance, has grown with the increase in per capita 
income and with the expansion of health insurance coverage. The private sector in 
Korea includes both non-profit and for-profit health care facilities, with university 
teaching hospitals as a separate category. In 1999, public hospitals accounted for only 
7% of all hospitals, and 20% of all general hospitals (see Table 14).  
Table 14. Public and private medical facilities, 1999 
Health care facility 
Ownership 
General 
hospitals 
(%) 
Hospitals¹ 
(%) 
Clinics¹ 
(%) 
Health Centres 
(%) 
Pharmacies 
(%) 
Public 20.1 7.1 0 100 0 
Private 58.0 91.9 100 0 100 
Non-profit 18.0 61.9    
Corporation 40.0 30.0    
For-profit   100  100 
University 21.9 1.0 0 0 0 
Total – Percent  
Number 
100 
(278) 
100 
(664) 
100 
(18,508) 
100 
(242) 
100 
(18,435) 
1
Excludes dental and medicine hospitals and clinics. 
Source: OECD Health System Review-Korea (2003) 
In 1980, three years after the first NHI program began, 53 % of all beds were 
public (see Table 15). By the late 1990s, the share of public hospital beds had 
dropped to 13%, and 87 % of all hospital beds were in private clinics and hospitals. 
Table 5 also shows that over 90% of all physicians work in the private sector, 
compared to nearly 50% in other Asian newly industrialized countries (NICs). The 
change in hospital bed ownership has been dramatic, and the trend is expected to 
continue at least in the near future. 
The fact that the private sector is dominant in health service delivery is not in 
itself a problem. The real issue is that frequent conflicts arise between the public 
health authorities and private providers during the course of health policy 
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implementation. In the absence of public sector leadership in health care delivery, 
private providers as a group oppose any policies that could reduce the size of their 
pie. For example, when the “Separation Policy” (separation of drug prescription and 
dispensing under health insurance) was introduced in 1999, private providers 
fiercely opposed to the policy for fear of losing revenues. The private providers 
eventually went on strike four times in a six month period.  
Most of the public health policies are challenged by the private provider 
groups, without questioning their relevance for the health of the population. To deal 
with this problem of conflict, the Korean government recently set a target of ’30% 
public sector’ in health care delivery. The plan is to increase the share of the public 
sector in health service delivery to 30% by 2008.  
Table 15. Public sector's share of total physicians and hospital beds 
Physicians Hospital beds 
Countries 
1980 (%) Late 1990s (%) 1980 (%) Late 1990s (%) 
Hong Kong SR NA 45 88 88 
Singapore 45 49 84 81 
Republic of Korea NA <10 53 13 
Taiwan 31(1993) 48 42 33 
Source: Ramesh. M., Social Policy and Administration, Vol. 37, No. 4. p.369 
Lack of referral channel 
In most cases, patients are given a choice of providers: they can choose among 
various providers at multiple referral levels. Because there is no patient referral 
channel, they can go directly to the outpatient departments of general hospitals. 
Consequently, within the system, a "gatekeeper" - someone who could guide the 
patient to a proper provider or proper level of care - is virtually unknown. Since 
most patients prefer to be treated in general hospitals, both the outpatient and 
inpatient departments in general hospitals are overcrowded. In the absence of 
"gatekeepers" in the system, there is inefficiency and a lack of cost effectiveness. 
Simple illnesses are treated expensively; for example, common colds are often 
treated by internists in general hospitals and simple headaches are treated by 
neurosurgeons in general hospitals. Moreover, patients often seek care from both 
Western and traditional physicians, and sometimes also from pharmacists, for the 
same episode of illness. This practice increases the revenues of the providers but 
does not necessarily give the patients appropriate care. Here the issue is possible 
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high inefficiency stemming from misuse and overuse of services. Value for money is 
not properly pursued in Korea’s health care delivery.  
Payment reimbursement method 
As shown in Figure 15, patients are charged according to a fee-for-service (FFS) 
payment method all services at all referral levels. This system leads to abuse as the 
FFS method provides perverse incentive for providers to cheat, and ill-informed 
patients are easily subject to induced demand for unnecessary services. The 
combination of (i) dominance of the for-profit private sector, (ii) weak public 
financing and high user charges, (iii) inappropriate government regulation, and (iv) 
FFS makes the Korean health care system expensive, inefficient, and inequitable. The 
above combination of market conditions also contributes to the creation of classes 
among people who needs health care. Some hospitals are mostly populated with the 
affluent, while health centres are the only resort of the medically indigent poor.  
NHI financial insolvency 
In 1975, the percent of GDP spent on health care was a mere 2.8. Between 1975 and 
1997, the Korean economy recorded unprecedented high growth rates. As shown in 
Figure 18, from 1985 through 2001, the health care share of the total economy grew 
from 4.0% to 6.4%, with an annual rate of increase of around 23%. The increasing 
share of health costs as a proportion of GDP, therefore, signifies how fast the health 
sector expanded during this period. It is expected that the rate will be even higher 
over time.  
Many factors contributed to the rapid increase in the national health 
expenditure. A substantial part of the total cost escalation is attributable to the 
increase in treatment costs. Data from health insurance expenditure show that total 
insurance expenditure has been increased by about 24% during the period of 1990-
2001. Increases in the expenditure on treatment can be explained by several factors: 
providers inducing more patient visits per case (supply side); more complex cases, 
and insured patients paying less out-of-pocket and asking for more expensive and 
presumably higher-quality services (demand side).  
The increases in the supply of private providers, as well as the incentives 
created in the payment mechanisms, have caused cost increases. A natural 
consequence is the financial deficit of NHI. The NHI fund is currently faces a severe 
deficit, paying interest for borrowed money from financial markets (see Table 16). 
The Korean government has health authority and devising ways to tackle this as a 
national priority issue.  
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Figure 18. National health expenditure as percentage of gross domestic product 
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Table 16. Financial insolvency of NHI (Unit: billion Korean Won) 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Revenue 4,116 4,608 5,435 6,326 7,297 
Expenditure 3,363 3,869 5,054 6,413 7,679 
Annual balance 752 739 382 88 382 
Accumulated surplus 3,432 3,926 4,121 4,002 3,785 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Revenue 7,849 8,692 9,529 11,642 13,890 
Expenditure 8,709 9,561 10,538 14,051 14,651 
Annual balance 860 869 1,009 2,409 761 
Accumulated surplus 3,036 2,244 919 1,811 2,572 
Source: National Health Insurance Corporation, 2003 
7. Conclusion 
The development of Korea from an agrarian to an industrial society served as the 
vehicle for the establishment of NHI. As consumers approved the idea of universal 
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health insurance, politicians pushed forward in recognition of public demand. The 
growing economy helped form NHI financially and there were no influential 
opposing forces existed in the market economy. As far as achieving NHI is 
concerned, fortunately all sectors of the economy worked in a harmonized way. 
However, Korea faces persistent difficulties with the delivery and performance 
of its health care system, despite its implementation of NHI in 1989. Inequity and 
inefficiency is embedded into the structure of health care delivery. Underlying this is 
the fact that the health care system of Korea is inflationary by choice. It is 
inflationary not simply because people demand more health care services, but 
because of the way the system is structured; it induces an expanding amount of 
service provision and consumption and, furthermore, of more expensive services. 
On the other hand, the treatment needs of the many medically indigent persons are 
ignored within the system. As mentioned before, background of these deficiencies 
lie in the structure of fee-for-service, dominance of for-profit providers, weak public 
financing, and inappropriate government regulation.  
Nothing is more basic to any government than ensuring adequate care for the 
poor, the elderly, and the disabled, and yet, Korea fails to do this. While the 1980s 
and early 1990s saw a rapid expansion of private health care, the story of the late 
1990s is likely to be one of consolidation into giant for-profit hospital chains. This 
trend has already been triggered by Jabul (business tycoon) hospitals such as 
Samsung and Hyundai Hospital. This kind of growth can only exacerbate the 
current problems in the health care system. 
There are many aspects of our lives that are best left to market forces to 
determine without interference from government. Unfortunately, health concerns 
are not always among them. Consumer health and quality of care are neither 
protected nor guaranteed by pure market forces. No country has succeeded in 
having a sound health system by relying solely upon market forces. Some form of 
regulation of both the public and private health sectors is necessary, with the 
government and the professional associations as principal actors in the regulation. 
Korea missed a good opportunity to have a sound health care system when 
additional resources were pumped into the system by NHI. Now with NHI fully 
implemented and providers adjusted to it, it may be difficult to achieve even minor 
reforms. But, unless basic reforms are tried, resources will be wasted, consumers 
will not be protected, health care expenditures will continue to rise, insurance 
coverage will not be expanded, and, consequently, the accessibility of essential care 
to low-income families will be further reduced. Without reform now, the problems 
will become more widespread, persistent, and intolerable in the future. 
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Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
Nanna Jürgensen 
1.  Background 
The Lao PDR, landlocked between China, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand and 
Myanmar, is ranked number 135 out of 175 countries in the 2003 Human 
Development Index. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is US$ 331 per capita. 
According to the National Statistics Centre the population size was estimated to be 
5.5 million in 2002. Of the total population, 80% live in rural areas and are mainly 
engaged in agricultural work. The rural areas are often difficult to access and largely 
underserved in terms of medical service and access to education. The Population 
growth rate is 2.8 % per year. Life expectancy at birth was 59 years in the year 2000. 
The under five-mortality rate is 106 deaths per 1000 live births while the maternal 
mortality ratio is 530 deaths per 100000 live births.a  
The population is characterized by a large percentage of persons under 20 
years of age (55%) while only 5% are over 60 years.b However, the fertility rates have 
been declining in recent years while life expectancy is increasing.  
The 1995 census showed that the labour force was approximately 2166,000 
persons. Roughly 22% of the labour force work in non-agriculture occupations: 28 % 
as public servants (civil servants, military, police) and 72 % work in the private 
sector and state- owned enterprises (SOE). c 
Public health sector 
The public health sector has always been critically under-funded. In 1997-1998, 3.2 % 
of the GDP or US$ 11.50 per capita per year was spent on the health sector. Out of 
this amount the government covered US$ 1.30, foreign aid covered US$ 3.50 while 
the households covered US$ 6.70.d Out of pocket health expenditure can thus take 
                                                   
a  Millennium Development Report Lao PDR, Final Draft 5.0, January 2004 
b   The Households of Lao PDR, Social and economic indicators, Lao Expenditure and Consumption Survey 
1997/98 (LECS2), 1999 
c Development of Social Security in Lao PDR and Future Steps up to 2005, 
d Common Country Assessment, The Lao People’s Democratic Republic, UN, Vientiane Lao PDR, December 2000 
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up a large part of especially poor families’ income and lead to debt and severe 
poverty.  
The high cost is one of the reasons for the underutilization of health services in 
the Lao PDR. Another reason is the low quality of services provided. The situation 
of public health workers is characterized by irregular payment and substandard 
working conditions. There are anecdotal reports of “under-the-table” payments in 
health institutions, but the frequency and size of this phenomenon is not 
documented. Another way to assure income for public health workers is to engage 
in private business such as running one of the 2000 pharmacies in Laos. Studies 
show that 64% of medical expenses are actually spent at private providers and 
pharmacies while only 36% are spent at the public health system.e  
Due to the necessity of earning extra income in private business, the number of 
health workers in the public clinics is frequently limited. Thus the public sector faces 
problems in delivering health care to the population. This affects especially the rural 
and poor population, which has limited access to and choice of health service 
providers.  
2.  Development of Compulsory and Voluntary  
Health Insurance  
Compulsory prepayment mechanisms 
The Lao People’s Democratic Republic was established in 1975 and introduced a one 
party socialist government. Part of the political ideology was to secure civil servants 
by providing them with a wide range of social security benefits to compensate for 
their low income. Hence, all 80-90 000 civil servants (not including the military and 
the police) are members of the government-run Civil Servants Scheme.  
Due to economic stagnation the government decided in 1986 to introduce the 
New Economic Mechanisms (NEM). Market economy principles and reforms were 
introduced, stimulating the private sector and decreasing the size of the public 
sector and the number of SOEs. As a consequence, the garment industry and the 
service and construction sectors in the urban areas of the country grew, which 
resulted in increased numbers of non-state employed people with salaried 
employment. In 1994 the Labour Law called for the introduction of social security 
systems for these employees. The government of Laos in collaboration with the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) therefore decided to introduce the idea of 
setting up a Social Security Organization (SSO) targeting this group of employees. 
With the promulgation of Decree 52 in 1995 the government no longer provided free 
                                                   
e The study on the improvement of health and medical services in the Lao People’s 
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health care. It was therefore decided to include health insurance as an essential part 
of the benefits provided under the SSO. The main Lao players in the development of 
SSO were the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, (MoLSW) and the Ministry of 
Health, (MoH). 
As part of the preparation to set up the SSO, the Prime Ministers Decree No 
207, Decree on Social Security System for Enterprise Employees, was drafted, widely 
distributed and then signed in 1999. This Decree is the main legal document 
determining decisions taken in regard to the SSO. There are plans to revise the 
Decree 207 after the initial four years of operation.  
In June 2001 the SSO started operating. As most workers in private and state-
owned enterprises are located in the capital city of Vientiane, the initial pilot 
implementation was started there. The SSO targeted all state owned and private 
enterprises in Vientiane with more than 10 employees. The SSO has now operated 
for two and a half years and currently has 20349 members of whom 12556 are 
females (62%) and 11767 (58%) are single. So far no extension to other provinces 
with high numbers of workers employed in private or state-owned enterprises has 
been initiated. However, there are plans to introduce the system to two districts in 
Vientiane province. 
Voluntary prepayment mechanisms  
With the end of free health care in 1995 the vulnerability of the indigent section of 
the population increased, as unexpected medical expenses posed a serious threat of 
pushing them into deep impoverishment. While social security schemes had been 
introduced for salaried workers, no health insurance scheme was targeting the 80% 
of the population working in the informal sector, mainly engaged in agriculture. The 
Lao government recognized the urgent need to approach this uncovered group and 
in May 2000, requested assistance from the World Health Organization (WHO) to 
set up a voluntary community based health insurance scheme (CBHI) to target 
people in the informal sector. With financial support from the UN Trust Fund for 
Human Security and technical assistance from the World Health Organization, the 
development of the pilot phase of CBHI commenced in 2001.  
A Health Insurance team was set up at the Department of Planning and 
Budgeting in the Ministry of Health. Its main task was to design the CBHI scheme, 
link with other health authorities, assist in the implementation of the pilot scheme, 
develop systems to extend to more areas, develop a monitoring and evaluation 
system and to evaluate the CBHI in the wider context. f  
                                                   
f  Community Based Health Insurance, Vientiane; Work plan preparation phase, Report on Community 
Consultation, March 20002 
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It was decided to start the implementation of CBHI in three pilot sites in: 
(1) Nine villages of Sisattanak (an urban district of Vientiane Capital);  
(2) Nam Bak (rural district town in the northern province of Luang Prabang, 
and  
(3) Part of Champassak (rural district in the southern province of 
Champassak). 
The CBHI started providing health care benefits in the Sisattanak site in 
December 2002, in Nam Bak district town in July 2003 and in the Champassak site in 
January 2004. Ahead of the launch, the ministerial team in collaboration with WHO 
experts spent one year developing the design of the scheme. This involved various 
studies, training, awareness campaigns, community consultations, financial 
calculations and the development of local management bodies, regulations and 
necessary forms. As the SSO was established only a couple of years earlier, lessons 
learned from its start-up phase were taken into account in the development of this 
scheme.  
Currently 1426 families have enrolled in the three pilot schemes covering 8238 
people. 
3.  Compulsory Health Insurance  
As of now, there are so far two compulsory prepayment health insurance systems in 
place in Lao PDR. The Civil Servant Scheme (CSS) covers employees in the public 
sector (administration, teachers, health staff, army and police) and the Social 
Security Organization (SSO) covers workers in private and state-owned enterprises. 
Both schemes are under the management of the MoLSW.  
Civil Servants Scheme (CSS) 
The 15 staff at the Social Security Department at the MoLSW deal with all issues 
related to the Civil Servant Scheme. Since 1989, civil servants contribute to the CSS 
with 6% of their salary, which is deducted automatically by the Ministry of Finance 
every month. However, as salaries are low (average monthly salary is 200000 kip ~ 
US $19.2) while the range of social benefits to be covered is extensive, the financial 
resources of the scheme are not sufficient to cover costs. No funds have been 
accumulated as reserves so far. The government does not contribute to the scheme 
with a fixed percentage or amount. Instead the national treasury contributes 
according to current ability in order to provide the most necessary amount.  
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The Civil Servants Scheme provides multiple social benefits such as retirement 
pension, health care and cash benefits for disability, maternity and funerals. The 
eligible persons are the civil servant, the spouse and all children under 18. As for the 
health insurance part, the scheme aims at covering medical expenses of the insured 
persons. People are free to seek treatment at any clinic or hospital and there is no 
waiting period as they are eligible at the time they enter the civil service. Civil 
servants have to pay the fee for services directly to the provider are reimbursed on 
submitting their claim to the local branch of the MoLSW. For civil servants living in 
the provinces and rural districts the process may take up to 4-5 months as claims are 
referred to the provincial section of the MoLSW, which again refers them to the 
Social Security Department at the MoLSW. Here the final decision is taken on how 
much to reimburse. The scheme is supposed to reimburse all claims up to 1.500.000 
kip (~ US$ 144). However, this is rarely practised and decisions on the amount to 
reimburse are taken on a case-to-case basis.  
Health insurance through CSS is characterized by a time-consuming 
procedure, which often results in very late and partial reimbursement. Civil servants 
may not even file the claims, as the process is too lengthy compared to the benefit 
expected. As civil servants pay the provider directly and file the claim to the 
MoLSW, there is no contact between the MoLSW and the providing clinics and 
hospitals. 
A reform of the CSS has been underway for some time. However, so far no 
official changes have been announced or initiated to restructure the scheme. The 
idea of introducing a pilot project in Vientiane Capital using the capitation system 
has been mentioned. The long-term goal is eventually to merge the Civil Servant 
Scheme with the Social Security Organization. 
Social Security Organization (SSO) 
After a five-year preparatory phase, the SSO started collecting contributions in June 
2001. The main organizations involved in the preparation were the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Welfare and the Ministry of Health. External assistance was 
provided mainly by ILO, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the 
Belgian Technical Cooperation (BTC) and WHO. Policies were developed; Decree 
207 was printed and distributed. Management structures were then determined and 
staff were recruited and trained. Important issues were the identification of the three 
providers (central hospitals), and the requirements for information systems for the 
health services and membership database. The necessary information system was 
then developed and staff in the SSO and hospitals received training on the use of the 
system.  Studies on target enterprises and employees were undertaken, awareness 
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campaigns implemented in target enterprises and information on SSO and its 
benefits broadcast over the radio. 
Although under the MoLSW, SSO is located in a separate office in Vientiane. 
The SSO has around 35 staff and of these, roughly 50% are civil servants appointed 
and employed by MoLSW while the rest are employed directly by the SSO. 
Changing the status of SSO staff from civil servant to SSO-employee is a step in the 
transformation of the SSO into an autonomous parastatal body rather than a part of 
the MoLSW. The supreme governing body of the SSO is the Board of Directors, 
which includes members from government, employers and employees (trade 
union). It is responsible and accountable for all activities of the SSO. A management 
team in charge of the daily management of activities includes one director and two 
deputy directors, all appointed by the MoLSW.  
The administrative and managerial tasks are organized into different divisions 
as required (registration and contributions, claims, computer service, policy and 
legislation etc). In the Health Insurance Division there are sub-divisions taking care 
of: quality control and complaints; contracts and administration; benefit package 
and capitation payment; research and development and public relations. A Medical 
Board advises the SSO on overall health care issues. It consists the directors of the 
three provider hospitals, two staff from SSO and six persons from Ministry of Health 
and Vientiane Capital Municipal Health Department. 
SSO members (employees) contribute to the fund with 4.5% of their salary 
(average monthly salary of SSO members is 500,000 kip ~ US$ 48). The employer 
contributes with an amount equivalent to 5% of the employee’s salary and transfers 
the total of 9.5% directly to the SSO account every month. The SSO uses 4% of the 
9.5% for health insurance purposes, which include services for both work-related 
and non-work related illness and injuries.  
That is, the SSO health insurance has health care for work injuries incorporated 
into a single fund. Out of the amount accruing from these contributions, 50% is used 
to pay the capitation rate to the provider and 50% is kept for other purposes. 
Records to date show that the costs foregone by providers have been about 
50% of the capitation fee paid. So far neither SSO nor the providers have developed 
a plan on how to invest the savings or the amount kept in reserves. 
Before the scheme started operation, studies on costs of care and expected 
utilization levels were carried out to determine the appropriate capitation rate. 
Despite the recommendations based on these studies, a higher rate was chosen when 
implementation started. At the launch the capitation rate was 80000 kip (~ US$ 7.7) 
per year per member covering all eligible dependents of the worker (as one unit). In 
that initial stage, the coverage of dependents was limited, as explained later.  In the 
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following year it was raised to 100000 kip (~9.6 US$). Recently the SSO has decided 
to change the rate to 60000 kip (~ US$ 5.8) for each worker and for each eligible 
dependent of the worker.  
The contracts between SSO and providers are signed every half year. However, 
after being in operation for 2 ½ years the providers are confident that SSO would be 
able to fulfil its financial commitment of the contract. From 2003 the contracts will 
therefore only be re-negotiated once a year. The SSO pays the providers 1/12 of the 
annual capitation rate on a monthly basis. The fluctuation in the number of SSO 
members is limited and the discrepancies are calculated by SSO on a monthly basis 
after receiving the exact number of members and their choice of hospital. Too little 
or too much capitation is balanced with the provider at the next capitation transfer. 
If an SSO member seeks emergency treatment in a hospital different from the chosen 
provider, the provider will reimburse the member directly.  
Although Decree 207 stipulates that all children up to 18 years of age should be 
covered by the scheme this has not been implemented so far. Initially children up to 
five years of age were covered. In the following year, coverage was extended to 
include the spouse and children up to five years and in the following year, to spouse 
and children up to 10 years. Together with the planned change of capitation rate, the 
scheme will from early 2004 cover children up to 18 years as intended in Decree 207.  
A benefit package has been developed by SSO to clarify for providers and 
members which services and drugs should be provided free of charge for the 
members and eligible persons. If special medication which is not included in the 
national essential drug list is necessary for the treatment of a member, it can be 
covered by SSO with the appropriate request. A list of exemptions has also been 
developed including treatment of traffic accident related injuries. 
There is a waiting period of three months before services can be utilized. 
However, for work-related injuries, services are covered from the date of enrolment. 
So far only the three central hospitals in Vientiane City have been chosen as 
providers. District hospitals and health centres, which usually take on the provision 
of primary care, have not yet been included. SSO members can change the provider 
hospital once a year by submitting a form to the SSO. 
As stipulated in Decree 207, the membership in the SSO is mandatory for all 
private and state owned enterprises employing more than 10 employees. However, 
compliance is weak as the SSO does not have the means to enforce the enrolment of 
enterprises that fail to register or to fine enterprises that are late with the payments.  
Laos has joined the ASSA, the ASEAN Social Security Association and will host 
one of its meetings in 2005. This membership provides an excellent platform for the 
exchange of experiences. 
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4.  Voluntary Health Insurance Schemes  
Community-Based Health Insurance (CBHI) 
CBHI is so far the only voluntary pre-paid social health insurance scheme in Lao 
PDR. It is designed as a non-profit scheme and does not accumulate reserves beyond 
the current needs. However, up to 10 % of contribution revenue can be used to cover 
operating costs and administration, mainly covering the salary of the account 
manager and providing incentives for collectors. The accounts manager is the only 
employee of the scheme and is posted at the district hospital. His/her main duties 
are to receive contributions from collectors and calculate and pay the capitation 
amounts to providers. He/she can only issue payments upon permission of the 
District Management Committee. 
The CBHI scheme is autonomous and community-based and is managed 
locally by District Management Committees which are composed of: 
(1) Two delegates from the district governor office;  
(2) Three delegates from the health sector; 
(3) One village leader for each village covered, and  
(4) One representative of the Mass Organizations in the covered area  
The Committees consists of one chair (District Governor or Deputy District 
Governor), two deputy chairs, a secretary and members of the committee. The main 
functions of these district Management Committees are to collect contributions, 
contract hospitals, pay capitation, monitor the quality of services, promote CBHI, 
register new members, receive complaints and mediate between members and the 
hospitals, produce transparent accounting and provide information and relevant 
reports.  
The District Management Committee is supervised by the Ministerial 
Management Committee, which is composed of: 
¦ Director of the Curative Department (chair); 
¦ District Governor of the pilot scheme (vice chair); 
¦ Deputy Director of Dept. of Planning and Finance (vice-chair); 
¦ Director of Municipal/Provincial Public Health Office (member), and 
¦ Chief of Policy Division, Personnel Organization Department (member) 
The main functions of these Ministerial Management Committees are to lead, 
supervise, monitor and control the implementation of the CBHI schemes, solve 
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problems proposed by the District Management Committee and report on the 
progress of the CBHI to the Steering Committee at MoH. 
The scheme receives technical advice from the Health Insurance Division at the 
Ministry of Health and from health insurance experts at WHO. 
The target beneficiaries of CBHI are the population engaged in the informal 
sector, as they have no access to any other social health insurance. Although the 
scheme is voluntary, only entire families can enrol. This is to limit adverse selection 
and provide a better risk-mix among the members. During the preparatory phase, 
hospital costing studies and community consultations were undertaken. This led to 
the determination of how much the target population was willing and able to spend 
on health insurance. As a result, progressive flat rate contribution amounts were 
developed according to family size. Large families pay higher contributions than 
small families or singles. However, a modest discount is given for families with 
many members compared to families with few members. This takes into account the 
findings that income per capita is lower with increasing family size. Contributions 
are not identical throughout the country but are adapted to each new setting 
considering the local socioeconomic situation. 
The collectors, who are members of the local community, collect contributions 
on a monthly basis. The insurance card of the family is stamped upon payment and 
the status of the family regarding entitlement to services is thereby indicated.  
The collectors deliver the contributions to the accounts manager who then 
updates the lists of members and calculates the capitation amount for the provider. 
So far CBHI has contracted district hospitals, which again have supra-contracted a 
central/provincial hospital for referral purposes. Capitation is split among hospitals 
according to a ratio agreed upon and stipulated in the contract. Members have to 
seek medical care at the contracted district hospital, which acts as a gatekeeper for 
the central hospital. If members approach the contracted central hospital directly 
without being referred, the scheme will not cover the health care costs. Apart from 
emergency cases the scheme will also not cover for health services obtained in 
hospitals that do not have a contract with the CBHI scheme.  
Members are entitled to a comprehensive list of medical services stipulated in 
the CBHI regulations and including primary, secondary and tertiary care as long as 
it is available in the geographical target area. Drugs included in the essential drugs 
list are also provided without charge. It is the responsibility of contracted hospitals 
to have 120 of the most frequently used drugs on stock at any time and guarantee 
their timely replenishment. A list of conditions not covered by the CBHI has also 
been developed. The exemptions are rather similar to the ones from SSO. 
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Although there is no official linkage with any of the other compulsory pre-paid 
social health insurance schemes, the majority of civil servants living in the 
implementation areas of CBHI have decided to join CBHI although they are already 
covered by the civil servants scheme.  
5.  Social Security and Social Assistance Programmes 
Civil Servant Scheme (CSS) 
According to the Labour Code, civil servants are covered for the following social 
security cash benefits: 
¦ Maternity: Women are entitled to receive full salary for 90 days from 
their employers or the social security fund if contributions have been 
fully paid. The total period should include at least 42 days after delivery. 
¦ Disability: If the disability is due to an employment-related injury or 
illness, it is the responsibility of the employers to pay  
l Medical expenses for immediate and continued treatment; 
l Funeral grants and lump sum benefits in the event of death; 
l Full salary for up to six month, 50% of the salary from 6-18 months 
while the employee is being treated or is undergoing rehabilitation, 
and  
l Compensation to the worker in case of disability. 
¦ Old-age pension: Full retirement pension is given to men aged 60 year 
and women aged 55 years after completion of at least 25 years of service 
where contributions have been fully paid. Lump sum options are 
available for people not eligible who cannot fulfil the above conditions. 
The benefits noted above are all part of the overall benefit package of the civil 
servants scheme and are administered by the same department of the MOLSW. As 
the entire group of civil servants is part of this scheme, in theory there is good risk 
pooling. However, as no reserves have been accumulated in this scheme, only 
limited benefits can be expected. Like for health insurance benefits, the 
remuneration of the other social security benefits is characterized by modest and 
irregular payments.  
Social Security Organization (SSO) 
According to the Prime Minister’s Decree 207, SSO members (salaried employees in 
private and state-owned enterprises), are covered for the following social security 
cash benefits: 
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¦ Maternity: A woman is entitled to maternity benefits if contributions to 
the SSO have been fully paid in nine out of the last 12 months. She will 
then receive 70% of the insured earnings for a maximum of three months. 
If she cannot resume work for medical reasons after this period, she will 
be entitled to sickness benefit. Insured women unable to work during 
pregnancy or within six months from childbirth receive the cash sickness 
benefit for 30 days. Thereafter, SSO pays the equivalent of 60% of the 
insured average salary or wages during the previous six-month period. 
¦ Invalidity: Invalidity benefits can only be received for persons who have 
contributed to the SSO for five years. After reaching retirement age, the 
invalidity benefit will be commuted into retirement pension. If the 
invalidity is employment-related, no waiting period is required. Benefits 
include wage compensation, claims for permanent disability, expenses to 
pay a caregiver and death grants and survivors’ benefits.  
¦ Old-age pension: Insured persons are entitled to receive pension from 
the age of 60. In some cases persons can retire at 55 and receive pension. 
People are entitled to an old-age pension if they have paid contributions 
for a full period of five years. If contributions have been paid for less than 
five years, the benefit will be paid in a single lump sum. The size of the 
pension is calculated by taking into account pension points, average wage 
and a set index. 
The above benefits are all part of the mandatory benefit package of the SSO. It 
is a system that combines risk-pooling with mutual support and is able to deliver the 
above-mentioned benefits due to realistic contributions and clear definition of 
benefits. Since the SSO has only been operating for 2 ½ years, so far only maternity 
and work-related disability benefits have been paid. Old-age pensions can be 
expected to be requested in two and a half years’ time as a minimum of five years’ 
contribution is required to be eligible for this benefit. However, as most of the SSO 
members are young, many years will pass before the pension expenditure will 
become a major part of expenditures of the SSO.   
Social assistance programme for the non-economically active and 
indigent populations 
Laos is one of the least developed countries. In 1997, an estimated 39 % of the 
population had incomes below the poverty line. This indicates the need for wide 
social assistance. However, as public funding is limited, the needy or indigent 
population can only expect limited assistance from government, if at all.  
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While physical rehabilitation falls under the auspices of the MoH, the MoLSW 
is responsible for assistance to the needy population. The MoLSW provides support 
for orphans, the disabled – especially the victims of unexploded ordinance - with 
financial and technical assistance of international organizations and NGOs. 
However, the support is limited compared to the need and is not provided equally 
throughout the country. The government does not provide any old-age pension, 
maternity allowance or other social benefits for the indigent population.  
Informal solidarity mechanisms exist as part of the Lao traditional culture. 
Anecdotal stories indicate that in some communities local emergency funds are set 
up. Funds may be collected and then distributed to people who experience sudden 
illness that require funds beyond their financial capacity. In case of natural disasters 
– mainly flooding – the MOLSW distributes food to the victims. It manages the 
external donor funds and collaborates with several NGOs and organizations in 
organizing Food for Work activities supporting both villages hit by disaster and 
villages with chronic food shortages. The next phase of the ILO programme in Laos 
will, among others, look into the issue of how to create a coherent structure for 
welfare activities, thus enhancing the cost benefit of the funds spent on these 
activities and increasing the coverage of activities. 
The Decree No 52/PM on Medical Services promulgated in 1995 put an end to 
free medical services. Nevertheless, medical staff can exempt poor people from 
paying user charges for their care. A study of central and provincial hospitals 
showed that exemptions ranged from 0.3 % to 11.9 % of total fees.g Since no official 
guidelines exist on whom to exempt, decisions are taken on a case-to-case basis.  
Since 2002, the Hatxayfong district in Vientiane Capital has provided free 
health care for the poorest families as part of their poverty reduction programme. 
The multidisciplinary District Poverty Reduction Committee has developed a set of 
criteria for poverty and is responsible for the identification of beneficiaries. Cards 
are issued to eligible families and currently 78 persons out of the total population of 
about 70500 persons in Hatxayfong district are registered, mainly elderly people and 
families with numerous children. These families are eligible to receive free health 
care and drugs at the district hospital. Services are limited to the district hospital as 
the activities are financed solely through the drug revolving fund of this hospital. As 
part of the poverty reduction programme the registered people are also exempted 
from paying school fees and can obtain interest free loans for agricultural activities 
through an ILO-funded project. The Committee will also assist in finding 
employment for family members out of work, and mediating between the families 
and the local enterprises.  
                                                   
g Draft of Lao Hospital Costing Study, 2003, MOH, WHO  
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The Swiss Red Cross is planning to set up an equity fund, which will assist 
poor families by buying them membership in the local Community-Based Health 
Insurance. This will be a local initiative in Nam Bak district in Luang Prabang 
province, where the first pilot of the CBHI has been implemented. Hence, it will only 
reach a limited number of households in a limited geographical area. 
6.  For-profit Commercial Health Insurance 
Assurances Générales du Laos (AGL), associated with the French AGF has operated 
in Laos since 1990 and is currently the largest private insurance company in Laos. Its 
head office is located in Vientiane while it has branches in all but two provinces. As 
for health insurance, AGL offers the following:  
¦ Individual health insurance; 
¦ Life insurance, which includes health insurance;  
¦ Group health insurance, and  
¦ Workmen’s compensation insurance  
Customers are mainly private people (1 and 2) and staff of enterprises and 
organizations (3 and 4). Currently more than 1000 Lao citizens are covered by one of 
these health insurance policies. 
Different options of benefits are available within the different insurance 
policies. The premiums are calculated taking into account the insured person’s age, 
gender, extent of coverage and the type of work (high risk or low risk) for 
workmen’s compensation. The insured are reimbursed by AGL upon submission of 
their claims, and 100 % of the expenses are reimbursed. However, upper limits on 
the amount to be reimbursed are stipulated in each insurance policy. The maximum 
amounts are generally not very high. Benefits are paid regardless of whether 
medical treatment is received in Laos or abroad. Medical care benefit packages 
include room and board, hospital services, and surgery and doctors fees. Workmen’s 
compensation insurance also provides cash compensations in case total permanent 
disability or death, and covers the insured workers during working hours as well as 
on their way to and from work. The waiting periods are of zero, three and six 
months duration.  
A discount on premium is provided if enterprises choose group health 
insurance and workmen’s compensation insurance. These are for example, 10% 
discount for a group of 21-50 persons and 20% discount for a group of 51 – 200. 
Motor vehicle insurance (liability) is compulsory but poorly enforced in Laos. 
Many if not most vehicles are therefore uninsured. The current practice in case of an 
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accident with personal injury is that those involved in the accident have to agree on 
who should cover medical expenses for the injured. 
Lately numerous insurance companies from neighbouring Thailand are 
offering commercial health insurance policies in Laos. There is no information on 
how many people purchase insurance from these foreign companies. However, 
according to AGL, the company is receiving new customers that formerly held 
insurance in Thai companies. They change mainly out of practical reasons as using 
an in-country company makes reimbursement and communications easier. 
Although health insurance is not widespread and is a relatively new concept for 
many Lao people, AGL has in recent years observed an increased interest for health 
insurance by the Lao middle class. 
7.  Critical Analysis of Health Care Financing Through 
Prepayament Mechanisms  
Current population coverage  
The overall goal and success criteria for any social health insurance scheme will be 
to reach universal coverage of the target group and deliver appropriate health 
services of high quality.  
The longest running social security scheme in Laos is the government run Civil 
Servants Scheme. It is the only scheme covering 100% of its target group as it 
automatically deducts contributions from the salaries of all 80-90000 civil servants 
(not including the military and the police). However, although the coverage is 
optimal, the actual provision of health insurance benefits is low if provided at all. 
Civil servants may not file claims, as the procedure of doing so involves too much 
work and is time consuming compared to the expected reimbursement. It also seems 
that many civil servants have no information about the actions they need to take. 
The administration of the scheme is characterized by inefficient procedures and lack 
of clear regulations and transparency. The health insurance under the CSS is 
therefore not serving as the safety net that it is intended to be. 
In recent years Laos has introduced additional social security schemes to 
provide safety nets for the population. The mandatory SSO currently has 20249 
members out of a target population of 343000 (all salaried employees working in the 
private sector or SOEs). Although the SSO has been running for 2 ½ years, coverage 
is still limited. So far, only about 6% of the countrywide target population is covered 
and extension should be implemented in a timely manner considering the lessons 
learned in Vientiane Capital. 
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The voluntary CBHI, the youngest of the schemes is still in its pilot phase and 
therefore coverage cannot yet be expected to be high. At present 8238 persons are 
included out of about 1690000 informal sector workers and their families in the 
country. How to take this scheme to scale will present a major challenge. This is 
mainly due to the huge target group and the barriers that exist for universal 
coverage of this diverse group of people in the informal sector. Implementation 
methods for efficient expansion have yet to be agreed upon. The high-level health 
insurance team in the Ministry of Health cannot be expected to perform outreach 
activities in all districts, and decentralized CBHI training teams will most likely need 
to be established to implement the extension. The means of funding the substantial 
start-up costs is also an issue. 
Assuming that the coverage by the private insurance companies is still limited, 
about 555000 Lao persons are currently covered by a health insurance scheme 
(insured persons and their eligible dependents covered by SSO+CBHI+CSS). 
Including only the persons covered by a well-functioning health insurance scheme 
the number gets much smaller and would reach about 45300 (SSO+CBHI), which 
means coverage of about 10% (including CSS) or 0.8% (excluding CSS) of the overall 
population. Although population and workforce numbers are not accurate, they still 
indicate the challenge that lies ahead if universal coverage is to be achieved in Laos. 
Changes in health-seeking behaviour 
Laos PDR faces a problem of underutilization of health services. This is due to many 
reasons, one of them being financial constraint of the users. The introduction of 
social health insurance has removed this financial barrier from the members as they 
can expect Lao standard treatment without having to worry about the availability of 
cash at the time of use. By introducing the capitation system it is expected that the 
level of irrational drug use will be reduced, as only drugs from the essential drugs 
list will be provided and the capitation as such discourages over-treatment. 
However, health-seeking behaviour is also very much determined by the proximity 
of the provider and the time and money needed for transportation. 
The SSO is already facing the problem that members can only access the 
contracted central hospitals, as no district hospitals in the vicinity of their homes are 
included as providers. This will have an adverse effect on the treatment seeking 
behaviour of members and their dependents living in the outskirts of Vientiane 
Capital. Plans for the inclusion of districts hospitals and eventual health clinics are 
now being developed. 
The CBHI schemes will also soon face the problem that the growing pilot areas 
will overlap with the target area of health centres. The insured members of the CBHI 
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schemes now bypass these facilities, as they are not contractual partners of the 
scheme. Plans are therefore being made to include health centres in CBHI 
contractual arrangements. 
The situation at provincial hospitals is generally characterized by long waiting 
periods while district hospitals are underutilized as people often go directly to major 
hospitals. The design of the CBHI does not allow its members to seek health care at 
central level, as every member has to visit the district facility first. The district 
hospital becomes the gatekeeper, as it will refer only patients that cannot be treated 
at local level. This leads to primary and other relevant care being delivered by the 
district hospital rather than by an overqualified central or provincial hospital and 
should lead to a better utilization of resources.  
One desired change in health-seeking behaviour which can result from the 
introduction of pre-payment schemes is a shift in the provision of health care from 
private unregulated providers (including pharmacies) towards a higher utilization 
of public health care facilities. It is anticipated that this will lead to delivery of health 
care of higher quality and more rational use of drugs. 
Service providers  
A major question concerning the expansion of the SSO and CBHI schemes is 
whether the health sector is prepared for expansion. As the standard of health 
services in general is lower in the more remote areas, it is of utmost importance to 
have an accreditation system in place before the schemes are extended. This system 
should determine whether specific hospitals and health centres are suitable as 
providers or not. Uncritical inclusion of sub-standard facilities would raise ethical 
concerns, as insured members are forced to seek treatment only at contracted 
facilities. The lack of appropriate provider facilities might be a major barrier for 
expansion especially in the remote areas.  
One of the major complaints about Lao health care facilities in general concerns 
the quality of services. This is not solely directed against treatment as such but also 
concerns the basic attitudes of medical staff. Unsympathetic staff might have a 
greater adverse impact on treatment-seeking behaviour than expected.  
Quality of services  
It should be in the interest of a health insurance scheme to assure members that they 
would receive high quality health care when needed. However, so far under the SSO 
there have only been limited efforts to improve the quality of care. It seems that 
barriers to quality assurance stem from the organizational structure of the SSO. As it 
is still considered a department under the MoLSW, the SSO does not have an 
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independent relationship with public providers. This may prevent SSO staff from 
critically reviewing the health care provided, as the staff would have to criticize part 
of their own system. Changing the SSO into a parastatal organization by changing 
the employment status of SSO staff from civil servants to SSO employees is therefore 
a step in the right direction.  
Another barrier to improving the quality of services is the fact, that the 
members of the medical board include the directors of contracted providers. As one 
of the tasks of the medical board is to ensure the delivery of quality health services 
for SSO members, there seems to be a clear conflict of interest in the composition of 
the board.  
The members of the SSO scheme can change the health care provider once a 
year. This gives them the chance to choose the provider that offers the best service. 
Capitation can be considered a motivating factor for hospitals to improve their 
quality of care by increasing the steady flow of income. However, capitation at the 
same time also carries the risk of under treatment. The positive impact on service 
delivered by contracted providers has still to be documented. So far it seems that 
attracting “customers” by competing on quality is not a driving force of Lao 
hospitals. Yet it is noted that after the initial year of SSO a considerable number of 
members changed from one provider to another, which might indicate changing 
perceptions of the quality of health care. In this regard it would be interesting to 
look into the main reasons for changing providers to see whether quality issues are a 
major cause.  
It is within the mandate of the MoH to improve the quality of health services. 
The introduction of health insurance schemes opens new opportunities to push for 
service improvements. The MoH is therefore in a position to speed up the process of 
developing hospital standards and accreditation systems and work towards timely 
implementation. The MoH could also play an important role on the issue of 
extending the provider system to include district hospitals. As there currently might 
be interests discouraging the inclusion of lower levels of health care providers in the 
SSO and CBHI systems, directions from ministerial level might prove helpful in 
applying this necessary next step.  
The health insurance schemes as such have an obligation to constantly upgrade 
their own management and administration systems to meet the demand and 
expectations of members. They should take into account the feedback from their 
members and the SSO in particular should take advantage of their findings through 
the complaints “hot line” and use this evidence in the development of better 
services.  
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Economic incentives 
A benefit for providers contracted under health insurance schemes is that they 
receive a steady income of considerable size through the capitation system. 
However, it seems that providers so far have not developed plans on how to best 
use the capitation funds to improve services. So far funds are used for direct cost-
recovery of the services provided to members. Large unspent funds are therefore 
built up under the SSO system, both at SSO level and at the provider hospitals. 
Figures from the fiscal year 2001/2002 show that for one of the contracted central 
hospitals, the income due to capitation from SSO was about 10% of the overall 
hospital income (out-of-pocket user charges and SSO capitation). The expenditure 
on SSO patients was however only about 5% of the overall expenditure. How to 
spend the accumulated surplus in a way that benefits the quality of services still 
needs to be addressed.  
There seems to be a concern among members of both SSO and CBHI that “non-
members” which pay at the point of service might receive better treatment than 
insured people. This is a relevant concern, as it is well known that providers under a 
capitation system might under-treat in order to keep the cost per treatment low, and 
thereby increase their net income accordingly. It is therefore a concern that needs to 
be taken seriously. A review and comparison of care provided to both insured and 
non-insured patients should be conducted by the schemes. A way to boost the 
motivation of health staff to treat SSO members could be to use a fixed amount out 
of the capitation fund for an equitable bonus system to all the staff involved.  
Both the providers and SSO need to plan on how to use their funds to 
constantly maintain and improve their services. It is of utmost importance to update 
computer systems and reinvest in the organization to keep it up to standard. 
However, as the SSO is still under the MoLSW, it has to follow government rules on 
how to deal with recurrent costs. This collides with the actual need for 
improvements (for example, permission to purchase a certain amount of computers 
a year rather than letting it depend on the actual need). 
Impact on health care financing  
For purposes of cost containment, the use of the capitation provider payment 
method as applied by the SSO and CBHI schemes has a clear advantage compared 
to the fee-for-service reimbursement practised by the CSS. Capitation also supplies 
the contracted health facilities with a stable source of income for services, 
administration and improvements and provides a much more visible flow of 
funding into the health sector. As the members contribute to the funds of these 
social health insurance schemes, the assurance of proper handling of their funds is of 
highest importance. Using a transparent financial system will address the concerns 
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that members might have towards cost- effective handling of “their” money and will 
have a favourable impact on the compliance of members to stay in the schemes.  
The CSS is planning to introduce capitation payment as a pilot in Vientiane 
Capital as an initial part of their reform. This will most probably improve 
transparency and feasibility, as the capitation payment is less burdensome to 
manage for the insurer and easier to implement in a context where staff and 
administrative skills are limited. The capitation method may create an incentive for 
better financial management by hospitals, as capitation needs clear information on 
the cost of different services delivered and the population served.  
Financial protection and poverty-reduction strategy  
The social security schemes aim at providing health care to all their beneficiaries by 
combining risk pooling with mutual support. Enabling people to seek health care 
according to their needs, and eliminating the risk of total impoverishment due to 
catastrophic health expenditures is in line with the Lao National Poverty Reduction 
Programme, which focuses on “access and quality” of health services to the entire 
population.h However, the needs of the poorest part of the population facing the 
highest barriers of receiving adequate health care have not yet been addressed by 
either of the schemes. How to include these people who have little understanding of 
insurance and no financial means to enrol even with a low contribution has yet to be 
solved. Creating an equity fund within the CBHI would be one way to approach the 
problem. However, this would complicate the simple administration of the scheme, 
which currently needs to develop measures to increase coverage. Furthermore, if 
funds for the equity fund were received from the government it would endanger the 
status of the scheme of being totally independent and locally administered. 
Receiving funds from international donors would also be an option but would cause 
sustainability problems. 
With regard to the SSO, an extension to other provinces should include equity 
considerations. It should be discussed whether universal contribution rates should 
be implemented countrywide or whether contributions should reflect the access to 
services. While SSO members in Vientiane Capital can access advanced services in 
the central hospitals, the service provided and equipment available at provincial 
level is less sophisticated.  
Key factors associated with success and failure  
A key factor associated with the success of CBHI is the feeling of ownership by the 
community, which is created mainly by having a locally known and trusted 
                                                   
h  Draft of the Lao P.D.R.’s National Poverty Eradication Programme (NPEP), A Comprehensive Approach to 
Growth with Equity, Mini RTM, May 2003 
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management structure. Also the fact, that contributions are being handled in a 
transparent way and no funds are accumulated reduces the worries about possible 
fraud, thus improving the willingness to join the scheme.  
Using the capitation system has proven to be a successful way of paying for 
services under SSO and CBHI. On the contrary, using the fee for services under the 
CSS has proven to be an inefficient way of paying for health services, as Laos 
currently is not equipped to deal with the administrative demands connected to this 
payment form. 
For SSO and CBHI it has been of great importance to have a charismatic 
driving force to advocate for the schemes. Good public relations with convincing 
and relevant arguments are especially important with the voluntary system. 
However, for all schemes it is crucial to have appropriate information and 
communications, as level of compliance and satisfaction is closely linked with good 
information.  
One of the forces of the CBHI is that it operates with a rather uncomplicated 
administrative set-up which makes expansion easier. Running the SSO however, 
requires strong administrative skills and well-trained staff in all areas of health 
insurance. This might become a barrier in the process of extension to provincial 
areas, as relevant managerial skills might not be available at the local level.  
Although the SSO is mandatory by decree, de facto it operates as a voluntary 
scheme as no enforcement tools were agreed upon before the introduction of the 
scheme. This might over time, lead to an adverse change in the risk-mix as members 
with a good risk might, opt out of the scheme, while the members with the bad risk 
stay in.  
8.  Conclusions  
The provision of pre-paid social health insurance is a well-known mechanism 
preventing the poor from catastrophic expenditure, which could lead them into 
deep poverty. As the Lao households are now expected to pay 58 % of the per capita 
health expenditure there is an urgent need to provide safety nets for the part of the 
population that does not have the means to cope financially with severe illness. 
It is therefore encouraging that two social health insurance schemes have been 
introduced in Laos in recent years. Initial implementation has shown that both the 
mandatory SSO and the voluntary CBHI can be managed in Laos and are acceptable 
for the Lao population. However, the level of coverage is still low. Developing 
feasible plans on expansion of the schemes and at the same time including the most 
indigent part of the population will pose an immense challenge both in term of 
management and funding.  
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For Lao PDR universal coverage cannot be expected in the near future. Too 
many barriers make especially the full extension of CBHI schemes unrealistic. The 
main barriers will be encountered in relation to the enrolment of the minority 
populations living mostly by subsistence agriculture in the remote mountainous 
areas of the country. Most probably the schemes will have to follow a natural course 
of evolution by expanding to areas where managerial skills, interest, facilities and 
demand are available. When the schemes become well established and success 
stories penetrate to less accessible areas of the country, it can be expected that some 
of the more resistant barriers will be broken down.  
The future of the Civil Servant Scheme also poses questions. A merger between 
CSS and SSO has been discussed. However, until the CSS has undergone a reform 
and considerable improvements have been achieved, such a merger will not be 
feasible as the health insurance of the CSS de facto is not functioning.  
The concept of prepaying for future potential health problems is new for most 
Lao people. Nevertheless, the pilot projects of CBHI have shown that the population 
is willing to sign up if appropriate information is conveyed to them through 
community consultations. The concept of risk-pooling on the other hand seems more 
familiar to the Lao culture where members of the extended family often form the 
households. Income is pooled which enables the household to keep a living standard 
which would not be possible if living in a nuclear family. The above conditions are 
important factors for the success of implementing social health insurance in the 
country.  
The long-term national development goal of the Lao PDR is to leave the status 
of being a least developed country by 2020. This requires among others a strong and 
healthy population and workforce. One way to improve the health status of the 
population is to remove the barriers for adequate utilization of quality health care 
facilities. Social health insurances have the ability to approach some of these barriers 
and will therefore provide an important tool for socioeconomic development. It is 
furthermore in line with the government Policy for Health Development from 2001 
to 2005, which wants to: 
“Promote community-based health care systems, ensure full coverage and 
good quality of health care services to all ethnic groups, prioritize disease 
prevention and health promotion activities, emphasize disease treatment, combine 
modern and traditional medicine; promote and support the establishment of health 
insurance funds, develop health management systems and ensure security for the 
health sector” 
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Mongolia 
Prof. P.Nymadawa, Dr K.Tungalag 
1.  Background  
Mongolia is a large and landlocked country in the northern part of Central Asia, 
located between Russian Federation on the north and Chinese People’s Republic on 
the east, south and west. The total land area of 1565000 square kilometres contains 
only 2.4 million population (2000) or 1.4 persons per square kilometre. More than 
50% of the Mongolian population is urban and lives in the capital city Ulaanbaatar 
and 21 Aimag (province) centres, and 20% of the population is semi-nomadic. In 
rural areas population density is very low, which makes health service provision 
quite difficult.  
During the previous political regime in Mongolia a comparatively good health 
care infrastructure was developed, which was adjusted to the centralized economy. 
Health care services for the population are offered through an extensive network of 
government health facilities at four levels; starting from feldscher (doctor’s assistant) 
posts at bag (the smallest administrative unit) level to the tertiary hospitals. Due to 
the attempts to ensure equitable access to health services even in the most remote 
areas, regardless of their economic efficiency and sustainability, there was 
practically universal coverage and accessibility to the primary health care (PHC) 
services. Under the centralized planning economy, about 5% of the GDP or 8% of the 
Government budget was spent for the free- of-charge health services throughout the 
country.  
Since the start of the socioeconomic transition in 1990, the health budget as a 
part of the Government budget has not been reduced in monetary terms, but it has 
decreased in real terms due to devaluation of the national monetary unit (the 
Mongolian Tugrig [¥] was devalued from 4.18 ¥ in 1990 to 40.00 ¥ in 1993, 750.00 ¥ in 
1996 and 1200.00 ¥ in 2000 in relation to 1.00 US$), making it difficult to run the 
health service at the previous level. The share of government health expenditure in 
GDP has dramatically dropped. This has adversely influenced the overall health 
care system performance. At the beginning of the transition period the population 
growth rate was 2.5% and almost 50% of the population were children under age 18, 
and around 5-6% of the population were aged 60 years and over. The infant, child 
and maternal mortality rates were relatively high. 
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The basis for health policy in the 1990s was determined in 1990 when the 4th 
Congress of Health Workers approved the “Guidelines for the Protection of People’s 
Health up to 2005”, in which the introduction of health insurance was proposed. The 
Constitution of Mongolia, enacted in 1992, stated that health care was a state 
function, but citizen’s active financial involvement has been requested instead of the 
previous free-of-charge health system.  
Therefore the government decided to gradually introduce cost-sharing 
mechanisms by the population into health service financing trying to keep equitable 
access of all population strata to basic health services. Considering these 
circumstances, the government developed the Citizen’s Health Insurance Act in 
1993, designed to keep previous achievements in equity and access, raise new funds 
for the financing of health care and to create financial protection of the population 
during the transition period.  
2.  Development of Compulsory and Voluntary  
Prepayment Mechanisms  
The idea to create new financial sources for the health sector (Health Insurance 
Fund: HIF) came at the end of 1980s, and led to the accumulation of information on 
the topic in the related departments of the Ministry of Health (MoH) and research 
institutions. Study teams were sent to Asian countries, including Japan, Thailand, 
Malaysia and South Korea, and specialized experts and consultants were invited 
through international organizations. 
In 1991, the first National Working Group of MoH was appointed to draft the 
Health Insurance Law and other related legal acts. The first draft of the Law and the 
required other legal acts were ready at the end of 1991. Then MoH in collaboration 
with “Mongol Daatgal Company (MDC)” drafted the Government Resolution on the 
Introduction of Health Insurance in Mongolia and associated regulatory documents, 
and submitted these to the government.  
In designing the HIF scheme, medical workers at all referral levels of the health 
sector and community were involved, through various kinds of discussions, 
workshops, seminars and scientific conferences on the topic. In addition, there were 
extensive surveys on health service providers and health service consumer’s 
attitudes and expectations of the health insurance. After all the preparatory work, at 
the beginning of 1992 the final draft of the Law was submitted to the Government 
and then submitted to the Parliament (Baga Hural). Due to time constraints before 
the expected new General Election, it was not discussed in the Parliament at that 
time.  
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According to the Draft Law all employed people of Mongolia shall be covered 
by compulsory health insurance. However, vulnerable population groups would not 
be obliged to contribute and all health expenditures for individuals in these groups 
would be financed from the state budget. Unemployed people and foreigners could 
join the scheme voluntarily.  
After the formation of the new Parliament and the government in 1992, the 
first Draft Law was again considered by the new MOH and the final version entitled 
²Citizen’s Health Insurance Law² was submitted to the Parliament in March 1993 
and approved in June 1993. According to the Law passed, all population groups of 
Mongolia shall be covered by the compulsory health insurance. In Mongolia that 
time, poverty was an unknown phenomenon. But since 1990, poverty has become a 
reality due to economic crises (such as growing unemployment and inflation) and 
the most vulnerable population affected by these transitional effects are children, 
retired people and some other low- income population groups. In order to protect 
and fully cover the population under the scheme, the Government identified seven 
sensitive and vulnerable groups: children under 16, mothers (and fathers) with 
babies under two years old, students, pensioners, invalids, herdsmen and others, 
who together constituted about 70% of the population. Health insurance premiums 
for individuals in all these groups were to be fully subsidized by the government.  
The government contributions for the seven vulnerable groups were the major 
determinants in the financial performance of the scheme. During 1994, payment 
from the Government totalled 62% of all revenues (57.7% in contributions for 
vulnerable groups and 6.6% for employer contributions for civil servants and state-
owned institutions). During the implementation period, the government planned to 
gradually reduce the numbers of subsidized groups, according to economic 
recovery. Through amendments enacted in 1995 and 1998, herders (initially by 50%, 
then by 100%) and students were excluded from the government subsidy.  
However, the percentage of people receiving government subsidy still 
remained high. Currently, according to official statistics, about 52% of the 
population is covered by government subsidy. The government policy is to further 
reduce the number of subsidized groups and better target resources to the people in 
real need.  
According to a survey (K.Tungalag, 2000), 44.2% of children under 16, and 
47.9% of the elderly (age of retirement) were living below the poverty line. In other 
words, not all people in the subsidized groups are poor, and the number of 
subsidized individuals could potentially be reduced by at least 30-35%.  
Due to difficulties in registration and income definition, unemployed and self-
employed people’s enrolment was identified as voluntary. After exclusion from the 
government subsidy, herders and students were added to this group. As the number 
of people in the voluntary category grew, there was an increase in moral hazard 
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(enrolment in the scheme just at the time of need). Amendments to the Citizen’s 
Health Insurance Law (2003) were then enacted, making coverage compulsory for 
all population groups, excluding foreigners. In general, since the initial introduction 
of the Law there have been several amendments to the Citizen’s Health Insurance 
Law (in 1995, 1997, 1998, and 2003).  
In order to reduce negative incentives from both provider and consumer sides 
to admit more patients to hospital or to be admitted to receive health care benefits, a 
prospective case payment method rather than retrospective per day payment was 
introduced, in addition to co-payments for inpatient services. According to the last 
amendment to the Law enacted in 2003, these benefits were expanded to include the 
current outpatient primary health care, secondary and tertiary services.  
The HIF has had a dramatic impact on funding for the health sector. In 1994, 
the first year of operation, health insurance funding accounted for 41.5% of the 
health sector funding.  
3.  Compulsory Social Health Insurance Mechanisms  
Organizational and institutional arrangements 
The management of the HIF was entrusted at first to MDC, a state-owned 
commercial insurance company. In 1996 the management of the fund was 
transferred to the State Social Insurance General Office (SSIGO). The main reasons 
for this transfer were considerations for savings of operational costs of activities, 
especially premium collection.  
Today, health insurance is part of the broader social insurance scheme, which 
is under the responsibility of the Ministry of Social Welfare and Labour (MSWL). A 
Health Insurance Sub-council (HISC) has been created under the National Social 
Insurance Council (NSIC) nominated by the Parliament. This body operates by Law 
under HISC, and is chaired by the State Secretary of the Ministry of Health. Its 
primary role is to supervise the fund’s utilization and spending; to develop 
regulations and guidelines to address implementation problems and to set health 
insurance policy. There are also 22 sub-councils at the aimag (provincial) and the 
capital city level.  
The SSIGO is responsible for the management of the overall social insurance 
scheme through its Health Insurance Department (See Figure 19). The SSIGO has 30 
branches in 22 aimags and eight districts of Ulaanbaatar. In each branch, there is a 
director and 8 – 10 staff members, of whom two are responsible for health insurance. 
There is also an SSIGO representative in each soum (district), often called social 
inspector. In total about 1300 officers are involved in the administration of SSIGO. 
Administration costs are officially set at 2% of the total health insurance fund.  
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Figure 19. Organizational chart of social insurance scheme in Mongolia 
 
Currently, the health insurance scheme is characterized by individual 
coverage, which means that only the contributor is entitled to benefits covered by 
the health insurance scheme. According to the Citizen’s Health Insurance Law all 
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3.2  Coverage and Premium Collection 
(1) Employees of economic enterprises and organizations; 
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(7) Persons on regular military service; 
(8) Herdsmen; 
(9) Citizens, as stated in the Article 12 of the Law on Social Welfare; 
(10) Persons serving a prison sentence, and  
(11) Other citizens not mentioned in Articles 1 to 10;  
The health insurance contributions for the various population categories are 
different. The amount of monthly premium contributed by insured persons 
belonging to the first category listed above is a percentage of their monthly salary 
and/or similar income. This percentage, which cannot exceed 6%, is determined by 
the government annually. Employees and contracted cattle breeders pay a half of the 
insurance premium (3%) while the remaining half is shouldered by their employers.  
A financial plan for premium collection from registered companies is set up 
each year. Each month the accountants of enterprises and government institutions 
transfer contributions to the HIF account at the SSIGO, based on the list of 
employees and their salaries. An inspector from the SSIGO verifies whether the 
premium amounts to be transferred are correct. There is a penalty in case of late 
payment of premiums (0.3% per day).  
Sole proprietors and owners of economic enterprises are responsible for 
premium contribution and the premium amount determined by the NSIC on the 
basis of the income declaration filed with the Tax Administration.  
Currently, self-employed herdsmen and students (categories 4 and 8) are 
required to pay a flat rate premium of 500 tugreks per month. During the initial year 
of implementation of the Law, the government paid the entire premium for these 
two categories of beneficiaries at a monthly rate of 160 tugreks. Due to difficulties in 
registration and premium collection of unemployed and self-employed people and 
students, the premium collection is the responsibility of local governors and 
administrators of colleges and universities.  
The premium for insured persons belonging to categories 3,5,6,7 and 9 (fully 
subsidized-vulnerable groups) from the above list is a flat amount per person per 
month, and is borne entirely by the government. The current premium amount is 
300 tugreks (proposed to be 500 tugreks in 2005 by the HISC). Initially, the premium 
amount was 160 tugrek in 1994, and was raised to 200 tugrek in 1995. Premiums for 
subsidized groups are determined annually by the NSIC based on the HISC’s 
proposal. The government transfers the premium to the HIF account monthly, based 
on the number of vulnerable people covered at each local administration.  
According to the last amendment of the Law, the unit of membership can be a 
family, which means that the head of the household can contribute for all family 
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members (spouse and children up to age 18 years). However, this amendment has 
not yet been fully implemented. 
3.3  Benefit Types and Payment Arrangements  
With Service Providers 
Since its creation, the health insurance scheme has mainly focused on the coverage 
of inpatient care.  
The benefits included under the Health Insurance Scheme are as follows: 
(1) Inpatient services for illnesses and injuries that are not covered under the 
free medical aid programme of the Government,  
(2) Outpatient treatment for minor illnesses or injuries, and  
(3) Fifty per cent of the cost of outpatient prescribed drugs included in the 
List of Essential Drugs approved by the MoH. The prescription must 
come from family doctors.  
The following medical services or supplies are not covered by insurance: 
(1) Cosmetic services and surgery; 
(2) Prosthetic devices; 
(3) Additional services requested by the insured; 
(4) Drugs purchased from pharmacies (except as described above), and  
(5) Other services (defined) paid by the government. 
According to the Law, the entitlement to benefits has a cash limitation of how 
much an insured person can use (as expenditure) during any year. The amount is 
determined annually by the HISC and the current limitation is 400000.00 tugreks. 
According to amendments to the Law enacted in 2002, and applied since 1 
January, 2003 outpatient and Family Group Practice (FGP) services are included 
under the scheme.  
3.4  Provider payment 
The payment system for hospitals is based upon a classification of medical institutions 
into three referral levels. Initially, the payment of hospitals was essentially based on 
fixed rates per patient-day. This stimulated hospitals to fill their beds, but not to 
produce high quality care. In 1998 the payment method was changed to ²prospective² 
payment. Currently, inpatient care delivered by hospitals is paid for by the HIF on a 
case-by-case. At the beginning of the year, the Hospital and the Health Insurance 
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Office agree on an annual number of admissions based on number of beds and 
determined amount of money which will have to be paid for the year. Payments have 
to be made prospectively every month. This case payment method does not depend 
on the relative complexity of cases. As stated above, it is dependent only on the type of 
hospital. In 1998, a co-payment for inpatient services was introduced. The co-payment 
is 10% of the case payment irrespective of the hospital type. In 2003 a different 
percentage was applied according to the referral level of the hospital, and the co-
payment now ranges from 5 to15%. At the primary level of inpatient care, the patient 
pays 5% of the case payment, at the secondary level 10%, and at tertiary level, 15%. 
However, the co-payment has not solved the problem of excess in-patent admissions. 
Outpatient service payment 
Initially, outpatient services at secondary and the tertiary hospitals paid for 25% of 
total visits according to a fixed amount per visit, which caused an increase in the 
number of outpatient visits. Since January, 2004 outpatient services at the secondary-
and tertiary level hospitals are paid per visit according to a fixed amount, but should 
not be exceed 10-15% of inpatient care expenditure depending on referral levels. The 
limitation of the 10 – 15 percentage is calculated based on the expenditure share of 
outpatient facilities to hospital expenditure.  
Payment of primary health care by Family General Practitioners (FGP)  
Until January, 2003 FGPs were financed from the state budget according to a per 
capita basis, according to age groups and poverty percentages in each group. In 
other words, 10 population groups with different per capita rates were identified. 
According to the amendments to the Citizen’s Health Insurance Law, from 1 
January, 2004, financing of FGPs is partly (40% from state budget, 60% from the HIF) 
transferred to the scheme, but the payment method has not been changed. Due to 
the lack of regulatory mechanisms and difficulties in registration and identification 
of the 10 population groups, the different per capita rates were in fact not used. In 
October 2003, regulatory documents were developed by the HISC and approved by 
the NSIC and related ministries. According to the document, the number of 
population groups was decreased from 10 to 2 (just poor and non poor).  The per 
capita rate is increased and differentiated for the poor and non-poor population 
groups according to health needs, and introduces fixed poverty percentages 
differentiated according to the location (the percentage is higher in gher (suburban) 
areas with a high percentage of poor households). In other words, to fulfil the 
government’s Poverty Reduction Strategy, financial resources (budget, HIF) for PHC 
services are targeted to the poorest vulnerable population groups. 
 Capitation payments are made automatically to providers (FGPs), on the basis 
of the number of insured population registered with each FGP. The amount is
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determined on a yearly basis, and paid to providers prospectively by monthly 
instalments.  
Payment of pharmacies 
Insured persons can get most drugs on the Essential Drug List partly funded (50-
70%) by HIF, if prescribed by FGPs. For this purpose, a prescription stating the 
insurance certificate number and the doctor’s code has to be presented to accredited 
and defined pharmacies. The pharmacy sends the list of prescriptions dispensed to 
the insured to SSIGO for control and reimbursement. This involves a lot of 
administrative work, without direct profit to the pharmacist. There also are 
complaints about late payments by the health insurance office to pharmacists. 
Therefore, pharmacists show little enthusiasm for the sale of essential drugs.  
4.  Voluntary Health Insurance Schemes 
There are two main types of voluntary prepayment schemes in Mongolia: private 
health insurance and the Revolving Drug Fund. Private health insurance plays a 
limited role and will be described in the section below. 
The Community and Health Project (CHP) was started in 1994 by the MoH in 
cooperation with UNICEF and supported by a grant from the Nippon Foundation. 
The project aimed to address the problem of the lack of essential drugs in rural areas 
(soums) by establishing the Revolving Drugs Fund (RDF). Initially, the project was 
piloted in six aimags, with two soums in each aimag. The project coverage expanded 
further so that by 2003, the project covered 221 soums in 13 aimags to sustain PHC 
services through the active participation of the community.  
The project was established by combining seed drug capital from donors 
through UNICEF and community contributions in cash or in kind at the start of the 
project. As the community participation was voluntary, the amount and type of 
contribution were not defined.  
The RDF capital therefore consists of both donor funds and community 
contributions. At the soum level the RDF is managed by a pharmacist and assistant 
or dispenser hired by the soum Governor. The project itself is managed by the 
CHP/RDF committee typically composed of the soum Governor, pharmacist, the 
soum hospital chief, an accountant from the soum Governor’s office, and a 
community representative. There is also a supervisory committee composed of three 
members headed by the head of the local parliament.  
The CHP/RDF purchases drugs from qualified suppliers and sells drugs to 
outpatient consumers and to the hospital. It manages the drug funds and allocates 
 244 Social Health Insurance 
profits from the sale of such funds to pay for operating costs and other expenditures 
related to health of community, such as funds for hospital facilities or the repair of 
such facilities or occasional community health activities. The operation of RDFs is 
not linked in any way to the health insurance system.  
5.  Social Security Programmes  
With the passage of the Citizen’s Health Insurance Law in 1993, a package of Social 
Insurance Laws in 1994 and the Social Welfare Law in 1995, a new process was 
started to establish a completely new social security system in Mongolia. These laws 
created two parallel sets of social security programmes. One set operates on the 
principle of social insurance, under which benefits are financed by contributions of 
employers and employees and are available only to persons who have previously 
made contributions. The other set consists of social assistance programmes that are 
financed from the state budget and provide benefits to persons with the greatest 
social needs.  
Social insurance: covers five major programmes:  
¦ Pension (old- age) Insurance,  
¦ Employment Injury and Occupational Disease Insurance, 
¦ Unemployment Insurance, 
¦ Benefit Insurance (cash sickness and maternity benefits and funeral 
grants), 
¦ Health Insurance. 
Social insurance funds, with the exception of the Pension Fund, operate on the 
basis of the pay-as-you-go principle.  
Pension insurance is the largest of the programmes. It provides monthly cash 
benefits to insured workers who have retired or become disabled and to the 
survivors of insured workers who have died.  
Employment injury and occupational disease insurance provides cash 
benefits and covers rehabilitation expenses for work-related injury or diseases.  
Sickness benefits and maternity benefits (short -term benefits). Workers must 
have contributed for 3 months to be eligible for cash sickness benefits and for 12 
months to be eligible for maternity benefits. Benefit amounts depend on the 
worker’s earnings level and, for sickness benefits, on the total number of years that 
the worker has contributed to the system.  
 245 Selected Case Studies from Asia and the Pacific 
Unemployment insurance benefits are available to workers who have 
contributed for at least 2 years in total and for the 9 months prior to becoming 
unemployed.  
Social welfare: The social welfare scheme offers in-kind services and cash 
benefits to the most vulnerable population groups. These services and benefits 
include: 
¦ In-kind services including residential facilities for the elderly, disabled 
people as well as services for the poor, homeless people such as feeding 
and bathing; 
¦ Discounts to the elderly, disabled and other groups to reduce the costs of 
housing, health care, wheelchairs, and hearing aids. There are 9 types of 
discounts and services provided for the elderly. Some of them are related 
to the health care costs. For example, subsidized prices for care in a 
sanatorium and transport for the elderly, honored people, war veterans, 
and those elderly with incomes below the minimum living standard; 
lump-sum benefit for prosthesis for elderly people; transport cost for 
treatment in Ulaanbaatar (the capital city) for those elderly living 1,000 
km or more away. 
¦ Monetary benefits from the Social Assistance Fund, including short-term 
benefits for pregnancy and delivery, child care, multi-children families, 
support for adopting orphans and infant care, benefits for twins or 
triplets, funeral grants for the elderly single persons, and long term 
pensions for those not eligible for the social insurance pensions. 
Residential care in the social welfare system is provided by the national and 
local nursing homes. National and local nursing homes administer the resources 
allocated for nursing care directly from the state and local budget, provide shelter, 
food, clothes and medicine to the residents, and carry out activities involved in care, 
treatment and rehabilitation.  
6.  Private Commercial Health Insurance 
Private health insurance is another alternative for people who can afford to pay the 
premiums and would like to get health security or supplementary insurance for 
benefits which are not covered by the social health insurance system. 
According to the Citizen’s Health Insurance Law, health insurance in Mongolia 
has compulsory and voluntary forms. The compulsory health insurance is provided 
only by the SSIGO, while the voluntary and reinsurance activities can be provided 
by insurance organizations with all types of ownership. 
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Since 2000, there are several private commercial insurance companies 
operating in Mongolia. The health insurance business in Mongolia is comparatively 
new and there are few companies acting in the field. The main companies are: MDC, 
Ard daatgal, Nomin daatgal, and Erel daatgal.  
Erel daatgal: On a voluntary basis, citizens can be insured against all types of 
health risks. Coverage is individual, and the health of the insured person has to be 
assessed. The minimum amount of health value has to be not less than minimum 
wage level multiplied by six (40 000 tugreks x 6 = 240 000). The premium amount 
has to be calculated individually according to the calculation formula. For example: 
4% x 240 000 tugreks (health value) means a premium of 9600. tugreks. The 
calculation percentages range from 4 to 6, and depend on where the insured person 
works and the relative risks in that employment, while the amount of health value is 
based on the agreement between the insurance company and the individual insurer. 
The amount of health value cannot be less than 240 000 tugreks. Contributions are 
made once per year. In case of illness and injury, an insured person receives a cash 
reimbursement, which is calculated according to a defined formula.  
Nomin daatgal: This voluntary private health insurance covers benefits 
excluded from the Social Health Insurance scheme (including treatment abroad), but 
only in case of acute diseases. Coverage is individual. Annual premiums range from 
US$ 4000 to US$ 12000 and provide 50% to 100% reimbursement of treatment costs, 
depending on the premium amount.  
Other private insurance companies mainly provide cash reimbursement in case 
of acute illness and injury.  
7.  Critical Analysis of Health Care Financing  
Through Prepayment  
The following points summarize the current system: 
The top priority of the health insurance programme is to achieve and maintain 
universal coverage for all citizens. Due to the strong start in enrolling nearly the 
entire population, this goal is achievable within the current programme structure. In 
addition, according to the last amendment to the Citizen’s Health Insurance Law, 
there is compulsory enrolment for all population groups in Mongolia. Although 
health insurance coverage is compulsory; the percentage of real coverage of the 
population is going down. The data in Table 16 show that HIF coverage has 
decreased from 95.4% to 77.6%. In addition, there are many problems in registration 
and information systems. The reduction in coverage and weak registration and 
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information systems cause serious problems in the financing of PHC providers, 
especially the FGPs.   
There are no official statistics at all for the comparison of health status among 
insured and non-insured separately. According to a survey (K.Tungalag, 2000) 
around 65% of the uninsured were poor people. Diseases are not equally distributed 
among different population categories (poor, non-poor). The self-reported 
prevalence rates of all chronic diseases among the population are 1112.6 per 10000 
population. The most frequently reported diseases are noncommunicable chronic 
conditions: 998.0 per 10000 population, and the lowest rate is reported among very 
poor individuals (603.1) while the highest is among the non-poor upper income 
individuals (1566.3). The next most frequently reported chronic diseases are 
tuberculosis (30.5); epilepsy (26.6), and malnutrition (11.2). Among the poor, the self-
reported prevalence of tuberculosis (43.7), malnutrition (39.3), and epilepsy (56.8) 
are much higher than the average for all population groups.  
Table 16. Health expenditure and health care financing in 1990-2002 
Health expenditure by contribution (%) 
Health 
expenditure 
share Years 
Government 
contribution 
HIF 
contribution 
Other 
contribution 
in % of 
total  
budget 
In% 
of 
GDP 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
53.6 
53.1 
58.6 
59.8 
47.0 
54.6 
64.3 
67.6 
64.1 
-  
-  
-  
-  
41.5 
44.2 
37.8 
30.9 
42.3 
31.8 
28.7 
26.0 
28.5 
-  
-  
-  
-  
4.9 
2.7 
3.5 
4.4 
3.0 
3.8 
7.1 
6.4 
7.4 
9.3 
12.0 
15.0 
10.9 
11.6 
11.3 
12.3 
8.9 
10.9 
9.8 
10.7 
10.8 
10.7 
5.4 
5.7 
3.9 
4.1 
4.1 
3.9 
4.4 
3.5 
3.6 
3.9 
4.4 
4.4 
4.7 
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Ideally, the health financing system has to reinforce the health policies of the 
government. Within the health insurance system, the payment mechanisms should 
also be designed to provide economic incentives and disincentives for hospitals and 
doctors to respond to national priorities for the health sector.  
The current payment mechanism is a flat rate paid per case of hospital care. It 
provides an incentive for increased hospital admissions. That is, the amount actually 
paid for services is determined by the rate multiplied by the number of admissions. 
These systems have an incentive for providers to increase the number of admissions 
in order to increase revenues (see Table 17 below). 
Table 17. Coverage structure by population groups (% to total population) 
Population groups 1998 2000 2002 2003 
Subsidized groups 54.1 54.2 54.2 51.8 
Workers 20.6 16.0 13.8 12.4 
Others 20.8 14.8 12.7 13.4 
Total coverage 95.4 85.0 80.7 77.6 
Not covered 4.6 15.0 19.3 22.4 
Total population 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
The most important and the most difficult part of any health care financing 
schemes relates to the quality assurance programme. The scheme provides for a 
certain number of programmes to assure the quality of care, by licensing and 
accreditation systems under the Health Law, and by medical inspection under the 
Citizen’s Health Insurance Law. However, these programmes are newly established, 
and need better regulations and management. Since 2000, hospitals are obliged to 
establish their own quality assurance committees. The contracts between the 
Insurance Office and health care providers also contain some quality of care 
indicators. But all these measures are not enough. In order to better control the 
quality of services, it is considered that a purchasing focal point should be 
established in the scheme. 
In order to follow the government poverty reduction strategy and assure 
equity in access to PHC, provider payment mechanism of FGPs on a risk (poverty) 
adjusted capitation basis was introduced. The payment of PHC services is designed 
to allocate financial resources where there are more poor people or people in need.  
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The main goal of the scheme is to protect the vulnerable population groups 
and provide equity in access to basic health services. Contributions of people who 
are unable to pay (vulnerable groups) are paid directly by the government; any 
introduction of co-payments has been avoided for vulnerable groups. There is a high 
rate of social admissions to hospital, especially in winter time. 
In spite of these conditions, equity in access to inpatient services has not been 
achieved. According to a survey (K.Tungalag, 2000) poor people use the service less 
than rich people. For example, the utilization rate of tertiary services by the poor 
was 2.5 times lower than for rich people. The main factors influencing the use of 
these services were co-payments and informal payments.  
Co-payments were introduced in order to influence patients' behaviour 
regarding hospital admissions. In consideration of equity, children and retired 
(vulnerable groups) persons were exempt from paying co-payments. However, for 
the other population groups with low incomes, co-payments served as a restricting 
mechanism.  
The utilization of hospitals by level is shown in Table 18 below. 
Table 18. Number of admissions and the referral structure 
Referral level 2000 2001 2003 
Tertiary hospitals 57 777 61 527 64 942 
Secondary level hospitals 
(aimag, district) 
15 1341 1 48 832 1 51 17
5 
Primary level hospitals 
(Soum) 
8 7961 1 19 321 1 35 
000 
Private hospitals 20419 27560 37815 
Others 16943 48435 1861 
Total 334441 405745 390793 
Success factors 
The key factors associated with success are the following: 
¦ The feasibility of collecting contributions easily from a large part (almost 
80%) of the entire population; 
¦ High percentages of fully subsidized groups; 
¦ Comparatively low administration cost (2% of the fund);  
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¦ Comparatively good health care infrastructure, and  
¦ An appropriate payment mechanism for PHC providers (FGPs). 
Failure factors 
Several factors associated with failure may be summarized. 
¦ Decline in coverage: Due to weak management, the proportion of 
Mongolians covered by the scheme declined from 95.4% in 1998 to 77.6% 
in 2003. The influencing factors were government policy to reduce 
subsidized groups in premium payment, and changes in the market work 
force structure. Since 1995, the government has reduced state 
responsibility for premiums for some vulnerable groups, and herders and 
students have been excluded from the government subsidy. Other 
reasons for the decline in coverage are the growing size of the informal 
sector and increasing unemployment. The sizes of the informal sector and 
unemployment rates have not decreased over the last 10 to 15 years.  
¦ Lack of a purchasing focal point: The success of operation of a separate 
insurance fund critically depends on rapid development of its purchasing 
focal point. Since the creation of the scheme, in practice there has been no 
purchasing focal point. The functions were managed by the HIF through 
allocations to aimags and provider payment mechanisms.  
¦ Management defects: The scheme has been characterized by an 
inappropriate management structure and management and planning 
capacity of Health Insurance Department of SSIGO. The registration and 
information system to support better management are still weak, and the 
scheme's staff lack technical expertise and practical experience.  
¦ Inappropriate payment mechanism, which causes inefficiencies and 
waste.  
Considering the failure factors noted above, improvement will be needed in 
the future in the organization and management of the scheme. It will also be 
necessary to strengthen the real purchasing function, modernize the provider 
payment mechanism and  increase population coverage.  
8.  Conclusion  
In summary, despite the many problems that the Mongolian social health insurance 
scheme faces at present, it is important to recognize its achievements. It has achieved 
a relatively high coverage, and has reached a situation in which it has contributed 
nearly one third of the financing for the health sector during the last 10 years. HIF is 
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one of the main financial sources for the health sector of Mongolia, and plays an 
important role in achieving the country’s socioeconomic goals, especially those in 
the poverty reduction strategy.  
One of the major achievements of the scheme is coverage of PHC and 
outpatient services. The PHC programme under the scheme is especially designed to 
protect poor population groups and improve equity in access to basic health 
services.  
In order to secure better protection of poor people and improve equity in 
access to the secondary and tertiary levels of health care, there is a need to choose 
appropriate provider payment mechanism of both out and inpatient services. The 
current co-payment policy should also be reconsidered, as it unfairly penalizes low 
income people and the sick.  
One of the attractive features of the scheme is universal population coverage. 
However, due to weak management, and lack of sensitivity to the changing 
workforce structure, the trend has been towards a reduction in coverage, which 
threatens the financial sustainability of PHC.  
A Health insurance scheme needs strong management. It needs to have a 
strong organization, with clear competence over the financial revenue and 
expenditure aspects, as well as a purchasing function which allows improvement in 
the quality of services.  
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The Philippines 
Alejandro N. Herrin 
1.  Background 
The long-run performance of the Philippine economy is characterized by slow and 
uneven economic growth compared to countries in the South-East and East Asian 
regions. Analysis shows that such relatively poor performance was due to the 
combined effect of policies associated with less openness to trade, a lower 
government saving rate, and weaker institutional quality (Sachs, et al 1998).  
Philippines experienced a severe economic crisis in the mid-1980s from which 
it still has to be completely recovered. The current per capita GDP is still lower than 
the per capita GDP in 1981.Poverty rates remained high at 35% of all families in 
2000. Whatever declines there have been since 1988 occurred only in urban areas. 
Rural poverty remained at 46% from 1988 to 2000.  
Coupled with the slow economic growth is the slow structural transformation 
of the economy. The proportion of labour force in industry has remained stagnant at 
around 10% since the 1970s. The decline in the share of labour force in agriculture 
was absorbed in the services sector, often in unskilled and low paying categories, 
e.g. personal services.  
In the meantime the population continued to grow rapidly compared to other 
countries in the Region. The growth rate remained at around 2.3% in the 1980s and 
1990s. South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia, which like Philippines had high 
growth rates in the 1960s and 1970s, succeeded in reducing their rates to 0.9%, 1.0%, 
and 1.3% respectively in the 1990s (UNESCAP 2000). The 2000 census counted 76.5 
million people, more than double the number in 1970. In 2004, the population is 
estimated at 83 million. 
The slow economic growth, high poverty rates and continued rapid population 
growth affected progress in several human development indicators. Fertility and 
infant and child mortality remained high compared to neighbouring countries. 
Differentials in health outcomes (infant and child morality and fertility) and health 
care utilization (contraceptive use and maternal care) remain wide. For example, 
data from the 1998 National Demographic and Health Survey revealed that infant 
and child mortality among the poorest asset quintile were more than twice the level 
of the richest quintile.  
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The poorest quintile had a fertility rate of 6.5 children per woman compared to 
only 2.1 children per woman for the richest group. The poorest group had less access 
to trained medical personnel than the richest group in terms of maternal care 
(prenatal and delivery attendance). Because of high fertility and less access to 
maternal care, the maternal mortality rate is much higher in Philippines (170) 
compared to the countries in the Region with the exception of Indonesia. Thailand’s 
maternal mortality ratio is 44, for South Korea it is 20, while that for Singapore is 6.  
Slow economic growth and high poverty rates constrain expenditures by the 
government and households on needed health care. The slow structural 
transformation of the economy makes it harder to expand coverage of social 
insurance schemes beyond the formal employed sector. The continued rapid 
population growth makes progress in improving health and other human 
development indicators more difficult. While rapid economic progress and slower 
population growth will provide the foundations for sustained improvements in 
health and other human development indicators, there is a need to adopt 
innovations in resource mobilization and allocation in the social sectors that will 
maximize the impact of limited resources.  
2.  Development of Compulsory and Voluntary  
Health Insurance 
The different ways in which health care expenditures are financed are reflected 
in the National Health Accounts. By 2001, 38% of total health spending was financed 
by national and local government through tax revenues while household out-of 
pocket payments financed 43% of total expenditures. These might be considered the 
traditional source of expenditures. Over the years, however, other sources of 
financing were developed to help ensure that the growing population would have 
financial access to needed health care services from both public and private sectors.* 
To help the population have financial access to higher quality health care, 
Philippines launched in 1969 a compulsory health insurance scheme known as the 
Medicare Programme. The Programme was implemented in 1972 after the creation 
of the Philippine Medicare Commission, which oversaw the health insurance 
scheme. The scheme was designed to start with the employed sector, but was aimed 
to eventually achieve universal coverage. Insurance benefits were limited only to 
                                                   
* The Philippine health care system is characterized by a large private sector (compared to some countries in 
the Region). About half of total hospital beds in the country are private. There are numerous private 
physicians’ offices and diagnostic centres especially in urban areas. In the rural areas, private practitioners 
include traditional births attendants and traditional healers. In the private sector, patients have to pay for 
their care. 
 255 Selected Case Studies from Asia and the Pacific 
inpatient care. The premium was equally shared by both employee and employer 
equal to 2.5% of the employees’ salary base.  
The Programme was implemented (premium collection and benefit 
reimbursement) by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for 
government employees and by the Social Security System (SSS) for private 
employees. In 1975, both GSIS and SSS also implemented the Employees’ 
Compensation (EC) programme, which is designed to provide public and private 
sector employees and their dependents with income and other benefits in the event 
of a work-connected injury, sickness, disability or death. The benefits come in the 
form of cash in the case of disability or death, medical and related services for injury 
and sickness, and rehabilitation services in case of permanent disability. 
Data from the 1991-1994 National Health Accounts show health insurance 
(both Medicare and the health component of EC programme remained a small 
contributor to total health care financing in spite of twenty years in existence. This 
finding spurred the Department of Health and Congress to consider a new 
legislation designed to expand the role of social health insurance in making health 
care affordable to the people. 
In 1995, Congress passed the National Health Insurance Act (Republic Act 
7875), which instituted a National health Insurance Programme (NHIP) and 
established the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth) to administer 
the Programme. PhilHealth also assumed the responsibility of administering the 
former Medicare programme for government employees managed by the 
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and private sector employees 
managed by the Social Security System (SSS). The NHIP aims to achieve universal 
coverage by 2010.  
In addition to social health insurance, coverage is also provided by a number 
of private insurance companies providing health benefits. In 2000, there were 156 
private insurance companies authorized by the Insurance Commission to transact 
business in the country: 114 non-life and 42 life insurance companies. The indemnity 
health industry is growing very slowly in terms of people covered as well as in share 
in total health care financing. The 1990s saw the emergence of HMOs in Philippines.  
These are mainly investor-based HMOs directed at the employed sector and 
are profit-oriented. The HMO benefit package commonly offers preventive health 
care, inpatient and outpatient services, and emergency care. The fee charged for 
membership depends on the degree of actuarial risk, the type of room, the frequency 
of payment, the number of persons covered, and the supplemental benefits 
(Gamboa, et al. 1994). At present there are about 21 investor-based HMOs listed as 
operating in Philippines (www.Rxpinoy.com). The HMOs’share in health care 
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financing rose from 1.3% in 1992 to 5.7% in 2001. In contrast, private health 
insurance share declined from 2.8% in 1992 to 1.3% in 2001. 
Another source of financing for health care are the private employers who 
provide health benefits voluntarily or as required by law or collective bargaining 
agreements. Apart from NHIP (and formerly Medicare) and EC, the Labour Code 
prescribes a minimum set of medical, dental, and occupational safety obligations for 
employers. The requirements vary, depending on the hazards in the work place and 
on the number of workers employed.  
At the lower end of the scale, the Labour Code requires that first-aid treatment 
must be available within the premises. Larger companies on the other hand must 
provide a company clinic with a full-time doctor, nurse, and dentist. Collective 
bargaining agreements (CBA) also specify the medical benefits that companies must 
provide their employees and the employees’ dependents. The estimate of the share 
of employer-based plans and private enterprise expenditures based on Labour Code 
requirements expenditures was placed at around 5% of total health care 
expenditures from 1992 to 2001. 
Another form of health financing is community-level health insurance. There 
are many community-level health insurance initiatives at the grass-roots level. 
However, estimates of their contribution to total health care financing is not known, 
partly because of the difficulty in obtaining systematic and standard financial 
information from these institutions. 
In sum, by 2001 as revealed by the 2001 NHA, these other financing 
mechanisms, namely social health insurance, private insurance and HMOs, 
employer-based and enterprise-provided health benefits, contributed 19.7% of total 
spending. Social health insurance contributed 7.8% in 2001, up from 6.0% in 1992. 
HMOs and private insurance contributed 7.0% in 2001, up from 4.1% in 1992, mainly 
on account of the growth of HMOs. The remainder was contributed by private 
enterprises either voluntarily for their employees or as required by the Labour Code. 
3.  Compulsory Health Insurance  
Medicare Programme 
The Medicare programme is a compulsory health insurance scheme established by 
Republic Act 6111 in August 1969 and implemented on 1 January, 1972, with the 
creation of the Philippine Medical Care Commission (PMCC). The PMCC, as a 
government agency, is supervised administratively by the DoH. 
Medicare was implemented in two stages. Programme I, which initially 
covered only public and private sector employees and their dependents, now 
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includes retirees and the self-employed. Programme II was intended for the informal 
sector but its implementation has been set back by financial and administrative 
difficulties. PMCC formulates policies and coordinates the implementation of 
Programme I. The SSS serves the needs of private sector employees, while the GSIS 
attends to state employees. 
By 1990, Medicare covered 23.5 million Filipinos (38% of the total population). 
About 16.8 million were under SSS and 6.7 million under GSIS. Medicare provided 
only inpatient benefits. The employee and employer share equally in the premium 
contribution to Medicare, at 2.5% of the salary base credit. Medicare support values 
or the portion of hospitalization expenses paid for by Medicare have fallen short of 
the targeted 70%. Between 1970 and 1989, they averaged from 32% to a peak of 49% 
in 1989.  This decline in support value is believed to be partly responsible for the 
spurt of HMOs (to be discussed later in this report) as employers attempt to provide 
health benefits to workers to supplement existing Medicare coverage (Gamboa, et al. 
1994)  
National Health Insurance Programme 
In 1995, Congress passed the National Health Insurance Act (Republic Act 7875), 
which instituted a National health Insurance Programme (NHIP) and established 
the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth) to administer the 
Programme. PhilHealth assumed the responsibility of administering the former 
Medicare programme for government and private sector employees, with the 
programme’s transfer from the Government Service Insurance System (Oct. 1997) 
and Social Security System (April 1998).  
Coverage 
The NHIP covers the following: 
¦ Employed members - all those employed in the government and private 
sector; 
¦ Individually paying members - self-employed, Overseas Filipino 
Workers, professionals in private practice (doctors, lawyers, dentists, 
etc.); 
¦ Non-paying members - members entitled to lifetime coverage that 
include retiree and pensioners of the GSIS and SSS prior to the 
implementation of the NHI Act of 1995, and those who have reached the 
age of retirement and have paid at least 120 monthly contributions, and  
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¦ Indigent members – members classified as indigent under the NHIP who 
are entitled to subsidized premium. Target members of the Programme 
are those belonging to the lowest 25% of the population.  
Also covered under the NHIP without additional premium are the legitimate 
spouse of the member who himself/herself is not a member in any of the above 
categories, and the children (legitimate, illegitimate, adopted and step-child) below 
21 years old, unmarried and unemployed. 
In 2002, some 8.71 million members or approximately 43.56 million 
beneficiaries were covered by the National Health Insurance Programme (NHIP). 
This figure is about 53% of the entire population. Of the 43.56 million beneficiaries, 
45% or 19.57 million come from the private sector, 23% or 10.19 million from the 
government sector and 16% or 6.75 million are individually-paying members.  
Some 14% or 6.30 million are enrolled under the Sponsored (formerly indigent) 
Programme and close to 2% or 730495 are retirees or non-paying members. By July 
2003, the sponsored programme membership rose to 1493212 families or 7466060 
beneficiaries were covered under the programme.  
Benefits  
Effective December 1999, PhilHealth has a unified benefit package for all members. 
This package of benefits with the corresponding ceiling in pesos according to hospital 
category is shown in Table 19.* It should be noted, however, that providers are 
                                                   
* A single period of confinement refers to a series of confinements / procedures for the same illness with the 
interval between such confinements not exceeding 90 calendar days within the calendar year. A member shall 
only be entitled for the remainder of the benefit ceilings set by the Corporation for that period for drugs and 
medicines, X-rays, labouratories, and others. 
The following types of illnesses are distinguished: catastrophic, intensive and ordinary. Catastrophic illness 
refers to (a) illnesses or injuries such as but not limited to cancer cases with metastasis and/or requiring 
chemotherapy or radiation therapy, meningitis, encephalitis, cirrhosis of the liver (childs C), myocardial 
infarction, cerebrovascular attack, rheumatic heart disease grade III, renal failure, other conditions requiring 
dialysis or transplant, other conditions with massive haemorrhage, shock of any cause; and (b) surgical 
procedure or multiple surgical procedures done in one sitting with a total Relative Unit Value of 20 and above 
such as but not limited to coronary angioplasty, coronary bypass, open heart surgery, or neurosurgery. 
Intensive illness/procedure refers to (a) all confinements requiring services in an intensive care unit such as 
respiratory and monitoring support, cardiac/haemodynamic monitoring and maintenance; (b) other similar 
serious illnesses or injuries such as but not limited to cancer, pneumonia, moderately or far advanced 
pulmonary tuberculosis including its complications, cardiovascular attack, disease of the heart, chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease, liver disease, typhoid fever, fever grade III, H-fever, kidney disease, 
septicemia, diarrhoea with severe dehydration, hepatitis B, dengue haemorrhagic, or severe injuries; and (c) 
surgical procedure or multiple surgical procedures done in one sitting with a total Relative Unit Value of 8 but 
not exceeding 19.99. Ordinary illness – refers to illnesses or injuries other than those included in the above 
enumeration. (PhilHealth, 2000: Revised Implementing Rules and Regulation, July 2000). 
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allowed to bill the patients for cost above the benefit ceilings. The support value 
defined as the amount per cent of total cost of confinement that is reimbursed by 
health insurance typically declines as the cost of health care goes up.  
For the Sponsored Programme, in addition to the above benefits (called 
Phase I), PhilHealth introduced additional benefits (Phase II), which entitled 
members with the following services from accredited Rural Health Units or Health 
Centres: free primary consultation with the physician; and free labouratory 
examinations for complete blood count, chest X-ray, stool exam urinalysis and 
sputum microscopy for TB suspects.  
Recently, new health care packages were also introduced. This included 
PhilHealth benefits up to the second normal delivery and tuberculosis treatment 
using the Directly Observed Treatment Short Course (DOTS). During the SARS scare 
in 2003, PhilHealth designed a package worth P100000 for health care workers who 
might contract the disease, while entitling members and their dependents to a 
similar package worth P50000. Renal dialysis in free-standing clinics can also be 
reimbursed now.  
Table 19. United Benefits for all Members and Dependents under the  
National Health Insurance Programme 
Hospital Category  
Primary Secondary Tertiary 
Room and Board 
Not exceeding 45 days for each 
member & another 45 days to be 
shared by his dependents 
 
 
200 
 
 
300 
 
 
400 
Drugs And Medicines 
Per single period of confinement 
a) Ordinary 
b) Intensive 
c) Catastrophic 
 
 
 
350 
700 
0 
 
 
 
850 
2,000 
4,000 
 
 
 
1,700 
4,000 
14,000 
X-Ray, Lab, etc. 
For single period of confinement 
a) Ordinary 
b) Intensive 
c) Catastrophic 
 
 
 
350 
700 
0 
 
 
 
850 
2,000 
4,000 
 
 
 
1,700 
4,000 
14,000 
Professional Fees 
For single period of confinement shall 
not exceed: 
 
 P 150/day for General Practitioner 
 P 250/day for Specialist 
a. Ordinary 
 General Practitioner 
 Specialist 
 
600 
1,500 
 
600 
1,000 
 
600 
1.000 
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Hospital Category  
Primary Secondary Tertiary 
b. Intensive 
 General Practitioner 
 Specialist 
 
900 
1,500 
 
900 
1,500 
 
900 
1,500 
c. Catastrophic 
 General Practitioner 
 Specialist 
 
900 
1,500 
 
900 
1,500 
 
900 
2,500 
Others 
Operating Room 
a. RVU of 30 and below 
b. RVU of 31 to 80 
c. RVU of 81 and above 
 
 
385 
0 
0 
 
670 
1,140 
2,160 
 
1,060 
1,350 
3,490 
Surgeon Maximum of 16,000 
Anesthesiologist Maximum of 5,000 
Compensable Outpatient Services: Chemotherapy, Radiotherapy, Cataract Extraction, Hemodialysis, 
Minor surgical procedures done in an operating room complex 
Surgical Family Planning 
Vasectomy  900 900 900 
Tubal Ligation  1,125 1,125 1,125 
Source: PhilHealth 
Premium Contribution 
Employed Sector 
Effective 1 January, 2004, the minimum Salary Base (SB) was revised from Php 3000 
to Php 4000 and the maximum SB was revised from Php 10000 to Php 15000. The 
contribution schedule is now as follows: 
Table 20: Contribution Structure in the Employed Sector 
Monthly 
Salary 
Bracket 
Monthly 
Salary Range 
Salary 
Base (SB) 
Total Monthly 
Contributions 
Personal Share  
(PS=SBx1.25%) 
Employer 
Share 
(ES=PS) 
1 4999.99  
and Below 
 4000.00 100.00 50.00 50.00 
2 5000.00  
to 5999.99 
 5000.00 125.00 62.50 62.50 
3 6000.00  
to 6999.99 
 6000.00 150.00 75.00 75.00 
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Monthly 
Salary 
Bracket 
Monthly 
Salary Range 
Salary 
Base (SB) 
Total Monthly 
Contributions 
Personal Share  
(PS=SBx1.25%) 
Employer 
Share 
(ES=PS) 
4 7000.00  
to 7999.99 
 7000.00 175.00 87.50 87.50 
5 8000.00  
to 8999.99 
 8000.00 200.00 100.00 100.00 
6 9000.00  
to 9999.99 
 9000.00 225.00 112.50 112.50 
7 10000.00  
to 10999.99 
10000.00 250.00 125.00 125.00 
8 11000.00  
to 11999.99 
11000.00 275.00 137.50 137.50 
9 12000.00  
to 12,999.99 
12000.00 300.00 150.00 150.00 
10 13000.00 
 to 13999.99 
13000.00 325.00 162.50 162.50 
11 14000.00  
to 14999.99 
14000.00 350.00 175.00 175.00 
12 15000.00 
and up 
15000.00 375.00 187.50 187.50 
Source: PhilHealth 
Individually Paying Programme (IPP) 
Premium contribution for the IPP including all existing self-employed, voluntary, 
and overseas worker members of SSS is fixed at Php100 per month. This can be paid 
on a quarterly, semi-annual or annual basis. According to PhilHealth, the premium 
contribution is fixed generally because there is no regular monthly compensation for 
which to base the contribution upon. Furthermore, the IPP is made under a 
voluntary scheme and majority of the target clientele of the programme falls under 
the less privileged sectors. 
Sponsored Programme 
The LGU and National Government through PhilHealth share the premium 
payments for the indigents to be enrolled. Other government agencies and officials 
as well as private entities may also participate in the Programme by paying the LGU 
premium counterpart. Donations to the Programme are fully deductible from 
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taxable income. The discounted premium is Php 1200, which entitles the indigent 
household one year of coverage. The premium is discounted in accordance with the 
income classification of the Local Government Unit where the indigent enrollees 
reside. The premium discount is then paid for by the National Government. The 
table below presents the schedule of premium contributions to the sponsored 
programme*. 
Table 21. Schedule of LGU Premium Contributions 
LGU Income 
Classification Year 
% 
Discount
* 
% 
Premium 
Payment 
Annual  
Premium 
Monthly 
Premium 
Per 
Capita*
* 
1st to 3rd  1st onward 50% 50% P 594.00 P 49.50 P 9.90 
4th to 6th  1st and 2nd 90% 10% P 118.80 P 9.90 P 1.98 
3rd 80% 20% P 237.60 P 19.80 P 3.96 
4th 70% 30% P 356.40 P 29.70 P 5.94 
5th 60% 40% P 475.20 P 39.60 P 7.92 
 
6th onward 50% 50% P 594.00 P 9.50 P 9.90 
* Paid by the National Government 
** Monthly premium per person for an average family size of five members 
*** Reckoned from the date the Memorandum of Agreement with PhilHealth is signed  
Source: PhilHealth 
Health Care Providers 
As of May 2004, there are 1520 accredited health care facilities equivalent to nine out 
of 10 DOH-licensed hospitals. There are to date 16204 accredited health care 
professionals, 40% of which are concentrated in the NCR. PhilHealth also has 178 
RHUs compared to just 33 accredited RHUs in June 2001, making the Outpatient 
Diagnostic Package available to more indigent beneficiaries. 
3.  Voluntary Health Insurance Schemes 
Although information is incomplete and unsystematic, there exists a number of 
community-based health financing schemes designed to address problems related to 
inadequate or unaffordable services. These schemes take various forms, from single-
purpose programmes to multi-purpose programmes that address both health and 
other socioeconomic concerns of the community. The schemes involve direct 
provision of health care goods and services, the setting-up of health financing 
                                                   
* An amendment to the National Health Insurance Act is being discussed in Congress that would peg the share 
of LGU according to their income classification irrespective of how long they occupy such classification. 
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schemes, and activities that simply enhance or expand the capacity of the existing 
health care delivery system  
In the early 1990, many of these schemes were identified through innovative 
information gathering contests sponsored by the DoH and the German Agency for 
Technical Cooperation (GTZ) in 1990 and 1993 as part of the Health Management 
Information System (HAMIS) project.* Both contests promised cash awards and 
public recognition as incentives. Any public or private organization which 
participated in the planning, delivering and assessing of health care could enter 
including: self-help groups, city health offices, rural health units, private hospitals, 
government hospitals, HMOs, health insurance companies, local government, city 
councils, outreach projects, cooperatives, trade unions, community organizations, 
charitable foundations, neighbourhood associations, barangay associations and 
nongovernmental organizations. Contestants were judged on the basis of 
effectiveness (outcomes from delivery of health care), efficiency (better management 
of resources for health), and equity (improved access to health care for the poor) 
(Schwefel and Pons, 1993. In 1990, 102 projects joined the contest and 52 became 
HAMIS awardees. In 1993, 153 projects joined the contest and 68 became awardees.  
An analysis of the information that contestants provided about their objectives, 
organization and activities uncovered a number of interesting insights into the 
operation of these various schemes (Herrin et al.1996). First, unmet health care needs 
in a community were defined to result from under-provision or underutilization of 
health services. Under-provision occurs when there are not enough local health care 
providers in the community and transport to the nearest facilities is difficult. 
Underutilization may occur when sections of the community (i) cannot afford to pay 
for health care; (ii) do not know that health care is available (and affordable), and 
(iii) do not recognize health conditions that require medical attention. Numerous 
community health programmes and projects have been developed that attempt to 
address one or a combination of these problems. 
Secondly, the approaches used to overcome under-provision or 
underutilization were varied and can be classified into the following four: (i) Direct 
provision of personal and public health care services; (ii) Establishment of health 
insurance and other health financing schemes; (iii) Assistance to existing health 
providers and other programmes for the purpose of expanding, improving and 
sustaining service provision (e.g. training, construction of facilities); and 
(iv) information, education and communication (IEC) campaigns on health and 
health-related concerns. Examples of these initiatives are shown in Table 22 below. 
                                                   
* The description that follows is summarized from Herrin, et al. (1996). 
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Table 22. Examples of Community-based Initiatives in  
Health Care Delivery and Financing 
Causes of Unmet Health Care Needs 
Under-provision of health care Underutilization of Health Care 
Solution Due to geography 
or lack of 
transportation 
Due to general lack 
of providers 
Due to lack of 
financial 
resources 
Due to lack of 
knowledge and 
information 
Direct provision of 
health care 
services  
1.  Community-
based Primary 
Health Care 
Among Ethnic 
Communities 
2.  Mobile Surgery 
4.  Malaria 
Surveillance 
and Vector 
Control Project 
5.  Community 
Participation in 
the TB Control 
Programme 
9. Bukas Palad 
Health 
Programmes 
10.  Manufacture of 
Herbal 
Medicines 
14. Archdiocesan 
Nutrition 
Programme 
15 Health Care 
Opportunities 
for Prevention 
of Disease 
Establishment of 
insurance and 
other financing 
schemes for 
health 
  11. Two-Peso a 
Day Hospitali-
zation Plan 
12. Lucena 
Diabetic 
Patients 
Association 
13. Community 
Health 
Financing 
Project 
(Multipurpose 
Cooperative) 
 
Assistance to 
existing providers 
and other provider 
programmes for 
the expansion and 
improvement of 
service provision 
3. Rehabilitation of 
the Sta. Fe 
Rural Health 
Unit 
6. City Health 
Office Linkage 
with NGO, 
industrial 
organizations to 
augment 
personnel 
7. Federated 
Primary Health 
Care in Surigao 
8. Purok Health 
Databoard 
  
Pure IEC for 
health 
   16. ”Gabay sa 
Kalusugan" 
17.  Child-to-Child 
Health 
Education 
Programme 
18. Stop AIDS 
Campaign 
Source: Herrin et al. (1996) 
Of the various initiatives identified, close to 90% directly provided health care 
services; about 5% established some form of health insurance fund; about 50% 
undertook activities for the enhancement and improvement of service provision in 
existing facilities, and nearly 85% had IEC components 
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Thirdly, community health projects were implemented and managed by 
various types of institutions. Nearly 60% are being run by religious, civic and other 
non-governmental organizations including religious orders, local churches, 
cooperatives, people's organizations, professional and corporate associations and 
charitable foundations. Government and private hospitals, clinics and lying-in 
centres manage about 15 percent of projects; while RHUs and BHS centers manage 
another 12 percent. The remaining projects are being run by other local and national 
government agencies, schools and cooperatives. 
Finally, funding sources of projects varied to include: (i) foreign donors 
including USAID, UNICEF and GTZ; (ii) the Philippine government, both local and 
national; (iii) local donations in the form of cash, kind or labour from private 
individuals, industry, religious and civic organizations; (iv) fund-raising activities 
including benefit dances, bingo socials, cockfights, lotteries; (v) earnings from 
entrepreneurial activities such as cooperative stores, drugstores, manufacture and 
sale of various products; (vi) fees for services rendered (e.g. medical consultation 
fees, training fees); (vii) membership fees including insurance premiums; (viii) loans, 
and (ix) others including earnings from trust funds and other assets and funds left 
over from previous years' operations. Eighty percent of projects have two or more 
sources of funds. About 70% receive funds from local donations. Thirty to 35 percent 
use funds from government, membership fees and fund-raising activities. Twenty to 
25 per cent receive funds from entrepreneurial activities and foreign donors. Only 5 
to 10 percent use loans and funds collected as service fees. 
Unfortunately, there has been no systematic effort to follow up the activities of 
all of the HAMIS winners. Available information from informal sources suggests 
that some of them still do exist and are doing well such as the Federated Primary 
Health Care in Surigao, the Lucena Diabetic Patients Association. A national 
federation of HAMIS winners was formed in 1993 to serve as a link among the 
winners. Although the national network has not been active in recent years, the 
Luzon network has been active and has held annual conventions. It is also learned 
that there are plans by the leaders of the different networks to activate the national 
network.* 
More recently, DoH and PhilHealth with the support of GTZ through the 
Social Health Insurance Networking and Empowerment (SHINE) project has 
identified and worked closely with community-based initiatives (referred to as 
community-based health care organization (CBHCO). Of the 66 community-based 
health care schemes identified, 35 were recently surveyed to obtained more 
information (Flavier, et al. 2004). The study finds that these CBHCOs are located in 
both urban and rural areas. They perform varied roles including health care service 
                                                   
* Communication with Ms. Fe Remotique of GTZ, Philippine Office. 
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providers, administrative intermediaries with strong information, education, and 
communication activities, and health care financing.  
Benefit packages vary and are difficult to classify but in the case of health care 
financing schemes, they include outpatient and inpatient drugs, surgery, room and 
board, professional fees, diagnostics and labouratory, dental and cash benefits. They 
generally complement those offered by the NHIP. Contribution structures also vary 
(and are again difficult to classify) but typically much lower than PhilHealth 
premium (about 29% of PhilHealth’s annual premium). Membership varies from 
low to upper-middle-income groups that include both the formal and informal 
sectors. One problem about CBHCOs as a group is that the membership base is not 
stable, and hence revenues at times may be too low to cover catastrophic or 
simultaneous claims. Social reinsurance, therefore, has been suggested. 
 5.  Social Security Programmes 
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) 
The GSIS, created by the Commonwealth Act No. 186 passed on 14 November 14, 
1936 is mandated to provide and administer the following social security benefits for 
government employees: compulsory life insurance, optional life insurance, 
retirement benefits, disability benefits for work-related contingencies and death 
benefits. 
The GSIS covers all government workers irrespective of their employment 
status, except employees who have separate retirement schemes under special laws 
such as members of the Judiciary and Constitutional Commissions; contractual 
employees who have no employee-employer relationship with their agencies, and 
uniformed members of the Armed Forces of Philippines and the Philippine National 
Police, including the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology and the Bureau of 
Fire Protection.  
The GSIS membership in its social security package is the estimated at 1.4 
million employees of the Philippine Government. In addition, the GSIS also services 
the members' dependents and beneficiaries, the retirees and pensioners, and the 
survivors of the deceased members or pensioners. 
Social Security System (SSS) 
In 1954 the Social Security Act (Republic Act 1161) was passed that provided for a 
social security system for wage earners and low-salaried employees. With some 
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amendments to the law, the Act was finally implemented in 1957 covering the 
employed segment of the labour force in the private sector. The Social Security 
System (SSS) administers social security protection to workers in the private sector. 
Like the GSIS, the SSS provides a range of social security benefits that include 
retirement, death, disability, maternity, and sickness benefits. It also provides 
medical rehabilitation services and funeral grants. It also administers the Employees' 
Compensation (EC) Programme for private employees. (Prior to its transfer to 
PhilHealth, SSS also administered the Medicare Programme for private employees.) 
Self-employed farmers and fishermen were included in the programme in 1992 
while workers in the informal sector earning at least Php 1000 a month such as 
ambulant vendors and watch-your-car boys, were covered in 1995. In 1993, 
household helpers earning at least Php 1000 were included in the compulsory 
coverage of employees. 
On 1 May, 1997, the Social Security Act of 1997 (Republic Act 8282) aimed to 
strengthen the SSS was passed. The Act amended the Republic Act 1161, providing 
for better benefit packages, expansion of coverage, flexibility in investments, stiffer 
penalties for violators of the law, conditions to apply or waive penalties of 
delinquent employers and the establishment of a voluntary provident fund for 
members. 
In June 2003, SSS had a total of 25.1 million members, which represented 
around 72.5% of the country's total 34.6 million labour force. The SSS membership 
comprises employees (19.8 million) and self-employed and voluntary members (4.6 
million). Included in the self-employed/voluntary members are farmers and 
fishermen, Overseas Filipino Workers, and non-working spouses.  
Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC) 
The Employee's Compensation Programme (ECP) is designed to provide public and 
private sector employees and their dependents with income and other benefits in the 
event of a work-connected injury, sickness, disability or death. It was created under 
Presidential Decree 626 and became effective on January 1975. It provides a 
comprehensive benefit package consisting of preventive occupational safety and 
health aspects, curative or medical and compensatory grant, and rehabilitation of 
occupational disabled workers.  
There are three agencies involved in the implementation of the Employees 
Compensation Programme. These are the Employees’ Compensation Commission 
(ECC), which sets policies of the ECP and to review appealed cases from the GSIS 
and the SSS, the administering agencies of the ECP.  
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Covered under the ECP are: (i) all public sector employees including those of 
government-owned or corporations and local government units; (ii) all employees in 
the private sector covered by the SSS; and (iii) Filipino Seamen compulsorily 
covered under the SSS. Land-based contract workers are only subject to coverage 
under the ECP if their employer, natural or juridical, is engaged in any trade, 
industry or business undertakings in Philippines.  
Under the ECP the following are compensated: work-connected injury or 
accident; work-connected sickness; and any disability or death resulting from any 
work-connected accident or work-connected sickness. The compensation which a 
claimant may receive is in the following forms: cash-income benefit for disability or 
death; medical and related services for injury or sickness; and rehabilitation services 
(in addition to monthly cash income benefit) for permanent disability. An injury is 
compensable if it was sustained due to an accident arising out of and in the course of 
employment. Similarly any sickness that is listed by the ECC as an "occupational 
disease" is compensable. Finally, a disability is compensable if it is caused by a 
work-connected injury or sickness.  
Employer-Provided health benefits 
Employers provide health benefits voluntarily or as required by law or collective 
bargaining agreements. Apart from Medicare and ECC, the Labour Code prescribes 
a minimum set of medical, dental, and occupational safety obligations for 
employers. The requirements vary, depending on the hazards in the work place and 
on the number of workers employed. At the lower end of the scale, first-aid 
treatment must be available within the premises. Larger companies on the other 
hand must provide a company clinic with a full-time doctor, nurse, and dentist. CBA 
also specify the medical benefits that companies must provide their employees and 
the employees’ dependents.  
6.  For-profit Commercial Health Insurance and HMOs 
Commercial Indemnity Health Insurance 
In 1988, there were 102 companies involved in health and accident insurance in the 
country. The indemnity health industry is growing very slowly in terms of people 
covered. Because of the generally low income of the majority of the population and 
the low profits in health insurance as a product line, the life insurance companies 
studied in 1994 foresaw no dramatic growth for commercial indemnity health 
insurance. Besides, at that time hospital cash plans, which involve lower 
administrative costs, were being marketed more aggressively by these companies. 
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There was also a growing clamour from labour unions for a comprehensive HMO 
type of health benefit package. (Gamboa, et al., 1993). 
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO) 
The 1990s saw the emergence of HMOs in Philippines. These were mainly investor-
based HMOs directed at the employed sector and were profit-oriented. Their growth 
was partly in response to employers’ need to supplement the social health insurance 
benefits, whose support value had declined due to increasing health care costs, and 
partly due to the clamour by labour unions for such health benefit package.  
The HMO benefit package typically offers preventive health care, inpatient and 
outpatient services, and emergency care. Pre-existing conditions are excluded. The 
fee charged for membership depends on the degree of actuarial risk, the type of 
room, the frequency of payment, the number of persons covered, and the 
supplemental benefits (Gamboa, et al., 1993). At present there are about 21 investor-
based HMOs listed as operating in Philippines (www.Rxpinoy.com). The HMOs 
share in health care financing rose from 1.3% in 1992 to 5.7% in 2001. In contrast 
private health insurance share declined from 2.8% in 1992 to 1.3% in 2001. 
According to Gamboa, et al. (1993), doctors are either paid regular salaries or 
accredited and compensated on a fee-for-service basis, at rates negotiated by the 
HMO with individual doctors. Salaried physicians serve at HMO-owned clinics. 
Enrollees requiring diagnostic procedures or treatment that are not available in-
house are referred to other clinics or hospitals or to accredited physicians. HMOs 
accredit clinics in strategic locations and in places where there are no HMO-owned 
facilities. 
7.  Critical Analysis of Health Care Financing 
Data from the National Health Accounts shown in Table 23 allow us to get a bird-
eye view of the health financing system in its entirety. The data show that by far the 
largest single source of financing is still the households, contributing 43% of total 
health expenditures in 2001. Households in turn finance these expenditures, 
especially large and unanticipated expenditures, in a variety of ways – from savings, 
contributions from extended family, borrowings, sale of assets, and from reduction 
in current consumption or human capital formation in children such as nutrition 
and basic education. Lower-income groups are likely to bear a disproportionate 
burden of these expenditures.  
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Table 23. Per cent Share of Health Care Expenditures by  
Source of Financing 992-2001 
Percent share Source of 
funds 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Government 35.2 36.6 37.2 35.3 36.3 38.3 39.5 39.7 41.1 37.5 
  National 30.8 24.1 21.3 19.3 19.9 20.5 21.0 21.0 21.5 16.6 
  Local 4.4 12.5 16.0 16.0 16.4 17.8 18.5 18.7 19.6 20.9 
Social 
Insurance 
6.0 6.4 5.7 4.5 5.1 5.1 3.8 5.1 7.1 7.8 
PhilHealth 5.7 6.1 5.4 4.3 4.8 4.9 3.5 4.8 6.9 7.5 
Employees 
compensation 
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 
Private 
sources 
58.9 57.0 57.1 60.1 58.6 56.6 56.6 55.2 51.8 54.8 
Out-of-pocket 49.6 47.8 47.5 50.4 48.7 46.9 46.8 43.9 41.0 42.8 
Private 
insurance 
2.8 2.4 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.0 1.3 
HMOS 1.3 1.4 1.6 2.0 2.3 2.5 2.9 4.0 3.9 5.7 
Employer-
based plans 
4.2 4.5 4.9 5.0 5.1 4.4 4.0 4.0 3.8 3.8 
Private 
schools 
1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 
All sources 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
As a last resort, government expenditures, financed from taxation, provide 
households protection from risk of catastrophic health care expenditures. However, 
the ability of government to finance health expenditures has been limited due to 
slow economic growth and low government savings rate. Risk protection then has to 
be provided by other means. The Philippines embarked upon social insurance 
programmes much earlier than such countries as South Korea and Thailand, yet 
while South Korea achieved universal coverage in the 1990s, the Philippines social 
health insurance programme is barely covering half of the population. The growth 
of private schemes such as HMOs and community-based schemes, while indicating 
innovativeness in responding to financing needs, also indicate the inadequacy of 
government-sponsored or formal schemes. As mentioned earlier, part of the 
difficulty in expanding social insurance is the low incomes of households in view of 
continued high poverty rates and due to the slow structural transformation of the 
economy leaving a large portion of the labour force in hard-to-reach agricultural and 
informal service sectors. 
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With the devolution of health care services to the local government units 
(LGUs) in 1992, much of health care delivery and financing became the 
responsibility of LGUs. With this responsibility came additional resources from the 
national government in the form of increased share in internal revenues, referred to 
as the internal revenue allocation (IRA) to LGUs. While there remains the concern 
about the mismatch between the IRA shares and the cost of devolved health 
functions and the fact the IRA is given as block grants, which LGUs can choose to 
spend among competing local expenditures other than health, LGUs on the whole 
have been responsive to delivering quality health care and financing such 
investments. One aspect which many LGUs have responded to is the financing of 
premium subsidies for the Indigent Programme of PhilHealth. The growth of 
coverage of indigents has been particularly rapid in the last few years. However, 
there is still much further to go in view of the slow decline in poverty rates and the 
fact that LGUs with large numbers of the poor are also the ones with limited 
financial capacity to subsidize their premium. 
While efforts are being made to expand health insurance coverage of the 
population, there are issues that need to be addressed to ensure that risk protection 
is adequate without unnecessarily raising the total cost of health care. These issues 
arise from the fact that health insurance can affect health utilization patterns and 
therefore overall costs. While it is expected that health care utilization increases with 
insurance as financial barriers are reduced, the type of health care that is sought can 
be influenced by the package of benefits that the insurance provides. Simulation 
analysis has demonstrated that hospitals are likely to be preferred over clinics as 
health providers, if insurance pays only for inpatient services, and that insurance 
has a tendency to induce individuals to substitute less expensive services (clinic 
care) with more costly services (hospital care). Furthermore, within hospital-based 
services, insurance shifts individual preference from public to private facilities. All 
these behavioural changes are likely to raise the financing requirements of the health 
sector. (Solon et al. 1995) 
In addition to providing risk protection to the poor, the expansion of health 
insurance had the additional beneficial effect of assuring minimum quality of 
services for both insured and non-insured. This came about from the accreditation 
requirements that PhilHealth imposes on those wishing to participate in the NHIP. 
With the inclusion of outpatient care in Rural Health Units (RHU) as health 
insurance benefits for the Indigent Programme, efforts to improve the quality of 
health care in RHUs (through, for example, the Sentrong Sigla programme) was 
accelerated because of the need of RHUs to be accredited in order to participate in 
the insurance programme. 
A health sector reform programme has been under way since 2000 that 
involves the coordinated implementation of a number of inter-dependent 
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interventions including health insurance coverage expansion, development of local 
health systems, upgrading regulatory capacity, restructuring hospitals, and 
strengthening public health care activities. The Success in engendering the 
synergistic impacts of these reforms is expected to have profound influence on the 
future structure of health care financing and the quality of health services.  
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Singapore 
Kai Hong Phua 
1.  Background  
Singapore is a city-state with a total population of over 4.2 million resident nationals 
living in a highly urbanized and planned living environment. It has inherited a 
strong British-type National Health Service system with the dominant role of the 
government in the public provision of health services, which is financed mainly by 
central taxation. Over the past 25 years, the government has actively embarked on a 
systematic series of health sector reforms to restructure the health care delivery 
system and to diversify the sources of financing.  
Health Care Philosophy  
The health-care philosophy of Singapore emphasizes the building of a healthy 
population through preventive health-care programmes and the promotion of 
healthy living. Singaporeans are encouraged through the public health education 
programmes to adopt a healthy lifestyle and be responsible for their own health. The 
government ensures that good quality and affordable basic medical services are 
available to all Singaporeans through the provision of heavily subsidized medical 
services at public hospitals and government polyclinics. All private practitioners, 
hospitals, clinics, laboratories and nursing homes are required to maintain a high 
standard of medical services through licensing and regulation by the Ministry of 
Health.  
To promote personal responsibility, Singaporeans are required to save under 
the Medisave scheme, for their medical expenses, especially during old age. This is 
to avoid over-reliance on state welfare. Under the scheme, every employee sets aside 
6-8% of monthly income into a personal Medisave account and the savings may be 
used to pay for hospitalization expenses and health insurance premiums incurred by 
the employee and family. This system is intended to encourage individuals to stay 
healthy and minimize the use of unnecessary medical care by sharing costs and co-
payments.  
To promote these ideals, the government has a philosophy that emphasizes 
building a healthy population through disease prevention and the promotion of 
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healthy living. Individuals are encouraged to take responsibility for their own health 
by saving for their own expected medical expenses. To reinforce this sense of 
personal responsibility, the health care system is designed to gradually build upon 
three health-care financing programmes that help people pay for medical expenses: 
Medisave, Medishield and Medifund. These three programmes are intended to 
create a largely self-funded health care system that requires people to first look to 
personal and family resources for health care, relying on the government only after 
their own resources are depleted.  
The principle of co-payment by the patient for medical care at the time of 
consumption was adopted in the public system to discourage unnecessary 
utilization. For those who choose to seek medical care in public hospitals, their 
hospitalization expenses are subsidized between 20-80% by the government. Lower 
subsidy is given to those who prefer the creature comforts and more luxurious 
services in the higher-class wards. The indigent can apply for partial or full 
remission of their hospitalization bills at public hospitals. There is universal 
coverage as no Singaporean is ever denied access into the health-care system and 
use of emergency services, or ever turned away by hospitals.  
2. Development of Compulsory and Voluntary 
Prepayment/Health Insurance Mechanisms  
In 1981, the government officially embarked on a plan to restructure the health care 
system in Singapore, principally through the introduction of an alternative method 
of financing as part of the existing Central Provident Fund (CPF) concept of 
compulsory savings. The idea of using CPF savings for medical care had been 
mooted much earlier in the 1970s when the government was looking at various 
options to finance old age security and the increasing costs of public services. It was 
not until the appointment of a new Minister for Health in 1981 that the policy to shift 
away from the old tax-based financing system took shape in the form of a major 
exercise in national health planning.  
The National Health Plan  
In June 1981, the Ministry of Health held many discussions with many stakeholders 
in both public and private sectors, and the National University of Singapore to 
gather ideas on how to develop further the health care system in Singapore. Further 
research and data collection were conducted, including the review of alternative 
health care systems in developed countries. The Members of Parliament were also 
consulted in February 1982 to consider their viewpoints. In March 1982, the Minister 
for Health announced in Parliament the proposed Medisave Scheme and its 
 275 Selected Case Studies from Asia and the Pacific 
underlying philosophy, which was followed by extensive press publicity. 
Throughout the following year, more dialogue sessions were held with grassroots 
and community leaders from the Citizens Consultative Committees, representative 
employers' federations, trade unions and health-related associations.  
The National Health Plan (NHP) was revealed in February 1983 to introduce 
the Medisave scheme as a compulsory savings plan for medical coverage. The NHP 
was intended to change the direction of the Singapore system, and avoid the pitfalls 
and problems of over-generous welfare systems elsewhere. The declared objectives 
of the NHP were to secure a healthy, fit and productive population through active 
disease prevention and promotion of healthy lifestyles, and to improve cost-
efficiency in the health care system. It was also justified on the grounds of meeting 
the growing demand of a rapidly ageing population for higher quality health care. 
The rationale for the NHP was that Singapore's health care system must "stand the 
test of time as the demand for hospital care will go up while the anticipated tax 
revenue may be expected to go down in relative terms”.  
The solution thus lay in a personal savings scheme like Medisave, with the 
philosophy to reward the individual for staying well. The scheme would also detach 
the quality of the health care system from the vagaries of economic growth, as past 
financing was heavily dependent on taxation or budgetary allocation. These 
objectives were also consistent with preserving the traditional values of self-reliance 
and strong family ties, which would be promoted as the primary social support for 
care of the sick and aged, embodied in the two axioms of "saving for a rainy day" 
and "charity begins at home". The Medisave account in the CPF finally evolved, 
which allowed withdrawals to pay for expensive medical costs, within certain limits, 
of account-holders and immediate family members. It was conceived that this 
additional source of funds could ease the pain of increasing costs for the individual 
and family.  
A Blue Paper on the National Health Plan was released in February 1983, 
which was widely publicized through the mass media. Feedback from the public 
was actively solicited while there was follow-up by the media covering issues 
related to health care financing and delivery. Parliament then debated the National 
Health Plan in August 1983 before it (i) approved in principle the Medisave Scheme 
which would enable Singaporeans to set aside their own savings to meet future 
hospitalization expenses; and (ii) recommended that there be periodic reviews in the 
implementation of the scheme and that adjustments be made when experience 
showed this to be desirable.  
From then until April 1984, the scheme was given mass media coverage to 
explain how it would work in practice. Printed informational material was widely 
distributed and public talks were held in community centres, hospitals and 
companies to provide information to as large a population as possible. The 
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Medisave Scheme was eventually implemented in all government hospitals from 1 
April, 1984.  
Before the scheme was expanded to include approved private hospitals from 1 
January 1986 onwards, it was first introduced as a pilot project involving the new 
National University Hospital (run by an autonomous quasi-government company) 
from June 1985. The scale of charges and Medisave withdrawals here were 
equivalent to those in government hospitals. Withdrawal rates however, were 
subjected to a 'per day maximum' for hospital charges and a maximum rate for 
major groups of surgical procedures. The same limits were then applied to the 
private hospitals.  
Since the scheme started, several modifications have been made to it based on 
the experience acquired. Initially, account-holders were only permitted to use their 
Medisave accounts to pay for the full charges of hospital stay in lower-priced wards 
and only a partial component for the more expensive rooms. This was gradually 
extended to cover almost all categories of hospital charges, but subjected to 
maximum daily limits. In addition, Medisave accounts that are used for payment of 
higher-priced medical treatment would not be allowed to be overdrawn.  
Population policies  
The Committee on the Problems of the Aged was convened by the government in 
1983 to recommend measures to prevent, ameliorate or deal with problems of the 
ageing population, and its report set out a national policy covering aspects of 
employment, financial security, health and recreational needs, social services and 
institutional care, and family relations. Measures implemented at that time were 
reinforced by the Report of the Advisory Council on the Aged in 1989, which 
recommended the development of community-based programmes for maintenance 
of good health, prevention of disease, and rehabilitation and social support for the 
elderly.  
These measures were implemented in a manner consistent with the National 
Health Plan and the Medisave Scheme, which in turn recognised that savings 
through the CPF were to form the backbone of viable financing of increasingly 
expensive health care of the elderly in Singapore over the longer term. Singapore has 
thus approached the financing of cost-effective health care for an expanding elderly 
population and more sustainable methods of financing care within the framework of 
its overall old age security system. The official policy of enlarging the scope of 
mandatory savings to cover other areas is consistent with the social objectives of 
providing old age security. Since health care needs and expenses are expected to rise 
dramatically with ageing, mechanisms to protect the elderly against expected 
medical costs were the first additions to be built into the CPF scheme.  
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In the Singapore context, financing health care through pay-as-you-go taxation 
or out- of-pocket payments was considered to be inadequate to pay for good quality 
health care and prior savings therefore had to be enforced to meet the anticipated 
rising costs of medical care. These considerations formed the underlying basis for 
the National Health Plan of Singapore formulated in 1983. In addition to promoting 
personal responsibility for maintaining good health, the Plan has aimed to build up 
financial resources so as to create the means to pay for medical care during illness, 
especially in old age.  
Integration of Medical Savings and Social Health Insurance  
Singapore’s current health care financing reforms developed in three stages: 
Medisave, the savings component of the system, was introduced in 1984. Medisave 
represents a form of compulsory saving. Because the contribution is based on wages, 
the very old and the very young frequently do not have Medisave accounts. 
However, Medisave funds now support over 80% of inpatient expenditures since 
these can be used to pay the medical bills of family members.  
Medisave funds are never adequate to cover all or most high-cost health 
expenditures, so there would be significant demand for health insurance. 
Medishield was introduced as a catastrophic insurance plan in 1990. Medishield 
premiums are automatically deducted from the Medisave, unless account-holders 
request otherwise. To reach the threshold for catastrophic coverage, it is usually 
necessary to have had a very long hospital stay or one of several costly, ongoing 
outpatient treatments such as day surgery or chemotherapy for cancer. Various 
supplementary Medishield Plus and voluntary private medical insurance schemes 
were also allowed in 1994, to offer different levels of coverage, based on deductible 
or excess per policy year, claim limits per policy year, and claim limits per lifetime.  
Medifund, a third financing component, was established by government 
endowment in 1993 to support health care for the poor and indigent. Government 
budget surpluses are used to fund additional contributions to Medifund. Requests 
for financial assistance are considered on a case-by-case basis with preference to 
“low-wage Medisave/Medishield contributors and elderly persons whose accounts 
are not adequate to cover expenses.”  
Singapore’s experience represents a natural experiment in the development of 
medical savings. While costs and demand continue to rise in Singapore, it is widely 
believed that unnecessary expenditures for inpatient care have been reduced 
without dramatic limits on physicians’ incomes or the availability of newer high-
technology treatment. However, it is important to emphasise that Singapore uses a 
fairly narrow definition of services eligible for medical savings expenditures (e.g. 
excluding most outpatient care), has a fixed fee schedule for medical services, and 
does not have comprehensive insurance. But universal access to public health-care is 
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guaranteed through a system of targeted subsidies and subventions from tax-based 
sources, as well as a last-resort Medifund endowment for the indigent. It does not 
use medical savings as the sole mechanism for financing care, nor does it treat 
medical savings as a single solution to all health policy problems. 
Chronology of Health Care Financing Development in Singapore 
January 1981 Mr Goh Chok Tong appointed Minister of Health to restructure health care 
financing system. 
March 1982  Medisave, a compulsory savings plan for medical expenditure, announced 
to Parliament by the Minister for Health 
February 1983 Blue Paper on the National Health Plan, with Medisave scheme released. 
August 1983 Medisave approved by Parliament, with reviews and adjustments in 
implementation. 
1 April, 1984 Medisave implemented in all government hospitals 
May 1984 Plan to restructure administration of government hospitals announced 
June 1985 Medisave introduced as a pilot in the first restructured public hospital 
National University Hospital (NUH) 
January 1, 1986 Medisave expanded to include approved private hospitals 
1 July, 1990 Medishield, a catastrophic insurance plan implemented 
1 April 1991 Review Committee on National Health Policies appointed to develop 
future policies on development of the health system. 
January 1992 Parliament passed the Medical Endowment Act to introduce Medifund  
February 1992 Report of Review Committee on National Health Policies released. 
Ministerial Committee on Health Policies formed to implement 
recommendations. 
1 April, 1993 Medifund, a health care plan for the poor, implemented 
October 1993 White Paper on Affordable Health Care presented to Parliament 
1 July, 1994 Medishield Plus for supplementary catastrophic insurance plans 
implemented. 
January 2000 Parliament passed the Medical and Elderly Care Endowment Schemes 
Act to set up the Eldercare Fund. 
September 2002 Eldershield, severe disability insurance for long-term care implemented. 
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3.  Compulsory Prepayment/Social Health  
Insurance Mechanisms  
Compulsory prepayment and social health insurance mechanisms in Singapore 
consist of the 3-M schemes of Medisave, MediShield and Medifund.  
Medisave  
Medisave is the compulsory medical savings scheme linked to the Central Provident 
Fund (CPF) accounts, and all employed people must contribute to a Medisave 
account up to the age of 55, with a minimum sum to be retained for health care in 
old age. Employees and employers contribute a total of 30-40% of the employee’s 
wages to the CPF, which serves as a national social security and pension fund based 
on savings. From this fund, equal contributions from the employer and employee 
amounting to 6% of wages are deposited into the employee’s Medisave account until 
age 34. The percentage deposited increases to 7% between ages 35 and 44, rising to 
8% at age 45 and continues until retirement or until the ceiling is reached. For self-
employed individuals who earn more than US$ 6000 per year, the Medisave 
contribution rate is 5% of an estimated “net trade income”, which is paid annually 
during the statutory renewal of trade licences.  
As of 2005, the maximum monthly contribution is S$ 300 for employees below 
35 years of age, S$ 350 for those between 35 and 44 years old, and S$ 400 for those 45 
years and above. For self-employed persons, the maximum monthly contribution is 
S$ 300, based on a maximum monthly income of S$ 6000. There is a maximum limit 
on the Medisave balance, currently maintained at S$ 30000 and which is regularly 
adjusted for inflation. After this maximum account balance has been reached, 
additional funds in Medisave are transferred automatically to the owner’s normal 
account in the CPF.  
Medisave savings earn interest at the prevailing CPF rate which is based on the 
current average inter-bank interest rates. The earned interest is also retained in the 
Medisave account and all Medisave and CPF savings are tax deductible. Upon the 
death of an account-holder, the Medisave balance along with the CPF account will 
be paid in cash to the bequeathed nominee, and will be free of estate duty. For those 
who have not nominated a beneficiary, Medisave balances will be channelled to the 
Public Trustees to be distributed to family members according to the law.  
Medisave accounts can also be pooled to pay for medical expenses of 
immediate family members, including spouses, children, parents and grandparents 
who do not have their own accounts. The use of Medisave for extended family 
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members such as siblings, in-laws, uncles/aunts and nephews/nieces may be 
allowed on a case-by-case basis if the patient is hospitalized in a subsidized ward of 
public hospitals.  
Medisave is currently subject to a withdrawal limit of S$ 300 per day for 
inpatient stays, which includes a maximum of S$ 50 for the doctor’s daily attendance 
fees and S$ 150 for day surgery. In addition, there is a fixed limit ranging from S$ 
150 to S$ 5000 for different categories of surgical procedures within a table of 
operations. For psychiatric treatment in long-stay institutions and chronic care in 
community hospitals, the use of Medisave is subject to a withdrawal limit of S$ 150 
per day and a maximum of S$ 3000 per year. For approved outpatient treatment 
which may be expensive, Medisave can be used within certain limits, for procedures 
such as assisted conception, chemotherapy, radiotherapy, renal dialysis, and 
antiretroviral treatment, etc. 
Medishield  
Medishield is a low-cost medical insurance scheme to help CPF members and their 
dependents to meet the high costs for serious and prolonged illness. It is designed to 
be a supplementary back-up to Medisave that provides catastrophic illness 
insurance with premiums payable from Medisave accounts. It has a voluntary opt-
out feature for those who have other health insurance coverage or who cannot even 
afford the relatively low premiums. Medisave account holders can also use their 
Medisave to pay the premiums for their dependents to join Medishield. The 
premiums are risk-rated according to age and range from S$12 per year for those 
aged below 30 to S$96 for the 61-65 age-group, and rising from $132 to $390 for those 
aged 66-70 to 80 years, when coverage stops.  
Medishield will cover the hospitalization expenses for most catastrophic 
illnesses, such as intensive care, surgical operations and implants, kidney dialysis, 
chemotherapy and radiotherapy for cancer treatment. Medishield will not pay for 
treatment of pre-existing illnesses, congenital illnesses, cosmetic surgery, labour 
delivery charges, mental illness including personality disorders, drug addiction, 
alcoholism, and overseas treatment.  
Medishield will cover 80 % of the total claimable amount above a deductible of 
S$500 for patients in subsidized wards of public hospitals, and above a deductible of 
S$1000 for those in the higher class wards. Medishield is subject to a claim limit of 
S$120 per day for inpatient stay and S$100-S$600 for surgical operations. There are 
also claim limits of S$15,000 a year and S$50,000 for a lifetime. The deductibles and 
co-insurance payments of 20% can be paid out of Medisave or by cash.  
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Medifund  
Medfund is a financial assistance scheme to help needy patients pay for their 
medical care. It is an endowment fund set up as a safety net for the poor and 
indigent who are without family support or do not have adequate Medisave or 
Medishield coverage. The fund is built up during periods of high economic growth 
so as to relieve the dependency on traditional sources of charity and taxation as the 
primary means of financing social welfare for the poor. Only the interest income 
from the principal will be used in order to keep the endowment fund sustainable.  
Medifund grants are provided in all approved public hospitals and 
government medical institutions to help Singaporeans pay their medical bills. Every 
approved hospital and medical institution will have its Hospital Medifund 
Committee to consider and approve applications, and decide on the quantum of 
assistance according to recommended guidelines. Applications are submitted by 
patients through a Social Medical Worker who would conduct an interview 
equivalent to a means test. Committee members comprise largely of people who are 
actively involved in community social work and would be able to adopt a fair and 
flexible approach in their assessments.  
The amount of assistance from Medifund depends on individual 
circumstances, taking into account the conditions of the patient and family, and the 
bill size incurred. To encourage a greater sense of personal responsibility, Medifund 
provides greater support to those who have contributed regularly to Medisave and 
covered by Medishield, but despite these, have run into financial difficulties. It will 
give priority to elderly patients with no Medisave or Medishield coverage, and 
without family support.  
4.  Social Security and Social Assistance Programmes  
Financing care for the ageing population has surfaced as a critical issue in Singapore, 
as the rapid ageing of the population is expected to intensify the demand for 
expenditure on health care and long-term care, making it necessary to plan for 
appropriate and cost-effective services so that the organization and financing of care 
can be integrated with arrangements for income support to guard against the 
pressures of increasing costs. This section presents an account of the integrated 
approach in which Singapore’s policies are directed towards achieving this 
objective.  
The core measure for tackling ageing in Singapore is the Central Provident 
Fund (CPF) which was set up in 1955 as a universal, compulsory saving scheme to 
provide income support for the working population when they retired. Subsequent 
provisions for health care have been integrated into the CPF, and together these 
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measures set the context in which arrangements for long-term care are now being 
developed. A Public Assistance scheme is administered by the Ministry of 
Community Development to provide a minimum income for the destitute, frail and 
disabled elderly who have no income from their CPF account and no family 
support. While the issues of population ageing faced by Singapore have much in 
common with other rapidly ageing countries of the Region, the initial solutions 
devised by way of the CPF and further elaborations building on that foundation 
have set in train a system that is in many ways unique to Singapore.  
It is now more than 20 years since the Singapore government began to 
recognize the impact an ageing population would have on society. In line with its 
philosophy of long- term planning and with some considerable foresight, the 
government set up an Inter-Ministerial Population Committee in 1984. This was to 
be the first of a series of inter-ministerial committees that have examined issues of 
ageing over the ensuing years. In 1988, the National Advisory Council on the Aged 
was formed to undertake a comprehensive review of the status of population ageing 
in Singapore. One of its key recommendations was that a National Council on 
Ageing should be set up with the character and authority of a statutory board to 
effectively plan and coordinate policies and programmes for older persons. Other 
proposals included: 
¦ Raising the retirement age from 55 to 60 as continued employment would 
provide a sense of worth, dignity and financial independence to older 
persons; 
¦ Readjusting the seniority-based wage system to remove disincentives to 
employ more older people; 
¦ Expanding and strengthening public education programmes on the older 
persons and ageing so that positive attitudes towards older persons could 
be inculcated; 
¦ Making land available for voluntary organizations to set up homes for 
older persons and lengthening the term of leases for these homes, to 
address the scarcity and high cost of land in Singapore; 
¦ Studying the feasibility of providing health and medical services for the 
frail older persons living in their own homes, and  
¦ Increasing the dependency tax rebate for families who look after older 
persons.  
A number of these initiatives have been acted on to support family care for the 
elderly and so give expression to the government’s philosophy of maintaining 
family support. Measures taken include provision of financial incentives linked to 
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CPF contributions and preferential treatment in allocation of housing and housing 
loans, closely integrated with the wider housing and income security policies that 
are particular to Singapore. These measures are reported to have increased the 
proportion of elderly living with family from 81% to 86% in 1995. This 5% shift is 
more impressive when seen as a relative decline among the 19% of the elderly who 
were not previously living with their children as it indicates a change in living 
arrangements for one in four of this group. Allowing for the proportion of the 
elderly who have no children, family living arrangements are evidently being 
sustained.  
To meet further challenges, the 1990s witnessed the development and 
implementation of three milestone policies. A significant piece of legislation, the 
Maintenance of Parents Act, was introduced in 1994 after extensive deliberation by 
various community groups and a Parliamentary Select Committee. The policy aims 
to prevent the neglect of elderly parents and provide for action when problems 
arise, and public endorsement for this policy that imposes a legal obligation on 
children to maintain their parents is again quite particular to Singapore. In 1996, 
amendments to the Women’s Charter provided channels for elderly parents to 
exercise legal action if they were victims of physical, mental or psychological abuse. 
An enlightened policy covering medical care of the terminally ill was also put in 
place in 1996. Under the Advanced Medical Directive Act, persons who have been 
medically certified to be brain dead, can now under their earlier directives be 
relieved of medical life support. This policy is seen as reducing unnecessary 
suffering for both the terminally ill older persons and their families. However, the 
present take-up rate is rather low and it is not expected to play a significant role in 
the immediate future.  
Beyond these specific initiatives, a national policy on ageing in Singapore has 
taken shape after a number of policy reviews. Two characteristics in the policy 
formulation process have been noted. First, the various committees have the benefit 
of representation from various sectors and so receive diverse inputs from 
government ministries and agencies, providers, professional and community 
organizations, leading to decisions that are very likely to be implementable. 
Historically, cross-sector represen-tation has worked well in the local context and it 
is a standard feature in the Singapore's government problem-solving approach. 
Second, the committees were given wide publicity, and public awareness on the 
issues of ageing was heightened especially when controversial recommendations 
were proposed. The enhanced discussion of policy changes by the public has seen an 
increasing emphasis on social care of older persons. The Inter-Ministerial Committee 
on the Ageing Population, formed in 1998, has also revisited many of the 
recommendations of earlier Committees on ageing matters and has proposed a more 
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coordinated and comprehensive plan to deal with challenging issues of Singapore's 
ageing population in the 21st century.  
Funding principles  
Achieving coordinated and comprehensive planning of long-term care in Singapore 
requires that a number of key features of other health and social policy areas are also 
applied to this field. Thus, the principle of co-payment is being applied in long-term 
care as far as possible, as it applies in health and social services for the general 
population. The individual consumer and his or her family are expected to share a 
portion of the charges while the government subsidizes the rest. This principle 
applies to the Medisave scheme, and it also demonstrates that joint responsibility 
lies with the family unit, as savings can be used to meet the cost of ageing parents’ 
hospitalization and long-term care as well as for the individual’s own expenses.  
Access to publicly-funded health and community care services for the elderly, 
such as home nursing, day care and rehabilitation, is restricted by a variety of 
eligibility tests. A sliding scale of charges based on household income is imposed for 
these services and only recipients of the Public Assistance programmes are entitled 
to free medical service at the government polyclinics. All other Singaporeans above 
age 60 are however entitled to a subsidy of 50% of the fees charged at these 
polyclinics. This principle of a sliding scale of means-tested fees will be further 
refined and extended to all long-term care services in the future.  
Financing Long-Term Care  
There is presently no comprehensive system for financing long-term care in 
Singapore, and financing currently draws on:  
¦ Direct payments from older individuals and their families; 
¦ Community assistance to voluntary welfare organizations which secure 
up to 50% or more of their recurrent expenditure from fund raising; 
¦ Government funding through grants-in-aid to voluntary welfare 
organizations, providing up to 90% of capital funding and up to 50% of 
recurrent funding based on government cost norms and 75% for Public 
Assistance cases, and 
¦ Extensions to Medisave to provide limited coverage for selected forms of 
non-acute care as noted above.  
While the norm is to keep elderly members as long as possible in their own 
homes, a number of problems have become evident in recent years. Although there 
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is little statistical information on the types and quality of informal care provided to 
the elderly in their own homes, it is not inconceivable that most of the care is 
rendered by untrained relatives and maids. Lower-income families who cannot 
afford household help would be hard-pressed to provide good quality care to their 
elderly members. The increasing costs of care without access to subsidies except for 
those receiving Public Assistance could also create pressures on middle income 
families, and the all-or-nothing situation with regard to access to subsidized nursing 
home care has only recently been addressed with the introduction of means testing 
that gives those with some income access to part subsidies rather than none.  
Second, due to the lack of long-term care alternatives and the limited financial 
assistance available, there can be perverse incentives to hospitalize since the current 
3-M financing system only covers hospitalization. The present hospital subsidy 
system may also explain the longer lengths of stay in the lower class wards as lower-
income patients and their working class families cannot afford the direct or indirect 
costs of alternative care at home. Since subsidies for home medical care and home 
nursing care are limited to the poor and indigent, there still exist currently perverse 
incentives to admit elderly to nursing homes when they could possibly otherwise be 
served more cost-effectively in their own homes.  
The present bias in funding to nursing homes is likely to increase. Capital 
grants to voluntary welfare homes have increased in recent years, along with rising 
operating expenditure. These capital grants carry future commitments to operating 
costs that will have to be met by a mix of government funding, increased fund-
raising and fees. Notwithstanding the commitment to support families in providing 
care for their elderly, the third problem is that there has been no comprehensive 
funding for community care services and long-term care in the recent past.  
Recent Initiatives and future options  
Several recent initiatives have been taken in Singapore, based on recommendations 
of the IMC, which extend provisions for long-term care within the wider framework 
of the CPF and the 3M scheme and which maintain the role of government as a 
partner with families and voluntary welfare organizations.  
Recent policy announcements have promised more government matching 
grants-in-aid for voluntary welfare organizations to work with grass-roots 
organizations through the Community Development Councils. Many of these new 
funding mechanisms are directed at the local government infrastructural 
development to cater for the needs of ageing constituencies. The deliberations of the 
IMC have focused public attention on the financing issues regarding the provision of 
long-term care. Other recommendations included a review of capital funding for 
voluntary welfare organizations to build step-down care facilities, a means test to 
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channel government subsidy for step-down care to those patients most in need of 
financial help, and government subsidies to support home medical care and home 
nursing services.  
Two initiatives were taken in early 2000. First, an Elder Care Fund was set up 
under the Medical and Elderly Care Endowment Schemes Act to finance the future 
operating subsidies of voluntary welfare organizations. Initial capital injections of $ 
500 million through 2000 are to be built up to a target of $2.5 billion by 2010. Second, 
means- testing has been introduced in voluntary nursing homes with a sliding scale 
of subsidies from 25% to 75%, taking account of household size and income. Prior to 
this, other forms of community care have not been means-tested, in contrast to the 
medical and health services, which provide discounts for elderly patients or waivers 
for those on Public Assistance.  
A second round of initiatives was announced in January 2001, when a number 
of recommendations that had been made by the IMC, through the Working Group 
on Health Care, were endorsed by the government. Principal among these is the 
move to restructure funding of voluntary welfare organizations in a way that 
provides incentives for them to raise more funds and to cover an increased volume 
of patients, including more fee-paying clients, and to improve the quality of care 
quite substantially so as to attract the higher-income clients. Under the previous 
arrangements, grants to voluntary welfare organizations were capped or reduced 
once the voluntary welfare organizations raised excess funds. These arrangements 
not only provided little incentive to raise funds, but could in fact penalise voluntary 
welfare organizations which did raise additional funds.  
At present, government funding for 90% of capital costs does not differentiate 
between the types of residential care, such as quality of amenities and level of 
comfort in the physical environment. The recommendation to fund on a “cost per 
bed” basis also does not take into consideration special requirements and needs of 
different services to be provided. Government funding for recurrent costs also does 
not differentiate specifically the case-mix of patients, like age, gender, severity of 
disease and complicated conditions. Recently policies have been formulated to 
target the limited government subsidies to those in greatest need. Furthermore, 
there polices now have refined subventions to balance the affordability of patients 
and their families with means-tested user charges.  
Beyond the initiatives that were recently supported by the government, the 
IMC also recommended the establishment of additional financing for long-term care, 
renamed as “step-down care”. The proposals included an insurance scheme to help 
individuals and their families defray the high costs of step-down care required by 
those elderly with very severe functional disabilities. The IMC thus concluded that 
the best option for financing would be along the lines of the Medishield scheme. 
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Like the Medishield scheme, a long-term care insurance scheme would be based on 
an opting-out approach, and have the features of deductibles and co-insurance to 
discourage over-consumption and over-servicing. There is concern that the number 
and proportion of those who have opted out of Medishield could be repeated in any 
long-term care insurance scheme established on a voluntary basis. Of greater 
concern is the large number of young people who have opted out of Medishield, 
despite the relatively cheaper premiums that are already adjusted to their lower 
risk-ratings. It will become increasingly unfair for those remaining in the smaller 
pool to have to bear the burden of carrying the risks of the elderly, especially if those 
who have opted out and have not contributed earlier are allowed to opt in later 
without any penalties.  
Indeed this was the case when the Eldershield scheme for severe disability 
insurance was launched in 2002. Despite massive publicity and public debates, the 
scheme experienced almost 40% opt-out rates, leading to a classic case of adverse 
selection inherent in most private health insurance markets. These were due to 
various reasons: 
¦ The scheme was privatized to be managed by two large private insurance 
agencies which were allowed to act as alternative carriers, and was 
perceived to be profit oriented and commercial rather than social 
insurance schemes 
¦ The premiums were substantial relative to the benefits to be paid out, 
thus conveying the impression that the scheme does not over give little 
value for money, and  
¦ Many of those who opted out were from the higher-income and younger 
age-groups for whom the benefits were considered meagre in relation to 
the relative risks of needing long-term care.  
Currently, there is an on-going review of the 3-M system and existing optional 
health insurance products like the fledgling Eldershield scheme for severe disability 
insurance and various Medishield Plus schemes in the market for catastrophic 
illness, with the objectives to fill in the gaps and enhance coverage. Early policy 
announcements point to the need for compulsory enrolment and greater 
enhancement of benefits through strengthening the insurance components of the 3-
M financing mechanisms.  
5.  For-profit Commercial Health Insurance  
Private health insurance does not play a major role in Singapore as it is estimated to 
contribute less than 5% of total health expenditure. Private insurance companies 
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offer competitive medical insurance plans to complement the government’s 
Medishield and Medishield Plus schemes.  
Medisave can be used to pay for premiums of approved plans which must also 
include similar features like co-payments and high deductibles for catastrophic 
illnesses that are consistent with social objectives to reduce moral hazard. Private 
health insurance plans with enhanced medical benefits are usually provided as 
perks within a total benefits package to expatriate staff and senior management. 
Many multinational and large companies in Singapore also purchase private 
medical plans, including managed care plans for their employees and dependents. 
Such company medical benefits are common and are treated as wage costs and 
business expenses that are tax exempt, up to a cap of 2% of overall remuneration. 
The benefits vary according to the entitlement and wage package offered to staff.  
Except for catastrophic illness and dread disease products, the local insurance 
industry has not ventured into newer areas beyond the traditional group and 
individual medical indemnity plans. While the for profit insurance companies are 
naturally cautious about underwriting newer and unknown products, the National 
Trade Union Cooperative’s insurance company, NTUC Income, is more supportive 
of many national and socially beneficial schemes like managed care, severe 
disability and long-term care insurance for trade union members.  
NTUC Income has pioneered the introduction of managed care since 1992, but 
this has not grown much due to lack of support from unionists and employees. This 
is despite the government’s indirect support by allowing Medisave to be used to pay 
for the premiums in the NTUC Income schemes, which are non-profit cooperative 
plans. In 2000, there were about 10 managed care organizations in Singapore, with 
the largest, NTUC Income having only about 22000 members.  
NTUC Income together with the largest local insurance carrier, Great Eastern 
Life, also tendered successfully to manage the privatized Eldershield scheme for the 
severe disability insurance scheme introduced in 2002. However, the opt-out rates 
were extremely high at about 40 %, even though Medisave could be used to pay for 
the relatively high premiums, while the proposed payouts were generally not 
considered to be attractive enough.  
In the provision of long-term care, private operators are not present in greater 
numbers because of the lack of financial incentives and problems in obtaining 
suitable premises mainly due to prohibitive land and rental costs. There are also 
difficulties in recruiting staff and high labour costs for specialized and trained 
personnel. Private nursing homes either cater to the very rich by charging high fees 
for superior facilities or provide very basic or poor quality care to the lower-income 
patients in order to retain higher profits.  
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Recently, it was announced that the private insurance industry would be 
invited to play a bigger role to provide enhanced coverage to the Medishield and 
Eldershield schemes. Several alternative proposals have been submitted by 
competing groups to the Ministry of Health. The details of the financing proposals 
are currently under consideration for a complementary public-private participation 
to enhance health insurance in Singapore.  
6. Critical Analysis of Health Care Financing Through 
Prepayment and Health Insurance Arrangements  
The actual implementation of the Medisave Scheme, though formulated and 
coordinated by the Ministry of Health, required the active participation of many 
sectors of the population, including the medical and related professions, 
academicians, politicians, community and grass-roots leaders, employers and 
employees, and the mass media alike. It took over two years of thorough public 
debate of the issues involved, for the dissemination of vital information and to 
gather feedback from all levels of the community. This exemplifies the importance of 
bottom-up planning and community participation in the wide acceptance and 
successful administration of any innovative public programme.  
The 3M financing system covers expensive hospitalization and limited 
outpatient procedures, including selected non-acute care in community hospitals 
which provide post acute and rehabilitative care, and hospices. At present, most 
types of long-term care are excluded. Medisave withdrawals are limited to a 
maximum of $ 300 per day of hospital stay and according to the type of operations 
performed. These ceilings have not been adjusted despite several revisions in 
hospital fees. Due to the fixed limits which have not been adjusted for inflation, 
increasingly larger amounts of expenses for medical care have to be paid out-of-
pocket, which would have detrimental effects on lower-income individuals and 
families affected during the recent economic downturn when unemployment rates 
rose. This could explain the recent dramatic shift in the preference for admissions 
into lower-priced wards in the heavily subsidized public hospitals.  
Policy review  
Following the implementation of Medisave and Medishield, along with the teething 
problems concerning the major restructuring of the public hospital system, a Review 
Committee on National Health Policies chaired by the Minister of State for Health 
was appointed in April 1991 to review the policy directions for the country. It 
presented the first part of its report in October 1991, emphasizing health promotion 
and disease prevention as the basic philosophy to Singapore's healthcare policies.  
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In its main report presented in February 1992, it recommended priority areas 
for action and measures for improving health-care while controlling costs and 
quality. Suggestions were made on manpower planning, medical specialization and 
training and ensuring professional standards and quality of care. The main thrust of 
the recommendations was on health-care financing, to define the role of government 
in financing health-care and managing health-care cost.  
The government accepted in principle the recommendations of the Review 
Committee and a Ministerial Committee on Health Policies headed by the Deputy 
Prime Minister, eventually finalized the courses of action to be implemented. In a 
parliamentary White Paper on Affordable Health Care presented in October 1993, it 
set out the government's philosophy and approach to controlling health care costs, 
in order to keep basic health care affordable to all Singaporeans. Among the plethora 
of cost-containment measures that were recommended were defining a good basic 
medical package; controlling the supply of doctors and hospital beds, and regulating 
subvented public hospitals through revenue caps and subsidies.  
The government has therefore introduced revenue caps on corporatized 
hospitals to prevent them from generating excessive profits through inducing 
demand without the need to remain cost-effective. It is establishing limits on 
average charges per patient day and will adjust them annually. Hospitals that 
exceed the limits will have their government subsidies cut by that amount, while 
hospitals with a budget surplus will keep the additional funds.  
The current average bill sizes from all public hospitals for up to 70 of the most 
common diagnostic conditions are listed on the Ministry of Health website. 
Following its implementation in 2003, dramatic adjustments were made to moderate 
price differences among outliers. Plans are being considered to introduce a more 
refined subvention system to adjust for case-mix based on diagnostic conditions.  
Historically, the rate structure of public hospitals may have indirectly 
influenced rates in private hospitals under the assumption that the public would be 
price-sensitive to the incremental cost differences between the two. The government 
has also threatened in the past, to impose more direct cost constraints on private 
hospitals and doctors, especially for “balance-billing” where providers charge 
substantially more than the limits set in various public financing schemes. However, 
there are inherent difficulties in its implementation unless the payment system and 
fee schedule are standardized and adjusted for different risks and severity of disease 
conditions, and is complicated by the absence of a case-mix classification of patients 
related to diagnostic groups. This problem is currently being addressed with the 
implementation of a modified DRG system based on a global budget similar to that 
of the Australian model.  
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Adverse selection  
Another outstanding issue inherent in the design of Medishield concerns voluntary 
opting-out in the scheme. This feature was to allow an element of choice for those 
who may have alternative coverage or those who may not be able to afford 
premiums that are risk-rated according to age. This is regressive to the older age-
groups but the poor elderly who are uninsured for catastrophic illnesses can still fall 
back on the Medifund as a last resort. A Cost Review Committee in 1996 was 
concerned that one in four older Singaporeans over the age of 60 had opted out of 
the scheme. As this group was more likely to require health care, the Cost Review 
Committee noted that such a high rate of opting-out was undesirable.  
This problem of adverse selection could potentially grow bigger in the future 
unless there is a greater degree of compulsion for enrollment, and acceptable rating 
of community risks that are actuarially fair to all age segments of the population. 
This issue and related problems of the current gaps in health care financing and 
social health insurance is currently being examined by a committee within the 
Ministry of Health, which is expected to finalize its recommendations for 
implementation in 2005.  
Coverage  
The current system of subsidies provides access to affordable health care for the 
elderly in the lower-and middle-income groups. In public hospitals, the subsidies 
range from 20% to 80% of the fees charged, depending on the ward class. In the 
government polyclinics, elderly patients pay only nominal fees with about 75% 
subsidy. It is expected that future generations of the elderly population will have 
built-up enough Medisave savings and that the majority who will also have 
Medishield coverage will have sufficient financial resources to meet the cost of acute 
care. Those who do not have enough Medisave funds, Medishield coverage or 
family support, will rely on Medifund and other forms of financial assistance or 
charity.  
Medisave can be used to pay for hospital expenses of immediate family 
members, in line with the concept that the basic social and economic unit of the 
society is the family, and that caring for the welfare of ill and aged members of 
society is to remain first and foremost, a family responsibility. The aim is to preserve 
certain desirable values such as filial piety, and thereby serve to enhance the stability 
of an essential societal structure amidst rapid changes. Only where there are genuine 
difficulties in the case of the entire family being unable to meet the medical expenses 
of its sick and elderly does the state step in to subsidize costs from public taxes.  
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The 1995 National Survey of Senior Citizens in Singapore has shown that 
Medisave has become the most important provision relied upon by seniors aged 55 
and above to finance their health care. More than half (55%) depended on their 
children’s Medisave to pay for their medical expenses while 18% depended on their 
own Medisave and 2% on their spouse’s Medisave. Medisave funds accounted for 
nearly 75% of the health care financing provisions of seniors, with the older groups 
relying on their children’s Medisave more than their own. Further, two thirds of 
older women depended on their children’s Medisave compared to 44% of men. As 
older men were likely to have accumulated more in their Medisave account over 
their working life, 30% of men were self-reliant for financing their health care, but 
only 7% of women. Less than 10% of seniors had not made any financial provisions 
for health care, either because of low income or unemployment or limited capacity 
to accumulate Medisave or personal savings, or because they felt that they could 
rely on their children to pay their medical bills if required.  
Resource mobilization  
A high priority on the health reform agenda is mobilizing enough resources to 
finance efficient and equitable provision of health care for increasing demand. This 
is likely to require an increasing diversification of financing instruments so as to 
develop a broad and sustainable revenue base to cope with rising health care costs. 
Singapore has diversified into extrabudgetary financing but in a radically different 
direction with the introduction in 1984 of an important new instrument based on 
mandatory medical savings accounts. Are medical savings an effective financing 
tool to mobilize resources for sustainable health spending by Singaporeans for their 
old age?  
In the longer term, the role of medical savings accounts is destined to rise 
considerably in Singapore. Today the proportion of all health expenditures financed 
by Medisave disbursements is only 8% but the total amount of assets accumulated in 
members’ savings accounts is already equivalent to four year’s worth of Singapore’s 
national health expenditure. The total balance stood at S$ 22.7 billion as reported in 
the Ministry of Health Annual Report of 2001, and there were more than 2.71 million 
accounts, thus giving an average of about S$ 8300 in each account. This would 
constitute a substantial nest-egg for the future aged population and other 
contingencies when the economy is expected to slow down while welfare 
consumption would continue to go up.  
There are several reasons for this impressive mobilization of financial 
resources: 
 293 Selected Case Studies from Asia and the Pacific 
¦ When Medisave was launched in 1984, there was an initial transfer of 
CPF special accounts amounting to S$ 2180 million earmarked for 
medical savings; 
¦ The interest earned from savings was more than the annual withdrawal 
rates as the payouts were limited by strict rules for withdrawals, and  
¦ Due to rapid economic growth rates, extensive payroll contributions 
could be collected from an expanding formal labour sector.  
To date, Singapore has sought to balance supply and demand in the health 
sector by deliberate manpower and facilities planning, and by mobilizing individual 
savings through the Medisave scheme within the CPF, despite contribution rates 
being reduced owing to the recent economic downturn. It is not clear whether 
demand has been rationed implicitly through constraining consumer purchasing 
power as there were parallel co-payments, price and other supply-side controls at 
the same time.  
Efficiency  
However over the years after its introduction, some initial income effects were 
observed by the dramatic shift in demand from the older government hospitals to 
the restructured and private hospitals, and a discernible upgrading from the lower 
to the higher-priced wards. This phenomenon was corrected by the introduction of 
mandatory pre-admission financial counselling to advise patients to make 
appropriate choices regarding the type of ward class and medical services.  
Few countries explicitly target costly financial risks in the design of their social 
insurance programmes. In exception, Singapore’s Medisave scheme generally 
excludes coverage of inexpensive outpatient services (which are financed through 
other sources like taxation, employment benefits and out-of-pocket payments) so 
that Medisave balances are reserved to pay for infrequent but high-cost inpatient 
care. However, because they depend on inter-temporal pooling over the individual’s 
lifecycle, it is not actuarially feasible for Medisave balances to insure against truly 
catastrophic contingencies. To solve this problem, Singapore introduced Medishield 
-- a back-up health insurance programmes based on cross-sectional risk-pooling that 
is designed to finance the extreme catastrophic tail of the risk distribution.  
Government policies on cost-sharing to help control moral hazard and contain 
costs in social insurance programmes vary greatly. Health financing policy in 
Singapore combines non-trivial co-insurance rates with explicit targeting of costly 
risks. On average about 60% of hospitalization costs in public hospitals are 
subsidized by the government. The residual 40% charged to patients is covered 
between Medisave and out-of-pocket payments. Thus patients feel a double bite of 
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individual responsibility - not only in the form of 20% co-insurance paid out of their 
Medisave account, but also another 20% paid directly out of pocket. Claims for back-
up Medishield coverage of catastrophic expenses are subject to 20% co-insurance on 
top of a high annual deductible.  
Equity  
The total amount of subsidized care in Singapore is approximately equivalent to 
about a third of the total health care expenditure, or 1% of GDP. A key component of 
the government's policy is a tiered structure of subsidies based on the setting in 
which care is delivered and the amenities provided with it. In the public hospitals, 
the different classes of wards receive varying degrees of subsidy, while private 
hospitals are unsubsidized. A major change following the review was to ensure that 
subsidies are targeted by appropriate channelling of patients into the appropriate 
ward classes according to their ability to pay, which is roughly determined by their 
Medisave account balances as a form of means-test.  
In principle, individuals are free to choose their level of ward accomodation 
based on their preference. Financial counselling is provided at the time of admission 
into the public hospitals when patients are advised that it is their responsibility to 
choose a ward class they can afford and to cover their expenses through a 
combination of Medisave, Medishield or other sources of personal funds. If 
required, patients can draw on their spouse's, children's or parents' Medisave 
accounts with the necessary consent.  
Class A wards have no subsidy and compete with private hospitals, offering 
private rooms with such amenities as air-conditioning, television and attached 
bathrooms, in addition to the government's list of basic services. Care delivered in 
the remaining four wards - B1, B2+, B2 and C - is supported by varying levels of 
government allowances. For example, the subsidy level in a class B1 ward is 20% of 
the total charges. Patients are responsible for the remaining 80%, which may be 
covered by Medisave, Medishield and/or personal resources. The fraction paid 
directly by the government increases incrementally, reaching 80% for class C, with 
the patient responsible for the remainder. As the subsidies increase, the amenities 
decrease. B1 wards have four beds to a room; B2 patients do not have choice of 
physicians; class C wards are generally open wards. In addition, Medishield pays a 
greater fraction of hospital charges for poorer patients and those who elect to receive 
their inpatient care in subsidized hospital settings.  
Reforming pricing policy for publicly-provided services is likely to be an 
important instrument to improve equity in the incidence of public spending. Out-of-
pocket costs facing users of publicly provided health services are often non-trivial, 
especially for hospital inpatient care, and can be a barrier to access by the poor. 
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Improving access may require selective price reductions, compensated by increased 
subsidies from the budget. Implementing this strategy calls for a pricing policy that 
consciously differentiates prices by the income class of users. In this way, public 
subsidies can be better targeted instead of being distributed indiscriminately. One 
targeting mechanism is through self-selection by charging lower prices for services 
more likely to be used by the poor. Alternatively subsidies can be targeted directly 
by means-testing individual users. Singapore’s policies demonstrate both of these 
approaches to promoting equity.  
Budget subsidies continue to play a major back-up role in financing hospital 
inpatient care and are targeted to poorer users by self-selection using public sector 
pricing policy. Explicit price discrimination is built around four different classes of 
hospital wards in public sector hospitals ranging in ascending order of comfort from 
Classes C, through B2 and B1 to A. The subsidy ratios are highly differentiated, 
ranging from 80% hospital costs in the lowest Class C, to 70% in Class B2, 20% in 
Class B1 to 0% in Class A. Public hospitals provide financial counselling to help 
patients and their family members select an affordable ward class. These differential 
subsidies are intended to help equalize the affordability of the class-specific prices 
relative to the income levels of patients who select them.  
As a last resort, patients unable to pay their subsidized hospital bills can apply 
for a means-tested grant from their Hospital Medifund Committee. This safety net is 
targeted directly at households in the lower one-third of the income distribution. 
One problem of the three-tiered approach is that some segments of the population 
which are currently not covered by the Medisave and Medishield schemes may also 
not qualify for Medifund which has very stringent eligibility conditions. These 
individuals have to depend on other forms of financial assistance. Thus during the 
recent economic downturn, fees were reduced in public hospitals and eligibility 
criteria for Medifund were liberalized. A recent policy to implement means-testing 
on a wider scale for patients in public hospitals along with more generous subsidies 
and coverage, is currently under-way.  
Overall assessment  
A significant factor contributing to the health sector reforms in Singapore hinges on 
the local population’s traditional cultural values to be self-reliant and to have high 
saving rates. Savings approaches for health care financing require sufficient funds 
attached to individuals or households to pay for some or all health-care 
consumption. Although illness and the need for health care occur unexpectedly, the 
demand for health care is not purely a matter of chance.  
The time, place, and type of health care that a person may need in the future is 
largely unknown, but a healthy young person can anticipate that chronic disease 
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will become much more likely when he or she grows old. The changing needs for 
health care over the course of a life imply that health care may be funded, at least in 
part, by savings.  
Thus savings approaches to financing health care have an important 
advantage. If people pay for health care with their own savings rather than 
insurance coverage, it should be possible to avoid the moral hazard that is typical of 
indemnity insurance. Savings alone will be insufficient to fund all health care for 
many people, since few people will be able to save enough to pay for the care 
needed to treat the most expensive illnesses.  
People would under-save for health care whenever they have inadequate 
insurance and if they can obtain care for free, also called free-riding. Furthermore, 
low-income men and women may be unable to save very much money during their 
working years for any purpose, including savings for health care that they would 
need in old age. Therefore, there has been little interest in adopting pure savings 
approaches to health care financing on a wider scale. Instead, most savings 
approaches also incorporate some form of high deductible or high excess 
catastrophic insurance as well.  
Singapore has the first and most developed system of prepaid medical savings 
which are integrated into social health insurance. The mix of financing mechanisms 
is supported by a range of government initiatives to improve efficiency in the public 
and private sectors of the health care system and to ensure equitable access to 
necessary medical care regardless of income.  
There is continuing debate over the effects of medical savings on total health 
care spending and on health care cost inflation. Singapore has enjoyed a lower rate 
of growth in health care spending than other East Asian countries and spends a 
lower percentage of GNP on health care than other countries with comparable levels 
of economic and health system development. There is also general belief that the 
judicious mix of taxation, savings and insurance systems have indeed contributed to 
more effective health care spending by reducing wasteful and unnecessary 
spending. 
7.  Conclusions  
The Singaporean system has shifted away from a model of tax-based and national 
health service, to a mixed system that has retained the dominant role of the public 
sector in providing essential medical services through a combination of taxation and 
savings, with limited insurance only for catastrophic illness. It is purposely designed 
to move away from the comprehensive and overly generous insurance models that 
may be unsustainable.  
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The declared objectives are different from those of other models having 
universal coverage, by limiting insurance only for "insurable" expenditure (i.e. high-
cost events of low probability and not low-cost events of high probability for which 
other types of financing would be more efficient and effective). It is important to 
note that the government still maintains heavily subsidized public health services 
for most preventive and primary health care, in addition to a dominant share of 
public hospitals for basic health needs. Thus, the role of the state to support the truly 
needy from public funding, while average individuals and families are expected to 
contribute towards greater cost-sharing of increasingly expensive health care, so as 
to encourage shared responsibilities and a more sustainable health-care system.  
Many countries have adopted pay-as-you-go social security and health 
insurance schemes, which without reform will be unaffordable and unsustainable 
against the fastest population ageing rates in the world. Their growth rates will 
inevitably slow down and yet they have to maintain higher spending with shrinking 
tax bases. Considering that health care needs are expected to be greater in old age, 
the proactive policies of the Singapore government have assumed that the same 
requirements be met for health care financing as for old age social security systems.  
The three basic functions of redistribution, savings and insurance have been 
applied for financing health care as for old age security. Even though the relative 
risks and uncertainties may be different for health care needs, a similar mix of 
financing methods has been utilized to offer more protection while promoting 
growth in a rapidly ageing population. These considerations have formed the basis 
for the existing integrated systems of old age security and health care financing in 
Singapore, which are fully-funded savings schemes that could avoid the inter-
generational transfer problems of pay-as-you-go systems financed from taxation.  
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1.  Background 
Thailand, a lower middle-income country in South-East Asia, has gradually 
achieved a remarkable Human Development Index (HDI) since 1985. The global 
HDI rank of Thailand in the 2003 Human Development Report was 74 and the index 
in 2001 was 0.768 (UNDP 2003). The HDI gradually increased from 0.612 in 1975, to 
0.650 in 1980, to 0.673 in 1985, to 0.705 in 1990 and finally to 0.739 in 1995 
(UNDP2003). The increase in GDP per capita and life expectancy were two crucial 
factors affecting the increase in Thai HDI.  
In 2002, the population size was 62 million, with a life expectancy at birth of 
69.9 years and total fertility rate of 2.1 (average during the period of 1995-2000). 
Economic performance was remarkable especially during the early 1990s, but the 
1997 financial crisis brought down economic performance for a few years, until 
recently in 2002 several indicators reflected a return to economic recovery. The GDP 
per capita was US$ 6400 in 2001, with a growth rate of 3.0% (average for 1990-2001). 
However, income was not equally distributed, and the ratio of richest to poorest 
deciles indicated a gap of 13.4 or the ratio of the richest to poorest 20 percentiles 
indicated a gap of 8.3 in 2000, while the Gini index was 43.2.  
The education profile in Thailand is remarkable, with an adult literacy rate in 
2001 of 95.7%. Public expenditure on education from 1998 to 2000 was 5.4 % of GNP, 
the total government education expenditure was 20%, of which primary education 
got 36% share, secondary 27.1% and tertiary 24.1% of all educational levels (average 
for 1998-2000).  
In 2001, the health profile indicated an IMR of 24 and an U5MR of 28 per 1,000 
live births, while average MMR from 1985 to 2001was 44 per 100000 live births. 
Immunization achieved a very high coverage rate due to strong and extensive 
geographical coverage of the health care infrastructure. This is reflected in several 
indicators such as, one-year-olds fully immunized against measles reached 94%, 
births attended by skilled health staff was 95% (average for 1995-99) and the ratio of 
physicians per 100000 population was 24 (1990-99). 
In 2000, the total health expenditure per capita was US$ 237 PPP, whereby the 
public share was 2.1% of GDP and private share was 1.6% of GDP.  
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The study on Burden of Diseases indicates that HIV/AIDS, stroke and traffic 
injuries are among the first three leading causes of deaths among men (Table 24). 
The top three among women are HIV/AIDS, stroke, and diabetes. The ten most 
common diseases claim 66% and 52% of total life years lost among men and women 
respectively. Similarly, those common diseases also claim 52% and 45% of total 
Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALY) loss among men and women, of which more 
than half is preventable by risk reduction, notably HIV/AIDS, traffic injuries, 
tobacco-related diseases and primary liver cancer. In 1999, People Living with 
HIV/AIDS among adult age group 15-49 years was 2.15% and HIV among children 
between ages 0-14 years was 13900. (UNDP2003)  
Table 24: Top ten conditions contributing to DALY loss by sex, Thailand 1999 
Rank Men DALY Women  Both Sex  
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Source: Thai Working Group on Burden of Disease, Ministry of Public Health, 2002  
2.  Evolution of Health Insurance and Social Welfare  
Since the early 1970s, successive governments had started to promote a “piece-
meal targeting approach” for health insurance and social protection to its citizens 
(Tangcharoensathien et al. 2004-forthcoming). These included the Free Medical Care 
Scheme for the Poor or the Low-Income Card and the Civil Servant Medical Benefit 
Scheme (CSMBS), the Social Security Scheme (SSS), the Workmen Compensation 
Scheme (WCS), the Voluntary Health Card Scheme (VHS), and for-profit private 
health insurance. 
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In early 1975, the government initiated a specific medical welfare scheme to 
cover the poor or low-income households. This scheme provided tax-financed public 
health services for poor households with earnings below the national poverty line. 
Cards enabling free of charge health services (termed "free cards") were issued 
through means testing, whereby the community was involved in identifying the 
poor. Despite community involvement, local prejudice and nepotism were difficult 
to avoid. Several assessments indicated the scheme covered some non-poor and 
inadequately targeted the real poor (Kongsawat 2000; Pannarunothai 2002). In 1994, 
this scheme for poor households had expanded to cover more targeted population 
groups, namely the elderly (aged over 60 years), children under 12 years old and all 
disabled people. Due to inadequate public health care financing, public hospitals 
were allowed to collect user charges from those who were not free-card holders and 
cross-subsidization among health insurance schemes was observed. However, 
inadequate financing for the Free Medical Care scheme led to inequitable health 
service provision in terms of quality of care for the poor.  
Government employees and their dependants (spouse and children under 18 
years old and elderly parents) were the first group in the country to be covered by a 
worker benefit scheme. The Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme (CSMBS) was 
introduced in 1980, essentially a fringe benefit. This is a tax-financed, non-
contributory scheme, to serve as a medical welfare scheme for government 
employees whose salaries are generally lower than those in the private sector. The 
scheme applies a fee-for-service reimbursement model for provider payment. As a 
result of this model and a very weak capacity of the scheme management to reject 
over-charging and fraudulent claims, rapid increase in expenditure of the scheme 
has been observed (Tangcharoensathien et al. 2002).  
A mandatory prepayment Workmen Compensation Scheme (WCS) was 
developed before the Social Security Scheme (SSS). The WCS first launched in 1972, 
was an employer liability scheme for work-related injuries, illness, disability and 
death. The Workmen Compensation Act replaced the previous law of 1994 and 
transferred responsibility for WCS to the Social Security Office. Both the WCS and 
SSS cover only private sector employees, while dependants (spouse and children) 
are not covered. Similar to the CSMBS, fee-for-service basis is the payment model for 
health care providers in the WCS; inefficient health service provision has been 
experienced under this payment model.  
The SSS launched in 1990 is a tripartite payroll-tax financed scheme, which 
covers health care for non-work-related illness and injuries, and maternity and cash 
allowances for disability, old age and death. The scheme started with coverage of 
employees in enterprises with more than 20 workers. It was gradually extended to 
cover more than 10, more than five and finally more than one worker in April 2003. 
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As the vast majority of the Thai population are engaged in the informal sector, social 
health insurance did not play a significant role in coverage expansion to the whole 
population to achieve universal coverage. The scheme has not yet improved 
performance in extending coverage to the informal sector and regulatory capacity to 
enforce quality of care (Mills et al. 2000) is still weak. The absence of a mandate to 
achieve universal coverage towards social health insurance is the major reason why 
the SSS has been reluctant to expand the coverage of beneficiaries' spouses and 
dependants. Moreover, the merging of other populations or schemes into the SSO is 
hampered by arguments among SSS beneficiaries, health policy- makers, and health 
sector reformists regarding differences in the source of finance, patterns of 
contributions, the benefit package and payment methods to health care providers. 
A voluntary public insurance scheme or the voluntary Health Card Scheme 
was initiated by the Ministry of Public Health to cover the non-poor and the 
uninsured in 1983. It was first started as a community financing scheme in pilot 
areas and later scaled up at the national level. In 1994, the scheme evolved into a 
public-subsidized voluntary health insurance scheme, where 50% was financed by a 
household voluntary contribution and the rest was supported by the government 
budget. The scheme suffered from adverse selection where the healthy opted out, 
while the sick and chronically ill opted in. As a result, the scheme was not 
financially viable (Srithamrongsawat 2002), particularly at the time of economic 
crisis. 
Voluntary private commercial health insurance covers a small fraction of the 
population, and mainly those who are better off and demand private health care 
services. It applies risk-adjusted premiums collected annually, and applies fee-for-
service reimbursement with various levels of co-payment. Most health services are 
purchased from private-for-profit hospitals (Pitayarangsarit S et al. 2002).  
Despite efforts to extend coverage by different players in Thailand, by the end 
of 2001, there were still 15 million Thais without coverage. Under the current 
government led by Prime Minister Thaksin Shinnawat, Thailand achieved universal 
coverage (except some areas in Metropolitan Bangkok) in October 2001, through a 
merger of the medical welfare scheme for the poor, the elderly, children, and the 
voluntary Health Card Scheme. These and other uninsured populations were 
covered under a new financing scheme, termed the “30 Bahts” or the Universal 
Coverage (UC) scheme. This is financed by general tax revenue, using a contract 
capitation model for provider payment and cost sharing by patients of 30 bahts 
when care is provided. (Towse et al. 2004).  
As a result of this reform, in 2004, there are three major public health care 
financing schemes providing health coverage for the entire population. These are:  
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¦ The CSMBS, which covers public sector employees and their dependants 
(parents, spouses and children) approximately 5.7 million beneficiaries,  
¦ The SSS, a mandatory pre-payment scheme protecting private sector 
employees approximately 7.2 million beneficiaries against non-work-
related illness, and injuries and maternity. 
¦ The UC scheme covers the rest of population, approximately 47 million.  
Despite the achievement of universal coverage, 3.2 million or around 5% of the 
total population were still not covered in April 2003. A sub-group analysis reveals 
that 34% of those without any coverage live in Bangkok and a half of them are in the 
fourth and the fifth income quintiles (the rich and the richest). In rural areas, the 
proportion of the population without coverage and identified as poor is higher than 
that in the urban areas (Vasavid et al. 2004).  
Table 25 demonstrates the gradual increase in population coverage by type of 
financing in 1991, 1996, 2001 and 2003.  
Table 25. Population coverage and trends, 1991, 1996, 2001 and 2003 
6FKHP H   20011 20033 
6RFLDOZHOIDUH6FKHP H    29.0 74.7 
* RYHUQP HQWHP SOR\ HHVFKHP H    8.5 9.0 
: RUNPeQ’VDQG6RFLDO6HFXULW\ 
6FKHP H 
  7.6 9.6 
9ROXQWDU\  +HDOWK&DUG   23.4 0 
3ULYDWHLQVXUDQFH   1.3 1.7 
8 QLQVXUHG   30.2 5.1 
3RSXODWLRQP LOLRQ    62.9 63.8 
Sources: National Statistical Office, Health and Welfare Survey 1991, 1996, 2001 and 2003 
Note: Data start in 1991, the first year available under the Social Security System 
Having described the evolution of health insurance expansion in the previous 
section, this section describes and analyzes four prepayment health care financing 
schemes in Thailand in order to draw lessons on their success and failure as well as 
the determining factors. Literature reviews and secondary data analysis of existing 
documents will be employed for the analysis. These four schemes are:  
¦ Social Health Insurance, a mandatory scheme for the formal sector 
employee for non-work-related illnesses,  
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¦ Voluntary Health Card, a voluntary prepayment health insurance scheme 
which was transformed to public subsidized voluntary health insurance, 
¦ Workmen Compensation Scheme, a mandatory scheme for work-related 
injuries and illness of the formal sector employees, and 
¦ Private voluntary health insurance.  
3.  Compulsory Prepayment/Social Health  
Insurance Mechanisms  
The first Social Security Act was promulgated in 1954, based on the tripartite 
contribution concept. However, political issues and the economic climate prevented 
this law from being implemented (Walee-Ittikul S 2002).  
In 1974, a Workmen’s Compensation Scheme, as a form of employer liability 
scheme was initiated to cover salaried employees for work-related injuries, illness, 
disability and deaths. The scheme took several years to cover the whole country in a 
phased manner.  
When political and societal acceptance of social insurance reached its peak, the 
1990 Social Security Act was promulgated by the Parliament. The Social Security 
Scheme (SSS) was fully implemented in April 1991. Health care was included as a 
benefit with the objectives of reducing inequities in access to health services among 
different population groups and providing financial protection against health 
service expenditure to all salaried employees in the private sector. Originally, the 
scheme covered employees or enterprises with 20 or more workers, but it was later 
extended to cover enterprises with 10, five and finally one or more workers in 1990, 
1994, and 2002, respectively. 
The benefits of SSS can be classified into two types: health care and cash 
benefits, which cover income-replacement during illness, maternity, disability 
(covering absence from work) and old age as well as child allowances and funeral 
grant. The health care branch, which is the area dealt with here, is therefore one 
branch of all the benefits provided by the Social Security Scheme. It covers illnesses 
and injuries that are not related to work (which were already covered by WCS). 
Unfortunately, the health care benefits were not extended to dependents (spouse or 
children) of the employed workers. The only exception is the provision of maternity 
care for spouses of male workers. 
The milestones in the progress in social health insurance and social security for 
formal sector private employees can be summarized as follows (Tangcharoensathien 
et al. 2004- forthcoming):  
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¦ 1954: The first Social Security Act was promulgated, but was not 
enforced, and the SSS was not established,  
¦ 1974: The Workmen’s Compensation Scheme was established to suppress 
a Labour Union demand for social security,  
¦ 1990: the Social Security Act was again promulgated, as a mandatory 
scheme for private sector enterprises with more than 20 employees and 
the SSS was established as the administrative agency, 
¦ 1994: SSS Coverage was extended to enterprises with more than 10 
employees, 
¦ 2001: SSS Coverage was extended to enterprises with more than five  
employees, 
¦ 2002: SSS Coverage was extended to employers with more than one 
employee.  
The Social Security Scheme is a mandatory tripartite contributory scheme, 
which is financed by an equal payroll tax paid by the employee, the employer and 
the government. Various qualifying periods for benefit entitlement are enforced and 
a period of continued entitlement to health for employees who leave their salaried 
employment is also granted.  
According to recommendations by the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) consultants during the design of the scheme in 1982 (several years prior to 
promulgation of the Law in 1990), the contribution rate was calculated based on a 
limited benefit package, namely only hospitalization, while ambulatory services 
were excluded. The design in the 1982 proposal was for a fee-for-service 
reimbursement, similar to the provider payment method in the Workmen’s 
Compensation Scheme.  
However, during the drafting of the Social Security Act in 1990, the 
recommendations of ILO providing technical assistance towards the implementation 
of the new Social Security Act and political pressure led to the expansion of the 
benefit package to include ambulatory care without a change in the level of 
contributions. The capitation provider payment model was also recommended by 
ILO and included in the regulations of the Social Security System. The decision was 
supported by the negative experience with fee-for-service payment in the 
Workmen’s Compensation Fund and the expectation of lower administrative costs 
of the capitation model (Tangcharoensathien et al. 1991).  
Under this capitation contract model, there is no co-payment at point of 
service. This model offers considerable potential for achieving efficiency by 
combining consumer-led competition, the development of suitable incentives to 
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health-care providers who command scarce health-care resources (capitation sends 
signal towards rational investigation and prescriptions) and formal contracts 
between the Social Security Office and providers (Tangcharoensathien et al., 1999a). 
Several OECD member countries have been observed to follow a similar provider 
payment model.  
A single rate capitation was applied to cover ambulatory and inpatient 
services. Capitation was calculated based on a target service utilization rate per 
person per year and the unit cost of services for ambulatory and admission services 
with an additional amount as an incentive towards accepting the provider payment 
method. Unit cost covers only operating costs of health services (staff and other non-
staff operating expenditure). Public and private health-care providers were invited 
to provide services to registered workers on a competitive basis. The same capitation 
fee is applied to all contractor hospitals, both public and private. An initial annual 
capitation amount* was set at 700 bahts (US$ 28) and in 1991 (Tangcharoensathien et 
al. 1991), the capitation rate was modestly increased to an annual amount of 1100 
bahts per capita. In 2002, an extra amount of 150 bahts per beneficiary with a 
reported chronic illness was added.  
The benefit package is quite comprehensive, covering a wide range of personal 
health care services, ambulatory care, hospitalization, dental care, and maternity 
services. High cost care was reimbursed outside the capitation contract in order to 
ensure adequacy of services. Recently, access to haemodialysis for end-stage renal 
failure has also been provided. However, a small exclusion list, for example, 
cosmetic services and infertility treatments have been excluded from the benefit 
package.  
Since the strength of the Social Security Scheme lies in its capacity for cost-
containment, the cost-quality trade-off has subsequently become a significant 
problem, especially when employees did not exercise their right to choose the 
provider with which they were registered in the initial years (Mills et al. 2000). 
However, employees are entitled to change their registered contractor hospitals on 
an annual basis. Changes in the number and proportion between public and private 
health care providers participating in the Social Security Scheme from 1991 to 2004 
are shown in Table 26. The number and proportion of health care provider selection 
of SSS beneficiaries are also demonstrated in Table 27. It is worth noting that health 
care provider selection was limited only in the first year, when employers selected 
the provider hospital.  
                                                   
* Calculation based on three ambulatory visits and 0.5 hospitalization days per capita per year, and average 
costs of 150 bahts per outpatient visit and 600 bahts per hospital day (Tangcharoensathien & Walee-Ittikul, 
1991). 
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Table 26. Public and private health care providers participating in the  
Social Health Insurance Scheme during 1991-2004 
Number of health care providers Proportion 
Year 
Public Private Total Public Private Total 
1991 119 18 137 87% 13% 100% 
1992 118 27 145 81% 19% 100% 
1993 119 37 156 76% 24% 100% 
1994 122 55 177 69% 31% 100% 
1995 126 63 189 67% 33% 100% 
1996 126 72 198 64% 36% 100% 
1997 127 70 197 64% 36% 100% 
1998 127 78 205 62% 38% 100% 
1999 128 103 231 55% 45% 100% 
2000 130 116 246 53% 47% 100% 
2001 133 129 262 51% 49% 100% 
2002 136 132 268 51% 49% 100% 
2003 137 132 269 51% 49% 100% 
2004 144 134 278 52% 48% 100% 
Source: Social Security Office, 2004 
Table 27: Beneficiary selection of public and private health care  
providers during 1991-2004 
No. of health care provider selection 
 
Proportion of selection 
Year 
Public Private Total Public Private Total 
1991 2,256,502 468,541 2,725,044 83 17 100 
1992 1,552,579 991,210 2,543,789 61 39 100 
1993 1,487,500 1,506,394 2,993,893 50 50 100 
1994 1,614,617 2,012,174 3,626,792 45 55 100 
1995 1,805,596 2,169,182 3,974,778 45 55 100 
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No. of health care provider selection 
 
Proportion of selection 
Year 
Public Private Total Public Private Total 
1996 1,816,761 2,718,308 4,535,070 40 60 100 
1997 1,981,176 2,753,251 4,734,427 42 58 100 
1998 2,567,024 3,189,096 5,756,120 45 55 100 
1999 2,147,454 2,969,713 5,117,167 42 58 100 
2000 2,373,262 3,281,129 5,654,391 42 58 100 
2001 2,468,318 3,457,197 5,925,516 42 58 100 
2002 2,725,214 3,925,537 6,650,751 41 59 100 
2003 3,109,536 4,654,790 7,764,325 40 60 100 
2004 3,216,716 4,703,611 7,920,327 41 59 100 
Source: Social Security Office, 2004 
Entitlement to social health insurance is linked to employment status but 
continues for three months after employment termination. The issue of loss of 
entitlement became evident during the economic crisis in mid-1997. Through a 
special ruling, entitlement to health care and the other short-term benefits (such as 
maternity benefits) under the social security system were extended for one year after 
termination of employment. A large number of salaried employees were affected by 
the huge amount of dismissals in order to save many firms from being closed down.  
The inability of the SSS to expand its coverage becomes the main obstacle to 
achieving universal coverage, even among formal sector private employees. There is 
provision for voluntary affiliation under Article 39 of the Social Security Act 
allowing for persons who were previously covered to continue to contribute on their 
own behalf and maintain participation in the scheme. This also applies to retired 
salaried employees who receive pensions from the SSS.  
4.  Voluntary Health Insurance 
In 1983, before the establishment of the SSS, the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) 
launched a voluntary pre-payment scheme, namely the Voluntary Health Card 
 309 Selected Case Studies from Asia and the Pacific 
Scheme (VHS) as a response to the “Health for All” policy. The objectives of this 
scheme were to ensure equitable access to health services and to protect against 
financial hardship due to expensive medical treatments for those who were working 
in the informal sector, for example, farmers, street vendors, private car drivers, and 
were not eligible for the low-income card. After the implementation of the SSS, 
individuals who were not covered by the Social Security Scheme, CSMBS, and the 
Medical Welfare Scheme (MWS) were the target groups of VHS. During two 
decades of implementation, the scheme was adjusted many times due to unclear 
policies on national health insurance and health welfare as well as changes in the 
responsible administrators (Srithamrongsawat 2002).  
The development of VHS can be classified into five phases (see Table 28). In the 
first phase, it was aimed to complement the activities of mother and child primary 
health care (MCH) and provide access to basic essential treatment. First a low-priced 
prepaid health card was piloted for eight months in seven provinces. After an 
assessment, the MOPH with technical and financial assistance from GTZ, set the 
target for the second phase to expand the voluntary health card to at least one sub-
district in each province in 1985, to all districts of each province in 1986, and then to 
all sub-districts at the end of 1987. To support the primary health care policy, funds 
were arranged at the community level as a revolving fund and they were provided 
as a loan for health card members to build latrines, and were later collected back to 
pay health facilities at the end of the year.  
In the third phase, at least 70% of households enrolled were initially identified 
by the MOPH. The target was later reduced to 30% due to the top-down policy to 
expand the scheme to cover all sub-districts. Two types of cards, the MCH card and 
the family card for curative care, were provided. The utilization of health services 
was capped at eight illness episodes per card with a ceiling of 2000 bahts per 
episode.  
In the fourth phase started from 1994, the principle of VHS was expanded to 
national public-subsidized voluntary health insurance. Moreover, objectives of the 
funds were changed to providing health security to beneficiaries and to achieving 
universal coverage. The government started providing a subsidy in the form of an 
annual matching fund, which was similar to the principle of the social security 
scheme. The scheme was managed like a revolving fund with a reinsurance policy 
aiming to distribute financial risk of high cost medical services at the central level. 
Only family card was offered to the beneficiaries with neither limitation of health 
service utilization nor a ceiling of health service expense. 
 310 Social Health Insurance 
Table 28: Main characteristics of the Voluntary Health Card Scheme 
Phase 1 
(1983) 
Phase 2  
(1984-1986) 
Phase 3  
(1987-1991) 
Phase 4  
(1993-1998) 
Phase 5  
(1999-2001) 
Conceptual 
framework  
MCH and FP 
(Community 
financing) 
  
Primary health 
care 
(Community 
financing) 
  
Primary health 
care and 
voluntary 
health 
insurance, 
 Voluntary 
health 
insurance. 
  
Public-
subsidized 
voluntary 
health 
insurance. 
Policy 
objectives  
To achieve 
target in MCH 
and FP  
To improve 
referral system 
· To support 
PHC.  
· To improve 
referral 
system.  
· To integrate 
health 
services.  
· To change 
the role of 
health care 
providers to 
be health 
Facilitators.  
· To downsize 
ambulatory 
services of 
tertiary care 
hospitals. 
· To provide 
health 
security.  
· To support 
primary 
health care.  
· To provide 
health 
security.  
· To achieve 
nearly 
universal 
coverage. 
·  o provide 
health 
security.  
· To achieve 
nearly 
universal 
coverage. 
Target 
population  
18 villages in 7 
provinces 
· At least one 
sub-district 
in all. 
provinces, 
and two 
villages in 
each sub-
district.  
· Reducing 
from 70% to 
30 % of 
villagers. 
· All provinces  
covering all 
districts in 
each 
province and 
30 % of total 
population. 
· All 
provinces.  
Sub-groups 
of population 
with no 
health 
benefit 
coverage 
who may 
suffer from 
health care 
expenditure. 
· All provinces  
Sub-groups 
of population 
with no 
health 
benefit 
coverage 
who may 
suffer from 
health care 
expenditure. 
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Phase 1 
(1983) 
Phase 2  
(1984-1986) 
Phase 3  
(1987-1991) 
Phase 4  
(1993-1998) 
Phase 5  
(1999-2001) 
Card prices  
200 bahts for 
medical 
treatments & 
MCH  
100 bahts for 
medical 
treatments only  
100 bahts for 
MCH 
·  200 bahts 
for Family 
card  
· 100 bahts 
for MCH 
·  300 bahts 
for family 
card  
· 200 bahts 
for individual 
card  
· 100 bahts 
for MCH 
·  Family card 
only  
· 1000 bahts; 
equally 
matched by 
the 
government 
and 
cardholders  
·  Family card 
only  
· 1500 bahts 
2/3 from the 
government 
and 1/3 from 
cardholders.  
Limitations of 
utilization  
Not established  
 
· Not more 
than eight 
illness 
episodes per 
card and 
capped to 
2000 bahts 
per episode  
· Not more 
than six 
illness 
episodes per 
card and 
capped to 
2000 bahts 
per episode 
· No limits of 
utilization 
and capping.  
· Including 
MCH 
Reinsurance 
polity for 
high cost 
care and 
cross-
boundary 
utilization. 
· No limits of 
utilization 
and capping.  
Including 
MCH 
Reinsurance 
polity for 
high cost 
care and 
portable 
cards. 
Source: Adapted from Srithamrongsawat, 2002 
When Thailand went into economic recession in 1997, the scheme became 
financially unsustainable. The reduction of household income shifted the pattern of 
people’s health seeking behaviour from private to public health sector providers. 
This led to a remarkable increase in demand for the cards. Therefore, the 
government decided to increase the matching fund from 500 to 1000 bahts per card 
instead of increasing the card’s price but limited the annual sale of cards to three 
million cards. In this regard, the scheme was inevitably geared to be a social 
assistance or welfare-oriented concept rather than an insurance-oriented one. The 
lessons drawn from the VHS can be summarized as follows: 
¦ Public voluntary prepaid health insurance was successful in providing 
health insurance coverage to the population in rural areas. It also ensured 
equitable access to health services when needed and protected 
households from getting in debt from expensive medical treatments. 
¦ Expansion of the public health insurance scheme to cover those in urban 
areas especially Bangkok was very difficult. The number of problems and 
complications tended to grow instead of coverage.  
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¦ In order to achieve universal coverage, a compulsory health insurance is 
the most appropriate method, rather than a tax-based welfare scheme or 
voluntary social health insurance.  
¦ Public voluntary health insurance scheme can be considered as an 
additional tool during the transitional period when universal coverage is 
still not feasible or achievable. 
5.  Social Security – Workmens’ Compensation Scheme  
The WCS was set up according to Decree Number 103 which was formally 
announced by the Revolution Party on 16 March 1972. After more than two decades 
of implementation, the 1994 Workmen’s Compensation Act replaced the Revolution 
Party’s Decree on June 1994 due to the out-of-date details of the Decree and the 
establishment of the Social Security Office. The purpose of the new Act was to 
replace individual employer liability and to provide a prompt and equitable 
protection against injury, disease, disability or death resulting from employment 
through the pooled risk of all private sector employers. The employees are entitled 
to benefits consisting of medical and rehabilitation services and cash benefits 
including compensation and monthly indemnity. In case of death due to work-
related injuries and illness, a funeral grant is paid to survivors.  
Contributions to the WCF are mandatory and solely paid by employers on an 
annual basis. The contributions are assessed on total wages of employees multiplied 
by the contribution rate, according to the type of business. The contribution rate 
varies from 0.2-1.0% of wages based on risk rating of establishment type classified 
by industrial classification. The rate is used for the first four years of contribution. In 
the fifth year, this basic rate of contribution may increase or decrease depending 
upon the accident record of the enterprise. This is called experience rating. Higher 
accident records and higher claims from the fund result in a higher experience rate 
and thus the basic rate in the fifth year may be adjusted in line with the increasing 
trend of compensation from the Fund, as shown in Table 29. In addition:  
¦ Firms whose loss ratio is less than 10% are granted a 70% reduction in the 
basic rate.  
¦ Firms whose loss ratio is 60-70% are not granted a reduction rate or are 
penalized by an increase in the basic rate.  
¦ Firms whose loss ratio is 150% are penalized with an increase in the rate, 
to 200% of the basic rate.  
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Table 29. Loss ratio and experience rate 
Loss ratio Experience rate  
Less than 10% 30% of basic rate 
10.01-20% 40% of basic rate 
20.01-30% 50% of basic rate 
30.01-40% 60% of basic rate 
40.01-50% 70% of basic rate 
50.01-60% 80% of basic rate 
60.01-70% same basic rate 
70.01-80% 110% of basic rate 
80.01-90% 120% of basic rate 
90.01-100% 130% of basic rate 
100.01-110% 140% of basic rate 
110.01-120% 150% of basic rate 
120.01-130% 160% of basic rate 
130.01-140% 170% of basic rate 
140.01-150% 180% of basic rate 
150.01% - 200% of basic rate 
Source: Workmen’s Compensation Office 
Although the scheme is mandatory and most establishments in Thailand with 
one or more employees must pay contributions to the WCF, some enterprises are 
exempted from the law. Employers who are peddlers or stall shop owners, and 
fisheries are exempted from the scheme. However, in case of a work injury, the 
employees in these establishments, though not covered by the Fund, have to notify 
the WCF. The WCF officer can then issue an ordinance to enforce the employers to 
pay compensation to the employees according to their rights.  
The employers have to submit the WCF Registration Form within 30 days as 
from the date when the establishments have one or more employees. The WCF 
collects contributions from the employer annually. In the first year, employers have 
to pay contributions as from the date when the establishments had one or more 
employees. For the next year, the employers have to pay contributions by January. 
Contributions are calculated in advance at the beginning of the year.  
Contributions may not be directly linked to the real wage during the year 
because employers may reduce or increase the number of employees or adjust 
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wages. Therefore in February of each year, the WCF requests the employers to notify 
the total real wage of the former year to the WCF Office. As a result, the WCF can 
compare the contribution with the amount collected at the beginning of last year. 
The WCF has to return any surplus back to the employers or collect the deficit by the 
end of March each year. 
Employees are eligible to receive benefits from the fund as soon as their 
employers register with the Fund and within 30 days from the date when the 
establishments have one or more employees. When employees suffer from work 
injuries or illness, they can receive compensatory benefits, which consist of medical 
expense, monthly indemnity, rehabilitation expenses and a funeral grant. Work 
injuries include physical or mental injuries or death suffered by an employee as a 
result of work or in the course of protecting the interest of the employer or according 
to the orders of the employer. Occupational diseases mean illness suffered by an 
employee as the result of a work related cause or diseases incidental to the nature or 
the conditions of work. 
Medical expenditures can be reimbursed as necessary up to an amount of 
35000 bahts per claim. If medical expenditure exceeds 35000 bahts, the employees 
can be reimbursed up to an amount not exceeding 50000 bahts according to the rule. 
If doctors allow the employees to be absent from work due to work-related illness 
work for more than three consecutive days, employees will receive reimbursement 
for medical expenditure and income replacement at the rate of 60% of the monthly 
wages up to a period not exceeding one year. In the case of loss of organs, 
employees will receive reimbursement for medical expenses, income replacement at 
the rate of 60% of the monthly wages where the employee is unable to work and 
compensation at the rate of 60% of the monthly wages in case of loss of certain 
organs of the body for a period not exceeding 10 years. 
In case employees need rehabilitation services, they can receive the following: 
¦ Reimbursement for medical and vocational rehabilitation expenses for 
amounts not exceeding 20000 bahts, and  
¦ Reimbursement for surgical expenses for amounts not exceeding 20000 
bahts. 
In case of permanent total disability, the employees receive reimbursement for 
medical expenses and compensation of 60 % of the monthly wages for a period not 
exceeding 15 years. In case of death or disappearance of employees during their 
work duties, the survivors receive funeral expenses at the amount of one hundred 
times of the highest rate of the minimum daily wages and compensation at 60% of 
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the monthly wages for eight years. A ceiling for compensation under the WCF has 
been applied. The amount of compensation in case of absence from work due to loss 
of organ, disability, death or disappearance must not be less than 2000 bahts and 
should not exceed 9000 bahts per month. To obtain reimbursement of medical 
expenses, the patient can bring the receipt of the medical expense and 
reimbursement is made by the WCF within 90 days from the date of payment for 
services. If employees receive medical treatment from hospitals with agreements 
with the WCF, the hospitals collect payment directly from the WCF. 
WCS performance analysis 1993-2002 
Table 30 describes the performance of the WCS. Figure 20 demonstrates the progress 
of the WCS in terms of number of employers registered and employees covered in 
1993-2002. The rapid increase of employers registered in 2002 was due to the 
extension of coverage of enterprises with more than one employee. The scheme now 
piggy-backs onto the SSS registration. Figure 21 describes trends in contribution and 
compensation of the WCF. After 1998, contributions collected outpaced 
compensation paid by the Fund, and resulted in significant surplus. This is a result 
of significant reduction in claim rate per 1000 employeesas indicated in Figure 22, 
from 47 claims per 1000 in 1993 to 29 in 2002, and due to the reduction in amount of 
compensation per claim. 
Table 30. WCS performance, 1993-2002 
Year Employer 
Contri-
bution 
(million 
Baht) 
Employe
e 
covered 
Injuries  
claims 
Compen-
sation 
(million 
Baht) 
Compen-
sation 
 per claim 
Claims 
Per 
1000 
1993  34,772 921 3,355,805 156,548 927 5,918 47 
1994  41,690 1,126 4,248,414 186,053 1,169 6,285 44 
1995  49,860 1,398 4,903,736 216,335 1,370 6,333 44 
1996  58,129 1,838 5,425,422 245,616 1,610 6,553 45 
1997  61,533 2,235 5,825,821 230,376 1,986 8,623 40 
1998  64,423 1,733 5,145,835 186,498 1,630 8,739 36 
1999  69,946 1,631 5,321,872 171,997 1,404 8,165 32 
2000  74,617 1,673 5,417,041 179,566 1,257 6,999 33 
2001  79,235 1,765 5,544,436 189,621 1,277 6,732 34 
2002  253,363 1,992 6,541,105 190,979 1,220 6,389 29 
Source: WCS Office, 2004  
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Figure 20. Registered employer and employee coverage 
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Figure 22. WCS financing situation, contribution and compensation, 1993-2002 
Contribution and compensation, WCS 1993-2002
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Figure 22. Number of employee covered by WCS and claim rate  
per 1,000 employees, 1993-2002 
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6.  For-profit Commercial Health Insurance  
Private commercial insurance has been available in Thailand since 1929 to cover 
mostly the better-off population (Tangcharoen-sathien et al. 2002). There are two 
major types of private health insurance companies: those providing health insurance 
as part of life insurance policies, and companies providing health insurance alone. 
Both types also provide individual and group insurance policies (Pitayarangsarit S 
et al. 2002, Surasiengsang S 2004). Private insurance companies are regulated by the 
Department of Insurance of the Ministry of Commerce. Membership is voluntary, 
and prior physical examination, and exclusion of existing conditions and the elderly, 
are common practices. The membership of health insurance policy is renewed 
annually.  
The population coverage by voluntary insurance in 2004 is estimated at five 
million persons, or 8% out 63 million Thais (Surasiengsang 2004). However, the 2003 
Health and Welfare Survey (NSO2003) indicated a lower coverage of 1.1 million (2% 
of total population) by private insurance. Estimates from Surasiengsang tend to be 
more reliable due to the accuracy and completeness of data sources. There is a trend 
towards increasing coverage by private commercial insurance, especially during 
good economic growth. With the sign of recovery from the 1997 economic crisis seen 
in 2003, a consistent increase in premium collection was observed, as shown in Table 
31.  
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Table 31 Performance of private commercial insurance, 1998-2002. 
Year Premium receipt, x  bahts  
Reimbursement 
of claims,  
x1000 bahts 
Loss 
ratio 
Life + health 
insurance 
    
1998 7,094,819 91% 3,662,346 0.52 
1999 7,380,125 90% 3,454,637 0.47 
2000 9,283,048 91% 3,315,905 0.36 
2001 9,578,912 91% 3,612,208 0.38 
2002 10,558,611 91% 3,949,976 0.37 
Health Insurance 
alone 
    
1998 708,082 9% 518,316 0.73 
1999 790,603 10% 596,115 0.75 
2000 872,817 9% 610,972 0.70 
2001 895,955 9% 614,625 0.69 
2002 1,027,257 9% 708,499 0.69 
Both plans     
1998 7,802,901 100% 4,180,662 0.54 
1999 8,170,728 100% 4,050,751 0.50 
2000 10,155,865 100% 3,926,877 0.39 
2001 10,474,867 100% 4,226,833 0.40 
2002 11,585,868 100% 4,658,476 0.40 
Source: Ministry of Commerce  
The financing of private insurance is solely based on voluntary annual 
premium contribution, with a risk-and-age adjusted indemnity insurance. Annual 
premium rates vary considerably, and range from a several hundred bahts per 
person for group insurance (1 USD = 40 bahts in 2004) to several thousand bahts per 
person, depending on the benefits covered. In 2002, the total insurance premium 
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receipts amounted to 11.6 billion bahts of which 91% came from life plus health 
insurance, and 9% from health insurance policies alone.  
The analysis of the private commercial insurance market shows that the three 
largest private insurance companies that provide life plus health insurance have 85% 
of the total market share. One of the companies providing only health insurance had 
more than half of the market share (Surasiengsang 2004) of that product. This 
indicates a considerable market concentration. The analysis indicates higher market 
share (91% of total premium collected) and lower loss ratio (42%) among life plus 
health insurance policies. Companies providing only health insurance with a share 
of only 9% of total premiums collected had a higher average loss ratio at 71%, while 
the national average loss ratio was only 44%. In other words, the life plus health 
insurance companies had a higher profit margin than the others, as seen in Figure 
23. 
Figure 23:. Loss ratio comparison between life plus health and health alone, 1998-2002 
Trend of Loss ratio 1998-02
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A typical private health insurance policy would cover only inpatient admission 
services and ambulatory care for injuries from accidents and injuries. The inpatient 
benefit package generally covers the following:  
¦ Room and board, and nursing charges per inpatient day 
¦ Other treatment costs 
¦ Surgical fees  
¦ Operation theatre fees  
¦ Anaesthetist’s fees 
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¦ Ambulatory services for accident injury and emergency services 
¦ Laboratory and radiological diagnosis 
¦ Doctor’s fees in hospitals  
Several varieties of benefit package are provided, depending on the level of 
premium. These may include a co-payment per ambulatory visit or inpatient 
admission by the patients, a lump sum payment for each episode of illness (plus co-
payment if beyond the lump sum), cash compensation for income loss during 
admission or convalescent period differ among private health insurance 
arrangements. In some cases, rehabilitation services and travelling costs may be 
included in the benefit package 
However, some illnesses and services are commonly excluded from the benefit 
package. These are:  
¦ Suicide  
¦ Injuries resulting from war, civil strife or strikes, and injuries to members 
participating in army, police and volunteer activities in wars or conflicts. 
¦ Injuries from nuclear accidents and radiation 
¦ Injuries related to travel in non-civil aviation services 
¦ Treatment for conditions existing prior to the start of the policy 
¦ Physical check-ups either during admission or ambulatory services 
The most common mode of payment to health care providers is fee-for-service 
reimbursement. It is increasingly common that certified hospitals bill the insurance 
companies directly. Hospitals need to seek prior authorization for inpatient 
treatment insured persons as for any high cost intervention from the insurance 
companies.  
Problems encountered in private commercial insurance relate to the fee-for-
service payment method, in which the insured, the insurance brokers and the health 
care providers may not be concerned with controlling costs. Health care providers 
have incentives to over-investigate and over-prescribe. Once insured, there is some 
risk of individuals using health services excessively (moral hazard). This prompts 
insurance companies to introduce tighter control, utilization reviews and medical 
audit. A network of certified private hospitals has been recommended for insured 
persons which allows allowed direct billing from these hospitals to insurance 
companies. To minimize the costs of inpatient admissions, an outreach ambulatory 
clinic at the workplace is a promising intervention for specific working populations 
covered by group policies. 
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7.  Critical Analysis of Prepayment/ 
Social Health Insurance Mechanisms 
The analysis above shows that mandatory and voluntary social health insurance 
schemes cover only a small proportion of the population in the formal private sector, 
especially as the SSS covers only individual workers and not family members, while 
public sector employees are covered by the non-contributory CSMBS. Private 
commercial insurance covers only the better-off who can afford to pay high annual 
premiums.  
In the Thai context, where formal sector employment is still small, mandatory 
and voluntary prepayment schemes still have serious limitations in expanding 
coverage to the whole population. While there is no politically conducive 
environment, social health insurance still seems to have weak support. At a time 
when there was no political support for full blown universal coverage through social 
health insurance, an effort to initiate work-related injuries and illnesses 
compensation through WCS was legitimate and gained support from policy-makers. 
The implementation of the WCS resulted in human capacity development to manage 
the health insurance fund and served as a solid platform for later implementation 
through the SSO. However, the configuration of WCS-fee-for service reimbursement 
with ceiling model led to over-charging, abuse and fraudulent claims, especially 
when the regulatory function of the WCS was weak. For this reason, health 
insurance under the SSO did not follow the WCS model and initiated the capitation 
contract model. Subsequent evaluation of the capitation payment model indicated 
cost-containment capacity with a decent quality of care.  
Furthermore, after the promulgation of the Social Security Act and beginning 
of the provision of health care benefits, an initial capitation rate of 700 bahts was 
proposed and accepted by the providers. Subsequent updates of the capitation rates 
were supported by calculations conducted by local researchers.  
The MoPH hospitals were the major contractor hospitals for the SSS health 
insurance during the first few years of its implementation. Without strong support 
by the MoPH hospitals, it was impossible to implement social health insurance. Not 
all private hospitals were interested in contracts with the SSO in the first year but the 
number of participating private hospitals grew in subsequent years when evidence 
indicated very low utilization rates among the insured and allowed for a very high 
profit margin.  
Eleven years after the implementation of social health insurance through the 
SSO (1990-2001), the Universal Coverage (UC) scheme was launched. The UC schme 
has adopted the SSO capitation contract model financed by general tax revenue. In a 
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developing country like Thailand where formal sector employment is still small, it is 
difficult to apply mandatory health insurance to extend coverage to the entire 
population. A proper mix of health care financing sources for UC is needed through, 
for example, contributions from the formal sector employment and general taxation 
for the rest of population.  
8.  Conclusions  
It is not only the source of health care finance that is important for the extension of 
health insurance coverage, but also the method according to which health care 
providers are paid. Social health insurance in other countries where a fee-for-service 
reimbursement model is the major mode of payment to health care providers (such 
as Philippines, The Republic of Korea and Taiwan) is facing difficulties of cost 
escalation and inefficiency. In addition, beneficiaries in such countries tend to 
shoulder a high level of co-payment.  
From the Thai experience, it can be concluded that private commercial health 
insurance has limitations in extending health insurance coverage, as they only 
provide this choice to the wealthier population. This is not a policy goal if a country 
needs to extend coverage to the whole population.  
On a voluntary basis, private commercial health insurance has a 
supplementary role to play for services not covered by the benefit packages offered 
in public schemes (such as the SSO and CSMBS). However, private insurance 
companies still provide the whole package, thereby duplicating most of the benefits 
covered, and requiring a full premium. By law, the SSO does not allow members 
with private commercial insurance policies to opt out. This indicates a closer policy 
attention to regulate the private insurance market.  
It is not clear why the SSO has not put more serious effort in expanding health 
insurance coverage to the employees' dependents, while there were good 
opportunities and adequate resources to do so. Repeated recommendations have 
also been made by ILO consultants regarding the technical and financial feasibility 
of such extension.  
We need to reiterate the recommendations made to the SSS to extend the 
coverage beyond the workers to cover their spouses and children as well. This 
would minimize the government’s fiscal burden in supporting the current universal 
coverage scheme that should be covered by social health insurance through the SSO.  
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Viet Nam 
Afsar Akal and Nguyen Kim Phuong 
1.  Background 
Viet Nam, since its establishment in 1945, has pursued with socialist models in 
economic and social development. Basic social services such as health care and 
education were free till 1986. From 1986, along with the disintegration of the former 
communist world, the country has embarked upon an economic reform programme 
known as “doi moi” which has transformed the system from a centrally planned one 
to a market-oriented one. Private economic sector emerged and it has profoundly 
affected social sectors, including health. One of the most challenging issues in the 
health sector today is finding alternative health financing mechanisms which can 
meet the growing health needs of the population as the economy grows at a faster 
pace. 
Prior to 1986, the health care system focused on primary health care, health 
education and disease prevention. With a considerably low income base to begin 
with after a long war and post-war reconstruction period, Viet Nam achieved 
significantly good health indicators, in comparison with other countries of the same 
income level. During the last ten years, Viet Nam has achieved a significant 
reduction in its population growth rate with an annual average of only 1.7%. The 
population was 77.6 million in 2000, and is estimated to be 81.2 million in 2003. 
While the unemployment rate in urban areas was 6.4% in 2000, 6.3% in 2001, and 
reduced to 6.0% in 2002, the national average including rural areas hovers above 
10%. People living below international poverty line* accounted for 16.4% of the total 
population in 1998 and this internationally comparable poverty rate is expected to 
decline to 10.6% by 2004. Living standards in mountainous areas and among the 
ethnic groups are still very low. The rate of unused working time of labour in rural 
areas is much higher than the urban unemployment rate as a result of low 
investment in rural areas. More than one million youths enter the labour force each 
year but there has been a lack of job opportunities, caused by the reduction in 
growth rates of production and business.  
                                                   
* Source: World Bank, East Asia and Pacific Region (2003); measured in constant 1993 prices of purchasing 
power parity (PPP) dollars, population living below one PPP-dollar per day. 
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On the health-financing front, national health expenditures in the past have 
been financed by central and local government general revenue. However, along 
with the collapse of the local collective economic system, the government faced 
severe fiscal pressures, which resulted in under-funding of the health sector in large. 
There was a drastic cut in the government budget for health care during the1980s. In 
order to cure and sustain the system, the government allowed health care facilities to 
apply cost recovery methods. Introduction of user fees at public facilities was timed 
with the introduction of health insurance pilots for the formal sector. The shift from 
fully public subsidized system to a mixture of budgetary support and additional 
funding from user fees and social insurance has led to the flourishing private 
provision of health care in Viet Nam. Private practice among the public sector 
employed health staff has become more acceptable by the populace, in an effort to 
let providers gain additional income complementary to their officially low salaries 
financed by the state budget. 
There is growing recognition among policy-makers that user charges in health 
care seriously jeopardize the equity in access to health care. Furthermore, user 
charge collections became an engine for the escalation of health care prices, 
distorting the quality of care, worsening professional ethics, placing financial 
burdens on many families and putting a barrier for the poor to access these services.  
At the same time, the policy-makers have been put under pressure to mobilize 
more resources for health care. There is growing recognition that government is no 
longer able to pay for all of health care needs of the nation. With the economic 
reform programme, the concept of “socialization of health care” has been introduced 
with the notion that both government and citizens should join in efforts to 
financially contribute for health care. 
The recent socioeconomic developments will expectedly challenge the 
government’s efforts to institutionalize social insurance mechanisms in the country 
for the first quarter of this century. The rural and informal sector still accounts for a 
sizeable share of the total economy, and setting functional social safety nets while 
integrating the informal sector into the broad social insurance system will occupy 
significant policy debate time in the foreseeable future. 
2. Development of Health Insurance Mechanisms 
In the late 1980s, social health insurance was put on the policy table for discussion as 
a means to mobilize more resources for health care and replace direct user charges. 
Social health insurance was also considered as a means to promote social solidarity, 
by pooling the contributions together to share the risks among the members. The 
policy option was discussed in detail and experimentation with social health 
insurance first began piloting in a few provinces in Viet Nam during the early 
nineties, initially covering government employees. In 1992, compulsory health 
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insurance was introduced countrywide with the issuance of the first government 
decree on health insurance (Decree 299) and with the establishment of health 
insurance offices in all provinces and with the Central Office in Hanoi. Since then, 
social health insurance has grown steadily, covering mainly civil servants and 
employees of the state-owned enterprises, including those who retired and have 
made meritorious services to their country, and in part private enterprise workers, 
students and the eligible poor.  
After almost ten years of implementation, members of national health 
insurance schemes are largely concentrated within the formal salaried workers and 
school students. Viet Nam is still largely an agricultural country with the majority of 
population residing in rural areas and not yet covered by health insurance. It is a 
challenge now for Viet Nam to expand the coverage to the rural population. 
Development of appropriate voluntary health insurance schemes is now being 
piloted in different provinces as a first step in the route to achieve universal 
coverage in health insurance. 
Health insurance schemes 
Currently, the following three social health insurance schemes are operating: 
¦ Compulsory Insurance Scheme: covering active and retired salaried 
workers in the public sector, private sector with over 10 employees and 
social benefit recipients such as meritorious persons or war invalids; 
¦ Voluntary Insurance Scheme: for students, farmers, informal sector and 
private sector with less than 10 employees, and  
¦ Health Insurance for the Poor: covering low-income earners, residents of 
communes facing difficult socioeconomic conditions and ethnic 
minorities living in rural, remote and mountainous areas. 
Administration of health insurance 
Social health insurance is administered by the Viet Nam Social Security Agency 
(VSS) and Provincial Management Boards for Health Care Fund for the Poor 
(HCFP). VSS with its Head Office in Hanoi and with 64 provincial/regional and 
more than 500 district offices, provides benefits for about 11.6 million people 
excluding the poor scheme members or 15.7 million including the poor (2003-See 
Figure 24). Provincial HCFP Management Boards administer benefits for a targeted 
14.6 million people of which more than four million have been issued free health 
insurance cards through VSS. The two administrations combined are aiming to 
provide benefits to more than 30% of the total Viet Nam population within a few 
years. The administration of social health insurance, which used to be under MoH, 
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was shifted to VSS in January 2003, which administers benefits for long-term 
pension, disability, occupational health, maternity and labour accidents. 
Figure 24. Health Insurance Coverage by Viet Nam Social Security Agency 
Social Health Insurance Coverage
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Government regulations and main events in health insurance 
development 
Health insurance has not yet been adopted as law. The highest order regulatory 
document applicable today is the Health Insurance Decree/58 enacted in 1998, 
which replaced the first Decree/299 of 1992. Preparatory work has begun to include 
health insurance as a chapter in the Draft Social Security Law. 
Various parts of the health insurance decree have been annulled by subsequent 
regulations. Table 32 below contains the title, date of issuance and historical 
significance of each regulation related to health insurance.  
In practice, after a law is passed the President issues a decree proclaiming the 
law to bring it into force and the relevant ministry issues a circular to provide 
guidance on how to implement the decree of the government. The process for the 
creation of these legislative instruments, while simpler than ordinances and laws, 
has reportedly led to situations where the subsidiary legislations are in conflict with 
the law they seek to implement. In response the policy environment in this area 
became highly dynamic. MoH, MoF, MOLISA, Prime Minister’s Office and National 
Assembly are actively debating policy improvements and issuing new changes.  
 329 Selected Case Studies from Asia and the Pacific 
Table 32. Chronology of Main Health Insurance Regulations  
and Law Amendments 
Reference and  
Title of Regulation Date of Issue Historical Significance 
Prime Ministerial Decision 45-
Introduction of Cost Recovery and 
Social Insurance  
 
Circular 14-Implementation Guidelines 
for Cost Recovery and Social 
Insurance 
24 April1989 
 
 
 
15 June 1989 
Government introduces user fees 
at public facilities and allows 
piloting of social health insurance 
and setting up of humanitarian 
funds for the poor to generate 
additional funding for health care. 
Health care is officially no longer 
free in Viet Nam.  
Decree 299-Health Insurance 
Regulations 
15 August1992 Nationwide implementation of 
social health insurance is 
decreed in Viet Nam. 
Decree 95 and revision of, by Decree 
33-Schudule of Fees at Government 
owned Hospitals and Clinics 
27August1994  
Revised 23 May 
1995 
Cost recovery at public facilities 
is embodied in a higher order 
regulatory document. Increased 
user charges, which are currently 
applicable. 
MoH and MoET Inter Ministerial 
Circular 14-Student Health Insurance 
Scheme 
19 September 
1994 
Voluntary Health Insurance for a 
large segment of the population 
(students) is introduced. 
MoH MoLISA Inter Ministerial Circular 
14-Exemptions Policy 
1995 Some groups of people (the poor, 
meritorious persons, children 
under age six etc) are exempted 
from paying official user fees. 
MoH and MoET Inter- Ministerial 
Circular 40-Voluntary Student Health 
Insurance 
19July1998 Amended first school health 
insurance circular by expanding 
benefits, increasing premiums 
and modifying reserve rules. 
Inter-Ministerial Circular 05/1999-Free 
Health Insurance Cards for the Poor 
29 January 1999 Fee exemption policy is replaced 
with special allocations (mainly 
from provincial Hunger 
Eradication and Poverty 
Reduction Programmes). 
Government brings the poor 
under social insurance with 
premium-backed funding. 
Ninth Communist Party Congress 
Strategy for People’s Health Care and 
Protection for 2001-2010  
19 March 2001 Universal health insurance 
becomes a nationally-adopted 
policy choice. 
Decree 63-Health Insurance for the 
Dependents of Armed Forces 
18 June2002 First instance of compulsory 
health insurance coverage 
extended to the dependents. 
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Reference and  
Title of Regulation Date of Issue Historical Significance 
Prime Ministerial Decision 139-Health 
Care Fund for The Poor and 
subsequent Circular 14 on 
Implementation Guidelines  
15 October 2002 
 
16 December 
2002 
Special provincial allocations for 
funding for the poor scheme is 
replaced with Central 
Government funding. 
Government increases the 
premium, decentralizes the 
administration of health 
insurance by setting up provincial 
management boards 
independent of VSS and stops 
reserve build-up. 
Decree 100-Prescribing the functions, 
tasks, powers and organizational 
structure of Viet Nam Social Security 
Agency 
6 December 2002 Health insurance portfolio is 
moved out of MoH and handed 
over to VSS to unify social 
insurance administration. MoH 
retains policy control over health 
insurance. 
Prime Ministerial Decision 02-
Stipulating the Financial Management 
Regulations of Viet Nam Social 
Security 
2 January 2003 All social security is now 
administered under a single “fund 
holder” made up of various 
“component funds or risk pools” 
each to be monitored separately. 
Ordinance 07 of National Assembly on 
Private Medical and Pharmaceutical 
Practice 
January2003 National Assembly endorses 
more stringent regulations for 
private provision of health. 
Private providers can contract 
with VSS and other insurers. The 
regulation aims to enforce private 
medical practitioners not to 
engage in the provision and sale 
of pharmaceutical drugs. 
MoH/MoF Inter Ministerial Circular 77-
Voluntary Health Insurance and 
subsequent Circular 3631 on 
Implementation Guidelines 
5 August 2003 
 
 
 
Voluntary insurance is now 
available to a larger population 
with a broader benefit package 
under a regulatory framework. 
Alternative payment methods can 
be used in provider contracts for 
this scheme only. 
Introduced “community enrolment 
thresholds” to eliminate adverse 
selection. Waiting periods and 
caps on some benefits 
introduced for the first time. 
MoLISA Circular 24 Health Insurance 
for the Elderly (Above 90) 
6 November 2003 Extension of health insurance to 
old people using the model 
applied for scheme for the poor. 
Another instance of fee 
exemption being replaced by 
premium-backed health 
insurance. 
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Figure 25 below shows growth of health insurance coverage during the past 
decade and major historical events and regulatory changes introduced by the 
government in order to increase health insurance coverage. 
Figure 25. Historical events in social health insurance coverage 
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3.  Compulsory Health Insurance Schemes 
Scheme Summary 
Administering Agency Viet Nam Social Security Agency 
Regulation Type/Date Decree-58/1998 
Target Group Formal sector-active and retired salaried 
workers in the public sector (civil servants 
and state-owned enterprise employees), 
private sector with over 10 employees and 
social benefit recipients such as 
meritorious persons or war invalids. 
Dependent coverage Dependent family members are excluded 
except for military personnel. 
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Administering Agency Viet Nam Social Security Agency 
Contribution basis and Premiums Percentage of salary or earnings including 
allowances-3% payroll tax shared between 
employer (2%) and employee (1%) 
excluding old age pensioners and social 
security beneficiaries whose contributions 
are paid by the state (3%) of base pension 
and national minimum wage respectively). 
Benefits Primary, in-patient and outpatient services 
and benefit paid drugs. Exclusions apply. 
Co-payments 20% of official user fee from active 
employed category. Pensioners and social 
security beneficiaries exempted. 
Approximately 50% co-payments apply for 
high-tech diagnostic/treatment services 
and disposable medical supplies for all 
beneficiaries. Safety-net of six times 
minimum wage, above which all costs are 
covered by the scheme. 
Service provision Free choice of provider at district hospital 
level and below. Patient needs to follow 
referral lines. 
Provider payment methods Capped fee for service. Providers receive 
capitation-based quarterly advances. 
Reserves/Risk Pooling Reserve carry-overs allowed. Nationally, 
the risk pooled with voluntary scheme. 
Compulsory health insurance covers active and retired salaried workers in the 
public sector (civil servants and state owned enterprise employees), private sector 
with over 10 employees and social benefit recipients such as meritorious persons or 
war invalids. Currently dependents of insured are not covered by compulsory 
insurance except for the armed forces*. All elderly persons above age 90 are covered 
by government-funded health insurance either through the formal VSS pension 
scheme or by MOLISA (Circular 24).  
                                                   
* Approximately 400 000 dependents became eligible following this regulatory change representing 7% of total 
compulsory insured persons. 
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Benefits 
The general framework for the health insurance benefit package is based on three 
criteria: 
¦ Whether separate government funding exists for particular health 
interventions; 
¦ Whether there is a fee exemption policy for the type of benefits 
demanded by a target group, and  
¦ Whether another insurance scheme covers a benefit (i.e. employment 
injury or traffic accidents). 
Services that are funded by the government under a vertical programme (i.e. 
vaccinations, TB, leprosy, malaria etc.) or services, which are likely to be demanded 
by a target group under an exemption policy (congenital malformations and 
diseases), are generally speaking not covered by health insurance (See Table 33). 
Hospital stays and diagnostic services are covered by insurance but certain items 
such as disposable medical supplies, high-technology diagnostic services and 
treatments and benefit-paid drugs are specifically outlined in separate MoH 
regulatory decisions. 
Co-payments 
Individuals in the meritorious category and pensioners are not required to pay co-
payments. Active contributors (employed persons) are required to pay 20% co-
payment based on the schedule of hospital fees. Co-payments for disposable medical 
supplies and high-technology diagnostic and treatment services are generally 50% of 
the charge and regulated separately. 
Choice of provider 
Generally speaking, members have free choice of provider although this has limited 
applicability in practice, especially in rural areas. All members are required to 
nominate a primary-level provider, which is often a district-level hospital, which can 
be changed every quarter. Rural people are generally required to be registered with 
the provider located within the administrative jurisdiction even though some 
members may well be closer to a provider in a neighbouring district. Members can 
obtain health services from Commune Health Stations (CHS) if there are sufficient 
members residing in the area and the District Health Centre (DHC) has an 
agreement with the CHS.  
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Table 33. Broad Health Insurance Benefit Package of VSS-Administered Schemes 
Benefit Inclusions Benefit Exclusions 
l Primary health care 
-  Personal hygiene, nutritional, 
environmental health and prevention 
activities 
-   Health check-up 
-   First aid and emergency care 
l Treatment for leprosy, 
psychiatric treatments 
(schizophrenia), epilepsy 
l Medicines used for tuberculosis, 
malaria, rabies prevention and 
treatment 
l Family planning services 
l Health care provider level 
-  Insured members can choose health care 
provider at district-level to register and 
will be referred to higher level when 
necessary. 
-   If health care is given in consistence with 
the regulations at district, provincial and 
central levels: the health insurance fund 
will pay 80% of the fees, the other 20% 
will be paid by the insured person. 
-  If patient’s total out-of-pocket payments 
for the 20% co-payment amount exceed 
the amounts set in the current applicable 
regulations for a given year, VSS will 
cover the cost difference. 
-  Members visiting providers where they 
are not registered for first level of contact 
or making discretionary choices for 
medical practitioner or medicines have to 
pay all the fees. Health insurance 
agencies will consider and reimburse 
costs in accordance with the currently 
applicable regulations on fees.  
l Fees for HIV/AIDS tests, 
gonorrhoea and syphilis, 
diagnosis and treatment 
l Preventive medicine, 
vaccinations, sanatorium, 
regular check-up, health 
examination for recruitment) 
l Aesthetic orthopaedics and 
plastic surgery, glasses, hearing 
aid, false limbs, false teeth, false 
eyes, artificial joints, crystalline 
lens and heart valve, prosthetics 
l Rehabilitative treatment out of 
the list established by the 
Ministry of Health 
l Congenital diseases and birth 
defects 
l Occupational diseases 
-  In emergency cases, people with health 
insurance cards will be given health 
service and treatment at any health care 
provider and enjoy all health insurance 
benefits regardless of variations in 
technical levels or different administrative 
boundaries. 
l Labour accidents 
l Road accidents including after 
effects from road accidents  
l War accidents and calamities  
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Benefit Inclusions Benefit Exclusions 
l Health service given under the 
doctor's instructions: 
-  Examination, tests, X-rays, functional 
investigation for diagnosis and treatment  
-  Provision of medicines within the list 
established by the Ministry of Health, 
blood and fluid transfusion using the 
common materials, health equipments for 
health care 
-  Surgeries and operations 
-  Use of patient beds 
l For maternity: health insurance 
agencies will pay the fees according 
to the currently applicable 
regulations. 
-  Death allowance per case at applicable 
rate set out in regulations. 
l Suicides, intentionally caused 
injuries, drug addiction, law 
violations 
l Early pregnancy tests and 
diagnosis, infertility treatment 
l Costs of transporting the 
patients, meals during treatment 
period 
Members can also obtain services from private providers albeit with partial 
reimbursement even in the absence of a contract between VSS and the private 
provider. The health insurance benefit for private consultations is often lower than 
the actual charge commensurate with the level of fee that would be payable to the 
equivalent public level provider. 
Insured members can obtain health services from any provider in their own 
provinces or outside in accident and emergency cases but they are normally 
required to make the payments to the providers themselves and then seek 
reimbursement once they return to the jurisdiction where they are registered. If the 
case is referred to a tertiary hospital outside the province of usual residence, in most 
cases the member needs to pay only the co-payment amount. 
Fund management and risk pooling 
Since the take-over of health insurance by VSS, allocation for health insurance 
reserves and administration is abolished. All compulsory health insurance premium 
income is used for paying health care benefits. From each month's social insurance 
fund income, VSS advances benefits to members and all carry-overs (revenue minus 
expenditure) are invested in bank deposits and government bonds.  
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Compulsory and voluntary schemes are now combined under a single risk 
pool. VSS can carry reserves for compulsory and voluntary health insurance 
schemes. Reserve carry-overs for health insurance for the poor are disallowed.  
Administrative expenses 
Insurance administration is for card printing and distribution, paying agent 
commissions, for IEC-Information Education and Communication campaigns and 
for conducting regular inspections at enterprise level (for premium payment 
compliance) and health care provider level (to detect fraud).  
Funding of administration is sourced from total revenue of social insurance 
fund, which includes all social insurance contingencies. Administrative expenses 
cannot exceed 4% of the estimated value of social insurance premium revenue in a 
year.  
Contracting and provider payments 
Government administered health insurance is generally conducted through 
contracts with public providers. Private hospital contracting has been piloted on a 
small scale. The National Assembly Ordinance 10 on private medical practice allows 
VSS to sign contracts with private providers. Contracting between VSS and a health 
care provider is normally done for providers who operate as a separate legal entity. 
In effect, these are limited to provincial, central and district-level hospitals. 
Commune health stations and inter-commune polyclinics can provide services to 
insured members under the supervision of DHC and receive payment from the 
DHC. 
Every quarter, VSS transfers a fixed percentage of premium income to each of 
the contracted health providers based on the number of registered members. This 
advanced “capitation-based” budget is approximately 70% of the health insurance 
premium for the quarter and covers all primary, outpatient and inpatient care 
services (See Table 34). The advance is for supporting health care services until all 
health services provided to insured persons are reconciled against itemized bills. 
The payment method is hence “fee-for-service with budget capping/ceilings” in 
order to safeguard the fund. 
The hospital fees are based on a government Decree (95/Revision Decree 33), 
which applies to public-owned and operated hospitals and clinics. The regulation is 
more than eight years old and the fees have not been adjusted since their official 
introduction. Providers on the other hand have taken initiative in moving the fees 
upwards within the range applicable in this regulation as well as introducing 
discretionary fees for advanced diagnostic and treatment services.  
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Due to more flexibility allowed for drug and disposable medical supplies 
prices, which are more or less determined by market forces, most provider income 
in the past has been highly dependent on movement in prices of pharmaceutical and 
medical supplies and volume of prescriptions given to patients who are willing to 
pay. 
Table 34:. Compulsory Scheme Fund Allocation, Quarterly Advance Calculation  
and Final Settlement Methods 
Type of Care Allocation Ratio 
Quarterly Advance Calculation 
Method Final Settlement 
Primary Health 
Care 5% Capped 
Outpatient Care 45% 
Fixed % of premium income (70%) 
Capped-Intra-
Provider Adjusted* 
Inpatient Care 50% 
Historical average cost for each 
clinical department adjusted by 
price index 
Un-capped 
* Expenses for patients referred to other hospitals are deducted from the payment of members’ principal 
registered provider. 
Safety nets 
Safety nets provide financial protection for members who suffer catastrophic health 
expenditure and apply to persons who are required to pay co-payments. For 
compulsory members who pay co-payments (active employed), annual co-payments 
exceeding six times the minimum salary per month is set as a safety-net threshold 
above which all benefit-payable health expenses of the member are covered by VSS.  
There are two complexities in the current safety net rules. The threshold only 
covers services where 20% co-payments apply. In other words, 50% co-payment 
applied to disposable medical supplies and high-technology diagnostic and 
treatment services are excluded from the calculation amount as they are not defined 
in the fee schedule of hospital bed-day charge or outpatient consultation fee as 
defined by the health insurance decree.  
Reimbursement 
Insured persons can be directly reimbursed by health insurance under the following 
circumstances: 
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¦ Member receives services not from his/her principal registered care 
provider such as in the case of accident and emergencies.  
¦ Member is outside his/her residential province.  
¦ Member receives services from a private provider. 
¦ Member has paid co-payments in excess of the safety-net thresholds. 
The payment amount for the private service would be based on the fee 
schedule applicable to the principal registered public care provider with a provision 
to allow a benefits up to 20% more than the public provider’s fee. 
4.  Voluntary Health Insurance Schemes 
Voluntary health insurance in Viet Nam is a VSS-administered pre-payment scheme 
being experimented as an interim mechanism for reaching universal health 
insurance. The target population segments are the dependents of individuals 
covered by the compulsorily insured, the self-employed and informal sector workers 
and their dependents. Unlike compulsory insurance premiums, which are a fixed 
percentage of salary or other forms of income, voluntary health insurance premiums 
are defined as flat-amount contributions and paid in full by the households. 
Definition of young age family dependents exclude children under six years of age 
as they are exempted to pay user fees at publicly-owned health facilities. 
Circular 77 issued in August 2003 (See Table 32) regulates voluntary health 
insurance, which has expanded health insurance benefit package and brought them 
more or less in line with the compulsory scheme. People can join VSS- administered 
voluntary health insurance from three channels 
¦ Schools  
¦ Administrative Units (i.e. commune, village, hamlet, ward) 
¦ Associations/Mass Organizations (i.e. Women’s Union, Farmers’ Union, 
Youth Union, Fatherland Front etc.) 
Scheme Summary 
Administering Agency Viet Nam Social Security Agency in close 
cooperation with community administrative 
units, mass organizations and schools. 
Regulation Type/Date Circular 77/2003. 
Target Group Informal sector, rural/agricultural workers 
and students 
 339 Selected Case Studies from Asia and the Pacific 
Dependent coverage All family members except currently 
insured by the compulsory scheme. 
Optionally fee-exempt children under age 
six can register.  
Contribution basis and Premiums Flat amount with discounts for additional 
members. Separate for urban and rural 
members. Lower premiums apply for 
students.  
Benefits Primary, inpatient and outpatient services 
and benefit-paid drugs. Exclusions apply. 
Benefit caps apply. Waiting periods apply. 
Co-payments 20% of official user fee. Approximately 
50% co-payments apply for high-tech 
diagnostic/treatment services and 
disposable medical supplies. Safety net of 
1.5 million dong, above which all costs are 
covered by the scheme. 
Service Provision Free choice of provider at district hospital 
level and below. Patient needs to follow 
referral lines.  
Provider payment methods Capped fee for service. Capitation-based 
contracts are allowed subject to 
agreement with the provider. 
Reserves/Risk Pooling Reserve carry-overs allowed. Nationally, 
the risk pooled with compulsory scheme. 
Commissions, which are a type of administrative expense is payable to the 
community agencies undertaking health insurance enrolment campaigns. The latter 
two channels have been created by the new regulation to mobilize the community. 
The involvement of community organizations and administrative units is to enrol all 
family members except currently-insured persons under compulsory insurance or 
children under 6. Family enrolment is functional only if families join through mass 
organizations or through an administrative unit. The school channel, as before, does 
not enrol parents of students.  
Community enrolment thresholds have been introduced in order to overcome 
adverse selection. Accordingly voluntary health insurance is offered to the public 
only if a community channel can warrant a minimum percentage of enrolment 
among target people before VSS processes membership applications (See Table 35).  
 340 Social Health Insurance 
Table 35. Community Enrolment Thresholds for Voluntary Health Insurance 
Enrolment Channel Community Enrolment Thresholds 
Local administrative units (commune, 
hamlet or ward) 
Minimum 20% of total households 
residing. 
Associations (Women’s Union, 
Farmer’s Union, Youth Union etc) 
Minimum 40% of total members of an 
association excluding compulsorily 
insured. 
Pupils, students (Schools) Minimum 30%* of students at school.  
Premiums: Voluntary health insurance premiums are defined as flat amounts 
per person where a discount of 5% is incrementally applicable for each additional 
member.  
Table 36. Voluntary Health Insurance Premiums 
Areas (VND) 
Enrolment Channel 
Urban Rural 
Local administrative units (commune, 
hamlet or ward) 
80000-140000 60000-100000 
Associations (Women’s Union, 
Farmer’s Union, Youth Union etc) 
80000-140000 60000-100000 
Pupils, students (Schools) 35000-70000 25000-50000 
Each local jurisdiction can choose an affordable premium amount established 
within these bounds (see Table 5), which can only be increased by VSS if the 
government increases official hospital charges. All hospital fee increases and 
subsequent raise in premium need to be endorsed by the MoF. 
A family of five in a rural area where the authority sets the base premium at 
60000 would be paying 270000 dong per year calculated as 
60000+57000+54000+51000+48000 with the 5% discount of 3,000 dong incrementally 
applied for each additional member. A complicating factor exists for students. If the 
local school is offering health insurance, a family would pay a lower premium and 
                                                   
* A temporary threshold of 15% applies for the 2003/04 school year during the transitional period since the 
new regulation came into effect. 
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the family premium calculation above would exclude school-enrolled family 
members. If there is no school health insurance on offer, which is often the case in 
rural localities, family members attending school would only receive the incremental 
5% premium discount. 
As a rule, members can pay their premiums every six months (semi-annual). 
However, this does not mean the collection cycle is year round every month, where 
each member can join anytime and pay their premiums six months after their joining 
date. The premium collection cycles are timed to be around harvest times and need 
to be completed within a month. Those who do not join at the collection time are 
generally excluded until the next collection cycle arrives. Each member needs to join 
for at least six months for VSS to print the insurance card validity period. 
There is no guaranteed minimum government subsidy for voluntary health 
insurance members. The Circular leaves it open for community organizations 
(unions and associations) to use their working budgets to subsidize premiums of 
their members who need financial assistance. 
Benefits, co-payments and benefit caps: The benefit package of the voluntary 
health insurance scheme is similar to the compulsory scheme (for actively employed 
persons who are required to pay co-payments of 20%). Voluntary insurance 
regulation has introduced a 20000 dong threshold per service below which no co-
payments are required in order to simplify insurance administration. Accordingly, 
low-cost services such as primary level care and essential drugs below this threshold 
are available free of charge to voluntary members. 
Unlike the compulsory scheme, voluntary health insurance has benefit caps for 
high cost surgical and medical interventions. Accordingly, VSS pays up to 10 million 
dong per person for heart surgery and 12 million dong for kidney transplants. 
Vaccinations for rabies/animal bites are also capped at 300000 dong per person per 
year.  
Provider contracting and payment methods: Provider contracting and 
payment methods for voluntary insurance is no different than the compulsory 
scheme although capitation payment method is allowed, provided that the provider 
agrees to perform services to all registered voluntary members under this 
arrangement.  
The voluntary health insurance circular is a lower-level document than a 
government decree. Therefore fee-for-service method established by Decree 
95/Decree 33 (see Table 32) applies to all compulsory and poor scheme members 
administered by VSS. This creates possibilities for duplicate payment methods in a 
jurisdiction for different classes of health insurance members. 
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5.  Health Insurance for the Poor 
Scheme Summary 
Administering Agency Provincial HCFP Management Boards in 
close cooperation with Viet Nam Social 
Security Agency. 
Regulation Type/Date Prime Ministerial Decision 139/2002. 
Target Group Low –income persons, populations living in 
rural, remote and mountainous provinces 
under difficult conditions, ethnic minorities. 
Dependent coverage All family members except fee-exempt 
children under age six.  
Contribution basis and Premiums Flat-amount 70000 dong per person per 
year shared 75% (52500 dong) by Central 
Government and 25% (17500 dong) by 
domestic and international donors. 
Benefits Primary, in-patient and outpatient services 
and benefit paid drugs. Exclusions apply. 
Co-payments Not applicable. 
Service Provision Free choice of provider at district hospital 
level and below. Patient needs to follow 
referral lines.  
Provider payment methods Capped fee for service and capitation-
based quarterly advances. 
Reserves/Risk Pooling Reserve carry-overs not allowed. 
Provincially risk-pooled. 
The Health Care Fund for the Poor (HCFP) is an insurance mechanism set up 
for a designated group of people by the decision of the Prime Minister. The decision 
has consolidated a number of regulations that exempted certain groups of 
beneficiaries from paying hospital fees in the past.  
HCFP works on the basis of a per capita allocation of 70000 dong where the 
government funds a minimum of 75% and the remaining 25% is sourced from 
international and domestic donors. The fund is administered by Provincial 
Management Boards. They can either decide to purchase health insurance cards 
from VSS for a fixed price of 50000 dong per card or reimburse health expenses of 
eligible members. Alternatively, care providers who provide services to exempted 
beneficiaries could also be reimbursed by these boards. 
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The fund needs to be spent for providing health benefits and its administration 
only, therefore fund roll-overs (reserve accumulation) are not allowed.  
Target groups, main beneficiaries  
¦ The rural poor with an income of less than 80000 dong per month in 
remote and mountainous areas and 100000 dong in other rural settings. 
¦ The urban poor with an income of less than 150000 dong per month 
provided that they have legal residence status. This excludes unregistered 
migrant poor. 
¦ All residents of designated rural, remote and mountainous areas and 
ethnic minorities living in the communes of these designated areas, 
regardless of income level. 
Membership is family based, except the under-six-years-old children who are 
exempted. 
Policy implications  
HCFP has the following policy implications: 
¦ Increasing government’s funding for health care; 
¦ Decentralization of health insurance administration; 
¦ Fragmentation of risk pools, and  
¦ Changing the flow of funds from provincial special allocations such as 
Hunger Eradication and Poverty Reduction Programme funding to 
Central Government’s consolidated budget. 
Previously, a free health insurance card for the poor scheme was administered 
through VSS, with provincial governments purchasing cards on behalf of the poor, 
at 30000 dong per card (Circular 05/1999) from the VHI. The present amount of 
70000 to a large extent dealt with the problem of inadequate funds to cover the 
health care costs of the poor. There was no formal arrangement for central budget to 
provide funding for provinces and hence, poor provinces relied on special budgets 
that were allocated broadly under the Hunger Eradication and Poverty Reduction 
Program of MoLISA. The few provinces that are self sufficient in terms of local tax 
and other revenue sources could make the necessary allocations while the remaining 
provinces suffered from budget constraints. Due to lack of funding, the target of 
four million cards was not achieved and total distribution was reported to be around 
1.6 million by 2002. By the end of 2003, VSS reported approximately four million 
cards purchased by 31 Provincial HCFP Boards, and accounting for 28% of total 
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beneficiaries. The remaining provinces have chosen direct reimbursement method 
from HCFP to providers or members. 
The directing of government subsidies from the Central Government has 
established greater equity in funding. The likely impact of this policy change is 
expected to increase public funding for health care (including tax-funded and VSS-
administered social insurance/prepayment schemes) by 12%. 
Risk pool: The HCFP mechanism has created two separate health insurance 
risk pools for administration by VSS and Provincial Boards as per capita financing is 
70000 dong whereby the insurance card cost is 50000 dong (See Table 37). Regardless 
of which agency administers the benefits, the fund is further fragmented at 
provincial level. Each provincial pool is separate: the deficit in the pool of one 
provincial HCFP fund is not subsidized by the surplus of another. If a Provincial 
HCFP board decides not to purchase health insurance cards from VSS, the HCFP 
pool operates as a single risk pool for that province alone. 
The VSS health insurance risk pool is made up of compulsory and voluntary 
schemes, as two component funds are risk-pooled nationally. Revenue from HCFP 
premiums is not pooled nationally and is separately accounted for by the VSS. 
Table 37. Main Features of HCFP and Pooling Arrangements 
Health care fund for the poor 
Main Features  
Target Population: million persons 14.6 
Per capita Allocation dong    70,000  
Central Government Contribution Billion dong 766.5 
in USD millions  $   49.77  
Local Government and Donor/Other Contributions Billion 
Dong 255.5 
in USD millions  $   16.59  
Total estimated expenditure per year Billion dong    1022  
in USD millions  $   66.36  
  
Pooling Arrangements  
Insurance card price dong    50000  
Health Insurance Pool-VSS (maximum) Billion dong 730 
in USD millions  $   47.40  
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Provincial Pool (Government Guaranteed minimum) Billion 
dong 36.5 
in USD millions  $   2.37  
Provincial Pool (Minimum if all local/donor contribution is 
collected) Billion dong 292 
in USD millions  $   18.96  
Note: Calculations are based on full coverage of 14.6 million target population. The sharing of the 
funding pool depends on provincial level arrangements. Cards could either be purchased from 
Viet Nam Social Security or members receive direct reimbursement for their Health expenses. 
Alternatively care providers can get reimbursed from the Provincial Management Boards of 
HCFP. 
It should be noted that, provincial-level fragmentation currently serves its 
purpose based on the current situation in Viet Nam whereby administrative capacity 
is a major constraint.  
Provider payments: Providers can receive funding from VSS or from the 
Provincial HCFP Boards. The VSS channel operates if the Provincial HCFP Board 
purchases health insurance cards from VSS. Payments to these providers are based 
on VSS’s current policies and practices applied to compulsory and voluntary scheme 
members. 
If the Provincial HCFP Board chooses the direct reimbursement method to the 
providers, the Board needs to make quarterly advances to providers according to the 
rules stipulated by Circular 14 on HCFP implementation guidelines. Accordingly, a 
capitation-based payment of 10000 dong per member needs to be allocated for 
commune-level health services. This amount would normally be forwarded to the 
District Health Centre (DHC), which supervises the activities of Commune Health 
Stations (CHS) in their locality. In return, the DHC needs to purchase drugs and 
supplies and distribute them to CHS in their area.  
For district and provincial-level hospital in-patient and out-patient services, the 
Provincial HCFP Boards need to make a budgetary estimate for services to be 
rendered to the poor and forward 70% of this amount to each of the district and 
provincial hospitals every quarter. The advance would then be reconciled against 
actual expenses whereby the shortfall would be covered by the fund and the surplus 
adjusted (netted-off) in the following quarter’s advance. 
Central-level hospitals would not be paid in advance as some of them are 
located outside provincial borders and they also receive tertiary referrals (cross-
border patients). These facilities are required to provide services free of charge to 
eligible members, which then would be submitted to each of the Provincial HCFP 
Boards where these members reside for reimbursement. 
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Providers may also receive funding for patients who have been issued with 
exemption letters by the local authorities for persons who have not been pre-
qualified as eligible beneficiaries. In these cases, the provider needs to submit total 
expenses based on the hospital fee schedule for approval by the Provincial HCFP 
Board. As a board member provincial VSS offices may qualify whether the expenses 
are benefit-payable as defined in the benefit package. Payment to the provider 
would be subject to approval and availability of funds. 
Regulations require all health care benefits covered by the HCFP to be in line 
with the VSS benefit package (See Table 33). However, items such as disposable 
medical supplies and high-technology diagnostic and curative services are subject to 
different co-payment regulations, which eligible HCFP members may have to incur 
despite regulatory requirement that no fees would be collected from these members. 
If discretionary fee collection policies are applied to eligible members, these persons 
may still contact Provincial HCFP Boards and seek reimbursement. 
6.  Social Security Programmes 
From a regulatory point of view, social insurance is a legal benefit to protect 
employees. It uses contributions of employers, employees and financial support of 
the government in order to provide material benefits to the insured persons and 
their families in case of reduction or loss of income caused by sickness, employment 
injury, occupational disease, maternity, unemployment, as well as retirement (old 
age pension) and survivor benefits.  
Before 2003, all these five social insurance contingencies were administered by 
VSI (Viet Nam Social Insurance Agency) and health insurance was administered by 
VHI (Viet Nam Health Insurance Agency), which used to be under the 
administration of MoH. Since January 2003, the two agencies have been merged and 
health insurance has been added as the sixth contingent for social insurance 
programme of the country. The newly merged organization now called VSS (Viet 
Nam Social Security Agency) is directly under the Prime Minister. 
There are two forms of social insurance schemes: compulsory and voluntary 
operating in Viet Nam. The coverage of the compulsory insurance includes all 
workers who have been working for three or more months at the publicly or 
privately-owned enterprises, which employ ten or more workers and at public 
service organizations and agencies stipulated by state for performing administrative 
functions.  
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Table 38. Payroll contributions for Social Insurance 
Percentage of Salary and Allowances Employer Employee Total 
Sickness 
Maternity 
Occupational Diseases and Labour 
Accidents 
Not Applicable 
Old Age and Survivor Benefits and 
Death Allowance 
15% 
5% 
Health Insurance 2% 1%   
Total 17% 6% 23% 
The voluntary system applies to workers who are normally engaged in tasks 
which have a duration of less than three months, in seasonal or occasional jobs in the 
informal sector, in enterprises that employ less than ten workers, self-employed, 
small business and handicraft workers. Because of administrative complications, 
only health insurance contingency of the social security programme is operating on 
a voluntary basis at the moment. As noted before, this scheme is predominantly 
made up of students who do not need the other social insurance contingencies.  
The contribution rate of social insurance premiums is 23% of the total salary 
fund where the employer pays 17% and the employee pays 6% of his/her salary to 
the compulsory social and health insurance schemes (See Table 38). The five social 
insurance contingencies collect 20% of payroll of which 15% is paid by the employer 
and 5% by the employee. The health insurance contingency is 3% and shared as 2% 
employer and 1% employee. Employees only contribute for pension and death 
allowance (5%) and health (1%).  
Sickness benefits: Sickness benefit is a cash-benefit paid when an employee is 
suffering from an illness or disease, which prevents him/her from continuing to 
work. The number of days a sickness benefit is payable are proportional to the 
number of years of contributions. For a contributory period of 15 years or under, the 
sickness benefit is 30 days in a year, from 15 to 30 years of contributory period, the 
benefit is 40 days and for 30 years or more, it is 50 days in a year. These benefit-paid 
days are 10 days higher for each contributory period for those working in heavy or 
hazardous occupations or jobs.  
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The amount of sickness benefit is 75% of the salary, which is used as the basis 
to set the payment of social insurance premiums. An employee who suffers from a 
disease, which requires long treatment under funded programmes of the MoH (such 
as tuberculosis, mental illness, epilepsy, cancer, leprosy etc) is entitled to a cash 
sickness benefit for a maximum of 180 days in a year, irrespective of the time for 
which he/she has paid social insurance premiums. A person is also entitled to 
sickness benefit if he or she has to take leave from work to look after a sick child. 
Maternity benefits: Maternity benefit is designed to ensure that working 
women can support themselves and their baby before and after birth, and to protect 
the health of the mother and the child. The maternity benefit is a cash benefit 
including days of absence both before and after the delivery of the child and is set at 
100% of the monthly salary. 
Employment injury and occupational disease benefits: Employment injury 
and occupational disease benefits are paid to workers suffering an employment 
injury or occupational disease and are designed to compensate the worker for loss of 
earnings and working capacity. The employer is liable to pay all medical expenses as 
the health insurance benefit package excludes occupational diseases as well as 
paying the salary for the victim during the period of his/her hospitalization and 
treatment.  
The employment injury benefit paid by social insurance depends on the degree 
of working disability and contains two components, a one-time benefit for injuries 
that caused working disability of 5% to 30% and a one-time benefit plus a monthly 
allowance for working disability of 31% or higher. The allowance is calculated as a 
percentage of minimum salary (40% to 1.6 times) and is proportional to the degree of 
disability. 
Survivors' benefit: The survivors' benefit or death allowance is designed to 
provide support to the dependents of the worker. The funeral benefit is designed to 
cover reasonable burial expenses for the insured person and is equivalent to eight 
times the minimum wage. The amount of monthly survivors’ benefit for each 
relative (up to four beneficiaries) is equal to 40% of the monthly minimum wage. 
The benefit is raised to 70% of minimum wage for survivors who have no other 
income or direct support from another relative. If the survivors have stable income 
and are not young age dependents in school, then they are entitled to a lump sum 
death allowance instead of a monthly survivors' benefit. The lump sum amount is 
based on number of years of contributions and capped at 12 times the average 
monthly wage of contributor. 
Old-age pension benefits: Old-age pension is designed to assist workers to 
maintain a reasonable standard of living when they are no longer able to work due 
to old age. The retirement age is 60 for men and 55 for women and having paid 
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social insurance contributions for 20 years or more. There are many special rules for 
individual circumstances such as disability or working in hazardous conditions 
when these broad measures are applied. 
The amount of monthly pension is based on the age of the employee, the 
number of years covered by social insurance premiums and the average of the 
monthly salaries, which have been used as the basis for computing the level of 
his/her social insurance premiums. The lowest pension is at least equal to the 
minimum wage and the maximum is equal to 75% of the average of the monthly 
salaries (i.e. these are lower and upper replacement rates). The pensioners are also 
entitled to health insurance benefits paid by the social insurance fund. 
Operational linkages (Affiliation of social insurance with health insurance 
and risk pooling): The main advantage of social insurance administration is the 
unified management of all social insurance schemes under the VSS umbrella. This 
allows better compliance monitoring as well as better social insurance fund 
management. Each social insurance contingency is risk-pooled separately but the 
investment decisions for the protection of social insurance fund are done in a unified 
fashion. The merger has also eliminated inter-agency transfers between VHI and VSI 
and simplified administration. At the moment there are intra-fund transfers between 
social insurance and health insurance for beneficiaries whose health insurance 
contributions are funded out of social insurance fund such as pensioners and 
workers who are temporarily away from work for sickness, employment injury or 
maternity.  
The merger has also strengthened pooling of 64 provincial-level social 
insurance funds under a single centrally monitored fund. There has been no instance 
for a need to cross-subsidize between social insurance contingencies so far. Within 
compulsory and voluntary health insurance schemes however, the latter scheme 
often experienced a deficit among non-school health insurance members, 
undermining not only the viability of the fund but the continuity of the scheme's 
offering to the general public. Cross subsidization between compulsory health and 
voluntary health insurance is allowed as all pilot voluntary health insurance 
schemes have been unified under a regulatory framework applicable across the 
country.  
VSS also administers health insurance benefits for the poor whose cards are 
purchased by provincial HCFP Boards. The premium income from cards, 
(purchased at 50000 dong per member), is pooled separately by the VSS as the 
regulation issued by the Prime Minister (Decision 139) does not allow reserve carry-
overs for this scheme. Therefore, the surplus funds from health expenses of HCFP 
members need to be remitted back to the provincial boards by the VSS and if 
expenditure exceeds premium income, each provincial deficit has to be funded by 
 350 Social Health Insurance 
the provincial HCFP Boards. The compulsory and voluntary health insurance 
premiums therefore do not cross-subsidize HCFP members. 
7.  For-profit Commercial Health Insurance 
Private insurance is available from some commercial insurance companies. 
Individual accounts and premiums which are risk-rated, are calculated based on 
age, health status, type of job, number of years working at the organization and 
other individual characteristics. Each individual has also to pay an administrative 
fee to the commercial insurance company and there is no government protection for 
private insurance. 
There is some evidence that around five million students are insured by Bao 
Viet, a government-owned, for-profit general insurance company under MoF. 
However little is known about the nature of benefits (health, life, general insurance 
or motor vehicle accident insurance etc). Also some foreign-owned general 
insurance companies and finance houses offer health insurance to high-income 
earning persons. 
The national health accounts data of 2000 indicate that despite low population 
coverage, private health insurance has accounted for about 11% of total provider 
revenue, rivaling social health insurance, which accounts for 10% (see Figure 25). 
Figure 25. Public Provider Revenue by Source 
Public Hospital and Clinic Revenue by Source-2000
Provincial 
Government
39%Social Insurance
10%
Private Insurance
11%
Households
24%
Other
3%
Central Government
13%
Source: WHO/MOH National Health Accounts Study-2003
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Table 39: Private Health Insurance Expenditure in Viet Nam 
Private Insurance-Funded Health Expenditure-2000 
Total Private Insurance-Funded Health Expenditure Million Dong 695872 
% of Provider Revenue from Private Insurance Agencies 11% 
% of Total Health Expenditure funded By Private Health Insurance 3.0% 
% of Recurrent* Health Expenditure from Private Insurance 3.4% 
* Excluding Capital/Infrastructure Spending  
Private insurance includes treatment expenses of persons involved in motor 
vehicle accidents, which is excluded from the benefit package of all VSS-
administered schemes. Private health insurance accounts for about 3% of total and 
3.4% of recurrent health spending (See Table 39). 
8.  Critical analysis of Health Care Financing in Viet Nam 
Insurance coverage 
In order to understand the role of social insurance in health financing in Viet Nam, 
we first take a close look at the big picture: the segments of the population, which 
have financial access to health services under various health insurance schemes or 
exemption mechanisms and those that do not. As at the end of 2003, there were 
estimated to be about 26.2 million people out of 81.2 million having some formal 
type of social health insurance (see Figure 26) representing 32% of the population. 
This leaves 55 million uninsured persons with limited (via user-fee exemption 
mechanisms) or no financial access to health services.  
The broad population structure is made up of 27.3 million young age and 6.3 
million old age and disabled dependents looked after by a workforce of 47.5 million 
people. Among the young age dependents some 9.3 million under the age of six 
have been exempted from paying hospital fees or user charges at publicly-owned 
health facilities. Due to failure of exemption mechanisms in general, this group (12% 
of the total population) is currently at the centre of policy debate. The remaining 18 
million young age dependents are students of which 4.4 million (25% of target) are 
insured by the voluntary scheme administered by VSS. The coverage rate of 
students is higher in urban areas than rural. 
Out of 6.3 million old age and disabled dependents, 2.7 million are insured 
under compulsory health insurance scheme administered by VSS made up of 1.6 
million pensioners and 1.1 million under meritorious category. This represents 
altogether some 44% of this population segment. 
Out of the total 47.5 million workforce only about 39.2 million are estimated to 
be economically active or employed. Some 8.2 million people, including adolescents 
who are not attending school, are economically inactive, unemployed or 
underemployed. 
 352 Social Health Insurance 
Figure 26. Insured and Uninsured Population Segments  
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 Among the 39.2 million active employed persons, some 12.3 million people 
belong to the formal sector out of which 3.58 million in the public and 780 thousand 
in the private sectors have compulsory health insurance. These two contributory 
classes represent the highest percentage among compulsorily insured. The coverage 
rates in the public and private sectors are 90% (considerably high) and 9% (very low) 
respectively. The overall insurance coverage among formal sector employed is 36%. 
The informal sector, comprising 27 million employed in the household-run 
economic activities predominantly in the agricultural/farming sectors, represents 
the largest segment of the population that is uninsured. As at 2003, only 88 thousand 
non-students were estimated as insured by voluntary insurance schemes 
administered by the VSS. This however is a result of a major fall in membership 
from as high as 676 thousand people in 1995 during the height of voluntary 
insurance expansion initiatives. Policy makers have tackled this issue and a new 
voluntary health insurance regulation was passed in the second half of 2003 in order 
to win back the numbers that were lost over the years. The means of implementing 
this regulation and its perceived success rate in coverage and benefits occupies 
significant debate time in national forums. 
The Health Care Fund for the Poor (HCFP) was introduced in late 2002 to 
provide health insurance to the poor and vulnerable. Before this fund was 
established, some 1.6 million poor were issued free health insurance cards funded 
by the government and administered by the VSS. The target number of people for 
the HCFP scheme was established as 14.6 million for 2003.  
The combined compulsory and voluntary insurance scheme coverage was 11.6 
million by the end of 2003 leaving 69.6 million people broadly defined as uninsured. 
When the exempted categories (children under 6), formal-sector employed who 
would normally be covered under the compulsory scheme or else have sufficient 
income, and the uninsured students who would normally be insured under the 
voluntary scheme are excluded, a narrow target of 38.7 million can be established for 
eligible people who can benefit from the HCFP. As at the end of 2003, four million 
persons had received health insurance cards from the VSS, which was purchased out 
of HCFP. The remaining 10.6 million people, generally speaking, were eligible for 
direct reimbursement from the management boards that administer this fund. 
Reportedly some 3.6 million insurance claims were lodged for the scheme 
administrators’ consideration and reimbursement during 2003. This preliminary 
figure indicates that if all of the target population had in fact been insured, some 
34% of the insurance method recipients would have benefited from this fund while 
the remainder may not have required health care services during 2003. 
Health-seeking behaviour of insured persons 
Service utilization rates of compulsorily insured persons are considerably higher 
compared to other social insurance scheme members (See Figures 26 and 27). 
Hospital admission rates of this group have levelled around 17% for more than half 
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a decade. This figure is comparable to health-seeking behaviour of the highest 
income quintile in Viet Nam (and many of the developed world) regardless of their 
insurance status.  
Figure 26. Hospitalization Ratios of Insured Persons 
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Figure 27. Medical Rate of Use of Insured Persons 
Medical Contact Rates
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The low rate of use among poor scheme members directly replicates health-
seeking behaviour of the lowest two income-quintiles in Viet Nam regardless of 
insurance status. A number of factors are at play: indirect costs (transport, meals, 
cost of accompanying relatives) and opportunity costs (loss of time away from work 
or income generation activity) have been major deterrents for poor people’s health-
seeking behaviour. Secondly, the incapacity to make under-the-table payments or 
high official fees for services, part covered or excluded by the health insurance 
benefit package, have reportedly resulted with negative attitudes among health care 
workers for delivering care to the poor. Members are often not well-informed about 
the benefits they are eligible for or too old to travel to the providers which are better 
equipped or funded. The administrative procedures for insured members while 
seeking care are often cumbersome. This rather bleak picture may change after the 
introduction of the HCFP, which is not reflected in these trend patterns. 
Health spending 
Share of public funding (tax and social insurance and excluding external 
sources) for health care has declined from 30% to 25% between 1998-2000 (See Table 
40) while both total and per capita spending in international dollars have risen for 
both public and private.  
Table 40. Public and Private Health Expenditure in Viet Nam 
  1998 1999 2000 
Total Health Expenditure-Mill. VND  
Public Funded  5344675  5741581  5921603  
Private Funded 12504563  13768448  17367751  
Total 17849238  19510029  23289353  
In USD-Billions 1.28  1.39  1.63  
Per capita Health Expenditure    
in VND  236551  254711   299984  
in USD 16.92  18.19  21.01  
of which -Public 5.07  5.35  5.34  
-Private 11.85  12.84  15.67  
Share in %    
Public Funded  30% 29% 25% 
Private Funded 70% 71% 75% 
Source: WHO/MOH National Health Accounts Study-2003  
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Figure 28. National Income Spent on Health 
Total Health Expenditure/GDP
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The national income spent on health rose above 5% in 2000 (See Figure 28) and 
is estimated to have levelled between 5-6% of GDP during 2001-2004 after factoring 
in the impact of unofficial payments, which are excluded from 1998-2000 national 
health accounts study. While this level is moderately high within the Region, the 
total spending of $1.6 billion or per capita of $21 in international dollars is quite low 
due to the low-income base of the country. 
More than 80% of total private funding for health care is sourced from 
household out-of-pocket payments (See Table 41). This trend has been consistent 
throughout years where households account around or more than 60% of total 
health spending in Viet Nam. 
Table 41. Household and Social Insurance-Funded Health Expenditure 
 1998 1999 2000 
Household-Funded    
Total-Mill. VND  10778739  11350576  14611106  
 % of Total Private  86% 82% 84% 
 % of Total Health Exp're  60% 58% 63% 
Social Health Insurance Funded    
 Total-Mill. VND   672319   603532   722138  
 % of Total Public  12.58% 10.51% 12.19% 
 % of Total Health Exp're  3.77% 3.09% 3.10% 
Source: WHO/MoH National Health Accounts Study-2003  
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Government budgets allocated for health mainly through supply-side 
subsidies account for 22% of total health spending. (See Figure 29). Other private 
sources including external aid at 9% of total health spending is more than total social 
and private insurance funding for health care combined (See Table 42). 
Figure 29. Components of Total Health Expenditure 
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Table 42. Total Health Expenditure in 1998-200 and % share by primary sources 
Total health  
Expenditure 
Mill. VND 
1998 % 1999 % 2000 % 
Government Budget  4,672,356 26.18%  5,138,049 26.34%  5,199,465 22.33%
Social Insurance   672,319 3.77%  603,532 3.09% 722,138 3.10%
Private-Households   10,778,739 60.39%  11,350,576 58.18%  14,611,106 62.74%
Private Insurance  413,963 2.32%  484,645 2.48%  695,872 2.99%
Other Private,  
External Aid   1,311,861 7.35% 1,933,227 9.91%  2,060,773 8.85%
 Total   17,849,238 100.00% 19,510,029 100.00% 23,289,353 100.00%
Source: WHO/MoH National Health Accounts Study-2003  
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Role of social insurance in total health spending 
The social insurance funded health expenditure measured before the introduction of 
HCFP in 2002 accounted for about 12% of total public funded and 3% of total health 
spending in the country (See Tables 41 and 42 respectively). Despite 16% population 
coverage throughout this period, the role of social health insurance in total health 
spending is still fairly small. The government as an employer of civil servants and 
SOE employees and payer of social insurance contributions of most pensioners and 
meritorious persons (via transfer payments), indirectly contributes for the bulk of 
social health insurance funding. 
The VSS-administered social health insurance revenue and expenditure in 
nominal terms have constantly risen during the past decade (See Figure 30), as more 
members are covered and formal sector salaries grew both in real and nominal 
terms. The national minimum wage rise from 210000 VND per month to 290000 
VND has resulted from a considerable increase in compulsory scheme revenue 
especially after the second half of 2002. 
Figure 30. Social Health Insurance Revenue, Expenditure and Reserves 
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Figure 31. Average Health Insurance Contribution per member 
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The average contribution per member in international dollars has also 
increased over the years (see Figure 31). The compulsory scheme contributions per 
person have levelled above $10.50 and are seven times higher compared to 
voluntary or poor scheme contributions. The average contribution per member has 
levelled around $6 during the past few years. 
Figure 32. Health insurance reserves and servicing ratios 
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During the past decade, national health insurance expenditure has consistently 
been lesser than annual premium income with a high of 89% in 1997 and averaging 
75-80% during the past few years (see Figure 32). This has made room for a sizeable 
reserve build-up equivalent to 21 months of average insurance benefit outlays as at 
the end of 2002. 
During the 1996-1998 period, 20-mainly urban and large-provinces overspent 
their health insurance revenue. The revised health insurance decree (58/1998) has 
introduced firm measures to ration expenditure. Co-payments, national reserve 
pooling and capped-fee for service payment method, were introduced and more 
stringent inspections on providers began to be conducted. While these targeted 
measures were successful in rationing insurance expenditure and building up 
reserves, these policy changes have resulted with general dissatisfaction among both 
health care providers and members. 
Current policy measures are aiming to increase benefit payouts while 
increasing population coverage. While the poor scheme is no longer risk-pooled 
together with compulsory and voluntary scheme, the central government funding 
has brought significant equity although it is yet early to make firm conclusions on 
the actual impact of HCFP on service access.  
The current low level of voluntary premiums and separate risk-pooling before 
the merger of health and other social insurance schemes have resulted in lesser 
population coverage among non-students. The new voluntary scheme with higher 
level of contributions and risk pooling with compulsory scheme together with the 
fact that the target is exclusive of the lowest income quintile (after the introduction 
of HCFP), may render more equitable contributions and service access among 
members. 
9.  Conclusions 
Viet Nam is continually putting more equitable and pro-poor health financing 
policies in place. The achievements to date can be summarized as follows: 
¦ The exemptions policy is gradually being replaced with premium-backed 
social health insurance. 
¦ The introduction of HCFP has created a safety net for the lowest income 
quintile. This initiative is expected to increase total health insurance 
coverage to more than 30% of the population by 2004-2005. 
¦ There are positive indications that the government’s funding for health 
care through increased demand-side subsidies such as HCFP initiative 
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will account for a higher percentage of total health expenditure coming 
from public sources instead of private out-of-pocket payments. 
¦ Voluntary insurance schemes are unified and gradually being introduced 
to the largest segment of the uninsured population (rural/informal 
sector). 
¦ Policy considerations are being debated for including dependents starting 
with the young-aged. 
¦ The benefit packages of different institutional insurance schemes have 
been harmonized, and the breadth of health insurance benefits has 
improved. 
While sufficient attempts have been made to increase population coverage, the 
amount of complexity in the administration of health insurance is largely ignored. It 
is also likely that greater equity in access to and the provision of benefits would be 
gained by simplification. Insured members need to value the benefits they get from 
health insurance. “Quality of health care” is one dimension and “quality of health 
insurance services” is another. “Quality of care” may improve once targeted 
government funding reaches the providers and VSS becomes a dominant source of 
finance for providers. Providers however need to be adequately rewarded in a 
timely manner.  
The current policy climate in Viet Nam is to continue running three 
institutional insurance mechanisms for those covered by the compulsory, voluntary 
and scheme for the poor. The government may scale down membership of the poor 
scheme (reduce HCFP target population from 14.6 million) as poverty is gradually 
reduced in the country. Currently, there is currently limited policy support to make 
health insurance compulsory for all people. Although 2010 may be a difficult target 
to reach universal coverage as originally planned by the ninth Communist Party 
Congress, significant steps are continually being made which warrant 
acknowledgement. 
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